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Abstract
The thesis looks  at a previously unstudied topic:  non-partisan humanitarian relief  by 
international agencies during the Spanish Civil War (1936-39). It defines these agencies 
as those offering aid independently of governments and to both sides in the conflict. 
Thus the thesis covers: the British and American Quakers; the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC); the Save the Children Fund, Britain (SCF) and the Save the 
Children  International  Union,  Switzerland  (SCIU);  together  with  Service  Civil 
International,  Switzerland  (SCI)  and.  later  in  the  conflict,  one  ad-hoc co-ordinating 
agency,  the International Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees in Spain 
(IC).
This study constitutes the first fully documented history of the humanitarian work of 
these agencies in the conflict. It covers the conduct of the agencies; their interactions, 
diversities and similarities;  the problems, successes and failures in their  work at  the 
start, during and at the end of the Spanish Civil War; and the way they interacted with 
the political authorities on both sides of the conflict. It offers an analysis of cases and 
situations  not  addressed  before,  while  also  offering  its  own  reassessment  of  other 
controversial topics: for example, Franco’s attitude towards foreign humanitarian aid; 
the work of the American Quakers and the SCIU in Francoist Spain; and the question of 
the “safe zone” in the North as an alternative to the evacuation of refugee children.
The contribution of this thesis lies in its coverage of a number of different agencies and 
their interaction.
It discusses the different approaches of British and American Quakers, shedding light 
on the respective histories of these two branches of Quakerism, and on the workings of 
humanitarian relief in the two zones of wartime Spain (Republican and Francoist). It 
also describes personalities such as Mme Frederique Small of the SCIU and Rodolfo 
Olgiati of SCI, so important for the relief effort in Spain, whose activities have been 
virtually  omitted  by other  historical  works.  As an initiatory  study,  it  also offers  an 
archival “map” of primary material that can assist future researchers.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Humanitarian intervention in conflict
Today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there are independent humanitarian 
relief  agencies  at  work at  almost  every scene of  war  or  natural  devastation.  Yet,  a 
hundred  years  ago,  barely  half  a  dozen  humanitarian  relief  agencies  existed  as 
permanent institutions, and a hundred years before that, none existed at all. Indeed, the 
awakening of a trans-cultural social conscience is a relatively recent phenomenon, as 
the  first  modern  humanitarian  intervention  in  war  did  not  occur  until  the  late  19th 
century, during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871.
Humanitarian intervention in modern war did, however, dramatically change the way in 
which conflict was perceived by the population. Witnesses and testimonies of war have 
always existed, of course, but before humanitarian intervention — and the technological 
developments of the early twentieth century — these voices could not be heard. 
Before the advent of humanitarian intervention and the development of the mass media, 
there was virtually no information concerning the plight of civilians in war. Along the 
roads to and from Jena or Austerlitz, how many farms were burned, homes ransacked, 
food stores  emptied,  animals  driven  off,  young  women  taken as  camp followers  or 
raped,  children murdered or kidnapped and their  parents killed while  trying to save 
them or  simply for  protesting  against  the  destruction  and pillage?  Indeed,  the most 
powerful description of this underside of the military history of the Napoleonic wars is 
not to be found in the dispatches, personal memoirs or newspapers, but among Goya’s 
eighty-two etchings, Los Desastres de la Guerra, just as the most powerful description 
of the horrors  of  the religious  wars  of  the 17th century in France is  to  be found in 
Jacques Callot’s two sets of engravings, Les Misères de la Guerre. 
With  humanitarian  intervention  in  conflicts,  voluntary  workers,  commissioners  and 
delegates were present, and their testimonies could be captured on film, in photographs 
and newspapers. The battles and horrors of war could now be photographed and filmed. 
Thus,  a  much  more  complex  and  accurate  picture  of  the  reality  of  war  could  be 
transmitted.
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If  humanitarian  relief  can  be  defined  as  assistance  given  to  people  in  distress  by 
individuals,  organisations  and governments  to  relieve  suffering,  it  was  probably the 
Christian Church, through the myriad of monasteries that spread throughout the Roman 
Empire  after  Emperor  Constantine  had  embraced  the  Christian  faith,  the  first 
organisation  to  give  humanitarian  aid,  through  the  help  given  by  monks  to  people 
suffering in the many conflicts, wars, famines and plagues of the time.
Well into the middle ages, in 1218, St. Peter Nolasco founded the “Order of the Virgin 
Mary of Mercy and the Redemption of Captives” in Barcelona, Spain. The aim of the 
order was the redeeming of Christian prisoners who had been taken hostage by the 
Muslims  as  a  result  of  the  numerous  incursions,  violent  encounters  and  the  many 
military clashes of the time, and who may have abandoned their Christian faith whilst in 
captivity.
Formed as a military order, its wide range of activity was focused mainly on the Iberian 
territories still under Muslim control and across the Mediterranean basin in the North 
African territories where most of the captured prisoners were taken. Over the years the 
order became a clerical order.
These humanitarian activities were an example of Christian humanitarianism following 
the parable of the Good Samaritan and the “universality” of the “neighbour” concept as 
“anyone in need whom you can help”.1 This evolved with the Renaissance revival of the 
classical world and the importance of “man”, with the individual human being as the 
subject of rights, and blossomed with the Enlightenment. Secular humanitarianism arose 
and combined with Christian inspired actions: their most significant achievement was 
the movement that made possible the abolition of the slave trade in the second part of 
the  XIX  century.  Rationalist  thinkers  from  the  XVII  century  onwards  condemned 
slavery  as  contrary  to  the  rights  of  man,  while  the  Quakers  and  other  Evangelical 
Churches condemned it as anti-Christian.
1 Humanitarianism also existed in Islam. The Qur’an mentions, together with the obligatory charity the 
‘zakat’, the ‘sadaqah’, a voluntary charity, based on help to the needy, concerning which it was advised, 
similarly to the Christian Gospel teaching, that “when you give ‘sadaqah’ with your right hand, your left 
hand should not know about it”. Abuarqub and Phillips (2009).
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1.2 The development of independent humanitarian relief agencies
As stated in the title  of my thesis,  this  work focuses on the agencies that  fulfil  the 
criterion of being independent and nonpartisan. By independent I mean that they were 
not  directly  promoted  by  or  linked  with  any  state,  political  party  or  inter-state 
organisation; and they were nonpartisan because their intervention in the Spanish Civil 
War was moved by a  clear  aim to relieve  the  need  of  the civil  population  of  both 
conflicting  parties,  Republican  and  Nationalists,  and  they  never  refused  to  provide 
relief, if so requested, to either of them. The personal stances of some agencies’ field 
workers are disregarded here,  in so far  as they did not represent a partisan position 
adopted by the agency as a humanitarian body.
Accordingly, as shall be argued in the following chapters, the agencies subject of my 
research were: The Religious Society of Friends (the Quakers) both British (FSC) and 
American  (AFSC);  the  Red  Cross  (ICRC)  in  Geneva  (Switzerland);  The  Save  the 
Children Fund (SCF) in Britain; and the Save the Children Union (SCIU) and Service 
Civil International (SCI), both also in Geneva (Switzerland). Later in the conflict, at the 
end of  1937,  the International  Commission  for  the Assistance  of  Child  Refugees  in 
Spain (IC) is also the subject of my consideration.
As an interstate organisation born from the ashes of the World War I, the policies of the 
League of Nations and their  humanitarian organisations shall  also be analysed when 
presenting the overview of relief and refugee problems in the context of the Spanish 
Civil War 1936 – 1939.
The  Religious  Society  of  Friends  (the  Quakers),  founded  in  1652  in  England  as  a 
religious movement headed by George Fox, based their doctrine on “The Inner Light of 
Christ”, because a basic part of the message was that “Christ had come to teach his 
people himself. To listen to the direct and individually received voice of God, a priest, 
church or book is no longer necessary. By waiting on the Lord they will come to know 
the will of God though direct communication”.2 
As  the  Quakers  expanded  internationally,  and  especially  in  Britain  and  the  United 
States, the organisation split in 1827, with the separation of the American Society of 
Friends from the original British “orthodox” organisation.
2 Fox (1997), p. 27.
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The  Quakers’  peace-oriented  ideas  motivated  them to  develop  actions  against  war, 
military  conscription  and  the  building  of  military  forces,  and  drove  them  towards 
activities that addressed the alleviation of the situations provoked by wars and natural 
disasters. With the introduction of conscription during the First World War, the Friends 
were pioneers  in  their  support  for  conscientious  objection.  They also  helped  in  the 
protection of German and Austrian nationals in England who were employed or simply 
stranded when the war started. However, they also contributed to the war effort through 
medical work in France and the provision of ambulance services behind the lines and on 
the front as non-combatants.
The first major intervention, by the earliest relief organisation, the Quakers, took place 
during the Siege of Boston in  the American Revolution  of 1774. It  is  therefore not 
surprising that the next major humanitarian organisation,  the Red Cross, emerged in 
continental  Europe  in  the  mid-nineteenth  century,  during  a  period  of  great  power 
rivalry, which caused numerous wars and the forced movement of civilian populations, 
leading inexorably to untold suffering and death. Only after the Battle of Solferino on 
24 June, 1859, where French and Sardinian armies confronted Austrian forces on Italian 
soil, did this situation change. Henri Dunant, a Swiss non-combatant businessman and 
committed Calvinist, present by chance at the battle, was shocked by the carnage, lack 
of care for the wounded and the inhuman treatment of prisoners on both sides. Dunant 
started a process that led to the establishment of a “Committee of Five” in February 
1863. This in turn resulted in the 1st Geneva Conference being held in the Swiss city 
from 16 to 29 October 1863, where the Red Cross movement was founded.
The concept of some kind of ‘ethical code’ to govern the waging of war, is —like the 
notion of humanitarian relief itself— a ‘modern’ concept, and it first emerged from the 
Red Cross in Geneva, in neutral Switzerland, a country caught between the two great 
powers in conflict at the time, France and Prussia. The first Geneva Convention of 1864 
was the first document of its kind in history, an attempt to ameliorate, in some measure, 
the barbarities of war, and is still, today, the most important reference code for judging 
war crimes and other abuses associated with army actions during war. Sadly, however, 
the  waging  of  war  became  increasingly  bloody and wasteful  of  lives,  as  ‘modern’, 
technological developments in military hardware increased. It was, indeed, during the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 that the Red Cross and the Quakers were forced to re-
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organise their relief efforts, in an attempt to respond to the massive scale of war, and the 
needs of the civilian populations affected so profoundly by this humanitarian disaster.
Less than fifty years later, the First World War of 1914-1918 revealed the true horrors 
of modern warfare, with millions of dead and wounded. Both the Quakers and the Red 
Cross responded as best they could to this unprecedented slaughter which, again, led to 
a process of re-thinking and re-organisation of their forces, and, for the Quakers, a more 
active role on the battlefield. The Red Cross, for its part, became more involved in the 
welfare of prisoners of war, not surprising given the enormous numbers of prisoners of 
war produced by the ‘Great War’.3
The devastation caused by the war, and the revolutions and civil wars which followed it, 
led to the creation of two new relief organisations at the end of the war, Service Civil 
International in Switzerland by the Swiss pacifist Pierre Ceresole and Save the Children 
in  Britain  by  the  spiritual  charity  worker  Eglantyne  Jebb.4 Though  these  two5 
organisations responded in very specific ways to the humanitarian crisis produced by 
war,  it  is  clear  that  both were profoundly affected  by the carnage of WWI, and its 
horrendous impact on civilian populations.6 Service Civil International introduced a new 
concept  into relief  work:  the idea of organizing for peace,  as an alternative  to war. 
Although all the relief organisations studied in this work have a strong pacifist element 
and  have  given  relief  to  civilian  populations  in  peacetime,7 SCI  was  the  first 
organisation to specifically mobilise volunteers for peacetime relief, such as during the 
period  of  post-war  reconstruction  and  disaster  relief  in  the  1920s,  and  their 
mobilisations of volunteers in the 1930s to help those most affected by the Depression. 
Save the Children, on the other hand, was deeply moved by the plight of women and 
children after the war – particularly in Austria and Germany – and was important in 
providing relief in the Soviet Union during the terrible famine of 1921-1923. Save the 
Children International Union was also the first organisation to recognise the ‘Rights of 
3 There are no official estimates for the total number of POW’s produced by WWI, but a rough estimate 
would be around 2.5 million. firstworldwar.com
4 See Appendix 1 for the history of the agencies before the Spanish Civil War.
5 Strictly speaking, three, because Save the Children Fund in Britain promoted the Save the Children 
International Union in Geneva as an international agency.
6 Estimates for the total number of civilian deaths sustained by all countries during WWI are around 10 
million. A large proportion of these were due to the terrible famine and disease that war brought in its 
wake. The war also led to the collapse of three empires, the Austro-Hungarian, the Russian and the 
Ottoman, which led to revolutions – in Russia and Hungary – and the emergence of new national states in 
eastern Europe: firstworldwar.com 
7 This is particularly the case with the Quakers, as we shall see.
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 14
the Child’, and its declaration of these rights in 1923 was adopted by the League of 
Nations in 1924.
In  1921  the  League  of  Nations  established  a  refugee  agency  for  Russian  refugees, 
whose first High Commissioner was the Norwegian Fridtjof Nansen,8 who dominated 
the  League’s  refugee  work  until  his  death  in  1930.  The  agency’s  field  of  action 
extended to a wide range of activities as its brief was to help all kinds of refugees. More 
importantly, when Nansen created an Advisory Committee of private organisations to 
the High Commission in March 1922, only sixteen members joined, including ICRC 
and  Save  the  Children.  However,  in  1936  more  than  forty  PVO’s9 reported  to  the 
League of Nations Committee charged with the task of reorganising refugee assistance. 
Sir John Hope Simpson, in his comprehensive Refugee Survey, asserted that: “It is fair 
to  say  that  the  greater  part  of  material  assistance  has  been  provided  by  private 
organisations, some of them set up  ad hoc, but some with more general functions of 
which refugee work is only one”.10 The involvement was more or less intense depending 
on the conditions of the struggle or the situation, and when the Spanish conflict started 
on 17 July 1936, the different private bodies and organisations were present in order to 
evaluate what aid was required. 
Michael R. Marrus refers to private organisations as institutions not only shouldering 
the principal burden of refugee aid, but coordinating international efforts as well, all 
from their  headquarters  in Washington D.C.,  New York,  London, Paris,  Brussels  or 
Geneva (the Red Cross, the Quakers, Save the Children Fund and a cluster of specific 
organisations helping Russian émigrés after  the First World War), and expresses the 
opinion  that  although  the  scale  of  relief  operations  was  unprecedented,  “involving 
unheard of sums of money and extraordinary private initiatives on the diplomatic front”, 
the results were paradoxical: “Having kept so many refugees alive during the critical 
postwar period, the private organisations helped to maintain the pressure of the refugee 
crisis. In the long run, this activity helped to elicit a response from Governments and 
from the International Agencies set in place after  the first world War.”11 In Marrus’ 
8 Former explorer in Greenland and the Artic, famous for his voyage on the ship “Fram” through which 
he proved his theory concerning “Artic drift”. Working for the Diplomatic services he was very active in 
humanitarian work, especially with the repatriation of prisoners of war and provision of aid to those 
affected by the Russian famine of 1920. 
9 Private Voluntary Organisations, as the agencies were called in the terminology of the epoch.
10 Simpson (1939), p. 172.
11 Marrus (2002), pp. 82-3.
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thesis  the  paradox  lies  in  the  fact  that  a  good  action  by  the  agencies  —the  relief 
provided—  caused  a  negative  result:  the  refugees  continued  to  be  an  unresolved 
problem. Nevertheless, Marrus maintains that thanks to the actions of the agencies, in 
the long term the Governments and the international agencies (those within the League 
of  Nations  presumably,  being  the  only existing  inter-state  bodies)  responded to  the 
needs.
Though all the individuals and groups who had propelled these organisations into action 
had been influenced by a profound religious sentiment,12 each of these organisations had 
its  own,  specific  organisational  structure  and  manner  of  working  and  these  bodies 
developed and changed over time, in large part in response to the needs thrown up by 
the  increasing  scale  of  modern  warfare,  and  its  devastating  impact  on  civilian 
populations.  This  change  and  development  was  also  affected  by  the  process  of 
secularisation that,  undoubtedly,  accompanied the advance of world industrialisation. 
Moreover, the increasing involvement of relief organisations in civil conflicts from the 
First  World War would impact  on their  organisational  structures,  and showing their 
deficiencies, would force them to adapt to the new needs. This ‘organisational history’, 
would,  of  course,  condition  the  way  in  which  each  relief  body  responded  to  the 
humanitarian crisis engendered by the Spanish Civil War of 1936 –1939, the subject of 
this research.13
1.3 Secondary sources
In this section I want to present the most significant themes resulting from the survey of 
the relevant literature on the agencies and their involvement in humanitarian relief in 
conflict, together with the general or specialised scholarly material connected with that 
subject.  I  shall  also  place  it  in  the  context  of  the  Spanish  conflict,  extracting  the 
questions that I propose to formulate in the body of my thesis. 
As the humanitarian  aspect  of the Spanish Civil  War is  the facet  least  explored by 
scholars, it is important to bear in mind that the elaboration of the arguments in some 
12 The religious ideas of the founders of the agencies under study, which can be clearly seen from their 
respective biographies, permeated their humanitarian ethos. 
13 To provide additional background on the history of these organisations before the Spanish Conflict, 
from the 19th century onwards, I enclose my research work “A historical approach to the independent, 
non-partisan humanitarian agencies”, as Appendix 1.
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topics is fundamentally based on the information obtained through archival research: 
little or no secondary literature can be used as an element of critical elaboration.
1.3.1 The Quakers
To have a necessary insight  into Quaker  faith  and principles,  I  studied the work of 
George Fox (the founder of the Quakers),  The Journal of George Fox  (Philadelphia, 
PA: Nickalls Edition, 1997) and T. Canby Jones’s study George Fox’s attitude toward 
war: a documentary study (Philadelphia,  PA: American Friends’ Service Committee 
1984)  which  provides  very  useful  information  on  the  Quakers’  beliefs  and  the 
personality of the their  founder.  Peace Testimony was studied through the works of 
Horace  Gundrie  Alexandre,  The  Growth  of  the  Peace  Testimony  of  the  Society  of  
Friends  (London: London Friends Peace Committee, 1956); Peter Brock,  The Quaker  
Peace Testimony 1600-1914 (York, UK: Sessions Books Trust, 1990) and Pacifism in 
the Twentieth Century  (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1999) together with 
Margaret  E.  Hirst’s  The  Quakers  in  Peace  and  War:  An  account  of  their  Peace  
Principles and Practice (New York: George H. Doran Company, 1923). This basis for 
understanding  the  British  Quakers’  perspective  was  complemented  by  two  works 
providing the American viewpoint: Howard H. Brinton’s Sources of the Quaker Peace  
Testimony (Philadelphia, PA: American Friends Service Committee, 1941) and Rufus 
Jones’  The Quaker  Peace  position  (Richmond,  IN:  Peace  Association  of  Friends  in 
America, 1915).
The main theme resulting from such analysis,  both on the British and the American 
Society of Friends, can be summarised as “Spirituality in the service of Quaker Relief” 
which, in my opinion, poses an important question:
How did the spiritual dimension of Peace Testimony change over time as a motive force 
in the service of relief? What similarities and differences were there in relief provision 
by British and American Quakers?
To introduce  the  question  in  the  context  of  the  Spanish  Conflict  I  will  present  the 
arguments of Farah Mendlesohn in her book: Quaker Relief Work in the Spanish Civil  
War (London:  The  Edwin  Mellen  Press,  2002).  Maximising  the  relevance  of  the 
spiritual factor, Mendlesohn praises the British way of working in comparison with the 
relief provided by American Quakers, which she accuses of not being “Quaker work” 
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but rather “humanitarian war relief”. She maintains that AFSC’s relief was moved by 
“humanitarian sympathy” and not by “pacifist witness”.14
The study of this work and the analysis of Howard E. Kershner’s,15 Quaker Service in  
Modern  War (New  York:  Prentice  Hall  Inc.,  1950),  highlights  two  conflicting 
approaches to Quaker activities in Spain, representing respectively the left-wing British 
and the more pragmatic American attitude towards the Civil War. Mendlesohn’s and 
Kershner’s  works  differ  substantially  in  their  explanations  and  answers  and  in  the 
present work I examine and discuss this issue. 
In surveying the Quaker material,  the following historical works supplied me with a 
good  account  of  different  interventions  in  humanitarian  situations,  revealing  their 
patterns and the evolution of their forms of organisation: John Ormerod Greenwood’s 
Quaker  Encounters:  Friends  and Relief (Vol.  I)  (York,  UK: William Sessions  Ltd., 
1975); John Bellow’s  “The track of the war around Metz and the fund for the non-
combatant  sufferers”  (London:  Taübner  & Co.,  1871);  Alistair  Heron’s  Quakers  in  
Britain: A Century of Changes 1895-1997 (Kelso, Scotland: Curlaw Graphics, 1995) 
and Mary Hoxie Jones’ Swords into Ploughshares: An account of the American Friends  
Service Committee, 1917-1937 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937) 
The issues which arise from this analysis, and which are presented and discussed in the 
body of this Thesis, are: 
1. Collaboration  and coordination  between the  Quakers  and amongst  the 
agencies present on Spanish soil; 
2. Similarities  or  dissimilarities,  if  any,  in  relief  provision  and  working 
procedures between the FSC and the AFSC; and
3. Whether the relief provided was independent and nonpartisan.
14 Mendlesohn (2002), p. 181.
15 Vice-President and First Director of the International Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees 
in Spain, (I.C.) the organisation that financed and coordinated the relief work of the agencies from 1938 
onwards.
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1.3.2 The Red Cross (ICRC)
Regarding the Red Cross I studied the material related to the history of the organisation 
beginning with Henri Dunant’s,  Un Souvenir de Solférino  (Berne, Switzerland: Croix 
Rouge Suisse, 1862), which charts the origin of the organisation. The history of the Red 
Cross movement  is well  reflected in Pierre Boissier’s  ‘official’  version,  Histoire  du 
Comité International de La Croix Rouge. De Solférino à Tsoushima (Paris: Plon, 1963) 
which covers the period from the start of the movement to the beginning of First World 
War and André Durand’s  From Sarajevo to Hiroshima: History of the International  
Committee of the Red Cross (Geneva: Henri Dunant Institute, 1984) which covers the 
period from First World War to the end of the Second World War.
In analysing the legal aspects of ICRC’s activities, I examined Jean-Philippe Lavayer’s 
‘Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons: International Humanitarian Law and the 
Role of the ICRC’ (International Review of the Red Cross nº 304 (March-April 1995), 
162-191, and Margaret MacMillan’s Peacemakers: the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 
and its attempt to end war (London: John Murray, 2004); together with Geoffrey Best’s 
Humanity in Warfare.  The Modern History of International Law of Armed Conflicts  
(London: Methuen, 1983).
David P. Forsythe, with his book The Humanitarians: The International Committee of  
the Red Cross  (Cambridge:  CUP,  2005),  produced the  first  significant  work on the 
ICRC  from somebody  not  working  in  or  linked  with  the  Red  Cross.  He  makes  a 
comprehensive  overview of  the  organisation,  examining  the  fundamental  aspects  of 
independence,  impartiality and neutrality,  focusing also on the policy making of the 
ICRC.  He  considers  the  effect  of  it  having  an  all  Swiss  Governing  body  and  the 
historical impact of the “Swiss elites” being the source of such management and policy 
creation. His shorter work (120 pages, as opposed to the 350 pages of the earlier book) 
The  International  Committee,  of  the  Red  Cross.  A  neutral  Humanitarian  action 
(London:  Routledge,  2007),  produced in  collaboration  with Barbara  Ann J.  Rieffer-
Flanegan, is easier to read as an introduction to the history of the ICRC but lacks the 
critical considerations and arguments offered by his longer work.
Forsythe examines the effects on the development of the Red Cross movement of the 
“discreet  and cooperative” approach adopted by the ICRC when facing conflicts,  as 
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opposed to a “confrontational attitude” towards states, and focuses on the “Swissness” 
of the ICRC and its repercussion in the shaping of the Agency.
Forsythe believes that the efforts of the ICRC to humanise the Spanish Civil War were a 
precedent  for  the  application  of  International  Humanitarian  Law  (IHL)  to  internal 
conflicts.
A few questions can be extracted from the themes outlined, all of them considered in 
the body of this Thesis:
1. Was  the  “discreet  approach”  beneficial  or  negative  for  the  ICRC’s 
actions in Spain?
2. Did the ICRC’s “Swissness” shape the actions of its Delegates?
3. Is it correct to maintain that the Spanish Civil War set a humanitarian 
precedent for internal civil conflicts after World War II? 
The  collection  published  by  the  ICRC  of  the  key  writings  of  Max  Huber,  ICRC 
President from 1928 to 1946, La pensée et l’action de la Croix Rouge (Geneva: Editions 
ICRC, 1954), includes two texts which in my opinion represent the foundations of the 
ICRC’s humanitarian project: the lecture given at the École Polytechnique Fédéral de 
Zürich, entitled ‘Les tâches de Guerre du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge’16; 
and  Le Bon Samaritain (Neuchâtel,  Switzerland: Éditions de la Baconnière,  1943), a 
work he calls ‘Considerations on the Gospel and the work of the Red Cross’, in which 
he elaborates on the above mentioned parable of the Good Samaritan.
Professor Huber explores the ICRC’s resources and difficulties, outlining the problems, 
and he addresses the fundamental subject of the “adaptation to the conflict” and various 
issues concerning personnel, training and finances. He goes into the additional difficulty 
represented by the fact that most ICRC actions are not covered by clear Conventional 
agreements  or  rules,  and  refers  to  the  ICRC’s  “right  of  initiative”  as  a  way  of 
overcoming that.
In his work, Professor Huber also asserts the ICRC’s role of “neutral go-between” and 
the conditions required for the ICRC to carry out its tasks, and specifically: caring for 
16 Huber (1954), pp. 177-197.
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prisoners of war, obtaining and transmitting information, distributing relief, and aid to 
civilians.
When connecting Huber’s arguments with the works of two of the actors in the field 
during  the  Spanish  Civil  War,  the  ICRC General  Delegate  Dr  Marcel  Junod’s:  Le 
Troisieme Combattent (Paris: Payot,  1963) and the Delegate Raymond Courvoisier’s 
Ceux  qui  ne  devaient  pas  mourir (Paris:  Robert  Lafont,  1978),  new  elements  for 
discussion appear with respect to the preparation of the delegates for their tasks, the 
efficiency of their work and the way in which the tasks which Max Huber considers 
corresponded to the ICRC were fulfilled.
The questions I present, resulting from the themes outlined and connecting with the 
reality of the Spanish conflict, are:
1. Was the ICRC adequately prepared,  in  financial  and human terms,  to 
confront a civil war like the Spanish conflict? 
2. Did the lack of a ratified convention negatively affect the action of the 
ICRC in Spain? 
I  also  examined  the  work  of  Pierre  Marques,  La  Croix  Rouge  pendant  la  guerre  
d’Espagne, 1936-1939: Les Missionnaires de l’Humanitaire (Paris: l’Harmattan, 2000), 
while his Les enfants espagnols refugiés en France (Paris: 1993), explores the subject 
of Spanish children in France. These works are very extensive surveys of the activities 
of  the  ICRC during  the  Spanish  Conflict  which,  on  the  specific  matter  of  prisoner 
exchange, are well complemented by José Giral Pereira’s Año y medio de Gestiones de  
Canje (Barcelona: 1938), and Javier Rubio’s  Asilos y Canjes durante la Guerra Civil  
Española (Barcelona: Planeta, 1979).
For  the  activities  of  the  Spanish  section  of  the  Red Cross  during  the  Civil  War,  I 
consulted Josep Carles Clemente’s, La Cruz Roja en la Guerra Civil Española (Madrid, 
1962) and Enrique Municio Oliver’s unpublished Degree Thesis, Actividades de la Cruz 
Roja durante la Guerra Civil Española (Madrid, 1986) and his essay, jointly with Juan 
Carlos Pereira Castañares, ‘La Humanización de la Guerra Civil Española. La Labor de 
la Cruz Roja’ in Bulletin d’histoire contemporaine de l’Espagne (Pau, France: Maison 
des Pays Ibériques, 1987) 
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1.3.3 Save the Children Fund (SCF) and Save the Children International 
Union (SCIU)
Understandably, much less has been written on these two agencies than on the ICRC, 
given  that  both  were  founded much  more  recently,  in  1919 and 1920 respectively. 
Edward Fuller in his book:  The Right of the Child  (London: Victor Gollancz,  1951) 
presents a history of the Save the Children movement and its work in favour of the 
rights of the child focused on the work of the British SCF and without references to the 
Spain  Civil  War,  in  which  the  SCIU  was  more  heavily  engaged.  The  works  of 
Francesca  Wilson  on  the  Save  the  Children  Fund’s  founder,  Rebel  daughter  of  a 
Country  House:  The  Life  of  Eglantyne  Jebb,  Founder  of  Save  the  Children  Fund 
(London:  Allen  &  Unwin  1967),  and  on  the  author’s  wartime  and  conflict  relief 
activities,  In the Margins of Chaos: Recollection of Relief Work in and between three  
wars (London, John Murray, 1944), give a profile of the life of Eglantyne Jebb and the 
activities of the agency and its sister body, the Geneva based Save the Children Union 
(SCIU), both of which later amalgamated in the Save the Children Alliance, which is 
still in existence. No secondary literature exists on the SCIU.
For these two agencies —and, as we will see below, with SCI— the scarce secondary 
literature is insufficient for us to extract themes and relevant arguments with which to 
elaborate sets of questions in connection with the Spanish conflict.
My questions, arising from the analysis of the relevant archives, are as follows: 
1. Did SCIU cooperate in their work with other agencies and how?;
2. Was  SCIU’s  Spanish  relief  intervention  different  from  the  agency’s 
previous actions?; and
3. Did SCIU achieve their objectives?.
Such questions are considered and argued in the body of my thesis.
1.3.4 Service Civil International (SCI)
The activities  of  the  founder  of  SCI,  Pierre  Ceresole,  are  well  described  in  Daniel 
Anet’s Pierre Ceresole: La Passion de la Paix (Neuchâtel, Switzerland: Éditions de la 
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Baconnière, 1969) and Helene Monastier’s Pierre Ceresole d’apres sa correspondence 
(Neuchâtel,  Switzerland:  Éditions  de  la  Baconnière,  1960).  The  works  of Leonard 
Kenworthy, ‘Pierre Ceresole, dreamer with a shovel’, in  Twelve Citizens of the world 
(New York:  Doubleday,  1963),  and  of  John  Harvey  and  Christina  Yates  (eds.  and 
trans.), For Peace and Truth: From the note-books of Pierre Ceresole (London: Collins, 
1968),  complement  the  above works.  Finally,  A.  Danan’s  L’armée des  homes sans  
haine (Neuchâtel,  Switzerland:  Attinger  1978),  E.  Best  and B. Pike’s,  International  
Voluntary Service for Peace 1920-1946 (London: Allen and Unwin 1948), and Hélène 
Monastier’s  Paix,  Pelle et  Pioche,  histoire du Service Civil  International de 1919 a  
1954 (Lausanne, Switzerland: La Concorde, 1955), focus on the activities of SCI until 
the 1950s, with scarce references to the Spanish conflict.
As  mentioned  above,  existing  literature  about  SCI  is  not  extensive  enough to  raise 
specific points of analysis; these have been generated mainly by a process of archival 
research. The themes and arguments I deal with are related to the nature of the SCI’s 
relief and the personalities involved. 
The questions raised are as follows: 
1. Did  the  Spanish  conflict  mean  a  new  approach  to  relief  by  SCI  as 
compared with their previous history of relief?;
2. To what extent did the presence and personality of its General Secretary 
Rodolfo Olgiatti permeate the actions of SCI?; and
3. How  did  the  absence  of  Pierre  Ceresole,  focused  and  working  on  a 
project in Bihar (India), affect the way SCI acted in Spain?17
1.3.5 The International Commission (IC)
No scholarly work exists on the Commission apart from the Kershner book described 
above. I studied their minutes and reports.
The involvement of the Commission and the role it played in Spain is presented in this 
Thesis.
17 See Appendix 1.
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1.4 Archival sources
1.4.1 The agencies’ archives
The  Religious  Society  of  Friends  (Quakers)  archives  in  the  Library  of  the  London 
Friend’s House (LFH) Friends House, 173 Euston Road, London NW1 2BJ, provided 
me with information on the humanitarian activities in which the British Quakers were 
involved,  before  and during  the  Spanish  Civil  War.  I  consulted  the  minutes  of  the 
Meeting for Sufferings and of the Friends Service Council Committee on Spain, and 
correspondence and documentation concerning the extent and quality of the operation in 
Spain, both unilaterally and in collaboration with the American Quakers, the SCIU and 
the other agencies.
In  Philadelphia,  (Pennsylvania,  USA)  research  into  the  Quaker  Archives  at  the 
American  Friends Service Committee  (AFSC),  1501 Cherry Street,  Philadelphia  PA 
19102 (USA), helped me to understand the reasons for the Quakers’ presence in the 
conflict,  and  how  their  intervention  began.  It  also  helped  me  to  understand  the 
previously underestimated extent and fluidity of their relations with the Nationalist side, 
through  their  delegates  in  Burgos,  and  their  activity  in  Republican  Spain,  mainly 
through collaboration with the well established British Friends. 
Access  to  the International  Commission  of  the  Red Cross  Archives  in  Geneva (19, 
Avenue de la Paix, Geneva, Switzerland), allowed me to gain a historical perspective of 
the Red Cross and the development of the institution before the Spanish struggle. It was 
also crucial  in helping me to analyse  the International  Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) operation and its delegates in Spain. Information about the Red Cross in the 
War in the North (1936 – 1937), was the result of an investigation of ICRC archives and 
from  the  information  provided  by  the  Archivo  Histórico  del  Nacionalismo  Vasco 
(Historical Archive of Basque Nationalism) at the Sabino Arana Foundation (HABN), 
in Artea Bizcaia, Spain. 
For the Save the Children Union (SCIU), I worked on the Archives de L’État de Genève 
where their material is kept.
In the Town Hall Library of La Chaux-de-Fons (Neuchatel, Switzerland) I studied the 
main material for Service Civil International (SCI) together with documentation for the 
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International  Commission.  At  the  Geneva  University  Library  I  could  study  some 
internal bulletins for SCI corresponding to the period of the Spanish civil war.
1.4.2 Other Archives
My investigation  at  IRARGI,  (Basque  Government  Archive  in  Bergara,  Guipúzcoa, 
Spain), provided me with information and documents from the Basque Government in 
relation to the War in the North during the Spanish Civil War. Research at the Foreign 
Affairs  Ministry Archives (AMAE) in Madrid,  Spain,  allowed me to investigate  the 
activities  of  SIFNE (Franco’s  Southern  French  based  intelligence  services)  and  the 
Basque  nationalist  movement  in  the  area.  The  Archive  Ministère  des  Affaires  
Étrangères (AMAEF)  in  Paris,  France,  and  the  Centre  des  Archives  Diplomatiques 
(CHDF) in Nantes, France, provided information on the British and French positions. 
These  archives  also  supplied  information  regarding  the  contacts  between  their 
respective ambassadors, Chilton and Herbette, the Basque Government, the Nationalists 
and the ICRC, in an attempt to present initiatives to reduce the suffering caused to non-
combatants by the conflict.
I consulted the National Archives at Kew (Ruskin Avenue, Kew, London, UK), where 
British public documentation relating to the UK’s involvement in the Spanish Civil War 
is located.
The Modern Records Centre (The University of Warwick Library, Coventry, UK) holds 
the minutes of both the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief (NJCSR), and the 
Basque Children Committee (BCC), under references MSS-292/946/I-46, together with 
the personal files of Wilfred Roberts, Liberal MP, acting secretary on both committees 
(reference MCC 300). These provided useful information revealing the views of the 
participating  members  and  the  way  their  decisions  were  taken.  There  is  still  some 
material relating to the evacuation of the Basque children at the Marx Memorial Library 
(37 Clerkenwell Green, London, UK). However, the material used by Jim Fyrth in his 
book The Signal Was Spain  was returned to the Basque Government in 1984 and no 
copies were kept.
Research at the Foral Library in Bilbao, Spain, the Servicio Histórico Militar, Madrid, 
Spain,  and  the  General  Military  Archive,  Avila,  Spain,  was  very  useful  in 
complementing the necessary information about the relief activities. The research at the 
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 25
Bibliothèque  Nationale  de  France  -  François  Mitterrand,  Paris,  France,  was  also 
important for analysing the French press for the years 1936, 1937 and 1938.
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Chapter 2: Independent relief and a 
military coup that evolved into civil war: 
the arrival of the agencies (July 1936-
Autumn 1937)
SPAIN: The Secretary reported on the various requests received by the  
Service Committee to consider work in Spain…. At this meeting it was 
felt…that Friends should be equally concerned for the victims of both  
sides: that the first step should be to send a representative to Spain to 
investigate relief needs and reconciliation possibilities…
AFSC Minutes, Board of Directors December 2, 1936 (American Friends 
Service Committee Archives (AFSCA)
2.1 The scene
The military uprising started on the morning of 17 July 1936 at the Melilla garrison, 
followed by uprisings at Tetuán, Ceuta and Larache, all in Spanish Morocco. General 
Franco,  then  Military Governor  of  Tenerife  (Canary Islands)  declared  Martial  Law, 
proclaiming the motives  for the uprising.  With the  help of General  Ordaz,  Military 
Governor of Las Palmas (Grand Canary Island), that island was also taken by the rebels. 
Franco flew from Las Palmas1 to Tetuán,  with a night stop in Casablanca,  using an 
aircraft chartered by Luis Bolín.2
At that time, Seville, Cádiz, Jerez, Algeciras and Córdoba, in the South, were in the 
hands of the rebels, as were Burgos, Zaragoza, Pamplona and Valladolid in the North of 
the Peninsula.
On 18 July the Prime Minister, Casares Quiroga, resigned and José Giral3 formed a new 
Government with General Castelló, Military Governor of Badajoz, as Minister of War 
and General Pozas in the crucial post of Commander of the Guardia Civil.
1 Franco had been authorised to travel to Las Palmas from Tenerife to attend the funeral of the Military 
Governor of Las Palmas, General Balmes, “shot dead at target practice” Thomas, H. (1990), p. 212.
2 Journalist representing the Monarchist Spanish newspaper ABC in London.
3 José Giral (1879–1962), scholar and politician member of the Acción Republicana party. 
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Giral advocated arming the workers against  the uprising while Casares Quiroga and 
Martínez Barrio4 were reluctant to take this step.5 The Republican Government reversed 
its opposition to the distribution of guns when it realised that part of the Army and the 
Guardia Civil, all over Spain, were backing the rebels or were reluctant to oppose them.
The anarchist  trade union,  Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT),  the socialist 
Union General de Trabajadores (UGT),  and the anarchist  political  organisation,  the 
Federación Anarquista Ibérica (FAI) formed militias to oppose the coup. Accordingly, 
“the response to the military action was a revolutionary war”.6
In Madrid, the militias took full control on 20 July,  after the Cuartel de la Montaña 
Military  Garrison  surrendered.  In  Barcelona,  where  the  Guardia  Civil  opposed  the 
uprising,7 the city was again under the control of the Government on 19 July. In reality, 
in  Barcelona,  as  in  many other  Spanish cities,  real  power  was  not  in  the  hands  of 
Government officials but of the militias. For a few months these, under the umbrella of 
the Anti-Fascist Militias Committee, controlled Barcelona and most of Catalonia, as did 
similar Committees in many other parts of Republican Spain. This was the time when 
most of the crimes and atrocities committed by the Republican side happened.
By the end of July, the rebels controlled the Galician provinces and their costal zone up 
to Asturias, which was in Republican hands. The capital of that region, Oviedo, had 
been taken for Franco by Colonel Aranda. The rebels controlled the Castilian territories 
forming a strip of land from the Portuguese border to the Western Pyrenees,  which 
included Zaragoza and Navarra. Part of the French border was still in the hands of the 
Republic.  The rebels  also controlled the cities  of Seville,  Córdoba and Cádiz in the 
South of Spain, together with Spanish Morocco. The Canaries, with all its islands, and 
the island of Mallorca in the Balearic Islands, were also in the hands of the rebels.8
4 Diego Martínez Barrio (1883–1962), President of the Spanish Parliament which was unable to make the 
appointment of the Republican President Azaña to present a new Government after the resignation of 
Premier Santiago Casares Quiroga (1884–1950), who was powerless to face the military uprising. 
5 Thomas, H. (1990), p. 230. 
6 Durand, A. (1984), p. 372.
7 The dismissal of the Chief of the Guardia Civil in Barcelona, Colonel Santiago Becerra Abadía, 
believed not to be sufficiently “pro-Republican”, on 20 April 1936, is considered by scholars a key 
element in the failure of the rebellion in Barcelona, the Catalan capital. See: Risques and Borrachina 
(2001).
8 See the map annexed to Appendix 2 as Document K.
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This was the state the Spanish conflict presented when the uprising was less than one 
month old. In this and the following chapters I will discuss how each of the agencies 
came to terms with the Spanish situation, their respective organisations and personnel, 
their relationship with the municipal and government authorities in both the Nationalist 
and Republican zones, and their connections and interactions with the other agencies 
that are the object of the present study, and with some other agencies providing relief 
during the Spanish struggle.  I  will  also examine how the agencies  met,  resolved or 
overcame the difficulties and problems that confronted them. 
2.2 Spanish relief and the agencies: settings and operations
The presence of a significant  number  of foreign children spending their  holidays  in 
summer  colonies  in  both  zones,  the  rebel  and  the  Republican,  and  the  anguished 
requests  from  the  diplomatic  representations  in  Spain,  moved  the  “International 
Committee of the Red Cross” (ICRC) to intervene in the Spanish conflict, by contacting 
both controlling authorities, the Republican Government and Franco. This removed any 
possible doubts regarding intervention in a civil conflict that was not yet fully regulated 
by  conventions.  The  Committee,  until  then  with  its  mind  still  on  the  conflict  in 
Ethiopia,9 was forced to face the Spanish situation. This it did early in August 1936, 
converting the “Committee  on Abyssinia”  — given the Italian  refusal  to  accept  the 
ICRC presence in Ethiopia — into the “Committee on Spain”.
After the visit of an expatriate Quaker in Spain, Russell Ecroyd, and his wife Maria to 
the British Quakers London Yearly Meeting in 1931, the Friends Service Council (FSC) 
had  studied  the  possibility  of  setting  up  in  Madrid  a  Quaker  centre  similar  to  the 
existing centres in Geneva, Berlin and Paris, taking advantage of an alleged increasing 
Republican  tolerance  towards  Protestantism.  Such  a  centre  was  to  serve  as  an 
“embassy” or Mission House for Quaker ideology. When the rebellion started in mid-
July and Madrid was about to be taken by the rebels, Barcelona was selected instead, 
and  the  religious  objective  gave  way to  a  food  aid  operation  aimed  at  children,  a 
growing issue with the influx of refugees to Catalonia.
Information received from visitors to Spain such as the American Quakers, Inez Muñoz, 
and Lydia  Ellicott  Morris,  and the Catalan  Dr Pijoan,  who was already working in 
9 Italy had invaded Ethiopia on 3 October 1935. 
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Madrid  with  the  Ecroyds  on  relief  activities,  moved  the  American  Friends  Service 
Committee  (AFSC)  to  consider  the  possibility  of  an  intervention,  assuming  the 
traditional Quaker Peace Testimony10. Already in October 1936 the AFSC addressed a 
letter to the FSC showing its interest in “knowing the developments”.11 With this aim, 
they sent a prominent Quaker, Sylvester Jones, on a mission to both Republican and 
rebel Spain in December 1936.
On 28 and 29 August 1936 the Save the Children International Union (SCIU) received 
telegrams from the Consejo Superior de Protección de Menores (CSPM, Spanish High 
Council for the Protection of Minors) and the Federación de Sociedades de Amigos de 
la  Escuela (FSAE,  Federation  of  Societies  of  Friends  of  the  School12),  both  in 
Republican  Spain13.  These  telegrams  —referring  to  the  situation  of  776  children 
scattered  in  summer  colonies  in  both  Nationalist  and  Republican  territory  and 
requesting intervention— moved the SCIU in Geneva,  and subsequently the SCF in 
England, to focus on the Spanish Conflict. After the visits in late 1936 and early 1937 of 
Mme Frederique Small from the SCIU, later appointed General Delegate in Spain, SCF 
and SCIU were active in collecting funds, and in various humanitarian activities in both 
zones, on their own or in collaboration with other agencies. 
Service Civil International (SCI) had a very early presence in the conflict.14 A letter 
dated 14 September 1936 and addressed by Rodolfo Olgiati, the General Secretary of 
SCI, to the President, Pierre Ceresole, and four other important members of the Agency, 
Marcel Auvert, Jean Inebnit,  Henri Roser and Ernest Wolf, refers to the question of 
another member, Marta Shöppi from Zurich, asking whether SCI “does nothing for the 
Spanish refugees in France”?.
Olgiati’s first reaction, not seeing what role SCI could play, was that “it was not their 
business”, but then he understood “the great possibilities” in Spain for a constructive 
pacifism:
10 Shorthand description of the action taken by members of the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers) for 
peace and against participation in war. 
11 FSC Committee on Spain, minutes, 27 October 1936; letter from AFSC, 15 October 1936, FHL.
12 No relation to the Quakers.
13 SCIU Executive Committee minutes, 21 September 1936; AP. 92.16.5; letter, 3 September 1936, AEG-
SCIU. In 1936 the CSPM was an associated member of the SCIU.
14 “Le Service Civil était prête à aider les victimes de guerre, de cote quelle furent” (“The International 
Civil Service was ready to help the victims of war of both sides”). Monastier 1955. This is also referred to 
in the Bulletin de l’Association de Service International – Berne 5 March 1937, p. 29. BUG.
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“We are in agreement that whichever side ‘wins’, the sad events in Spain will have 
serious consequences for these poor people and the most appalling will be, not how to 
face the huge material losses brought about by the Civil War, but rather how to reach a 
true pacification of the spirit, and to carry out reconstruction with a spirit of 
reconciliation.”15 
As the end of the conflict is far from near, he focuses on the relief of the refugees in 
France with the construction of provisional buildings to lodge and care for them, in a 
task suitable for the work of the “sisters”16 of SCI.
Immediately afterwards, Olgiati goes into what he calls “considerations and cautions” 
where he examines the core of some important controversies, analysing key aspects of 
relief work.
He felt that maintaining neutrality required them to initiate relief from outside Spain 
before the end of the war. If not, and the war ended in a victory for the Nationalists, 
these would probably only accept money,  and not the direct intervention which SCI 
would desire. Alternatively, if the Government won, SCI would be considered by public 
opinion to be aiding the “Bolsheviks”. By beginning their action before the end of the 
conflict they would be above the political parties, and it would therefore be easier to 
continue the work afterwards inside Spain.
In theory, Olgiati’s principles should have been put into practice by the ICRC, but the 
vision of ICRC founder Henri Dunant “which would have directed the activities of the 
ICRC towards SCI ideas”, had been lost, and the ICRC was “in the hands of the military 
and not prepared for this”. Therefore, Olgiati believed, SCI had to apply Dunant’s ideals 
and direct actions in collaboration with the League of Nations, ICRC and SCIU.
Olgiati  accused  the  Swiss  Federal  Government  of  “weakness  and,  in  fact,  having 
reverence towards Fascism”. Working in Switzerland was now quite difficult, because 
SCI had been accused of providing a free labour force, thus harming the unemployed. 
Finding new fields of action such as Spain (or India, when Pierre Ceresole was working 
at the time) was thus very opportune.
15 ‘Correspondence and reports’. SCI International Archives. 30362-1, LCF Bibliothèque; henceforth SCI 
(1936a); letter from Rodolfo Olgiati, 14 September, LCF Bibliothèque; henceforth Olgiati (1936). 
16 The title used by the women members of SCI.
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“Helping the victims of a conflict was not a new activity”; the Quakers had done this for 
a long time and there was space for SCI to work in Spain, which in Olgiati’s opinion 
would be best done in collaboration with the Quakers. He considered the possibility of 
seeking  support  in  the  form  of  volunteers  from  SCI  in  Britain,  (the  International 
Volunteer  Service  for  Peace,  IVSP).  Finally,  Rodolfo  Olgiati  proposed  gathering 
information about the Spanish refugees in France and travelling there to assess their 
needs.17
In his brief analysis, Olgiati addressed matters that were to become very relevant in the 
future Spanish Relief action.
His  proposals  were  well  received.  Marcel  Auvert  replied  to  Olgiati’s  letter  on  18 
September 1936, adding further reservations concerning the Red Cross: “The Red Cross 
is not and I do not know if it ever was, an organisation against war, quite the contrary, it 
helps the military to perform it.”18
Soon after the agencies’ first consideration of the Spanish Conflict, a meeting was held 
at  the  Quaker  Centre  in  Paris  on  20  September  1936.  Pierre  Ceresole  and Rodolfo 
Olgiati  attended  for  SCI,  with  J.  Harvey and  Alfred  Jacob  representing  the  British 
Quakers  (and J  Harvey also  representing  the  IVSP)  as  well  as  M.  Roser  from the 
“Fellowship of Reconciliation”.19
Jacob and Harvey proposed the establishment of some kind of “clearing house” for the 
refugees and their families from different parts of Spain and outside. Pierre Ceresole 
informed  them  of  the  agreement  reached  by  the  ICRC  with  the  Republican  and 
Nationalist  governments  to  share  information  and  for  the  exchange  of  women  and 
children, which made their proposal unnecessary.20
Roser  informed  them of  the  actions  taken  to  help  the  refugees  in  France.  France’s 
political polarisation between Left and Right, and the fact that it had a Popular Front 
17 SCI (1936a): Olgiati (1936).
18 SCI (1936a); Auvert, M. (1936), letter, 18 September, LCF Bibliothèque; henceforth Auvert (1936). 
Both Olgiati and Auvert reflect a common popular misunderstanding concerning the Red Cross. As will 
become clear in the present work, the ICRC’s objectives never included opposition to war, but rather 
alleviating the suffering caused by it.
19 This was a gathering of pacifist and other organisations committed to non-violence, established in 
Britain in 1914. At the creation of SCI, its founder, Pierre Ceresole, developed his ideas at a meeting of 
the fellowship in The Netherlands, in 1919.
20 See Section 2.3
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government, influenced attitudes towards the Spanish refugees, who were all considered 
to  be  from  the  Republican  side.  The  Nationalist  refugees,  backed  by  the  French 
nationalist right, were mainly wealthy and stayed in hotels. State aid to refugees was in 
the hands of local authorities, who provided blankets and shelter  depending on their 
political alignment.
At the meeting, it was agreed to make contact with the Spanish Embassy and Franco’s 
representative in Paris, together with the French Red Cross and “International Workers 
Relief”, a left inclined agency. It was also agreed to visit Bayonne in southern France — 
at that time the centre for refugees and relief work — and contact important figures 
there as well as diplomatic representatives based in the area.21
Olgiati refers to a new meeting at the Centre on 21 September 1936 and to the contacts 
made in Paris, in a later report.22
The group (comprising Ceresole, Olgiati and the other representatives mentioned above) 
visited the French representation of the International League of Red Cross Societies23 
whose Secretary had no useful information. At 4pm on the same day, Pierre Ceresole 
and John Harvey visited Mme Flury-Herard, the Secretary of the Confederation of Red 
Crosses in France, who confirmed the information already obtained by Pierre Ceresole 
in Geneva from Mlle Suzanne Ferriere (member of both the “Commission on Spain” 
formed by the ICRC and the Executive Committee of the SCIU) about the agreements 
reached by the ICRC with Burgos and Madrid. They also contacted the French Red 
Cross.
Most importantly, Olgiati refers to the meeting Alfred Jacob had in the afternoon of 21 
September 1936 with the Count de Molina, Sr Malo de Molina, Secretary to Quiñones 
de Leon, representative of the rebel party.  Olgiati reported what Jacob had told him: 
“M. de Molina assured me that he shall do his best for Quiñones de Leon to give a letter 
of recommendation  so as to facilitate  the entrance of our English friends into rebel 
Spain… Nevertheless, A.J. [Alfred Jacob] has the impression that M. de M. [Malo de 
21 SCI (1936a); minutes of meeting at the Quaker Centre in Paris, 21 September 1936, LCF Bibliothèque.
22 SCI (1936a); minutes of meeting at the Quaker Centre in Paris….
23 The League of Red Cross Societies was founded in 1924 by the Societies of Britain, France, Italy, 
Japan and the US “to strengthen and unite, for healthy activities, already existing Red Cross Societies and 
to promote the creation of new societies” (Foundation Statement). It was based in Paris until 1939, when 
its headquarters were transferred to Geneva.
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Molina] was not very interested in the matter, and that such assurances [from M. de 
Molina] fall into the domain of courtesy.” 
On the same 21 September  1936, at  the Quaker Centre  in Paris,  the group met  Mr 
Braun, Secretary to M. Chauvet of the French Committee coordinating the Action of 
Relief to the Spaniards, whose most representative agency was Red Aid, founded in 
1922 and connected to the Communist International. 
The  “impressions”  conveyed  by  Jacob  of  his  visit  to  the  assistant  to  Franco’s 
representative  — which  as  we will  see  were not  well  founded — led  the group to 
conclude: “It looks as though we will not obtain authorisation from the Rebel side to 
organise any kind of activity whatsoever. The fact of not being Catholics will aggravate 
our position much more”.24 Thus the exclusion of the rebel zone from the relief action 
was not due to any Francoist rejection, but rather to Jacob’s personal impressions, and 
assertions in the same line by sympathisers with the left. The erroneous claims to the 
contrary presented by existing literature on the subject shall be examined in the present 
work.
Following their meeting in Paris, in late September 1936, Ceresole, Olgiati, Jacob and 
Harvey visited Bayonne, a town in the French Basque Country, near the Spanish border 
and a centre for Basque refugees and activities of all kinds related to the conflict.25 They 
came to the conclusion that it was not the time for any relief work to be undertaken in 
France for the Spanish refugees,26 but in the following two months, through contacts 
with Wilfred Roberts and his NJCSR27, the Quakers and the SCIU, the urgent need for 
the evacuation of Madrid became central to their work. Accordingly, we will see the 
agencies,  and  Olgiati  personally  with  SCI and Swiss  Aid — another  Swiss  agency 
discussed below — involved in evacuations from the Spanish capital.
In summary, all four organisations became involved from the early days of the war at 
different levels of commitment but working closely and maintaining contact with many 
other agencies, mostly “ad hoc” and clearly sympathising with the Republic and the left. 
Under these conditions, they tried to maintain their neutrality.
24 SCI (1936a); ‘Activities Report, 21 September’. LCF Bibliothèque; henceforth SCI (1936b).
25 FSC Committee on Spain, 27 September 1936, FHL.
26 SCI (1936a); IVSP Report, 14 December1936.
27 National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief, the mostly leftist British ad-hoc relief agency to which 
we shall refer in section 2.4 below.
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Because of its special situation as a “coordinating agency” in Spain from late 1937 and 
early  1938,  the  work  of  the  International  Commission  (IC)  shall  be  considered  in 
Chapter 7.
2.3 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC): navigating 
uncharted waters
The attempted coup and the resistance to it in the part of the Spanish territory that came 
to  be  called  “Republican”  or  “Loyalist”  Spain  had  a  significant  role  in  disrupting 
humanitarian work in this zone. Many hospitals, clinics, and other health institutions 
that formed part of the Spanish health system were then run by religious orders such as 
the Sisters of Charity or Brothers of St. John of God, and even centres which were not 
run by religious orders often had staff from these orders. The health centres were seized, 
not only by the Spanish Republican Government but, in many cases, by the militias, and 
the workers’ committees, whether anarchists (of the CNT) or socialists (of the UGT). 
The killing of nuns, priests and lay Catholics working in health and welfare provision 
was an important  factor in disrupting these services in Republican Spain during the 
early months of the Civil War.
The Red Cross was not spared. On 20 July 1936 both the official Doctors’ Guild and the 
central offices of the Spanish Red Cross were taken over by Doctors Juan Morata (from 
the  CNT)  and  Francisco  Haro  (from Republican  Left)  representing  the  Republican 
Government. General Burguete, President of the Spanish Red Cross, explained how his 
office was invaded: “a hundred militiamen went in, placed him on his knees and forced 
him to sign his resignation”.28 The religious and civil personnel in charge before the 
conflict were in many cases replaced with more inexperienced nurses who held a trade 
union card, following the intervention of the militias. 
On 25 July 1936 the ICRC sent a telegram to the Spanish Red Cross as follows:
“Does the Spanish Red Cross require from the sister societies any aid, especially 
material?”29
28 Durand, A. (1984), p. 265.
29 Doc 18, Copie du telegram 25/7/1936, in ‘Correspondance générale et rapports 1936-1950’ (24/7/1936-
7/9/1936). B CR 212 GEN-01, ICRCA; henceforth ICRC (1936a).
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On 2 August 1936 the ICRC was notified by the Republican Red Cross that  a new 
Central Committee of the Spanish Red Cross had been formed, by a decree issued on 31 
July,  adding:  “we cordially  greet  the International  Committee  and offer  our  sincere 
support”30. This did not answer the ICRC’s question.31
On 5 August, the ICRC received another telegram from the Spanish Red Cross asking 
for help to free Dr Luis Jenis, a Republican Red Cross doctor detained by Franco’s 
forces. This was followed by another telegram on 8 August 1936, requesting ICRC help 
to evacuate the children of the San Rafael “Preventorium” and the School Colony of La 
Granja to Madrid. With this official request, an ICRC intervention could begin. On the 
same day, the ICRC contacted General Franco32 in Tetuán and General Cabanellas33 in 
Burgos, conveying the request of the Republican Red Cross.
On 12 August 1936, the ICRC again contacted both Dr Aurelio Romeo34 in Madrid and 
General Cabanellas in Burgos, to obtain information about the Spanish Red Cross and 
the treatment of the wounded, and sending them a copy of Resolution XIX of the X 
International  Conference  (1921),  considered  to  be  an  unofficial  Convention  for  an 
internal conflict: unofficial because the Resolution had never been ratified.
Marcel Junod, “ICRC Delegate to Abyssinia”, who had just arrived in Geneva to report, 
was presented with the task of dealing with the Spanish Civil War. The ICRC informed 
both Madrid and Burgos on 22 August about the appointment of Dr Junod as a delegate 
to both zones. On 28 August, Dr Aurelio Romeo in Madrid agreed to Dr Junod’s visit 
and,  on 29 August,  Junod flew to Barcelona,  on his  way to  Madrid,  because direct 
flights to Madrid had been suspended. General Cabanellas also accepted an ICRC visit 
to the Nationalist Zone.35
30 Bulletin International ICRC: Tomme LXVII – Août 1936 – nº 408, p. 695, Europe, ICRCA.
31 In a letter sent to the Red Cross National Societies, dated 21 August 1936, the ICRC confirms that their 
offer of aid has not yet been answered by the Spanish Red Cross, the Republican Government or Franco. 
The letter also informs recipients that Dr Junod is being sent to Spain. Finally, it is important to note that 
the letter refers to the “parties” to the conflict, placing the Republican Government and the Rebels on the 
same level, in a position maintained by the ICRC throughout the conflict. Doc. 47, in ICRC (1936a).
32 Franco was only named “Generalísimo” and “Head of State” on 1 October 1936.
33 Miguel Cabanellas Ferrer (1872-1938): Spanish General that rose with Franco and Mola in July 1936. 
From 24 July 1936 until 1 October 1936, he was the Chief of the National Defence Committee, which 
acted as the ruling body of the rebels.
34 Dr Aurelio Romeo Lozano, new President of the Republican Red Cross, as per referred Decree of 31 
July 1936 (see fn. 30).
35 The ICRC was also contacted by the SCIU in respect of the children displaced in colonies in late 
August 1936 after they received requests from Republican Spain; see Section 4.1.2. 
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Once in Spain, Junod signed an agreement with the Republican Red Cross, accepting 
offers of help through the ICRC from other Red Cross societies, and the possibility for 
the ICRC to open, under the control of the ICRC’s delegates, information agencies for 
civilian prisoners and prisoners of war. This agreement, signed on 1 September, was 
followed  by  another  with  the  Republican  Government,  accepting  the  presence  of 
delegates  in  Barcelona  and  Madrid,  as  well  as  delegates  to  be  sent  to  Burgos  and 
Seville.  The  information  agency  agreed  with  the  Republican  Red  Cross  was  duly 
authorised  and prisoner  exchanges  were now possible.  The Republican  Government 
formed on 4 September 1936 under Largo Caballero36 confirmed this agreement.
On  15  September,  Dr  Junod  signed  a  similar  agreement  with  Fernando  Suárez  de 
Tangil, Conde (Earl) of Vallellano, President of the Nationalist Red Cross, accepting 
ICRC delegates  in  Burgos  and Sevilla.  Junod also  visited  General  Cabanellas,  who 
declared that the Junta had been informed of the agreements signed by the ICRC with 
“the Madrid Red Cross and the Government of that Capital”,37 and:
1. Expressed gratitude to the ICRC for its intervention and noted the noble 
feelings that moved it;
2. Accepted the agreement with Conde of Vallellano and the offer of help 
from the foreign Red Cross societies;
3. Expressed its agreement to be bound by the Geneva Convention on the 
wounded, the sick and prisoners; and
4. Accepted the evacuation of women, children and youngsters not subject 
to military service, on a reciprocal basis.
Finally,  the  issue  of  hostages  and  their  exchange  was  disregarded  because  the 
Nationalists claimed that it did not take hostages.38
Having obtained the agreement of both parties, a new Executive Office was established 
in Geneva (the “Committee on Spain”).  Its  members  were ICRC officers who were 
already  members  of  the  “Abyssinia  Committee”:  Colonel  Favre,  Miss  Odier,  Mr 
36 Francisco Largo Caballero (1869-1946): Trade-Unionist and Socialist Spanish politician.
37 Doc. 163, in ‘Correspondance générale et rapports 1936–1950’ (8/9/1936–28/9/1936), B CR 212 GEN-
02, ICRCA; henceforth ICRC (1936b).
38 Doc. 163, in ICRC (1936b).
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Jacques Cheveniere and Dr Audemond, together with Mlle Ferriere. By December 1936 
the presence of ICRC Neutral Delegates in Spain was as follows: 39
Republican Spain Nationalist Spain
Madrid: Dr Georges Henny40 Burgos: Horace de Pourtales (substituted 
by Raymond Broccard in late November 
1936)
Barcelona: Dr Horace Barbey Seville: Dr Werner Schumacher




Delegates changed during the conflict in accordance with the circumstances of the war, 
territorial variations and authorities’ requests, as well as for budgetary reasons.41
The Spanish conflict,  due to its  own nature and the strength of the social  forces in 
combat,  became a civil  war with opposing forces that  were bitter  enemies  and thus 
doomed to clash with incredible violence. Marcel Junod’s words explain the situation in 
full:
“At the start of the conflict, we saw the quick execution of prisoners of the two 
categories (political and war prisoners). Only some political prisoners were spared and 
imprisoned, because they were less known, or because they were lucky or because they 
were protected by friends. In respect of the war prisoners, they were executed, until 
November 1936, by both parties. Afterwards, little by little, the number of prisoners 
increased because, once the military operations escalated, an increasing number of 
soldiers surrendered and mass execution was impossible. This was also due to our 
intervention in asking for news and requesting information about the prisoners, together 
with our presence in the field”.42
39 Doc. 1487, in ‘Correspondance générale et rapports 1936–1950’ (27/1/1937-16/2/1937), B CR 212 
GEN-09, ICRCA; henceforth ICRC (1937a).
40 Wounded on 8 December 1936 when his plane from Madrid to Toulouse was attacked by unknown 
planes. Enric Arbenz took his place on 11 January 1937. (See Section 3.2.1)
41 See the chronological list of ICRC Neutral Delegates in the Spanish Civil War annexed to Appendix 1 
as Document L.
42 ‘Rapports et correspondance du Dr Marcel Junod, délégué générale pour l’Espagne’ (1/9/1936-
1/12/1937). Handwritten note by Marcel Junod, Delegate for Spain, for a General Report, ICRCA. B CR 
212 GEN-60.
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2.4 The British Quakers (FSC): independent relief with conflicting souls
As mentioned above, Russell and Maria Ecroyd had presented their plan for a Quaker 
International  Centre  in  Spain to  the London Yearly Meeting in  1931.  Their  Quaker 
Group in Madrid, including an ex-Catholic priest, Juan Ortiz González, and the Catalan, 
Dr Pijoan, had by 1936 a regular meeting place and Maria and Dr Pijoan were involved 
in educational and child-feeding projects, respectively.
When in 1936 the FSC decided to proceed with the project and asked for volunteers, a 
British  Quaker  couple,  Alfred  and  Norma  Jacob  (Alfred  was  American  born  but 
educated  in  England),  both  fluent  in  Spanish  having  travelled  in  Spain  and  South 
America, decided to live in Spain for a year to launch the Quaker Centre under the new 
favourable conditions of the Republic with the objective of presenting the Quaker faith 
to the Spaniards.
The military uprising changed everything. In September 1936, the first meeting of the 
FSC’s new “Committee on Spain” was held in London, and in October 1936, Alfred 
Jacob travelled to Spain with,  John W Harvey.  The Civil  War,  by now a full-scale 
conflict,  made it  clear to Jacob and Harvey that this was not the time for a Quaker 
Centre and that aid was required. The Ecroyds and their existing group immediately 
began a relief operation in Madrid, as a private project.
In England at that time, many aid initiatives had been inspired by the “Aid to Spain 
Movement”43. Two coordinating bodies were established. The General Relief Fund for 
Distressed Women and Children of Spain (GRF), backed by the Churches, presented 
itself as not linked to any political ideology.44 The National Joint Committee of Spanish 
Relief (NJCSR) was created, following a visit to Spain by an all-party parliamentary 
delegation, to bring together other organisations, such as the FSC and the SCF. From 
the start, the NJCSR was driven by the left and led by the Duchess of Atholl, the “red 
duchess”.
43 The wave of support for the Spanish Republic that the British left had led since the early days of the 
Spanish Civil War.
44 All documents related to this agency are lost. References to their activities come indirectly through 
mentions in other agencies’ archives.
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 39
The FSC and the SCF were members of both the bodies, but differences arose between 
them and the NJCSR, mainly after the bombing of Guernica on 26 April 1937, over the 
proposal to evacuate Basque children to England.45
Farah Mendlesohn maintains that the Quakers focused their work on Republican Spain 
for religious motives:
“The Evangelical and Protestant nature of the proposed Quaker presence ensured that 
the Friends would not be welcomed in Burgos, the Nationalist capital, although 
inquiries were made. Instead, Jacob and Harvey turned their attention to Catalonia, an 
area not at the forefront of the fighting and therefore relatively safe, but which was 
taking a major role in the housing and maintenance of refugees.”46
Catalonia was clearly a suitable place for relief work, but the evidence does not sustain 
the religious motive quoted by Mendlesohn nor does it show any “inquiries”. 
As we have seen, the Quakers had abandoned the proposal for an evangelical mission in 
favour of a relief operation, and we have, furthermore, clear evidence from the Quakers 
themselves that religious differences were not an obstacle, as we shall see in section 
2.8.2 below. Sylvester Jones, on his mission to Spain on behalf of the AFSC, was well 
received in Burgos, the Nationalist capital. In his diary, there is not a single word of 
rejection by the Burgos authorities of Quaker aid. In fact, the extensive relief activities 
that  the American  Quakers carried  out  in Nationalist  Spain disproved the idea of  a 
negative stance by the Francoist authorities. On the contrary,  these collaborated fully 
with the American Quakers.47 Neither the FSC’s minutes, nor those of the Meeting for 
Sufferings, show any specific refusal by Franco’s authorities to Quaker relief work in 
Nationalist Spain.
Franco’s alleged rejection of Quaker aid is based only on the “impression” which Jacob 
took  of  his  lone  visit,  described  in  section  2.2  above,  to  the  assistant  of  Franco’s 
representative in France.48
45 On this episode, see Appendix 2.
46 Mendlesohn (2002), p. 23.
47See Chapter 5.
48Documents in the SCI International Archives show that this organisation also acted on the basis of the 
same “impression”. See also Best & Pike (Eds.) 1948, p. 60: “it was only Franco’s refusal to accept this 
aid which led to almost all Service Civil relief being given on the government side.”
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The exclusion of the Nationalist Zone as an initial target of the British Quakers’ relief 
work was arguably related to the political feelings of those involved in the early days of 
the Quaker action,  who despite  their  formal  commitment  to neutrality,  favoured the 
Republicans.  Charles  Chatfield,  a  historian  of  pacifism  in  the  USA,  refers  to  the 
“socialist  overtone evident” in the British Quakers.49 Even Farah Mendlesohn shows 
this, with quotes from Francesca Wilson, an experienced Quaker relief worker, though 
not a Quaker herself.  Mendlesohn says:  “Like Jacob, Francesca Wilson was not the 
strict neutral the FSC claimed to prefer, nor did she travel to Spain with an open mind 
about  what  she  was  to  see.”50 The  choice  of  Barcelona  reflected  the  inclination  of 
individuals who, while they wanted to be non-partisan in the provision of aid, preferred 
to be based in a zone which represented values and stances closer to theirs, and with the 
advantage of there  already being an active YMCA Centre,  where Alfred Jacob was 
residing by late October 1936.51 
Neither the religious barrier nor the inquiries and refusal to which Farah Mendlesohn 
refers, existed.
It was only when Wilfred Jones, the son of Sylvester Jones, the Quaker sent by the 
AFSC to investigate  in December  1936, arrived in Spain in early 1937 and without 
much difficulty made his way to the Nationalist Zone and concluded an agreement with 
the Nationalist authorities to allow the AFSC to operate on its territory that the Quaker 
operation reached the Nationalist  Zone.  The American Friends,  without  the political 
sympathies of the British Quakers, were able to establish and develop a very effective 
relief operation in the territory controlled by Franco. 
2.5 Service Civil International (SCI) and Save the Children International 
Union (SCIU): the Swiss connection
The presence of Service Civil International (SCI) and Save the Children Union (SCIU) 
in the Spanish Civil War is closely related to the history of Swiss aid during the Spanish 
struggle.
49 Chatfield (1971), pp. 158-9.
50 Mendlesohn (2002), pp. 47-8. See also Wilson (1944), p. 200, p. 171.
51 Young Men’s Christian Association: Christian movement founded in London in 1844 by George 
Williams which today represents more than 45 million members in over 120 associations worldwide. The 
YMCA always had a good relationship with the Quakers.
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The  Swiss  left  promoted  two  associations:  “Oeuvre  Suisse  d’Entraide  Ouvrière” 
(OSEO,  Swiss  Labour  Assistance),  which  was  socialist-inspired  and  already  in 
existence in May 1936, two months before the Spanish coup, in principle to coordinate 
humanitarian activities already undertaken by the trade unions, and “Central Sanitaire 
Swiss”  (CSS)52,  formed  in  1937  and  communist-inspired,  with  its  origin  in  the 
International Red Aid.
The OSEO started with fairly successful requests for donations and collections aimed at 
supplying food and clothing to Republican Spain, mainly Madrid. However, this initial 
humanitarian activity was in practice mostly unnecessary because at the beginning of 
the conflict, despite the shortages suffered in the capital, the greatest need for supplies 
was not here but in other zones, such as the Northern Front, that were less accessible 
and  often  forgotten.  Some  in  the  OSEO  suggested  establishing  and  funding  an 
orphanage  in  the  South  of  France,  in  collaboration  with  other  humanitarian 
organisations.53
When the bombing of Madrid began in  November  1936, evacuating the children to 
France  and  Switzerland  appeared  to  be  the  most  sensible  and  potentially  effective 
solution.54
In August 1936 the Swiss Government (Federal Council) issued very strict regulations 
aimed at maintaining Swiss neutrality, forbidding its citizens from fighting in Spain as 
volunteers and restricting and regulating financial appeals for either side in the conflict, 
making them subject to Federal authorisation. The Bern authorities refused to authorise 
the OSEO due to its partisan (i.e., left) orientation: they requested that any action be 
assumed by a non-political body, and made their authorisation subject to this condition 
being met.  To that end, the OSEO proposed a union of the bodies already active in 
children  relief.  As  Regina  Kägi-Fuchsmann,  OSEO’s  Secretary,  explained,  “The 
Federal authorities were in agreement, with the plan being subject to the condition that 
the OSEO did not act alone, but tried to create an all encompassing Swiss action, to 
guarantee the initiative with an absolute neutral character”.55 Thus OSEO had to contact 
right wing organisations in Switzerland in order to create a new joint venture for the 
52 Swiss Sanitary Central (CSS).
53 S.S.: Zurich: Proces Verbal (PV), Minutes of the Directing Committee, 3/11/1936, OSEOA.
54 S.S.: Zurich: Proces Verbal (PV), Minutes of the Directing Committee, 4/1/1937, OSEOA.
55 Kägi-Fuchsmann (1944), p. 123. 
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work  of  appealing  for,  obtaining  and  using  funds  in  Switzerland  for  the  Spanish 
conflict. Negotiations were difficult. From 4 January to 12 February 1937, the OSEO, 
represented  by  its  Secretary,  worked  hard  to  bring  into  its  project  other  Swiss 
institutions not associated with the left,  and took on board religious and centre-right 
(“bourgeois” in the Swiss terminology of the epoch) organisations.
The new Committee included Caritas, the Swiss Quakers, among other entities, together 
with individual such as Alfred Siegfried of Pro Juventute (a Swiss Charity working with 
children and young people) and JM de Morsier, from Save the Children International 
Union (SCIU), These two organisations refused to join as bodies, as they were not fully 
satisfied of the new Committee’s neutrality. The ICRC and the Swiss Red Cross gave 
the same reason for not participating, while other associations, such as the leftist  Rote  
Hilfe, were prevented from joining.
The first problem arose when the new conservative partners proposed that neutrality 
implied formally offering help to the Nationalists.  The OSEO rejected this proposal, 
arguing  that  their  supporters  would  never  accept  such  an  offer:  by  neutrality  they 
understood working in the Republican Zone without participating in military operations.
A solution  to  this  dispute  came from outside.  Before  authorising  the  evacuation  of 
Spanish children to Switzerland, the Swiss federal authorities had obtained a guarantee 
from the French government that after a stay in Switzerland they would repatriate all the 
children back to Spain.56 The only children crossing the border from Spain into France 
and thence  to  Switzerland  would  be  from the  Republican  Zone,  so  the  question  of 
helping children from the Nationalist side did not arise.57
Between 12 and 23 February 1937, the Swiss Committee to Aid Spanish Children58 was 
formally  created  under  the  presidency  of  Alfred  Siegfried,  with  Susanne  Blun  as 
secretary. At that time, Rodolfo Olgiati, secretary of SCI, back from Spain on a research 
trip to explore the possibilities of helping the evacuation of Madrid, offered his services 
to the new committee and took on the direction of the fieldwork. The committee was 
then renamed “Swiss Aid” (SA). 
56 SS.: Zurich: letter to the members of the Committee 2/2/1937, SSA 20.203, OSEOA.
57 SS: Zurich: Process Verbal (PV) Minutes of the Directing Committee 5/2/1937, SSA 20.203, OSEOA.
58 “Neutral Action Committee for the Spanish Children”, in its literal translation from the French.
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 43
While  the  evacuation  was  being  prepared  in  Switzerland,  and  many  families  were 
prepared to receive Spanish children, a key question had been ignored: the attitude of 
the Republican Government to the proposed evacuation.59
“The Spanish Government after past experiences, is afraid that the children, upset by all 
the ‘events’, will have great difficulty in adapting to the different conditions that they 
will experience in Switzerland, and does not want the children, who are already badly 
shocked by the ‘mal du pais’ (due to their evacuation from Madrid to the provinces), to 
spend a lot of time without speaking Spanish”.60
The  Republican  Government  insisted  that  children  go  to  centres  run  by  Spanish 
personnel. This proved so expensive that in October 1937 the committee abandoned the 
plan to evacuate children to Switzerland.61 
It  is  most  important  to  note  here  that  the  conditions  that  the  Spanish  Republican 
Government placed on this proposed evacuation, in February – October 1937, were not 
applied to the evacuation of about 4,000 Basque children, carried out by the Basque 
Government  in  May  1937.  That  evacuation,  strongly  supported  by  the  Republican 
Government, did not assure the “Spanishness” of the evacuee children, who did suffer 
the effects of losing their roots in their homeland.62 
The Swiss authorities, despite the failure of the evacuation project, were very happy that 
the Committee had promoted this joint initiative. The fact that it was related directly to 
children helped to overcome the debates about neutrality.63 
When  questions  arose  about  why  the  action  was  not  extended  to  children  in  the 
Nationalist zone, it was argued that the authorities in the rebel zone were not interested 
59 SS: Zurich: Process Verbal (PV) Minutes of the Directing Committee 19/1/1937. SSA 20.203, 
OSEOA.
60 SS: Zurich: Rapport annuel 1936, pp. 11-12.
61 SS: Zurich: Process Verbal (PV). Minutes of the Directing committee, 8/10/1937, SSA 20.203, 
OSEOA.
62 See Appendix 2.
63 “The Spanish problem caused tensions in Swiss public opinion. Some, prorepublicans, were afraid of 
the Fascists, the others, supporters of Franco’s troops, feared the Bolsheviks. Today I learn with pleasure 
that a group of Swiss organisations… gathered together to aid the Spanish children… I am extremely 
happy. After the political passion, the old Swiss spirit awoke, the humanitarian spirit that goes beyond 
political parties and borders.” Hans Frölicher [Chief of the Federal Police Division] ‘Beginning of Work 
in Spain: 3c- Reports and Correspondence, October-December 1937’ S.C.I. International Archives 
20.362. 3, LCF Bibliothèque. Interview with Ralph and Ida Hegnaver, 8/4/1937, LCF Bibliothèque.
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in  aid  and that  there  was  greater  need  in  the  Republican  zone.  As  we know,64 the 
assertion “not interested” was a falsehood. Furthermore, even if the need was greater in 
the Republican zone than in rebel territory (150,000 against 30,000 children in need as 
established  by Sylvester  Jones  in  his  visit  to  both  zones);  humanitarian  good sense 
should have led them to explore the possibility of working in Nationalist Spain… as 
Sylvester  Jones,  representing  the  AFSC,  in  fact  did.  The  clear  socialist  and  leftist 
sympathies of the OSEO created discomfort among the Committee’s other members, 
which was resolved by a division of labour between the two tendencies. The Committee 
— basically  the  bourgeois  organisations  — ran  the  collections  and  public  relations 
(more than 85% of the funds came from them) while the OSEO was able to distribute 
the aid  without  many restrictions.  The “entente  cordiale”  in  the Committee  allowed 
Regina Kägi-Fuchsmann to declare happily in June 1938: “This arrangement means the 
Swiss bourgeoisie is working for Republican Spain.”65
Following  the  visits  to  Spain  by  Rodolfo  Olgiati,  SCI  commenced  to  support  the 
evacuation of children from Madrid to Valencia, with the help of its Swiss members.66 
This  activity  was  absorbed  by  SA  in  May  1937,  using  the  six  trucks  bought  in 
Switzerland with finance from OSEO, SCI and the Swiss United Syndicate.67 
This  evacuation  process  also  involved  the  ICRC,  which  had  been  involved  in  the 
evacuation  from  Madrid  to  Valencia  since  November  1936,  when  the  Nationalists 
attacked the capital. 
The ICRC was not used to merging its activities with private organisations, but worked 
with the Swiss volunteers of Swiss Aid and SCI, in a smoothly run operation.68 The 
Swiss  Government  gave financial  support,  as  did the  Swiss  Red Cross,  which  later 
supplied 15 additional trucks.
64 See Section 2.8.2
65 SS: Zurich: Process Verbal (PV). Minutes of the Directing Committee 10/6/1938, SSA.20.203, nt, 
OSEOA.
66 Kägi-Fuchsmann (1944), p. 140.
67 This operation is considered in detail in Section 3.3.
68 In its Bulletin No. 10, 27 November 1937, SCI refers to the request from the ICRC in respect of the 
evacuation of about 5,000 children, some of whom with Nationalist connections who, separated from 
their parents by the front, could move from Valencia to the other side. The SCI remarks that this is “a 
good chance to prove their neutrality and their aim to bring relief to all the suffering innocents, without 
distinction”. BUG: Bulletin No. 10, 27 November 1937.
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Swiss Aid was humanitarian, in that it did not help the Republic’s military effort. The 
Swiss authorities accepted it as neutral, because it was aimed at children, and one child 
is like another. However, although it was not partisan in its objectives, Swiss Aid was 
“partisan de facto”. The location of their activity meant that most of the aid that was 
eventually sent to Spain by Switzerland went to the Republican zone: only 0.8 tons were 
sent to the Nationalists. Thus it can not be considered, for the subject of this thesis, at 
the same level as the other Swiss agencies: the ICRC, the SCIU and SCI.
2.6 Service Civil International (SCI): forgetting pick and shovel
Following the  visit  to  the  South  of  France  by  Rodolfo  Olgiati  and  Pierre  Ceresole 
together with the Quaker representatives, which had led to them abandoning the idea of 
a  relief  base  in  French  territory,  Olgiati  visited  England  in  December  1936.  He 
contacted the British “Aid to Spain” movement, meeting Wilfrid Roberts — the Liberal 
MP and General Secretary of the NJCSR — the IVSP and the British Quakers.
On 31 December 1936, the SCI Committee met in Basel. The general opinion was that 
“SCI would have difficulties in carrying out the evacuation of Madrid without risking 
the SCI movement and jeopardising the anticipated work of clearing the ruins after the 
war”, and that “it would be impossible to make an appeal for volunteers in Switzerland 
due to the opposition of the Swiss Government”.69
After receiving telegrams from Edith Pye and Alfred Tritton70, who wanted to propose 
“a new service” to Olgiati,71 it was agreed to send him to Barcelona to collaborate with 
them. Olgiati  met  the SCIU in Geneva and decided to travel  to Spain “as a private 
individual and not as a representative of SCI”.72 On 7 January 1937 Rodolfo Olgiati 
departed for Paris and Barcelona.
69 ‘Correspondence and reports, January-March 1937’. SCI International Archives. 30362-2. LCF 
Bibliothèque; henceforth SCI (1937); Minutes of the Meeting 31 December 1936, LCF Bibliothèque.
70 Both British Quakers. Edith Pye (1876-1965) was a midwife and international child relief organizer, 
and a very good lobbyist. She would be the key element in the formation of the International Commission 
(IC)
71 SCI (1937); Olgiati’s Report sur les investigations faites a Paris, 2 January 1937.
72 The member of the SCI Committee Jean Inebnit asserted, reacting to Olgiati’s report: “we decided to 
send Rudi (Rodolfo Olgiati) not as a private individual as he proposed, but in his capacity as SCI officer. 
We have given Rudi the power to call some SCI friends to help him as he felt necessary”. SCI (1937); 
Letter from Jean Inebnit, 12 January 1937.
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Once in Spain, Rodolfo Olgiati made contact with David T. Luscombe of the British 
IVSP, and also with the NJCSR’s representative, Geoffrey T. Garratt, who worked in 
connection  with  Dr  Pictet  of  the  SCIU,  all  of  them active  in  the  territory  between 
Valencia and Barcelona. Still in January, Olgiati made his first trip from Valencia to 
Madrid in one of the buses used for the evacuation and the resupply of the capital.73
Olgiati envisaged that SCI had to be focused on the evacuation of Madrid (“not pick and 
shovel, but Madrid evacuation”) and that any relief bound for Spain must be neutral and 
“we must work possibly on the two fronts.”74 Even the possibility of collaboration with 
the Quakers by supplying volunteers to them was considered. In fact, the intention of 
active  impartiality  clearly  shown  in  the  early  SCI  documentation  was  somewhat 
undermined by their focus on the Republican zone, though not to the same extent as 
occurred with Swiss Aid, as explained above.
Olgiati estimated the total number of evacuees for Republican Spain at about one and 
half million: three quarters of them children and most of the rest women. Half a million 
of these were in Catalonia, and about 350,000 women and children were waiting to be 
evacuated  from  Madrid.  By  that  time,  Olgiati  —  who  introduced  himself  as  a 
representative of the “Swiss Committee” — had established a group of contacts focused 
on feeding and evacuating children and mothers from Madrid to Valencia. 
Four buses were purchased in Switzerland, with the support of the Swiss SCI and its 
British  branch,  the  IVSP.  Without  Swiss  Federal  Government  opposition,  an 
advertisement  was  published  asking  for  volunteer  bus  drivers  experienced  in  the 
transport of children.75 These drivers were the first SCI volunteers to go to Spain, and 
also the first in the history of SCI to go and serve in a country with an ongoing military 
conflict.  The “pick and shovel” — until then the symbol of SCI’s work in post war 
relief — had become the steering wheel of a bus. 
73 SCI (1937); R. Olgiati letter, 17 January 1937 (Copies to: Elden Lawrence (NJCSR), Esther Farquahr 
(AFSC), Alfred Jacob (FSC), Patrick Malin (AFSC), Kendell Park (GRF) Miss Petter and D. Pictet 
(SCIU) Sunding (Swedish Committee) and Elise Thomson (Danish Quakers).)
74 Bulletin SCI No. 7/8: 5 Mars 1937, p. 1, BUG.
75 “N’étant en considération comme volontaires qu’un petit nombre de chauffeurs d’autobus bien 
qualifies pour le transport d’enfants (pas nécessaire de savoir Espagnole)” (“needing only as volunteers a 
small number of bus drivers, well qualified for the transportation of children; Spanish not necessary.”). 
Bulletin SCI nº 7/8, 36, BUG.
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The four buses left Bern on 24 April 1937, full of food, clothing and other material.76 
They arrived in Spain four days later and established their base at Burjassot (Valencia). 
Every day two buses left Madrid with children for Valencia, crossing mid-way with the 
other two that left Valencia with supplies. Sister Inma Schneider, from the Swiss SCI, 
was based in Madrid to procure and organise the necessary feeding of the travelling 
children. Later, two new buses joined the relief operation.77
2.7 The Save the Children International Union (SCIU): the Union and the 
appeal from the Spanish (Republican) Schools 
As  mentioned  above  in  Section  2.2,  the  SCIU  in  Geneva  was  alerted  by  their 
Administrative Commission as result of two telegrams received from Madrid in August 
1936. These called  for  help in  the evacuation  of children  who found themselves  in 
summer camps in one zone while their families were in the other, as well as of foreign 
children who had been trapped by the conflict while spending their summer holidays in 
Spain.
The  SCIU  answered  both  telegrams  on  29  August,  requesting  more  information 
especially about the number of children to be evacuated. Meanwhile, they contacted the 
Swiss authorities (the political department in Berne, under M. de Rham), the Save the 
Children Fund in Britain — an agency which would be very useful if British ships were 
involved in an evacuation — together with the ICRC (Dr Junod was in Spain at that 
time).78 The Spanish Consulate in Geneva, the Spanish Red Cross (Republican) and the 
Social Section of the League of Nations were also contacted over the matter. Finally, 
the  SCIU  addressed  all  its  member  organisations  through  an  informative  leaflet, 
preparing them for a possible request for cooperation in Spain.
On 7 September 1936 the SCIU received a letter from the Federation of Societies of 
Friends of the School, dated 3 September. It stated that all foreign children at La Granja 
had already been evacuated, and provided a list of 15 groups, 804 children in all, who 
76 The buses were named “Pestalozzi”, after the Swiss educational reformer and benefactor of the Swiss 
orphans whom he had helped during the French invasion of Switzerland in 1798; “Dunant”, for the 
founder of the Red Cross; “Wilson”, the US President who promoted the League of Nations; and 
“Nansen”, the polar explorer and later Commissioner of refugees for the League of Nations.
77 Named “Dufour”, after a Swiss Army General who was one of the founders of the Red Cross, and 
“Zwingli”, after the Swiss Canton whose school children financed it.
78 Executive Committee minutes, session 225, 21 September 1936, No. 9 – “Intervention en Espagne, p. 
2, AEG-SCIU.
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had been located in three different regions under the control of the Nationalists, and a 
list of 754 children in the North of Spain (Santander and Asturias), still under control of 
the Republican Government but cut off from Madrid and from their home town, Toledo. 
The letter did not mention the children in the Republican zone whose families were on 
the Nationalist side.79
As Dr  Junod was  to  return  from Spain  the  same  day,  7  September,  and  would  be 
travelling immediately to Santander and Burgos, the SCIU met him. It was agreed that 
he  would  raise  matters  with  both  Governments  to  obtain  their  corresponding 
authorisation, and would also inform the SCIU about the conditions in the Santander 
summer camps. Dr Junod hoped to be able to report back from St Jean-de-Luz not later 
than 14 September.
The Executive Committee of the SCIU noted that the League of Nations was not able to 
intervene before the next General Assembly reached some agreement on the issue. As 
this thesis shows, this intervention never came about, revealing the lack of effectiveness 
of this international organisation with respect to an important European conflict. The 
SCIU,  underlining  its  desire  to  remain  neutral,  formally  declared  that  “…our 
intervention status appears very appropriate under the circumstances, since organising 
the exchange of children should not provoke any accusations of partisanship.”80 
The  SCIU  now  began  its  relief  work  for  children  in  Spain,  organised  through  its 
Executive Committee, and administered through delegates sent to the country to assess, 
organise and implement as necessary. They focused first on those displaced in summer 
camps.  In  October  1936,  475  children  from  the  Santander  summer  camps  were 
transferred by ship to France and thence to their parents in Madrid and Toledo.81 The 
other challenge was the thousands of evacuees from Madrid, the south and the north of 
Spain, who required relief, such as food, clothing and other essential needs. In this task 
we shall see the permanent collaboration and interaction of the SCIU representatives in 
Spain with the ICRC delegates in the diverse Spanish regions.
79 AP 92.16. Guerre Civil Espagnole: demande d’aide a L’UISE (SCIU) de la Fédération des Sociétés des 
Amis de l’Ecole pour l’évacuation des colonies des enfants. (“Aid request to the UISE (SCIU) from the 
Federation of Friends of the Schools for the evacuation of children from summer camps”), AEG-SCIU.
80 Executive Committee minutes, session 225, 21 September 1936 – No. 9 – “Intervention en Espagne”, 
p. 2, AEG-SCIU.
81 Executive Committee minutes, session 226, 16 December 1936, p. 210, AEG-SCIU.
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Once the Executive Committee decided to intervene in Spain, one of its members, Mme 
Frédérique Small, was put in charge of investigating and assessing the needs, and the 
actions and resources that their intervention would require. Mme Small travelled to the 
area on six occasions, from October 1936 to December 1937, visiting both Republican 
and  Nationalist  Spain,  as  well  as  the  French  border  region.  The  relief  service  was 
structured and new delegates  were engaged in accordance  with the assessments  and 
reports of Mme Small, who in 1937 was named SCIU’s General Delegate for Spain.
2.8 Quakers working in opposing camps
2.8.1 The American Friends become involved in the Spanish conflict
The  AFSC  monitored  the  Spanish  conflict  from the  beginning  but  approached  the 
matter cautiously, relying on the information, actions and advice of the British Quakers, 
the FSC in London.
Minutes of the AFSC and of its Foreign Service Section refer to Spain from late 1936. 
On 24 September  there is a reference to the failure  of the American Quaker Emma 
Cadbury82 in her endeavour to visit Spain to “investigate the possibilities of Service” 
due to hostilities, as well as to the appointment of Norma and Alfred Jacob: “to take up 
a Centre work in Spain [sic] and are ready to go as soon as way opens”.83 The minutes 
also refer to the presence of the Californian Quaker, Inez Muñoz, and her request for 
help to be sent to Spain.  The minutes record that:  “the Friends are not at  this  time 
planning to do anything in Spain, that the Foreign Service Section as a Committee is 
watching  the  situation  and that  the  time  may come when it  will  be  called  upon to 
cooperate  with English  Friends  in  their  work in Spain”.84 On 22 October  1936, the 
Foreign Service Section noted reports from the FSC in London of the visit to Barcelona 
by John Harvey and Alfred Jacob to assess the problem of the children evacuees from 
Madrid and Valencia. There is also mention in a cable received on 20 October 1936 
from Lydia Ellicott  Morris, an American Quaker (already mentioned in Section 2.2) 
who lived in Philadelphia  but often visited France,  and occasionally Barcelona.  She 
reported on FSC plans for collaborating in food relief in a joint operation with Save the 
82 Emma Cadbury (1875-1965), American Quaker committed to international aspects of Friends’ work, 
serving the Quaker Centre in Vienna after World War I and visiting Spain during the Civil War.
83 This reference is also made in the abovementioned AFSC Minutes of 24 September 1936, AFSCA. 
84 AFSC Foreign Service minutes, 24 September 1936, pp. 2 and 4, AFSCA.
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Children under the leadership of Alfred Jacob. Lydia Morris asked for financial help 
and a worker to rent and manage the upkeep of a care house for 30 children. She also 
proposed that relief be channelled through the British Friends. The American Friends 
resisted sending any money to Spain until they had made their own investigation of the 
situation. Their answer was, accordingly, negative.85
In  its  meeting  of  31 October  1936,  the AFSC’s  Foreign Service  Section  paid most 
attention to Palestine and China. With respect to Spain, the Chairman, William Eves III, 
pointed out that “all of the work that is done in this Section is carried out in cooperation 
with the Friends Service Council of London and Dublin Yearly Meetings, together with 
the national groups of Friends on the continent of Europe”. There was also mention of 
Alfred Jacob’s investigation in Barcelona “as to whether there should be relief work 
done in Spain”. They noted that no one was there representing the AFSC, but that Lydia 
Ellicott Morris was in Barcelona, cooperating with Alfred Jacob.86
However, the AFSC was still unsure about what action to take in Spain. While their 
British counterparts were motivated to act by a pro-Republican atmosphere as well as 
by their own sentiments, stimulated by the Ecroyds and the Jacobs, the AFSC felt that: 
“there  was not  sufficient  information  concerning  the actual  need,  etc.,  to  make any 
definite plans; that Friends shall be equally concerned for the victims of both sides; and 
their first step should be to send a representative to Spain to investigate relief needs and 
reconciliation possibilities.”87
The Board of Directors spoke about the offer of the Ethical  Culture Society in New 
York  to  pay  50%  of  the  expenses  involved  in  sending  an  administrator,  and  the 
Mennonites’ offer to cooperate in any work the Friends might undertake in Spain.88 The 
Board  agreed  to  send  an  investigator  and  selected  Sylvester  Jones,  a  Quaker  from 
Chicago who spoke Spanish. They accepted both offers of financial help.
A  note  was  made  of  a  private  party  of  Friends  at  the  International  Restaurant  of 
Philadelphia on Tuesday 24 November 1936, where relief for Spain was considered. 
85 AFSC Foreign Service minutes, 22 October 1936, AFSCA.
86 AFSC meeting minutes, 31 October 1936, AFSCA.
87 AFSC Board of Directors minutes, 2 December 1936, AFSCA.
88 Board of Directors minutes, 2 December 1936, p. 2, AFSCA. The Ethical Culture Society was a 
nontheistic religion established by Felix Adler, a Jewish rationalist intellectual, in 1876. The Mennonites 
were a group of Christian denominations named after Menno Simons (1496-1561), committed to non 
violent resistance and pacifism. They were very close to the Friends.
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They agreed to gather as much information as possible about the Spanish situation, from 
Salvador de Madariaga,89 A. Kuckhorn, correspondent in Spain for the New York Times, 
and other informed persons. It was felt essential to send an American Friend to Spain to 
make a report.90 
Also at about the time of the restaurant meeting, Clarence E. Picket, in typical Quaker 
fashion,  “unofficially”  brought  together  a  group  of  Friends  to  promote  the  process 
through the AFSC, the Foreign Service Section and the Board of Directors. Contact was 
made with the Spanish Ambassador,  Mr Fernando de los Ríos.  Through a  Catholic 
Priest, the Jesuit Francis Talbot S.J., editor of the national Catholic weekly magazine 
America, contact was also made with Sr Juan de Cardenas91, Franco’s representative. 
Letters of introduction were obtained, and the way was prepared for Sylvester Jones’ 
mission to Spain.
Picket wrote to Jones in Chicago, explaining the contacts made as well as the activities 
of  the  “most  active  organisation  in  USA for  Spain:  ‘American  Friends  of  Spanish 
Democracy’ (who were already sending food clothing and money, but helping only the 
Republican side)”. Mention was also made of the letters about the Spanish situation 
received from Dr Josep Pijoan, then working in Chicago.92
On 3 December 1936, Picket sent a telegram to Sylvester Jones, requesting him to carry 
out the mission.93.  Jones answered positively on 5 December  1936, also mentioning 
Pijoan’s offer to accompany him and notifying Picket that he would be at the Foreign 
Service Section meeting on 17 December 1936.94 At this meeting, attended by Sylvester 
Jones, Dr Pijoan and representatives from the Mennonites (Orie O. Miller, unofficially), 
Sylvester Jones explained Dr Pijoan’s offer of help. It was agreed, on the proposal of 
Rufus Jones,95 AFSC President, to start collections immediately,  so as to be ready to 
help as soon as Jones returned from Spain. It was also agreed that for the moment all aid 
89 Salvador de Madariaga (1886-1978), Spanish diplomat, writer and historian who went to England in 
1936 to escape the Civil War. He had been ambassador in the USA, Delegate to the League of Nations 
and Minister of Education 1932-34.
90 ‘Note concerning proposed steps with regard to Spain, growing out of a discussion meeting held at the 
International Restaurant, Tuesday, November 24, 1936’, Committee on Spain, Minutes, 1936, AFSCA.
91 Letter to Mr Juan de Cárdenas, 18 November 1936, AFSCA.
92 Letter from Sylvester Jones to May M. Jones, 30 November 1936, AFSCA.
93 Telegram from Clarence E. Picket to Sylvester Jones, 3 December 1936, AFSCA.
94 Letter from Sylvester Jones to Clarence E. Picket, 5 December 1936, AFSCA.
95 Rufus Mathew Jones (1863-1948), American Quaker. A writer and college professor of Theology, he 
helped to found the AFSC and became its President.
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would  be  channelled  through  the  British  Friends  (FSC).  A “Special  Committee  on 
Spain” was appointed to organise the care and forwarding of funds through the FSC, to 
prepare for the receipt of gifts in kind and to make plans to solicit funds from Friends 
and various other interested groups. Finally, it was agreed not to decide on the question 
of maintaining American personnel  in Spain and establishing their  own channels  of 
distribution until receiving the recommendations of Sylvester Jones.96
The AFSC, at its meeting of 18 December 1936, confirmed all the decisions made the 
previous  day  by  the  Foreign  Service  Section  and  formally  adopted  the  following 
agreement, initiating the involvement of the American Friends in the Spanish Civil War:
“FOREIGN SERVICE SECTION: William Eves III, Chairman.
Spain: As previously reported, the Foreign Service Section has been following the 
situation in Spain with a view to discovering ways of rendering assistance if the way 
should open. In view of the increasing need and of the number of individuals and 
organisations interested in the Service Committee’s undertaking a mission of relief in 
Spain, an unofficial group of Friends met on November 24 to discuss the situation, 
following which this group reported to the Board of Directors on December 2 and to the 
Foreign Service Section on December 17 to which meeting were invited members of the 
Board of Directors and representatives of various organisations (Association to Save the 
Children of Spain, the Ethical Culture Society, the Central Committee of the Mennonite 
Church) interested in learning more of the situation and the possibility of working out 
some form of cooperation for work in Spain.”97
At each of the meetings mentioned above, a great deal of information was presented 
concerning the tragic situation and the enormous need for relief in the form of food and 
clothing. Their conclusions focused on the need to make their own investigation as to 
what that service for Friends should be. They asked Sylvester Jones of Chicago, who 
had  spent  many  years  in  Cuba  and  had  “a  remarkable  command  of  the  Spanish 
language”,  and  the  ability  to  seek  out  the  particular  relief  needs,  to  undertake  this 
mission of investigation.
In view of the appalling and widespread need and the fact that only a small portion of 
this need could be met by funds raised in America, they agreed that emphasis should be 
placed on the relief of children and nursing and expectant mothers, and the paramount 
96 Foreign Service Section minutes, 17 December 1936, AFSCA.
97 AFSC minutes, 18 December 1936, AFSCA.
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aim  that  any  relief  undertaken  should  be  entirely  non-partisan  and  administered 
according to need.
The Foreign Service Section recommended to the Service Committee the appointment 
of a nucleus committee on Spain with power to act and add to its number, referring 
important questions of policy to the Board of Directors for a decision.
Finally, they decided that the question of maintaining American personnel in Spain and 
of  establishing  their  own  channels  of  distribution  be  left  open  until  the 
recommendations of Sylvester Jones had been received; in the meantime, utilising the 
channels established by British Friends.98
Concerning  neutrality,  the  minutes  state:  “Considerable  discussion  followed  on  the 
difficulty of maintaining a neutral attitude in this present situation in Spain; that it was 
only human to be sympathetic with the party which was felt to be right”.99 While this 
feeling  seemed  to  be  general,  it  was  strongly  emphasised  that  the  Friends  had  to 
maintain their policy of rendering assistance according to need, regardless of political 
affiliation; going into a situation quietly and rendering their mission in the spirit of love 
and goodwill.100
On 23 December 1936 the newly formed Committee on Spain held its first meeting. The 
nucleus of the Committee was composed of Patrick Murphy Malin, William Eves III, 
Richard R. Wood, Esther Thomas, Harold Evans, Douglas V. Steere, Grade E. Rhoads 
Jr.,  Hertha Kraus and Albert  L.  Scott  Jr.  They also sought representatives  from the 
Mennonites and the Dunkerds101, and wanted to involve other groups interested in doing 
relief work with the Friends. Thus members were made responsible for contacting the 
Methodists and the Council of Churches.102 They decided to ask the AFSC Director, 
John Reich, to dedicate his available time to the clerical work of the new Committee 
and to find stenographic assistance. They allocated $1,000 to cover expenses.
At this first meeting, Dr Pijoan reported on contacts in New York with individuals and 
associations such as the “Association to Save the Children of Spain”, a title which could 
98 AFSC minutes, 18 December 1936, pp. 2-3, AFSCA.
99 AFSC minutes, 18 December 1936, p. 2, AFSCA.
100 Their unstated objective was that the latter would convey the Quaker spiritual message, without them 
carrying out explicitly religious activity. AFSCA: AFSC Minutes 18 December 1936, 3 (Sylvester Jones).
101 Christian Churches closely linked to the Friends.
102 Protestant gathering of Churches
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easily be confused with the Save the Children Fund and Save the Children Union. In 
fact, the association was so openly pro-Republican that even Dr Pijoan, sympathetic to 
that cause, advised proceeding “cautiously” until evaluating their “fundamental aim and 
ideals”.
It is interesting that Pijoan refers to contacts  made with groups interested in raising 
relief for the rebel side —he took it for granted that the Friends would to try to help the 
Republicans— stating that: “he gathered that this group would accept money and gifts 
in kind to be administered through their own channels but that it would probably not be 
possible for Friends to administer that relief in [rebel] Spain”.103 We see again the idea 
presented by the Jacobs and their Madrid group, which in turn influenced other British 
Friends: no relief could be given to the Nationalist side, either because they did not 
want it or because it would be subject to unacceptable rules. As shown in this thesis, 
this was not so.104
Finally, it must be mentioned that it was agreed not to make any public appeal for funds 
until the recommendations of Sylvester Jones had been received. 
2.8.2 Through Loyalist and Insurgent Spain: the journey of Sylvester 
Jones
Sylvester  Jones sailed from New York on 20 December 1936 to  London, where he 
arrived  on  Sunday  28  December  1936.  There  he  met  the  Spanish  Republican 
Ambassador,  Sr  Pablo  de  Azcarate  y  Florez,  and  the  Catalan  Government 
representative, Mr Jerome Darling, who provided him with letters of presentation for 
both  the  Spanish  Central  Government  and  for  Catalan  officials.  Both  were  very 
receptive to the American Quakers’ presence and relief activity.
After meeting the British Friends, Paul Sturge and Fred Tritton, both involved in the 
Spanish operation,  he also had the opportunity to meet the Chairman of the Friends 
Service Council (FSC), Cuthbert Wighan, and Moser Anderson, a member of both the 
Friends’ Committee on Spain and of the Save the Children Fund. He also met Peggy 
Smith,  working  for  the  NJCSR,  who  proposed  the  creation  of  a  Committee  of  all 
103 AFSC “Committee on Spain” minutes, 23 December 1936, AFSCA.
104 See above and Chapter 4. 
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American nations to administer the relief operation in Spain. Jones wrote of her: “Her 
enthusiasm carries her away. Being young she has the right to be visionary”.105 
From London, Sylvester Jones travelled to Paris, where he spoke by telephone with Dr 
Junod,  the  ICRC’s  delegate.  Junod,  then in  St  Jean de Luz,  on the  French-Spanish 
border in the Basque country, asked him to go to Geneva and make contact with the 
ICRC there.
After  meeting in Geneva with Mlle Suzane Ferriere,  he was in touch with both the 
ICRC and the SCIU and obtained information and contacts that he would require if he 
“should later go to the Rebel side”.106 Why was Sylvester Jones unsure that he would be 
visiting Nationalist Spain, given that the American Friends had clearly requested a full 
investigation on both sides? He gives no explanation, and we can only presume that he 
was swayed by the British Friends assertions about the Nationalists’ supposed hostility 
to relief work by the Friends. 
Sylvester  Jones left  Geneva for Barcelona,  arriving on 3 January 1937 and meeting 
Alfred Jacob, Edith Pye and Miss Pictet.107 The following day he visited some of the 
children’s camps and saw the feeding operation at the Barcelona railway station for the 
refugees arriving from Madrid. He also met Pijoan’s brother Joseph, who was working 
in Valencia with the Republican Government.
On 6 January 1937 Sylvester Jones visited Castelló, on his way to Valencia, where he 
met  the  Ecroyds  and could  see  the  refugee  problem personally;  the  small  province 
accommodated  more  than  6,000  refugees.  After  visiting  Valencia  and  Alicante,  he 
finally arrived in Madrid, where he met with the authorities and did a needs assessment. 
On 14 January 1937, Jones sent Clarence F. Picket the following cable:
Great scarcity of essential foods STOP war conditions and falling peseta make 
commercial purchases abroad increasingly difficult and domestic supplies nearly 
exhausted. STOP send food not money STOP recommend sending cargo as generous as 
possible of flour, sugar, tinned milk and meat STOP for use exclusively of children and 
mothers STOP distribution be made by non military government authorities jointly with 
Friends Committee STOP challenging opportunity for service of love STOP 
105 Jones, S. (1937), p. 9.
106 Ibid, p. 10.
107 Dr Miette Pictet, based in Republican territory, represented the SCIU in Spain; see Chapter 4.
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Government here guarantees that food sent will be used exclusively for purposes 
designated by donor STOP just returned from Madrid front STOP city prepared for 
siege STOP complete evacuation of civilians ordered STOP two hundred thousand will 
evacuate in next thirty days STOP help in feeding increasingly needed.108
Once back in Barcelona on 17 January 1937, Jones met Jacob and Rodolfo Olgiati. 
Leaving the city and travelling via France, he arrived at St Jean de Luz on the Spanish-
French border in the Basque country. As Jones explains, the American Ambassador in 
Spain, Claude G. Bowers, made arrangements for him to travel to Burgos, obtaining the 
corresponding permit.  As we can see,  Sylvester  Jones had not been dissuaded from 
visiting Franco’s Spain by the British Friends’ opinions.109
On 22 January 1937, Sylvester Jones travelled to Burgos by car.110 Now in “insurgent 
territory” as he called the Francoist zone, he went to his appointment with the Count of 
Vallellano,  the  President  of  the  Nationalist  Red  Cross.  As  Vallellano  was  visiting 
hospitals, he was met by the General Secretary,  the Count of Torrellano, Marquis of 
Buniel. Jones wrote: 
“He greeted me cordially from behind a desk piled high with work. When I told him 
who I was and why I had come, he was enthusiastic. I hastened to caution him that we 
were not wealthy people and that donations, if any, might be quite small. He replied, as 
others had, that the important thing is that a group of people in far-off North America 
have thought enough about Spain to send someone to inquire with a view to lending a 
hand”.111
Torrellano estimated that there were about 30,000 war orphans, “cared for mostly by the 
Religious  Orders.”  According  to Torrellano,  food was “in sufficient  amount  for  the 
present” [sic], but he did not know much about the specific needs of the war orphans.112 
He presented  Sylvester  Jones  with  a  list  of  Red  Cross  requirements:  “ambulances, 
operating tables, stretchers, surgical instruments in general, steam pressure sterilisers, 
portable x-ray machines, and other x-ray material, clinical thermometers, quartz lamps, 
anti-gangrene  and  anti-tetanus  serum,  gauze  and  cotton”.  In  brief,  there  was  a 
108 Jones, S. (1937), p. 16.
109 Ibid, p. 15.
110 Ibid, p. 16.
111 Ibid.
112 There were many coordination problems in welfare matters in Nationalist Spain immediately after the 
military coup. See Chapter 5.
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“desperate need of medicines and hospital  equipment”.113 At the end of the meeting, 
reports Jones, the Marquis “walked arm in arm with me to the outer entrance where he 
asked the chauffeur to take me to the hotel”.114 The expected Nationalist refusal was 
nowhere to be seen.
From Burgos, Jones returned to Barcelona via France, and then sailed to the United 
States on 5 February 1937. He reported: “There were 150,000 refugee children without 
sufficient food in Loyalist Spain. Another 30,000 war orphans in the care of Nationalists 
were in urgent need of clothing and medical supplies”.115 He estimated the needs on 
both  sides  and  confirmed  that  he  was  warmly  welcomed  both  by  Nationalist  and 
Republican officials. There is no evidence that the fact that it was “Quaker aid” was an 
obstacle to its being accepted. 
2.9 A first assessment
The  Spanish  conflict,  with  its  highly  political  overtones,  inspired  humanitarian 
initiatives almost immediately. In general, these supported one or other faction, mostly 
the Republicans. In the lead was Britain, where the “Aid to Spain” movement created a 
groundswell of support for the Spanish Republic.
This upsurge contributed to moving the consciences of the British Quakers and of Save 
the Children. These organisations helped to found some of the emerging initiatives, the 
NJCSR and GRF,  as  well  as  mobilising  their  own resources.  From early  on in  the 
conflict, they focused on help for refugee children in Catalonia and other parts of Spain.
Once the idea of helping children within France had been abandoned, Rodolfo Olgiati 
of SCI went to Madrid to work for the evacuation and the care of the needy in the 
besieged Republican capital,  and in Valencia,  coordinating with the efforts of Swiss 
Aid. SCI had previously limited its work to helping once a conflict had finished: the 
trips  organised by SCI to  evacuate  children  from Madrid to  Valencia  were its  first 
action in the midst of an armed conflict.
As explained above, by late 1936 the British Quakers and SCI were active in Spain. 
While the FSC and SCI were non-partisan in their founding principles, they went to 
113 Jones, S. (1937), p. 27.
114 Jones, S. (1937), p. 28. 
115 Jones, S. (1937), p. 1.
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Spain moved by the suffering of the population on the Republican side and worked in 
the Republican zone. Nonetheless, they did cooperate with AFSC in the management of 
supplies and in other actions related to relief operations on both sides. 
The American Quakers were influenced by the “aid to Spain” movement and the British 
Quakers’ experiences and information. However, they took a very “Quaker” approach 
and, on the basis of Sylvester Jones’ findings, planned an effective non partisan relief 
operation. They worked in Republican territory with and through the British Friends and 
went on their own to Nationalist territory.
The intensive work of Mme Small, travelling through both Republican and Nationalist 
Spain, made possible the work in both zones of Save the Children, through the Union 
(SCIU), which was present in the conflict from late 1936.
The ICRC dealt with the Spanish conflict from the beginning. It accepted and dealt with 
both Red Cross organisations and both Governments, working through its delegates in 
both zones. The ICRC focused on the alleviation of suffering in accordance with its 
principles and helped in the evacuation from Madrid, in coordination with SCI and SA.
The detailed study of how the agencies performed their humanitarian tasks is the subject 
of the following chapters.
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Chapter 3: The work of the agencies (1) 
(1936-1937) 
3.1 The British Quakers
3.1.1 Initial plans for relief work in Republican Spain
The  FSC  in  Barcelona  focused  on  the  problem  presented  by  the  refugees,  mainly 
children from Madrid and Valencia, of whom normally around 600 arrived each day, 
and some days  up to  2,500. Local  authority and charity  resources  were scarce and, 
disrupted by the conflict, were unable to cover all the needs.
By October 1936 the supply of milk was irregular and close to total failure, not only due 
to  the  exceptional  situation,  but  also  because  most  dairy  factories  were  located  in 
Nationalist Spain.1
The Spanish situation was considered by the Meeting for Sufferings in London on 4 
November 1936, taking into account a report from Alfred Jacob and Paul D. Sykes from 
the FSC, and the idea of a joint appeal with Save the Children Fund was contemplated.2
The Committee on Spain agreed on a joint FSC/SCF appeal, with the collaboration of 
the  British  Red  Cross.  They  agreed  to  joint  action  and  distribution,  including 
collaboration with the SCIU in Geneva, which would be in charge of purchasing and 
technical  direction.  Mr  Bertrand  Pictet,  a  Geneva  Friend,  was  named  “Agent  de 
Liaison” between the Quakers and SCIU.3
3.1.2 Official relief in Catalonia: the nightmare of the conflicting powers
The Civil War saw clashes between the Catalan government —the Generalitat— and the 
Spanish  central  government.4 The  relief  responsibilities  of  municipal  authorities  in 
Barcelona and other Catalan cities were a further source of conflict.
1 FHL CoS, minutes, 27 October 1936; circular letter dated 21 October 1936 and attached to the minutes, 
FHL.
2 Meeting for Sufferings, minutes, 4 November 1936, FHL.
3 FHL CoS, minutes, 5 November 1936, FHL.
4 Catalonia was an Autonomous Region under the Autonomy Statute of 1932. 
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In  reality,  between the defeat  of  the military  uprising  in  Catalonia  in  July and late 
October 1936, power was in the hands of the revolutionary Comitè Central de Milícies 
Antifeixistes,  led  principally  by  the  anarchists5,  and  both  governments  were  mere 
spectators.  Mme Small  talks  of  “incontrollable  organisation”  saying  that  the  central 
government “does not count for anything” in Barcelona.6 At this time, care of refugees 
in Barcelona was nominally assured by local refugee committees (with representatives 
from unions, parties, government bodies…), and funded by the Republican and Catalan 
Governments.
Between September  1936,  when the  Catalan  Government  was  restructured  with the 
entry of the anarchists, and August 1937, action became more disciplined. The Central 
Committee  for Refugee Aid was created  and regulated,  with the Ministry of Public 
Health Affairs and Social Assistance and the Council of Public Health at War. There 
was  growing  interest  in  coming  to  terms  with  the  increasingly  serious  matter  of 
refugees.
When  the  central  government  transferred  to  Barcelona  on  31  October  1937,  the 
confrontation between the Catalan and central authorities sharpened and continued so 
until the end of the conflict.  The Republican Government began to absorb, under its 
Public Health and Social Assistance Ministry, many activities that had been officially 
transferred or “de facto” taken on by the Catalan Government, such as refugee relief and 
supplies to the civil population. 
Nonetheless, responsibilities continued to be divided and contradictory.  For example, 
Marcel Junod refers to the difficulties of dealing with Catalan and Basque Red Crosses, 
together  with  the  Republicans,  on  prisoner  and  hostage  matters,  as  well  as  the 
relationship with three different Public Social assistance organisations and Ministries of 
Public Health (Republican, Basque and Catalan).7
With  masses  of  refugees  arriving,  and  food  becoming  scarcer  day  by  day,  the 
humanitarian  relief  brought  by  foreign  agencies  was  in  huge  demand.  Government 
disorganisation meant that this relief was not subject to control, with the exception of 
5 Anti-Fascist Militias Committee, formed 21 July 1936. Thomas, H. (1990), p. 295.
6 Mme Small, ‘Voyage October-November 1936’, p. 12, AP.92.16.5, AFG.
7 Junod (1963), p. 65.
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the strict collection of import duties on goods imported. The agencies in the Republican 
territory tried with little success to reduce or eliminate these duties for relief goods.
Nonetheless, even if in theory their activities were subject to many different regulations, 
the multiplicity of political power in Republican Spain gave agencies greater freedom of 
movement than they would have under a single authority, as we will see in the case of 
Nationalist Spain. On the other hand, the communication problems and the vacuum of 
power made the agencies’ work more hazardous.
3.1.3 The Friends begin relief work in Barcelona
The  way  the  Friends  started  their  activity  in  Barcelona  is  a  clear  example  of  the 
combination of freedom and bureaucracy.
In December 1936, supplies of dried milk failed. Jacob reported to Mme Small on 12 
December  that  the  production  of  tinned  milk  had  fallen  by  40%.  The  municipal 
maternity centre could only supply two tins a week to 400 mothers with children under 
18 months.  Jacob proposed to  the local  relief  committee  selecting  200 of  the  more 
needy children. The committee’s officer refused, saying “to select a group of children 
for special treatment… amounts to creating a little hierarchy”, and “the Syndicate which 
organised most of the rationing was unlikely to approve and might even appropriate the 
milk for those children they personally identified as needy”.8
The  Friends  then  discovered  an  uncovered  need.  New  child  refugees  arriving  at 
Barcelona Sants railway station were first transferred to the Casa de Misericordia. Here 
they were fed if it was lunch time, but otherwise they had to wait until being placed in 
their corresponding colonies or foster homes.9 As nobody was yet involved, the Quakers 
could establish a feeding station at the Casa de Misericordia without any problem. They 
began a joint operation with SCIU, with the Friends assuming the direct distribution of 
food, avoiding the possibility that the authorities try to feed the children themselves. 
Jacob did not want “to report to London and Geneva: ‘200 cases of milk turned over to 
the authorities in Barcelona’.” He argued that the Friends wanted to know the children 
and “regard them as our special charges”.10 
8 Letter from A Jacob to Mme Small, 12 December 1936, FHL.
9 Letter from A Jacob to Mr Mackenzie (ESC) and Mme Small (SCIU), 7 and 12 December 1936, FHL.
10 Letter from A Jacob to Mme Small. 12 December 1936, FHL.
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The work started on 25 December 1936 and a few days later the feeding operation was 
extended to the zone of the railway station, because some children arrived and departed 
without making a stop at the Casa de Misericordia. The operation at the station was run 
by Quakers, and as in the Casa de Misericordia, children were given a hot drink. This 
was to be milk but, as result of a cocoa donation from the well known British chocolate 
firm, Cadbury, the drink that was going to became popular in Republican Barcelona was 
“hot  cocoa”  (hot  water  with  some  milk  and  cocoa  powder)  that,  with  the  sugar  it 
contained, was a very nourishing drink. 
From  the  donations  received  and  some  supplies  from  the  authorities,  the  Quakers 
maintained canteens in Gracia and Sants, able to feed 1,000 children under six years old 
with half a litre of milk a day and occasionally food such as biscuits. A quarter of a 
kilogram of sugar was also provided per week. Valuable donations from MacFarlane’s 
and McVitie’s in Britain permitted a steady supply of biscuits.
3.1.4 Alfred Jacob’s personal activities
From the start of the Quakers’ work in Spain, Jacob ran a relief activity coordinated 
with the Ecroyd group in Madrid. Financed by himself and others, this was separate 
from the joint FSC/SCIU operation, with its own budget.
Jacob’s republican sympathies were not a barrier to him seeing the terrible conditions 
under  which  many  right  wing  supporters  were  living  in  Republican  Spain.  Jacob 
proposed that a hotel be set up under government protection and control while he took 
care of refugee support. This proposal did not take into account Barcelona’s political 
atmosphere, where rightists were denied official support; a pattern which was repeated 
in the Basque Country.11 Where Jacob did succeed was in an “unofficial” programme of 
food parcel supplies to the right wing refugees living “undercover” and also to some 
needy British expatriates in Barcelona. This programme received money from Britain.12
3.1.5 The break with the Save the Children International Union
The British Quakers’ relationship with the SCIU, governed by a contractual agreement, 
was very effective in obtaining funds through joint appeals. However, it broke down 
11 See section 4.1.5.
12 FSC, Meeting for Sufferings, 4/11/1936, FHL.
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due to differences in working methods and personalities. Both Mme Small  and Mlle 
(Dr)  Pictet,  the  experienced  and  professional  SCIU  workers  organising  relief  in 
Barcelona, reacted negatively from the beginning to Alfred Jacob’s lack of experience 
in humanitarian tasks and his individualistic working methods.13 
Jacob’s  wife,  Norma,  very involved in  the service,  referred  as  follows to  a  visit  to 
Barcelona by Mme Small:
“in a spirit of fault-finding and after just a mere glimpse began giving orders and 
turning everything upside down without consulting us”.14
Jacob  avoided  meeting  Mme  Small;  there  are  many  references  to  him  missing 
appointments and disappearing. This situation brought collaboration between the FSC 
and the SCIU to an end, and their agreement terminated at the end of 1937.
The problem was considered by some of the Friends. In a letter to Paul Sturgess and 
Fred  Tritton  of  the  FSC  Committee  on  Spain,  the  American  Friend  Patrick  Malin 
proposed without success a series of measures to resolve the dispute, basically based on 
the elimination of the negative postures of Norma Jacob and the separation of Alfred 
Jacob from direct relief activities. 15
3.1.6 Difficult times in Catalonia
In November 1938, it was estimated that there were more than 700,000 refugees from 
the rest of Spain in Catalonia,  excluding the internally displaced Catalan population. 
Given the estimated population for Catalonia at that time of 2,800,000 inhabitants, this 
was an increase of 25%. The magnitude of the problem speaks for itself.
Reporting on his visit to Catalonia in January 1938, Dan West16 advised that the region 
was “the neediest in Spain”. Thousands of refugees came over the border at Puigcerdà, 
13 “A Jacob has not any kind of experience in this kind of work” (25 Nov. 1936); “He cannot be 
considered as very capable” (Mme Small in meeting with Pictet and Miss Pye, who were in full 
agreement, 22 December 1936); “Jacob is not a loyal collaborator” (13 Feb. 1937), AEG-SCIU. 
AP.92.16: Guerre Civil Espagnole: Notes, rapports et voyages en Europe Nationaliste et Gouvernemental 
de Mme Frédérique Small et de Mlle Miette Pictet… Octobre 1936 – Décembre 1937.
14 Letter from Norma Jacob to Fred Tritton, 29 October 1937, FHL.
15 Committee on Spain – Correspondence AFSC – FSC 6 July 1937, FHL. See section 4.1.4 for the 
SCIU’s view of the rupture.
16A FSC worker in Nationalist Spain whose activities are studied in Section 5.1.4.
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the  nearest  point  of  entrance  to  any Atlantic  port.17 Domingo  Ricart,  Jacob’s  close 
assistant,  advised:  “Out  of  the  crowd  of  poor  people,  came  a  mass  of  humanity 
consisting of old women and young women, women with babies in their arms, children, 
a few tottering old men, wounded militiamen… They stand in this queue (for a card 
entitling them to a hot meal of potatoes or rice, and a place to sleep) sometimes for 
hours. Their clothes are ragged, they look worn out. They look cold. Finally they get 
their meal. But there isn’t enough milk for the babies…”18
The  Republic’s  loss  of  the  north  at  the  end  of  1937  produced  an  exodus  towards 
Barcelona of such proportions that the agencies were unable to cope and the authorities 
in Barcelona (the central  and the Catalan governments),  not always  in coordination, 
struggled  to  meet  the  challenge.  The  Catalan  government  established  five  canteens 
feeding 16,000 children of up to 14 years of age with a midday meal at the price of one 
peseta. Additional space was added by converting cinemas into feeding stations.19
The Quakers’ milk distribution policy changed after  the rupture with the SCIU and 
instead of maintaining a fixed level of food supply for a fixed number of recipients, 
their  aim  became  to  feed  as  many  children  as  possible;  a  slightly  smaller  portion 
allowed them to reach more children.20 With this  policy,  the FSC in Barcelona was 
feeding approximately 19,000 children. Funding came from their own resources, as well 
as from the General Relief Fund and the Swiss Committee that ran the Swiss Aid (SA). 
Jacob’s own operation  in  Catalonia  could not  expand,  because no more  funds were 
available. In fact, the Quaker effort expanded, as we shall see in Section 5.1.1., through 
the action of the American Friends (AFSC).
Conditions worsened day by day, and in January 1938, Dan West gives a sober vision of 
his visit to a refuge in what used to be the Barcelona Seminary:
“Here 2,500 people live a miserable existence. The 250 children get an orange and a 
piece of bread for breakfast, the others nothing. At lunch time, we saw the soup being 
made in the kitchen – 220 pounds of chick peas, 165 pounds of rice, water – this with 
less than 2 ounces of bread each is all the 2,500 get. At supper they have beans; and 
there is little variation from day to day. On one of the beautiful arched porches I saw a 
17 West (1938), p. 11.
18 Ibid, p. 11.
19 Committee on Spain (1938) (Emily Parker report), AFSCA.
20 Letter from Elise Thomson to Fred Tritton, 29 November 1937, FHL.
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pile of small bones – clean ones. And I asked the guide if someone has had chicken, 
“No”, he replied, “Cat. Every cat which can be caught is eaten”.
The situation  was  also  appalling  at  the  Valls  refuge:  all  the  Asturian  children  who 
arrived  were  anaemic  and  most  had  contagious  skin  troubles:  the  special  meal  at 
Christmas was a piece of bread and a cup of milk.
No  planning  could  be  made,  because  funds  were  limited,  the  needy  increasing  in 
number and the government services, Asistencia Social and others, lost in the need.
According to Alfred Jacob, the products required were: milk, codfish, beans, chicken, 
pears, rice, sugar and flour. But Domingo Ricart insisted: “we must repeat and keep on 
repeating:  Milk,  milk,  plenty  of  milk,  at  least  milk  for  the  children!  This  is  the 
unanimous appeal of all the mothers, and of all those responsible for the refugees: only 
give us milk.”21
3.1.7 Relief work in Barcelona and new alliances
From mid 1937, the FSC looked for new alliances with smaller organisations, believing 
that  the size and highly organised character  of the SCIU had led to the rupture.  In 
November  1937,  when  the  agreement  with  the  SCIU  terminated,  there  was  a 
reorganisation, and understandings were reached with Norwegian and Danish Friends 
and the General Relief Fund (GRF). Elise Thomson, a Danish Friend already working in 
Barcelona, was taken under the direct support of Danish Friends, who also agreed to 
sponsor part of the relief expenses.
In mid August 1937, the Barcelona operation had moved to the Hogar Luis Vives, in the 
upper part of Barcelona, which became the office and the residence for all FSC workers. 
The Gracia canteen, run by FSC, was to be funded solely by the GRF, while those in 
Sants and in calle  Carmen were to be run and funded by both FSC and GRF. The 
Norwegian Friends would fund the San Andrés canteen but the FSC would run it for 
them. Elise Thompson was in charge of the technical direction of the Carmen and Sants 
canteens.22 
21 West (1938), p. 12.
22 FSC Committee on Spain, ‘Barcelona Milk Canteens Suggest Scheme for Joint Management by 
General Relief fund and Society of Friends’, November 1937, FHL.
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Without the “interference and control” of the “Swiss envoyees”, new policies of milk 
distribution were established, and Jacob felt relieved: “The impression is one of endless 
activity in which everyone knows his part and gets on with it, maintaining the most 
cordial relationship with the others”.23 
3.2 The activities of the International Committee of the Red Cross
The ICRC learned in the Spanish Civil War that they could not act as they would in a 
“normal”  war between armies  of different  countries.  Here,  they had to  extend their 
action to the civilian victims of the war. Also, in the first months the brutality of the 
conflict  meant  that  there were practically no prisoners:  as Dr Junod explained,  they 
were executed.24
The delegates addressed: 1) the conditions and treatment of inmates; 2) their relief while 
in captivity; 3) their possible exchange with prisoners of the other side; 4) information 
about the captives; and 5) the establishment of postal communication.
In Spain prisoners’ names and details were for the first time in history transmitted by 
the ICRC using a radio service.
3.2.1 The treatment of prisoners
The leading authorities of both parties promised to treat prisoners in accordance with 
the Geneva Convention, but lower down this commitment  was often ignored. In the 
Republican Zone, the ICRC delegates faced the added complication of the existence of 
autonomous governments in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Furthermore, some of 
the fighting units on the Republican side had their own autonomy and at times rejected 
the orders of the higher authorities. 
The Nationalist  militias (the Falange and the Carlists) were more controlled by their 
upper ranks. Here there was another difficulty: since Franco did not accept the existence 
of the Catalan  and Basque governments,  the ICRC’s work was stopped or  severely 
delayed when these bodies were involved.
23 Correspondence, 26 April 1938; Committee on Spain 1938 – Barcelona B-7, FHL.
24 See Section 2.3.
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As it was a civil war, prisoners were not only combatants but included civilians who 
were possibly to be used as hostages.
During the first months of the war, Marcel Junod and all the ICRC delegates aimed to 
secure  prisoners’  safety,  improve  their  living  conditions  and,  if  possible,  organise 
prisoner exchanges between the parties. With this objective, the ICRC was in permanent 
contact  and  collaboration  with  the  Diplomatic  Corps  representatives  in  Spanish 
territory. At this time, there were prisoners on both sides, but on the Republican side, 
with  big  industrial  cities  such  as  Madrid,  Bilbao  and  Barcelona,  there  were  many 
prisoners in prisons and, in the maritime cities, prison-ships. In general, in Barcelona 
the militias committee, led by anarchists, held the real power at the beginning of the 
conflict. In Madrid the authorities had more influence, but here too the militias were 
powerful.  Finally  in  the  Basque  country,  the  civil  authorities  disappeared  with  the 
military  uprising,  except  in  Vizcaya.  Of  the  three  Defence  Committees  (Juntas  de 
Defensa) that assumed all power, only that in Azpeitia was under nationalist  control 
(PNV): the San Sebastian junta was controlled by the anarchists and that in Eibar by the 
socialists.25 During the first days of the war the workers’ militias were predominant, but 
gradually the Basque nationalists’ own militias became a substantial force to impose 
some kind of order and control in the matter of the prisoners and their safety. 
The  ICRC’s  task  was  complicated  by  the  advance  of  Franco’s  forces,  usually 
accompanied by increasing air raids on the towns. Prisoners were at risk of becoming 
the only available target of reprisals for these bombings.
Dr Junod was in Bilbao on 24 September 1936, together with Jean Herbette, the French 
Ambassador to Spain, to negotiate with the Civil Governor, then the leading authority in 
the city.26 One of the objectives of his visit was the exchange of the Carlist MP, Esteban 
Bilbao Egia, a well known Nationalist, for the Bilbao Mayor, Ernesto Ercoreca.27 
As the Nationalists had announced an offensive against Vizcaya the next day, Burgos 
Radio was constantly calling Dr Junod to “leave Bilbao, because otherwise the Burgos 
25 See Garmendia & González Portilla (1988), pp. 19-24; Meer (1992), pp. 100-105.
26 A Basque Government would later be created under the Autonomy Statute introduced on 1 October 
1936.
27 Bilbao Egia would become one of the key political figures in Francoist Spain. Ercoreca, a member of 
the Republican Left Party, had been in Madrid at the time of the uprising and was taken prisoner by 
Franco’s forces while trying to return to Bilbao.
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Government can not guarantee his life…”28 The planned offensive and bombardment 
affected the meeting. Dr Junod explains: “José Antonio Aguirre approached and told me 
that really it was not a good time to discuss the exchange of hostages, because if Bilbao 
was bombarded, the reaction of the masses in respect of the hostages would be terrible. 
He advised me to return to San Sebastian, as soon as possible, to dissuade the Francoists 
from bombing the capital of the Basque Country. He even authorised me to take with 
me Don Esteban, because the exchange had been agreed, and ‘word given, word kept’. 
We waited  until  dark  and  placed  Don  Esteban  in  a  taxi,  well  hidden  between  the 
Ambassador (Herbette) and myself. The man was more dead than alive, and despite his 
belief that it was his final hour I needed to keep him going. He very readily gave me his 
word that he would remain in France until Ercorea had been liberated”.29
On going  to  the  Nationalist  side,  Dr  Junod  obtained  from the  authorities  a  verbal 
guarantee that if prisoners’ lives were respected they would do the same for the prison 
guards in Bilbao when, as forecasted, they took Bilbao.30 He hoped that this would serve 
as  protection  for  the  prisoners.  Junod  went  to  Vitoria  and,  after  complicated 
negotiations  with  the  military  commander,  took  Ercorea  to  St  Jean-de  Luz,  where 
Esteban Bilbao already was. They met in a hotel,  where the hostages and “enemies” 
hugged one another and “swore to use their best efforts to stop the massacres, and to be 
allies”. 31
On 25 September the Nationalist General Solchaga began the offensive, including aerial 
bombing. Junod, Herbette and his wife Marta, against the advice of the French consul in 
Bilbao, who said that the city was “in the bloody hands of the anarchists and without 
any authority”, decided to return there. On arriving, Junod witnessed what “a dozen 250 
kilo bombs felt like, with disembowelled houses and causing terrible destruction”.32 He 
noted  that  the  population  abandoned  their  houses  and  referred  to  a  total  lack  of 
authority.
28 Junod (1963), p. 73.
29 Ibid, pp. 72-73. Junod is mistaken in naming José Antonio Aguirre; he must refer to the civil governor 
José Echevarría, since he and the Basque nationalist leader Julio Jauregui were those present at the 
meeting, as confirmed by Jean Herbette. Aguirre — the future Basque President — was at that time in 
Madrid preparing the Spanish Parliament session scheduled for 1 October, in which the Basque 
Autonomy Statute was to be approved.
30 The Basque authorities and those guilty of crimes subject to court action were excluded from the 
guarantee.
31 Junod (1963), p. 74.
32 Ibid, p. 76. 
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With  the  bombardment  there  were  reprisals  against  prisoners.  In  the  morning,  the 
guards of the Altuna Mendi prison-ship, with 600 prisoners on board, selected and shot 
twenty nine prisoners, including one priest, and two more were shot at 12.30. On the 
Cabo Quilates, another prison-ship with 500 prisoners aboard, the guards shot thirty five 
prisoners.33 The threat of reprisals at the convent of the Custodian Angels, where the 
women prisoners were kept, was averted by Jean Laffontain, chief of the French colony 
in  Bilbao.  He  contacted  a  Basque  Nationalist  MP who  ensured  the  intervention  of 
soldiers to save the women.
All  this  complicated  Junod’s  task  of  organising  new  exchanges.  However,  as  the 
Nationalists confirmed their guarantee concerning prison guards, Junod was able to use 
this promise to protect the surviving prisoners.
In  Madrid  at  the  end  of  October  1936,  the  Republican  authorities  became  very 
concerned with the presence in the capital  of opponents of the Republic.  More than 
8,000 were imprisoned, about 8,000 were refugees in diplomatic premises and there was 
an unknown number free and working for the “Fifth Column”.34
News  arriving  from  the  front  about  Francoist  atrocities  in  captured  villages,  with 
killings  of  trade  unionists  and  left  activists,  increased  the  risk  of  reprisals  against 
prisoners. More people were being detained and some politicians started to ask what 
was happening to them. Largo Caballero asked the Interior  Minister,  Angel Galarza 
Gago, to  deal  with the matter,  but  any concrete  action,  such as the transfers of the 
prisoners to safer places,  was postponed. The beginning of October saw the start  of 
what would become known as “sacas”, the illegal removal of prisoners to be executed 
without trial,  supposedly by uncontrolled persons. According to the Soviet journalist 
Mijail Koltsov, then present in Madrid: “In the Madrid prisons there are 8,000 detainees 
and amongst them 3,000 academy officers, on active or reserve. If the enemy comes 
into the city or if a mutiny happens, the enemy shall find an excellent army officers’ 
column ready. It is necessary to evacuate them from the city, walking and in stages. But 
33 Meer (1992), p. 164. Other sources refer to the “killing of prisoners from the prison-ships Cabo 
Quilates and Altuna Mendi with 500 hostages on each and Arantzazu Mendi with 600, without any 
details.
34 From a phrase attributed to the Nationalist General Mola when, asked about the forces attacking 
Madrid, with four columns approaching from different points, he asserted that “another Fifth Column of 
Nationalists partisans was already in Madrid”.
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no one addresses this problem.” He raised the question with the Minister of State, Julio 
Alvarez del Vayo, who responded that all would be taken care of “in good time”.35
And, from that date until the nomination on 4 December 1936 of the anarchist Melchor 
Rodríguez as General Director of Prisons, one of the darkest episodes in the history of 
the Spanish 2nd Republic took place.36
During that period, the communist Santiago Carrillo Solares was head of public order in 
the Defence Junta, formed on 6 November 1936 to replace the Republican Government 
which moved to Valencia. His deputy was José Cazorla Maure.
The ICRC delegate in Madrid, George Henny, present in the capital from November 
until 4 December, reported:
“On 6, 7 and 8 November, 974 prisoners (you will find a list attached) left the Modelo 
Cellular Prison; 175 from the San Anton prison and about 150 from Las Ventas prison. 
This last figure is less exact because we do not have the list of names from this prison. 
Of these prisoners, only 196 arrived at the Alcalá de Henares workhouse: 11 from the 
Modelo prison, 120 from San Anton prison and 65 from the Ventas prison. We received 
the latter information from the director of the Alcalá workhouse, whom Sr Schlayer and 
I visited to find out what had happened to the prisoners that had left Madrid, since the 
prisoners’ parents, worried by the rumours, had come to our delegation looking for 
reassuring information.”37
When they realized  that  only 196 of the 1,275 prisoners that  had left  Madrid were 
accounted for, they began investigating in the different prisons to which they could have 
been transferred (Barcelona, Valencia, Alicante…). In Madrid there were many rumours 
about the prisoners’ fate. Henny, Schlayer and the Argentinian chargé d’affaires, Perez 
Quesada, travelled to Torrejon de Ardoz, near Madrid. They gathered information about 
executions and met witnesses who took them to the site of a suspected mass grave, of 
around 200 metres in length. Henny does not establish the number of dead, but refers to 
35 Koltsov (1963), pp. 168-169.
36 Melchor Rodríguez, appointed by the new Minister of Justice, García Oliver, another anarchist, was 
opposed to the practices mentioned. He had been Director of Prisons before, and had resigned very soon 
due to this attitude, according to Gibson (1983).
37 Henny, George (1937) ‘Rapports et Correspondance de Madrid 18/9/1936-2/1/1937’. B CR 212 GEN-
58. ICRCA; henceforth Henny (1937). Felix Schlayer, a German engineer who had lived in Madrid since 
1935, was Chargé d’affaires of the Norwegian Legation in Madrid. He worked with Henny on prisoner 
matters.
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a report by Shlayer who had seen many similar sites with Perez Quesada.38 He annexed 
Shlayer’s  findings,  drafted  in  Spanish  for  the  Norwegian  Government  and  the 
Diplomatic Corps, to his own report.
Shlayer refers to about 120 rebel officers “transferred” to Valencia who never arrived. 
He visited Santiago Carrillo, who said he “knew nothing”. However, Shlayer affirms: 
“But also that night and the following day, the deportations continued from the prisons, 
without any action by Miaja or Carrillo, who then did not have the excuse of a lack of 
knowledge,  because  they  had  been  informed  by  us.”39 From the  Modelo  prison  he 
obtained  information  about  970 prisoners  sent  to  Valencia  by  order  of  the  General 
Director of Security and executed by members of the “Investigation Brigade García 
Atadell”  (known  in  Madrid  as  the  Sunrise  Brigade,  because  their  detentions  and 
executions  were  usually  performed  at  dawn).40 On  the  afternoon  of  Sunday,  8 
November, Schlayer went to Paracuellos del Jarama, were he found two graves of about 
200 metres each, covering more than 600 bodies. During the following days Schlayer 
visited Aldovea Castle,  where a recent  grave uncovered about 500/600 dead; Henny 
obtained copies of prisoner lists. 
But it  did not end there.  During that time,  the killing of prisoners, and the visits  to 
private  homes  to  take  and  execute  civilians,  continued.  On  25  November  “popular 
courts” were set up at San Anton prison where, day after day,  prisoners were either 
condemned to death or “liberated” to be illegally executed. 
The Junta de Defensa of Madrid denied what was already appearing in the international 
press, but Schlayer, Henny and Quesada gave detailed information about the executions. 
These were mainly carried out by Government assault Guards, and not “incontrolados”, 
an expression used by Republican sources to refer to the anarchist militias. It will never 
be possible  to  establish the  precise  number  killed,  but the  information  about  prison 
transfers indicates that the figure cannot be less than 2,000.41
38 Henny (1937).
39 Schlayer (2008), p. 140.
40 Schlayer saw the document signed by Vicente Girauta Linares, Deputy Director, under the oral 
instruction of Manuel Muñoz Martínez, Director, before his escape to Valencia, giving the order to 
transfer the 970 prisoners. Schlayer (2008), p. 148.
41 Henny (1937).
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On Thursday,  8 December Dr Henny left Madrid on a French plane. The flight was 
attacked by “unknown” planes and forced to make an emergency landing.42 There was 
much  debate  both  within  the  Republican  and  Nationalist  governments,  in  the 
international press and elsewhere, concerning the culprits and whether the target of the 
attack  had  been  Henny,  or  Delapreé,  the  special  envoy  to  Madrid  of  the  French 
newspaper France Soir. Many writers attribute the attack to the Republican Air Force. 43 
Henny  survived  but  Delapreée  died,  and  his  widow  presented  the  Republican 
Government with a request for compensation. ICRC also presented a formal note to the 
Valencia Government. Captain Eric Arbenz, the ICRC delegate in Barcelona, went to 
Madrid, while after a long trip, Henny arrived in Geneva on 21 December 1936.
There was fierce fighting in Andalusia in early 1937. Nationalist conquests of cities that 
had  seen  heavy  fighting  and  repression  in  July  1936  were  followed  by  ferocious 
reprisals. Málaga, where the uprising had been initially defeated after a fierce fight, was 
taken by the  Nationalists  on  8 February 1937.  Auxilio  Social,  the  Nationalist  relief 
agency, counted 17,000 orphans in the town as a result of Republican repression: other 
sources  put  the  figure  at  2,000.44 According  to  an  eye-witness:  “4,000 people  were 
killed in the first week after  the fall of the city”.45 Queipo de Llano, the Nationalist 
South Commander, in an interview with Pourtales, the ICRC delegate at St Jean-de-Luz 
sent to Málaga, admitted that 9,000 prisoners had been taken and three Military Courts 
set up. Pourtales sent a full and concise report to Geneva through the Swiss Consul.46 
Another ICRC delegate, Raymond Courvoisier, arrived in Málaga on 9 April 1937, and 
he  also  reported  on  the  capture  of  the  city  by  the  Foreign  Legion,  Moroccans, 
Phalangists and Italian Black Arrows:
42 Schlayer refers to the description of the attack by M. Boyer, the pilot of the French plane (Schlayer 
(2008), p. 190).
43 According to Hugh Thomas the plane was “probably attacked by republican aircraft”. Thomas, H. 
(1990), p. 486. Sefton Delmer of the Daily Express claims the attack was carried out by the Soviet police, 
NKVD, operating in Spain, to avoid Henny delivering his sensitive information to Geneva and it being 
used in the upcoming session of the League of Nations. Delmer (1961), pp. 322-3. Henny himself stated 
that he believed the attacking planes were of the “Legal Government”. Henny (1937). 
44 Marqués (2000), p. 170.
45 Thomas, H. (1990), p. 386.
46 Thomas, H. (1990), pp. 378-9.
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“In the process of an unmerciful repression, four thousand people were executed. There 
is talk about rape, torture and mutilation. German and Italian planes chased thousands 
of people leaving Málaga for Almería.”47
All  over Spain,  the situation  was more  or  less similar  and the conduct  of  one side 
provoked reactions by the other.
3.2.2 Relief aid
The ICRC neutrality principle was tested from the first days of the war by Red Cross 
Societies’ offers of aid addressed to only one of the parties, usually the Republicans. 
This  raised  the question  as  to  whether  it  was  appropriate  that  aid  from a donor  be 
distributed selectively. In its Bulletin Nº 329, dated 21 August 1936, the ICRC asserted 
that aid received would not be directed to only one party, in keeping with the ICRC 
tradition of impartiality. 48
To facilitate their relief action, the ICRC involved the League of Red Cross Societies.49 
The League was to convey ICRC appeals to the Red Cross Societies in the various 
countries,  informing  them  about  relief  operations  and  the  needs.  The  ICRC  also 
cooperated with the League in dealing with the different authorities and in the purchase 
of supplies and their delivery to the ICRC delegates in Spain. The League coordinated 
the efforts of 41 Red Cross Societies in the Spanish conflict.
It was agreed that the distribution shall be equal for both fighting zones. The ICRC 
member Jean J. Pictet  states that  the organisation referred in its  Bulletin  330 to the 
possible distribution of aid offers which were partisan or carried special conditions, but 
decided to avoid this matter.50 It was felt that people expected the ICRC to exercise 
relief  on  a  strictly  equal  basis  for  both  sides  in  the  war  and  mentioning  any other 
possibility could be considered as partisan. Nonetheless, Pictet explains that “the ICRC 
would distribute aid in accordance with individual needs and urgency, which meant that 
47 ‘Rapport de Raymon Courvoisier pieces nº 1-24, San Sebastian, 18/12/1936-27/12/1937’. B CR 212 – 
GEN-53, ICRCA.
48 ‘Circulaire nº 329’, 21 August 1936, ICRCA.
49 See footnote in Section 2.2.
50 Pictet (1955), Chapter III.
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 74
the only aspect the Red Cross had to maintain as equal between the two countries (or 
two parties in a Civil War), was its vocation to serve”.51
The relief appeal was very successful. The different Red Crosses reacted with donations 
that in November 1936 amounted to 441,000 Swiss Francs of the time52. However the 
world economic crisis reduced the stream of funds. Other conflicts, such as that between 
China and Japan in 1937, forced the ICRC to consider other ways of responding to the 
growing needs in Spain. They requested support from Governments and this, together 
with donations, allowed the ICRC to maintain an acceptable minimum level of relief. In 
fact, we shall see that the ICRC suffered the same problem as other agencies in Spain, 
like the Save the Children Fund and Union and the British Quakers: the near exhaustion 
of funds for their charitable work.53
ICRC  relief  aid  was  basically  medical  —  clinical  material,  first  aid  kits,  hospital 
equipment, beds and laboratories — sent through the French border to both sides and 
delivered to delegates who conveyed it to the corresponding Red Cross (Republican or 
Nationalist).  The  Republican  zone  received  more  supplies  because  its  needs  were 
greater, but ICRC strived for equilibrium. From 1938, due to the need in the Republican 
zone, the ICRC food packs distributed all over Spain.54
3.2.3 The “asilados” (asylum seekers)
The Spanish conflict presented the ICRC with a novel situation: following the failure of 
the military uprising in Madrid, thousands of civilian Francoists sought asylum in the 
capital’s foreign embassies — the most widely accepted figure is around 8,000.55 The 
embassies,  with their  “extraterritorial  rights”,  became refugee camps:  in  the Chilean 
embassy alone there were 622 refugees. 
While these “asilados” in embassies were protected by the countries represented, the 
ICRC,  which  had  relations  with  the  authorities  of  the  conflicting  parties,  tried  to 
mediate and bring about the evacuation of the refugees. The ICRC obtained information 
about the “asilados” in October 1936 and was able to produce a list of names which was 
51 Ibid.
52 About £22,300 in 1936 (or £1,180,000 at 2010 prices, according to www.measuringworth.com).
53 See Chapter 7.
54 As we shall see, this was done in collaboration with Swiss Aid (SA) and SCIU.
55 The ICRC had dealt before with cases of refugees in embassies, but never in such numbers.
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kept secret for reasons of security. The ICRC’s attempts to organise exchanges were not 
acceptable to the parties involved. However some countries, like France, Turkey, The 
Netherlands, Czechoslovakia and Cuba, achieved understandings with the Republican 
Government and many “asilados” were evacuated.
3.2.4 Relief in captivity
The warring parties initially rejected ICRC visits to detention camps and prisons, but on 
10 October 1936 delegates could visit the prison ships in Bilbao and in November the 
Montjuïc  and  Modelo  prisons  in  Barcelona.  They  criticised  health  conditions  in 
Montjuïc, finding the Modelo acceptable. This seemed to be a pattern in both zones; in 
some camps prisoners had reasonable conditions while in others food was scarce, the 
buildings were in a terrible state and/or there was overcrowding.
In both zones, the ICRC delegates obtained uneven results, suffering from the problem 
that what was authorised one day was forbidden another. Through careful diplomatic 
work, they were able to organise the distribution of food parcels and correspondence to 
inmates.
3.2.5 Exchanges
In  general,  all  the  ICRC’s  negotiations  to  improve  prisoners’  condition  and  avoid 
reprisals — mistreatment and illegal executions — were subject to difficulties. Above 
all,  even  if  the  higher  authorities  agreed  improvements,  the  lower  levels  of  prison 
directors  and  guards,  under  pressure  from  different  political  forces  on  the  ground, 
delayed or contradicted their orders. The only real way to guarantee prisoners’ lives was 
to remove them from detention through exchanges.
Focusing  on the prisoners  at  most  risk because  of  their  political  affiliations,  family 
connections,  or military unit,  ICRC delegates  became heavily  involved in  arranging 
exchanges. From the start of the war this required diplomacy and patience, strength and 
dedication,  in  the  face  of  often  unreasonable  demands  by  the  fighting  parties.  The 
ICRC’s efforts to exchange prisoners at risk without distinction of name and condition 
proved difficult, because the status and importance of each prisoner strongly influenced 
whether the authorities were prepared to exchange them.
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 76
Once the exchange of a list of prisoners had been agreed, the operation itself was time 
consuming. The ICRC delegate in St Jean de Luz, once informed by Geneva, visited the 
military  command  in  Irun  who  notified  the  Burgos  authorities.  The  nationalist 
authorities notified the prison or camp director about the prisoners to be exchanged. The 
prisoners were delivered to  the ICRC delegate  once Geneva had confirmed that  the 
prisoners from the Republican  prison had crossed Catalonia’s  French border  or  had 
embarked on a neutral ship.
The  ICRC fought  to  obtain  a  general  agreement  for  the  exchanges  but,  ultimately 
abandoned the idea as the parties could not agree and, instead, left it to the personal 
work of the delegates, with the feedback from Geneva. When the “equality principle” 
was abandoned by the ICRC and the delegates  just  dealt  with the interests  of both 
parties, the process was more fluid.
From the first exchange negotiated by Dr Junod on 24 September 193656 until the end of 
1937 only the following operations took place:
- 150 women detained in Bilbao were liberated in exchange for Basque women 
and children in the Basque territory occupied by the Nationalists.
- The order by Franco’s Government General to liberate all women and men older 
than 60 or younger  than 18,  detained  in the Basque territory under Franco’s 
control.
- Exchange in October 1937 of 20 Soviet sailors — from the Komsomol and the 
Snidovitch,  ships  captured  by  the  Nationalists  —  for  Spanish,  German  and 
Italian aviators.
These were unconnected operations, organised by the ICRC using the negotiating skills 
and the contacts of their delegates in “both Spains”. The scarcity of the results shows 
the difficulty of the task the ICRC had taken on.
3.2.6 Information and communications
The ICRC was in close contact with the SCIU and their  delegates during the entire 
conflict, to trace displaced children, one of the main activities of the SCIU in Spain.
56 See Section 3.2.1.
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As we have mentioned in Sections 2.2 and 2.7, the SCIU action in Spain was inspired 
by an appeal from the Republican Government (through Sra Matilde Huici, from the 
CCPM) and the Federation of Societies of Friends of the School in August 1936. But 
we have also seen that the SCIU, before starting work, consulted the ICRC and met with 
Dr  Junod who had investigated  on his  visits  to  Spain.57 This  collaboration  was  the 
pattern during the conflict.
The ICRC agreed with both Governments to open “Information agencies for civilians 
and released prisoners”. This was to be a conduit for information about prisoners and 
people reported missing. In addition, it could help pass information for families who 
were unable to communicate as a result of being separated by the war. The ICRC was 
able to assist in this, as it was in contact with both sides. As early as 31 July 1936, it 
received requests from the Republican Zone through the French Red Cross and on 5 
September the General Secretary of the Republican Spanish Red Cross asked the ICRC 
to obtain news about people living in the Nationalist zone. When it received a request 
from one of the parties, the ICRC acted as intermediary to receive and transmit family 
mail. “Local Information Offices” were set up in both territories under the supervision 
of delegates. At the end of September 1936, Madrid, Barcelona and Burgos had these 
“Information Offices”, and in early 1937 they were established in Santander, Bilbao, 
San Sebastian and Palma de Mallorca.
The tasks  of  the  offices  were  as  follows:  receive  information  requests  from people 
living in their territory in respect of family members who may be hostages, prisoners of 
war,  living  in  the  other  territory  or  refugees  outside  Spain;  receive  requests  from 
Geneva  and  to  investigate  accordingly;  answer  the  people  requesting  information; 
inform the central agency of the ICRC; and convey mail. The Spanish personnel in the 
offices received and classified the mail, registered it and sent it to the Spanish services 
of the ICRC, who then conveyed it to the addressees, depending on the functioning of 
the postal services. The ICRC became well known among the Spanish population that 
used its services for correspondence and to search for family members.
The service was a great success. By December 1936, the ICRC had received 21,800 
requests in Madrid and was forced to set up separate offices. The “News Service” was 
located at the delegation in Calle Abascal, where it received between 3,500 and 4,000 
57 See Section 2.7. 
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visits each day, with requests for family searches that they passed on to Geneva. The 
“News Service” processing the requests received from the Nationalist zone, sited at the 
office  in  Calle  del  Pilar,  received  about  2,000  visits  per  day.58 Together  with  the 
evacuation service at Calle Oquendo, the ICRC employed about 100 Spaniards.
ICRC  was  aware  that  letters  may  include  information  or  comments  that  could  be 
perceived as dangerous and an objective of the censors acting in both zones. There was 
a system of extracting strictly the family information and transcribing it onto special 
forms, but the increasing number of letters made this task impossible. The ICRC created 
an “official basic form” in two parts: one for the sender’s text and other to be written by 
the  addressee,  with  a  25  word  text  limit  for  both.  The  Republican  and  Nationalist 
Governments  both  approved  the  system and  granted  free  postage.  The  forms  were 
distributed by the ICRC delegations and even to prisoners during the occasional visits to 
the prisons and detentions camps. This form, inspired by the forms used at the end of 
World War I to permit mail between the USA and the Central Powers, was to become 
the “Civil Message” that was used with great success in World War II.
The stream of information obtained through the service made it possible for the ICRC to 
keep accurate registers and increase the effectiveness of its humanitarian task: “When a 
person under threat — whether a prisoner of war, a detainee, a hostage or a civilian — 
had been identified, or even if inquiries were made of the authorities with regard to that 
person, in other words, once that  person ceased to be anonymous,  then there was a 
better chance of escaping arbitrary judgements.”59
3.3 Service Civil International: action in Spain
The SCI’s  principal  activity  in  late  1936 and early  1937 had been  the  transport  of 
refugees from Madrid to Valencia. By the end of November 1937, the SCI’s buses had 
evacuated about 5,500 people, half of them children and the rest women and some old 
people. Towards the end of 1937, this activity reduced in intensity, and SCI redirected 
its efforts. 
The problem for the Swiss SCI was that while it could find volunteers, it did not have 
enough funds to finance its activities in Spain. This problem was resolved with the aid 
58 Durand, A. (2002) p. 298.
59 Durand, A. (1984), p. 355.
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of their British branch, the International Voluntary Service for Peace (IVSP), together 
with the collaboration of the Quakers (FSC) and the SCIU.
The IVSP directly rented a farm near Puigcerdà (Catalonia) to produce goods for the 
children’s  colonies  established  there.  The  farm,  run  by  British,  Swiss  and  Danish 
volunteers, also provided an activity and a farming education for the young boys living 
in the colonies.
In Spain Olgiati forsaw the need for a coordinated work effort, in which SCI would 
“sustain and develop” the action started by the Quakers (FSC) and the SCIU in the 
distribution  of  food  and  clothing  in  both  zones,  and  establishing  milk  distribution 
points. He believed the SCI’s sisters could collect and organise the clothing and help in 
the evacuation of children and mothers. He also referred to the possibility of organising 
the transfer of ill or wounded Spanish children to Swiss hospitals. Olgiati considered the 
Neutral Committee,  then being established,  to be a fundamental  body for organising 
future relief work.
The Madrid canteen, located at the maternity hospital  (“Maternidad”),  opened on 17 
October 1937. It started serving two meals a day to 70 women and 50 children; it had 
space for 250 people at full capacity. However, Mr Dubois of SCI reported that at the 
end of November 1937 nearly 1,600 meals were served daily.
Soap was very much in need, and SCI, with good reserves, was able to regularly supply 
the main Madrid children’s hospital, “Hospital del Niño Jesús” with 5 kg per day, the 
normal  daily  soap  consumption  had  been  25  kg.  Soap  was  also  distributed  in  the 
canteen.
Clothing  was  distributed  in  Burjassot,  Valencia,  where  the  operational  base  for  the 
evacuation  was  established,  using  a  warehouse  donated  by  the  Municipality.  Baby 
clothes were also given to two Madrid maternity hospitals.
Some clothing from SCI was also sent to Murcia. At the Sierra de Espuña, 50 km from 
the coast, there was a colony of 200 refugee children from Málaga. This colony was the 
result of the efforts of Sister Leonor Imbelli, an SCI member experienced in relief work, 
who was working in Murcia under contract with the SCIU. In July 1937 she was able to 
send  100  refugees  children  to  the  hotel  and  some  barracks  in  Espuña.  With  tents 
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obtained from local authorities and the help of SCI, in August 1937 the number of child 
refugees reached 200. In an endeavour to obtain the best for the children, she was able 
to organise, by October, tours of visiting families, to provide the children with family 
support, that always was necessary.
Finally,  the Puigcerdà farm was running smoothly with four volunteers:  F. Funk, F. 
Girling, a Dane and Sister J Moorhouse. This supplied chicken and pork, as well as 
firewood for cooking and heating, to the nearby colonies.
Having examined the work of the British Quakers, the ICRC and SCI during this first 
part  of the war,  we will  now consider the activities of the SCIU and the American 
Quakers (AFSC).
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Chapter 4: The work of the agencies (2)
4.1 The Save the Children International Union
4.1.1 The Save the Children International Union organises its work in 
Spain
In  accordance  with  the  assessments  and  reports  of  Mme  Small  (appointed  General 
Delegate for Spain later in 1937) resulting from her trips all over Spain (see section 2.7) 
the relief service was structured and new delegates were engaged.
Mr  Auguste  Reynald  Werner,  a  Doctor  in  Law  by  the  Geneva  University  who 
volunteered to work for the SCIU,1 was sent on a mission to Santander and Bilbao, the 
Republican  north,  with instructions  on the care  of  displaced  children  and a brief  to 
provide  information  about  them.  He  remained  there  from  April  until  June  1937, 
working on the distribution of food, clothing and the like.
Martha Müller volunteered in April 1937, and was sent to Nationalist  Spain in May 
1937.
In its relief service in Spain, the SCIU used also relief workers for specific purposes and 
places. For example, Sister Leonore Imbelli, an experienced member of SCI, was sent to 
south-eastern Spain, where she worked to create and develop the children’s colony of 
Espuña, at the Sierra de Espuña, Murcia, (see Section 2.3). 
A detailed study of the work of Mme Small will give a clear picture of the SCIU’s work 
in Spain, as well as clarifying some aspects of the work of other agencies and their 
workers, that have been ignored or distorted by historians.
Mme Small made her first visit to Spain, from 16 October to 27 November 1936, in 
order to consider the initial situation faced by the SCIU in the Spanish struggle. The 
main issue was the displaced children.
1 Letter from Auguste Reynald Werner to J M de Morsier, 2/4/1937. AP. 92.16.7–1, AEG-SCIU.
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In this task the SCIU worked closely with the ICRC, as noted above.2 Mme Small was 
in touch with the leading ICRC delegate, Dr Junod, and with Dr Raymond Broccard, the 
delegate ICRC based in Burgos. She visited children’s colonies in the North, including 
Galicia, Segovia and Zaragoza. In permanent contact with Dr Broccard, she was party 
to the negotiations to evacuate the children located at a Vitoria colony to Bilbao. Also, 
in close contact with the Comte of Vallellano, the Marquis de Valdeiglesias and other 
Nationalist Red Cross officials, Broccard and Mme Small faced up to General Mola’s 
refusal  to  authorise  the  children’s  evacuation.  After  intense  negotiations,  on  1 
November 1936, the Comte of Vallellano informed the SCIU and ICRC that General 
Mola was ready to authorise the departure of Republican children from the Colonies. 
The next day, Monday, 2 November, Dr Broccard sent the Vitoria Children to Bilbao.
In St Jean de Luz, Mme Small tried to negotiate the return of San Sebastian children 
evacuated to France and kept at Hygabia at Hendaye. She faced the opposition of the 
Spanish Consul, a Republican, who requested individual letters from the parents to hand 
over the children to the Red Cross.
She returned to Spain with money provided by the Swiss Consulate  (1,000 Spanish 
pesetas  received  from  Berne;  illegal  under  Nationalist  regulations),  where  she 
investigated and provided for clothing needs. 
In  Irun,  the  Mayor  had  received  some  clothing  from  Mme  Small.  It  had  been 
distributed, covering the needs for the time being. In Burgos she was able to purchase 
50 sets of underwear and 85 pullovers for the children. After a lot of effort, she obtained 
agreement  to  evacuate  the  131  children  at  the  Abadia  de  Labanza  to  Republican 
territory.  She  also contacted  Mercedes  Milá,  who provided Mme Small  with  useful 
information about Red Cross officers and their relationship with Franco’s Government. 3
On 16 and 17 November, Mme Small travelled to Valladolid, Talavera, Toledo and then 
to see the Comte of Argillo in Leganés, near Madrid. She asked him three questions. 
Firstly, what were the needs of the children in Nationalist territory and how could the 
SCIU be of use? Second, were there reconstruction plans for after the war and would 
2 See Section 2.2.
3 With family political connections to the Franco side, Milá had been deposed as President of the Spanish 
Juvenile Red Cross in Madrid after the Nationalist rising. She was described as “Nurse in Chief of the 
Nationalist Red Cross”. ‘Mission en Espagne - Suite de journal’, 27 November 1936. AP.92.16.6. AEG-
SCIU; henceforth SCIU (1936), no. 3.
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the SCIU be welcome,  in  a  technical  advisory capacity?  Finally,  was  it  possible  to 
establish  a  neutral,  combat-free  zone,  that  would  be  respected  by  the  Nationalist 
Government?
The Comte Argillo answered the first two questions. Food was not required but about 
10,000 children needed warm clothing. He welcomed the idea of technical advice from 
SCI. On the third question,  he referred Mme Small  to the diplomatic  service of the 
Nationalist government and advised her to go to Salamanca. We must now make a brief 
digression to consider this neutral zone proposal.
4.1.2 The neutral zone proposed by the Save the Children International 
Union
The fact that a neutral zone for children, and their mothers and carers, was proposed as 
early as November 1936 is very important. It represents a clear precedent for the neutral 
zone presented by Franco and the ICRC as an alternative to the evacuation of Basque 
children in April-May 1937, an episode practically forgotten by historians which merits 
a thesis in itself, and cannot properly be covered in the present work. 
Late in the evening of 17 November,  Mme Small  travelled in Nationalist  army cars 
from Toledo  to  Talavera,  and  thence  to  Avila.  On  the  morning  of  Wednesday  18 
November she arrived at Salamanca and met José Antonio Sangroniz, the head of the 
Nationalist  diplomatic  service.  Mme  Small  presented  him  with  her  proposal  for  a 
neutral  zone.  He thought  that  in  principle  it  would be  acceptable  to  the  Nationalist 
government, but this would be subject to the approval of General Franco. However, he 
feared the Republican government would oppose it.
Sangroniz,  working  on  Mme  Small’s  proposal,  considered  the  South  American 
countries as the best guaranteeing powers for the proposed neutral zone and suggested 
contacting the Argentina Ambassador, based at St Jean de Luz.
At that time, Mme Small asked Sangroniz if he thought it would be useful for her to 
present the project to Doña Carmen Polo, Franco’s wife. Sangroniz agreed and arranged 
an appointment that afternoon. Mme Small was received cordially by Doña Carmen, 
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who was very interested in the idea of the neutral zone. She promised to speak to her 
husband about the proposal, “personally she believed it was fully acceptable”.4 
On her way to Republican Spain, Mme Small visited the Argentinian Ambassador, Sr 
Daniel García Mansilla, in St Jean de Luz on 20 November, to explain the idea of a 
neutral  zone.  He  thought  it  “feasible”  and  asked  for  a  written  proposal.  Sr  García 
Mansilla recalled his personal efforts for the “humanisation” of the war and his contacts 
with  the  ICRC.  He  was  not  able  to  give  an  immediate  answer,  but  believed  his 
Government would look favourably on the proposal and would become a guarantor for 
the  zone.  Mme Small  finally  noted  in  her  report:  “Argentina  had  a  warship  in  the 
Mediterranean Sea”.5
A few days later, on 25 November, Mme Small was in Valencia, where she met the 
Republican Minister of State (Foreign Minister), Sr Julio Álvarez del Vayo, introduced 
and accompanied by Sra Matilde Huici, the President of the Spanish High Council for 
the Protection  of Minors (CSPM).  Del  Vayo was in  principle  opposed to  the zone, 
referring to the recent rejection of a zone proposed in Madrid by the ICRC and the 
Swiss Government.
His  main  reasons  were that  it  meant  discrimination  among the population,  with the 
acceptance of the bombardments in other parts of the city, and that he believed the zone 
proposals  were  made  to  ease  the  consciences  of  the  foreign  Governments  that  had 
treated the Spanish Government so unfairly.6
Mme Small  argued that the zone proposal was not for a city,  but for an area to be 
selected, to the benefit of children with no distinctions. Also that the SCIU was not a 
Government  and did  not  represented  the  bad  conscience  of  any country,  but  rather 
wanted to save children who were under the care of a Government of which Sr Del 
Vayo was a member.
Del Vayo accepted that the new proposal was different, since children were involved. 
He requested a formal proposal that he could show to his Cabinet, which would reply in 
24 hours.
4 SCIU (1936), no. 7.
5 SCIU (1936), no. 10.
6 SCIU (1936), no. 16.
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 85
The zone was never established. The main reason was that the Republican Government 
would not negotiate with the Nationalists, maintaining the fiction they were “officially 
non  existent”.  Thus,  the  Republican  Government’s  political  agenda  eliminated  a 
possibility of avoiding,  or at  least  reducing,  the damaging effects  of evacuation and 
displacement for thousands of children across Republican territory. The same occurred 
with the Neutral Zone, referred to above, which Franco and the ICRC offered for the 
women, children and the aged in the Basque Country.
4.1.3 The rest of Mme Small’s visit
We will now return to where we left off with Mme Small’s work in the Nationalist 
zone. On the night of 18 November 1936, she met Vallellano and organised for the first 
canteen to be opened in Orduña, with the funds provided by the SCIU (1,000 Spanish 
pesetas).  This  would  include  the  distribution  of  the  remaining  third  of  the  clothing 
purchased; two thirds had already been distributed in Segovia and La Coruña.
On 19 November in San Sebastian, and with Dr Broccard in St Jean de Luz, Mme Small 
faced the matter  of the children in France to be returned to the Nationalists and the 
distribution  of  clothing  in  the  villages  surrounding  San  Sebastian.  The  children  at 
Hygabia were in the middle of a nightmare.  The Bilbao Savings Bank that financed 
their stay in France and the local people in charge were refusing to allow the children to 
be transferred to San Sebastian, as their parents requested under the documents provided 
by Mme Small. 
Before leaving Nationalist territory for Barcelona, Mme Small worked frantically with 
Dr Broccard to avoid the Nationalist  children being transported surreptitiously,  on a 
British ship, to Bilbao, thus disregarding their parents’ desire to repatriate them to San 
Sebastian. 
On  Friday  20  November,  Mme  Small  left  St  Jean  de  Luz  for  Toulouse.  She  left 
Toulouse  by  plane  at  6am,  but  at  8am  the  plane  made  an  emergency  landing  at 
Perpignan and was destroyed.  Mme Small  survived unscathed,  but could only reach 
Barcelona  by  train  the  following  day,  because  the  Revolutionary  Committee  in 
Perpignan refused her the use of a car to go to Cerbere to catch a train to Barcelona.
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In Barcelona she met the ICRC delegate, Dr Barbey, who worked on the exchange of 
information for family members living in the two zones. With 22 volunteers, he dealt 
with  no  less  than  1,500  people  a  day.  Barbey  was  negotiating  with  the  Catalan 
Government an agreement to guarantee the free evacuation of children, women and the 
aged in exchange for those in the Nationalist zone, with agreements also to be signed 
with the Burgos and Valencia Governments. 
On Sunday 22 November 1936, the popular anarchist leader, Buenaventura Durruti, was 
buried after his death at the Madrid front and 30,000 people demonstrated in Barcelona. 
Mme Small assessed the situation in the Catalan capital, overcrowded by refugees: “The 
atmosphere gives an impression of terror. You can feel the population is afraid not only 
of Franco’s announced bombardment but also of the different organisations that, right or 
wrong,  have  power.  The  Valencian  Government  that  accounts  for  nothing  and  the 
Catalan Government (the Generalitat) are the legal powers. There is also the FAI, the 
CNT and the UGT, which are legal and a very important factor. There are as well a 
certain number of organisations out of control and unregistered, which are the ones to 
fear the most”.7
She remarks on the deficient organisation of food rationing and hopes to see A Jacob of 
the FSC, already established in Barcelona; it would be several days before she could 
locate him.
Mme Small met the chief of the refugee office in Barcelona, Sr Alcalá. He begged for 
milk, as the item most in need, and proposed that the best solution for children was their 
evacuation abroad. In Valencia she discussed with Sra Matilde Huici, of the CSPM, the 
evacuation of the children to their respective zones as well as the possible use of French 
hospitals to take care of the Spanish children. As explained above, Mme Small also met 
Sr del Vayo to propose the neutral zone.
In Castelló, the Ecroyds presented her with a proposal for a kindergarten and a project 
for refugees in the city. She considered that Castelló did not yet have a refugee problem 
and felt that the Ecroyds were not practical; she also doubted their impartiality.
Mme Small finally found Jacob in Castelló, late on Wednesday 25 November. They 
talked  into  the  night  about  the  possibilities  for  relief  work.  Given  Jacob’s  lack  of 
7 SCIU (1936), no. 12.
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experience, they decided to focus on distributing milk to the children designated by the 
refugee office. They would check their physical needs through a Doctor linked to the 
centre.  To  avoid  mistakes  it  was  agreed  to  start  at  a  low level  of  activity,  with  a 
distribution centre for between 100 and 200 children, with a quarter litre of milk a day 
for a month. Locations outside Barcelona and Valencia were foreseen. The following 
day,  Thursday  26  November  1936,  the  foundations  of  the  service  were  agreed  in 
Barcelona, with Sr Alcalá.
That same evening, as the Air France flights were full up with Government personnel, 
Mme Small took the overnight train from Barcelona, arriving in Geneva on Friday, 27 
November.
4.1.4 Problems in coordinating relief work
Early in November 1936 the FSC and the SCIU had made their joint appeal, and the 
Agreement for the joint relief action in Spain was signed.
As we have seen, A. Jacob had already started his own relief action, together with the 
Ecroyds in Valencia, not financed by the FSC; the Friends were unwilling to collaborate 
with the Ecroyds.8 In early December, Jacob complained in a letter to the FSC: “My 
only work here is to wait”; “Felt terribly left at it”.9 
Despite Mme Small’s visit, Jacob continued his work with the Ecroyds and did not put 
into  action  what  he  had  agreed  with  her.  It  seems  that  from the  start  he  disliked 
cooperating with an agency like the SCIU, which the signed agreement put in charge of 
supplies and the technical direction of the relief.
Between 19 and 23 December1936, Mme Small returned to Barcelona, accompanied by 
Miette  Pictet,  a  Doctor  of  Medicine  that  the  SCIU  had  engaged  to  take  over  the 
technical support and organisation of Spanish relief. As soon as they arrived, they faced 
a problem: a shipment of condensed milk, sent by the SCIU, was overdue. Mme Small 
was angry, because: “He [Jacob] had sent many people to investigate the whereabouts 
of the lost milk, instead of going himself to the French border, as we had requested. It 
8 FSC Committee on Spain, minutes, 16 November 1936, no. 46, FHL.
9 Letter from A. Jacob to Fred Tritton, 4 December 1936, FHL. 
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looks as though we can not count on him for even the most simple and practical work 
which doesn’t even require any special experience”.10 
On Monday 21 December, Mme Small and Mlle Pictet travelled to Port Bou and after a 
laborious  investigation,  being  passed  from  one  border  officer  to  another  or  to  an 
employee representing the revolutionary committee, the milk wagon was found and its 
shipment for Barcelona organised. At Port Bou, they also met Edith Pye, the British 
Quaker  activist  and Janet  Perry,  a Quaker  worker.  Pye  complained  that  in the joint 
appeal  the  Quakers  collected  more  money  than  the  SCIU,  and  she  expressed  her 
opposition to the agreement between the two agencies. After a long discussion all three 
agreed on the need to develop their joint relief work as quickly as possible, starting with 
the basic practical tasks.
They returned together from Port Bou and visited Sr Puig de Fabregas and Sr Alcalá of 
the refugee committee in Barcelona. They rejected the committee’s demand to deposit 
the milk shipment in its own warehouse, instead of at the agencies’ premises. They were 
also informed that the Catalan and the Valencia Governments continued to oppose the 
transfer of sick or wounded children to foreign hospitals. Alcalá welcomed Dr Pictet 
and her expertise; it seemed he preferred to deal with her rather than with Jacob.
By now, after  a bad start,  relations  between Pye  and Mme Small  were cordial.  Pye 
proposed a private meeting between the two, in which they agreed that Jacob was not 
very effective. Pye wanted Dr Pictet to accompany her on her travels around Spain to 
assess  needs  and  make  joint  decisions  about  the  implementation  of  the  different 
services. Finally, the milk arrived in Barcelona and the joint service would be able to 
start.
Thus, at the end of 1936, six months into the Spanish conflict, the FSC and SCIU were 
ready to begin cooperating in child relief  in Barcelona,  but a problem was looming. 
Alfred Jacob, the person in charge for the FSC, was found wanting for this task by the 
representatives of both agencies. He may have been a very spiritual Quaker, but he was 
not  an  effective  leader  capable  of  developing  joint  work  with  an  active  relief 
organisation like SCIU. The seeds of the failure of the collaboration in Barcelona had 
been sown even before the work really began. Had attention been paid to those who 
10 Report on the voyage of Mlle Pictet and Mme Small to Barcelona (19-23 December 1936). AP.92.16.6, 
AEG-SCIU.
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raised the issue, such as the American Quaker, Patrick Malin (see Section 3.1.5), the 
problem could have  been resolved.  But  this  did  not  happen,  and the operation  was 
doomed.
Mme Small was in London from 19 to 26 January 1937, where she discussed the work 
in Spain with the SCF, the FSC, the General Relief Fund (GRF) and the NJCSR. She 
then visited the French Committee for Children’s Aid (CFSE) and the French Under 
Secretary for National Education, Mme Bruswieg, in Paris11. She returned to Spain in 
mid February 1937 and gave a clear report of the findings of her trip.
The proposal to transfer children abroad to receive medical attention had been rejected 
by the Catalan and Valencia governments: “our Government and our organisation [the 
High Council for the Protection of Minors] are afraid of sending the children far away 
and for them to experience the consequences of new living conditions, which may be 
better, but too different from their own environment.”12 Less than three months later, a 
different  standard  would  be  applied  to  the  Basque  children,  when  the  Republican 
Ambassador  to  London,  Mr  Azcarate,  supported  the  Basque  Government  and  the 
NJCSR’s evacuation plan.13
Sra Matilde Huici wrote that: “We believe it is more effective for you to send us food, 
as you do now, and clothing, aiding us here… As you said this morning, establishing 
colonies in selected places where we could send our children, in small groups, with one 
or two Spanish teachers.  This latest  proposal [Dr Pictet  had just suggested it]  I  feel 
would be ideal, if you have the means to provide us with the food we do not have”.14
Pictet’s suggestion gave rise to the program of colonies. At a forecast cost of 3 ptas per 
child per day,  children would be placed in partially furnished houses, provided with 
some support from the High Council for the Protection of Minors, which would also 
select the children and choose the teachers. 
Concerning Barcelona, Mme Small noted that milk distribution at the railway station 
was working irregularly,  due to train  delays  and the lack of professionalism among 
11 SCIU Executive Committee, minutes, 10 March 1937, AEG-SCIU.
12 Letter from Sra Matilde Huici to Dr Pictet, 10 February 1937, mentioned in Mme Small’s report of the 
trip, 2 February 1937. AP.92.16.6, AEG-SCIU.
13 See Appendix 2.
14 See Appendix 2.
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volunteers.  A responsible  person was  needed.  It  was  agreed  to  employ boy scouts, 
originally from Zaragoza but in Barcelona as refugees, at 150 ptas. per month per head. 
About 6,000 milk rations had been distributed up until the middle of February 1937. 
The  operation  included  two  “canteens”,  Carmen  and  Sants,  and  another  at  the 
International Hospital, distributing milk sent from the FSC/SCIU and biscuits and sugar 
from the GRF, which had a collaboration agreement with the FSC. In total about 725 
litres per day were distributed.  Clothing for adults that  FSC/SCIU had in stock was 
exchanged for children’s clothing from the Refugee Committee, which was distributed 
in Barcelona. Mme Small referred also to the rapid deterioration of rail transport, the 
lack of road transportation and the scarcity of fuel.
At Alcazar de San Juan, there is a very important rail junction where trains carrying 
refugees from Madrid made a stop. A milk distribution unit was established there, at 
which Young Communists washed the child evacuees, gave them new clothing and fed 
them, with supplies provided by SCIU.
Using  some  very  unreliable  cars  provided  by  the  NJCSR  and  commanded  by  Mr 
Garratt,  its  representative,  it  had  been  possible  to  transport  half  a  train  wagon  of 
condensed milk to Almería.
A SCIU bus had just started to help evacuate children from Madrid. The joint operation 
with Swiss Aid was directed by Rudolph Olgiati.
These  being  the  agency’s  basic  activities  at  the  time,  the  following  expansion  was 
planned:
1.  Milk  distribution  at  the  ‘Gotas  de  leche’15 (including  canteens)  in  Barcelona, 
Valencia, Madrid, Tortosa and Tarragona.
2. A canteen in Madrid to feed parents and children prior to evacuation
3. Lodging for the bus drivers working on the evacuation, because “living conditions in 
Madrid are horrible”.
4. The child colonies mentioned above.
15 “Gota de leche”, or “Drop of milk”, was a project to feed and care for babies and mothers. It took its 
name from a similar operation in France, where in 1892 D. Leon Dufour set up an institution offering 
artificial feeding to babies. The name originated from a poem by the French poet, Musset.
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5. Improvement of the information service for children whose parents were on the other 
side.
While organising this in Republican Spain, in Nationalist Spain the SCIU continued to 
fund selected canteens on the Basque front — with special consideration given to that at 
Villarcayo — and to distribute clothing at different points. The SCIU, by request of the 
GRF, supplied food to three child centres in Málaga, and milk to three others with the 
sole financing of the SCIU. This action had been planned by Mme Small at her meeting 
in London with various agencies, as explained below.16
In  March  1937,  the  Executive  Committee  noted,  on  the  basis  of  the  information 
received from the field, that: “Our intervention is well received in both camps. Every 
facility is given to our representatives  for the accomplishment of our work.”17 Once 
again the evidence contradicts the idea that Franco rejected foreign relief.
In April 1937, the SCIU focused on relief action on the Northern front. Two delegates 
were appointed: the Swiss lawyer, August Raynald Werner, to be sent to the Republican 
North, mainly Bilbao and Santander, and Martha Müller, a Swiss woman from Zürich, 
to cover Nationalist territory: mainly in the North, but including the rest of the territory 
under Franco’s control. 
4.1.5 The Republican North: politics and humanitarian relief
Werner, who volunteered for the post, was a nephew of George Thélin, a member of the 
SCIU. He only worked until late June 1937. Before entering Spain, Werner wrote to 
Mme Small from St Jean de Luz on 15 April, raising two points. He stated that his first 
impression of the work was of uncertainty, and he asked about the possibility of him 
contacting “L’Espagne National” in France: this was never formally authorised.
His first task was to trace some supplies sent by the NJCSR to the SCIU. They had 
arrived at a small port near Bilbao and had been seized by the Basque Authorities. From 
Bilbao he went to Santander were he met a representative of the FSC, Miss Caton, and 
on 28 April 1937, Werner signed an agreement with the Basque Government for the 
management  of  food  supplies  and  concerning  the  ship  which  was  to  arrive  from 
16 Executive Committee, minutes, 10 March 1937. “Intervention de l’UISE (SCIU) en Espagne”. AEG-
SCIU.
17 Executive Committee, minutes, 10 March 1937.
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England for the SCIU. The food would be distributed on a non partisan basis by the 
Basque  Asistencia Social.  The ship was to embark displaced children that the SCIU 
wished to return to their parents, mainly in Nationalist territory.18
Werner makes several interesting points in his report of 7 May 1937. He notes that the 
official institution of Asistencia Social of the Basque Government is perfectly equipped 
and has plenty of supplies, but these go to the militiamen and their families. The Bilbao 
population  has  not  had  meat  supplies  for  months,  lacks  potatoes,  vegetables,  fruit, 
sometimes bread, and everything else is rationed, while militiamen’s orphans receive all 
this with no difficulty. The official institutions also have very spacious, well furnished 
buildings, gardens, special dairy factories and their own efficient medical services.
The arrival of refugees from other parts of the Basque country led to a large increase in 
the population: that of Bilbao increased by 60% —from 150,000 to 250,000— and that 
of the whole Vizcaya province by 67%, from 500,000 to 750,000. This meant it was 
impossible for the official Asistencia Social to attend to all the demand. But, in addition, 
Werner stated: “The activity of Asistencia Social is characterized by the principle of an 
absolute  partiality,  an  ostracism without  piety  in  respect  of  all  those  suspicious  of 
sympathy for the insurgents. I saw at the Red Cross office a mother with many children 
constantly refused every possible aid because of the real or supposed pro-Nationalist 
stances of her family.”19
Werner refers to various Basque Government projects for mass evacuations, notably to 
France and England. He questions the humanitarian nature of the proposal because: “on 
the one hand, it is characterised also by a systematic partiality, keeping the hostages [the 
pro-Francoist  children]  and saving  the  partisans,  whereas  on  the  other,  it  is  not  an 
evacuation but a migration of people that do not want to accept the Burgos Government 
and prepare themselves to settle for a long time in France.”20
In the evacuation,  the Basque Government,  led by the Basque Nationalist  Party,  the 
PNV, never maintained the supposed neutrality and equal distribution of places between 
children from the two sides. Furthermore,  many reports from foreign representatives 
18 Werner, August Raynald (1937) ‘Report on the Mission and Activity’ (7 May 1937). AP: 92.16.17. 
AEG-SCIU; henceforth Werner (1937); draft agreement with Asistencia Social, 28 April 1937.
19 Werner (1937).
20 Werner (1937).
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refer to ships which carried no nationalist supporters, with in some cases adult PNV 
members making up the majority of the passengers.21
Werner explained the precarious state of food supplies for the civil population: plenty of 
rice; local rationed eggs were very expensive at 18 Ptas the dozen; fish, depending on 
local  fishing  results;  beans;  lentils;  black  bread,  from time  to  time;  and  some milk 
mixed with water. Werner ends his report with two proposals. 
His  first  suggestion  was  that  canteens  be  set  up  for  the  children  of  the  civilian 
population, not only those of militiamen and party leaders. He knew this would face 
several serious difficulties. There was no organisation ready to run it; he did not judge 
Asistencia  Social to  be  suitable.  The  number  of  children  was  high  and  constantly 
increasing, thus requiring selection, but this would be arbitrary and based on politics; he 
again showed that he did not believe the authorities would be impartial.  All schools 
were closed and their buildings taken over as barracks. A final problem was Basque 
Nationalist Government, which could feel its authority and effectiveness were put in 
question by such a service being required from outside.
Secondly, he proposed that the relief service in France be organised to care for child 
evacuees. He knew that Mme Small was opposed to this.
In his  report,  Werner  clearly  shows the partisanship of the Basque Authorities  with 
respect to the civil population and the political objectives of the massive emigrations, 
something which practically no scholarly work on the Civil War in the North has dealt 
with so openly. It is important to bear in mind that he was no Fascist or anti-Republican, 
but a young doctor in law from Geneva University who had attended the Free School of 
Political Sciences in Paris.22
From Bilbao, he went on a similar mission to Santander, from 14 May to 15 June 1937. 
Here, Werner was better received by the authorities and he met up with Weber, the 
ICRC delegate, who was fully committed to the evacuation of children. Werner decided 
to leave the evacuations to Weber and to concentrate on food distribution. The problems 
he faced, and the fact that the supplies lost in Bilbao were never recovered, left him 
21 For more information, see Cable (1979); Appendix 2; and Pretus 2003.
22 Werner (1937).
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with a feeling of failure about his service in Spain. In June 1937, when his engagement 
with SCIU terminated, Werner returned to Geneva.
4.1.6 Nationalist Spain
Martha  Müller’s  brief  for  the  SCIU  was  to  cover  relief  activity  in  the  Nationalist 
controlled provinces of Burgos, Salamanca,  Valladolid,  Madrid, Sevilla  and Málaga. 
Her  responsibilities  included  the  evacuation  of  displaced  children,  Republican  and 
Nationalist;  the  distribution  of  food  and  clothing  already  in  process;  ensuring  that 
donations received from abroad arrived at their desired destination. Some Belgian goods 
were for Navarra, baby feeding bottles for Seville, Swiss goods for Burgos and there 
were even 1,000 items of bed clothing sent from Germany for the Feminine Section of 
the Falange, and addressed to Pilar Primo de Rivera.23
At the end of June 1937, children were to be evacuated from Santander by boat, the 
Marion Möller, which would arrive with supplies. Müller went to the port of La Pallice, 
en La Rochelle, France, to coordinate the different aspects of the evacuation to France. 
Miss Caton, from FSC, accompanied her. After some delays,  the ship arrived on 24 
June 1937, with 1,700 passengers, both children and adults, and not just children as both 
sides had agreed. Werner who had been sent to Santander to organise this, had already 
left in despair. The French Prefect organised the reception of the children in accordance 
with what had been planned.24
Between July and August, Müller, who had already made an exploratory trip through 
Nationalist Spain, made proposals to the SCIU for strengthening relief work:
1. The need for a car, with driver if possible.
2. The most urgent problem was food for children. Canteens for children would also be 
very useful.
3. Canteens:
a) To be located in villages near the front, where the suffering was worst.
23 Pilar Primo de Rivera (1907 - 1991) sister of José Antonio Primo de Rivera, founder of the Falange.
24 Martha Muller, ‘Journal and Report of the voyage to la Pellice 23-25 June 1937’. AP.92.16.7: 21, 
AEG-AP.
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b) Food could be purchased locally: 0.80 Ptas was enough for 2 good meals a 
day.  The  canteens  should  be  run  for  not  more  than  3  months,  because  a 
Spanish organisation could take them over (she was thinking of Auxilio Social, 
which at that time was the only one doing such relief services).
4.  Milk:  condensed  milk  was  impossible  to  find.  It  was  mostly  needed  by  the 
populations  recently  taken  over  by  the  Nationalists:  “In  Santander  [taken  by  the 
Nationalists  on 26 August  1937] I  found great  misery and clearly  the desire  of the 
refugee is to have condensed milk.”25
For Málaga, where more than 20,000 people needed to be feed in canteens, milk for 
children was essential. If half a litre per child per day was acceptable, 200 Swiss Francs 
would cover 100 children for a month.
5. In Seville, supplements were needed for rachitic children as was baby milk powder. 
6.  Clothing  was  needed,  mainly  underwear  and  all  kinds  of  winter  clothing,  to  be 
prepared for the coming cold season.
7. Nurseries were needed in Amorebieta and Gernika, to give children there a normal 
life after a long time on the streets or hidden in caves. There should be local voluntary 
workers and the cost should be similar to the canteens (0.50 ptas) and 500 to 1.000 ptas 
for the installation.
8. Packs of clothing for new born babies, to be procured from Switzerland and to be 
completed locally. Very useful for young mothers.
9. Orphans and weak children: Special care was needed for 250 children who were in a 
very  bad condition  in  Santander.  They could  be  attended  in  homes,  with voluntary 
workers at a cost of 3.50 Ptas per day, per child. Different countries could cover the 
costs, and each house could be named after the country that financed it.
Müller met Wilfred Jones and Patrick Malin, from the AFSC, just before Jones left for 
America. This joint meeting, together with the Count of Torrellano, the Secretary of the 
Nationalist  Red Cross,  initiated  what  would soon become an effective  collaboration 
with the American Quakers.
25 Martha Müller, ‘Work proposal (August 1937)’. AP.92.16.7-2, AEG-SCIU.
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Mme Small wrote to Müller on 18 August 1937, accepting her proposals and attitude: 
“As you  know,  our  norm is  to  collaborate  with  the  national  organisations,  keeping 
strictly apart from all politics. Of course, where you have the occasion to collaborate 
with the Falange, if you believe their principles for relief work are in agreement with 
ours, we do not have any objection to this. As we have told you, the main bodies we 
must collaborate with are the official Beneficencia [the previously existing state charity 
organisation, in the Nationalist zone now under Francoite control] and the Spanish Red 
Cross.  Naturally,  if  it  is  possible  to collaborate  with a  local,  municipal,  regional  or 
provincial authority or even a competent personality, it is advisable to do so.”26
Müller clearly took this line. She met Pilar Primo de Rivera, the General Delegate of the 
“Sección  Femenina”,  the  Women’s  Falange.  They talked  about  a  project  for  social 
schools for women,  and Müller explained similar schools in Switzerland.  The SCIU 
agreed to supply cutlery and baby feeding bottles to Auxilio Social canteens. Primo de 
Rivera directed Müller to Mercedes Sanz Bachiller, National Delegate of Auxilio Social; 
the meeting would consolidate their collaboration.
Müller travelled to the Nationalist South, visiting a large number of canteens, sanatoria 
and other assistance programs run by Auxilio Social. In Málaga, for instance, they fed 
more than 20,000 people every day. Müller ensured the milk supply to the maternity 
hospital and the tuberculosis dispensary, as well as calcium for children, donated by the 
Swiss pharmaceutical company, Sandoz. Müller wrote: “With Miss Werner, the head of 
the Women’s Falange [Auxilio Social] in Málaga, the relationship is very good… I want 
to underline that this is the organisation with which we can really do something”.27
While travelling through Nationalist Spain Miss Müller tracked down many children on 
the SCIU list, contacting the institutions (mainly the ICRC) and informing them of their 
whereabouts.
On 4 September 1937 Miss Müller was at San Sebastian, where she contacted the ICRC 
concerning  displaced  children,  and  Auxilio  Social.  She  visited  the  SCIU canteen  at 
Trespademe, which was working well, and went on to Palencia to visit the Sanguesa 
orphans  and  to  push  for  a  nursery.  She  continued  to  Valladolid,  where  she  met 
26 Letter from Mme Small to Martha Müller, 18 August 1937. AP.92.16.7, AEG.
27 Martha Müller ‘Rapport sur le voyage dans le Sud, du 6 au 20 Août 1937’, Burgos, 23 August 1937. 
AP.92.16.7, AEG-SCIU.
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Mercedes Sanz Bachiller, who greatly impressed Müller: “She is a young widow, very 
simple, nice, of a bright intelligence and good heart.”28 They talked about many relief 
subjects, including the introduction of medical  advice for baby feeding and clothing 
baskets for the new born. Müller accepted an invitation to a gathering of Auxilio Social 
delegates representing the different provinces of Nationalist  Spain, due to take place 
shortly in Valladolid.
She  wrote:  “As  General  Franco  recently  gave  all  powers  related  to  social  relief  to 
Mercedes Sanz Bachiller,  I  believe  we can without  doubt work with this  institution 
[Auxilio Social], without worrying about breaking our neutrality.”29
At the end of September,  Miss Müller  contacted the two AFSC representatives,  Mr 
Smith and Mr West. Together they studied the relief situation and went to the Corrales 
and Cilleruelo canteens with clothing that was distributed to local  children with the 
Auxilio Social delegate. The basis for collaboration had been established.
Miss Müller continued her work in villages scattered all over Nationalist territory and 
continued tracing displaced children.
In mid October, her contract with SCIU ended and she returned to Zurich. Mme Small 
considered that “Müller had done good work and was much liked by the Spanish bodies 
she had contacted in her work. She had established good relations with Mr Smith and 
West, the two representatives of the American Friends Service Council.”30
On 14 November 1937, Mr Thelin and Mme Small, representing the SCIU, met with the 
FSC in Paris, and, as mentioned above, their collaboration agreement was terminated on 
1 December 1937, due to “the personal difficulties in the field”,31 and each organisation 
recovered their freedom of action in Spain. At that meeting, the FSC stated they were 
not prepared to make any new appeal for Spain, on their own or with any other Agency.
The fact is that at the end of 1937, relief work in Spain underwent a setback: all the 
Agencies working in Spain suffered a drastic reduction of funds. The war in China and 
28 Letter from Martha Müller to Mme Small, 10 September 1937, Burgos. AP.92.16.7, AEG-SCIU. 
Chapter 5 deals with Mercedes Sanz Bachiller.
29 Letter from Martha Müller to Mme Small, 10 September 1937, Burgos. AP.92.16.7, AEG-SCIU.
30 Executive Committee minutes, Session 232, 6 December 1937. AEG-SCIU.
31 The difficult relations with Jacob and his team, and the imbalance between FSC’s appeal collections 
and those from SCIU sources. See Executive Committee, minutes, 6 December 1937. AEG-SCIU.
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the  refugee  crisis  caused  by  rise  of  the  Nazis  in  Germany  also  required  aid.  The 
International Commission would only later be a key element in re-launching appeals for 
Spain, after it had finally been established in Geneva in December 1937.
Without a SCIU representative in Nationalist Spain, the two canteens at Corrales and 
Cilleruelo were maintained by the Auxilio Social. Müller had considered that the relief 
work, with the supplies provided, could be done without a permanent representative of 
the SCIU on the spot.
A final note on the canteens in Barcelona, which had been administered by Mrs Petter, a 
SCIU volunteer, until August 1937, and on her departure by the Danish Quaker, Miss 
Thomson. When she left in October, Jacob and Park of the GRF took over: “and they 
administered the canteens in a way we [the SCIU] could not approve.”32
Dr Pictet left Spain in October 1937, due to tiredness after ten months of continuous 
work. At the end of 1937, the SCIU had no permanent representative in Spain, only 
some volunteers in the Republican zone.
4.2 Efforts at coordination
All the agencies acting on the ground in Republican Spain worked on the Barcelona – 
Valencia – Murcia axis. Valencia was in the middle, and hosted the head offices of most 
of them (as well as the Republican Government from November 1936). Thus the “First 
Conference of Committees carrying out Relief and Social Work in Spain”, on 10-11 
July 1937, was held in Burjassot (Valencia)33 at the premises of Swiss Aid–SCI, under 
the leadership of Rodolfo Olgiati. Patrick Malin, an American Friend resident in Paris, 
acted as chairman. On opening the conference, he declared that its objectives were to 
hear about each others’ work, to make joint arrangements with the Spanish Government 
and to improve personal relations between foreign delegates in Spain.
The agencies and representatives attending were as follows:
- Sir George Young (British Universities Medical Unit)
32 Executive Committee, minutes, 6 December 1937
33 Minutes of meeting of 10-11 July 1937, in ‘Conferences of Representatives of Foreign Relief Agencies 
in Spain, June 1937-February 1938’. SCI International Archives, 20364, LCF Bibliothèque; henceforth 
Swiss Aid & SCI (1938).
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- Mr Garratt (NJCSR)
- Dr Pictet (SCIU – FSC)
- Miss (“Sister”) Imbelli (SCIU)34
- Mrs Wood (British Friend, representing the FSC in Valencia)
- Mrs Petter (SCIU – FSC)
- Mr Jacob (FSC and on behalf of the General Relief Fund – GRF)
- Mr Malin (AFSC)
- Miss Farquhar (AFSC)
- Miss Thomson (Danish Spanish Help Committee)
- Mr Sundning (Swedish Committee for help to Spanish Children)
- Mr Olgiati (SCI – Swiss Aid)
- David T. Luscombe (AFSC worker in France)
The representatives gave interesting information about relief conditions in Republican 
Spain at that time, in mid 1937. 
Garratt of the NJCSR reported they were ending the Madrid – Valencia evacuation and 
would use their vehicles to help other organisations. Following the Republican victory 
in  Guadalajara:  “the  desire  to  leave  Madrid  has  gradually  grown  less  and  now 
propaganda is needed to persuade parents to allow their  children to leave”.35 Olgiati 
confirmed that “at the present time, owing to hopes for the success of the offensive, 
very few people are coming to be evacuated”.36
The Conference decided that one person should collect all available information about 
the movements  and work of the agencies’  delegates,  so as to be able to inform the 
agencies; they appointed Mrs Wood.
34 “Sister” of SCI employed by the SCIU.
35 Swiss Aid & SCI (1938), p. 2. 
36 Olgiati refers here to the Battle of Brunete, on the Madrid Front, that started on 5 July 1937, breaking 
Franco’s lines. By 14 July, the Republican offensive had been stopped.
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They also considered appointing a person “to do propaganda work” for all the agencies, 
going into the field to write and take photographs.
Finally,  they  discussed  their  difficult  relationship  with  the  different  Ministries  and 
government bodies in charge of customs, and their problems in obtaining exemptions 
and  other  facilities  they  required,  such  as  transport  and  permits.  An  arrangement 
reached with Dr Negrín in April 1937 to centralise and facilitate this work had had little 
effect. They decided to write to Prime Minister Negrín, on the lines of a draft prepared 
by Dr Picted, explaining the problem. They also agreed that those who had reached the 
existing agreement should approach Dr Negrín unofficially a few days later. If this did 
not work, they would have to ask the agencies’ respective Foreign Offices to request tax 
exemption for humanitarian relief shipments.
The letter described the problems caused by the multiplicity of authorities intervening in 
the import and transport of goods. In theory this was controlled by the High Council for 
the Protection of Minors, as Negrín himself had suggested in April 1937. They proposed 
the  creation  of  a  coordinating  committee  for  all  government  bodies  dealing  with 
agencies:  “We should always  know whom we need to address and the coordinating 
committee would undertake the receipt of our supplies and convey them to their final 
destinations, having given us a total guarantee that the goods would not be sold.”37
The  second  conference,  held  at  Burjassot,  Valencia,  on  15  August,  heard  that  the 
Government,  through Sr Granados of the High Council  for the Protection of Minors 
(CSPM),  had “intimated”  to  Mrs  Wood that  “it  would  welcome the formation  of  a 
coordinating  committee  of  relief  work  on  which  the  Government  would  be 
represented”. Its objectives would include avoiding the entry of undesirable elements 
into the country disguised as relief workers, and organising the distribution of the work 
in  agreement  with  the  government.38 In  effect,  the  Government  responded  to  the 
agencies’ request for a simplification of the bureaucracy with an interventionist body to 
catch spies and organise the agencies’ work.
This reveals that while the Republican Government accepted the agencies, because it 
needed  their  help,  it  did  not  really  trust  them.  There  is  a  clear  contrast  with  the 
37 Draft letter in French to Dr Negrín, in Swiss Aid & SCI (1938).
38 Minute of Conference on 15 August 1937, p. 3, in Swiss Aid & SCI (1938).
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impression given by Miss Müller and other SCIU and AFSC delegates when referring to 
their good relationship with the Nationalist Auxilio Social.
It was agreed to send a delegation with Wood, Garratt, Olgiati and Jacob to discuss the 
matter with Granados and put the following points before the government:
1 – The right of tax free entry for food supplies and goods for distribution.
2 – Permission to bring foreign currency into the country, to be changed into Pesetas.
3 – The right to cross the French border at Puigcerdà (Catalonia).
4 – To have strict control of and restrictions on volunteers in return for more confidence 
on the part of the Government.
A  third  conference  was  called  for  17  September  1937,  at  the  Quaker  premises  in 
Barcelona (Angli 39).39 Sra Matilde Huici, of the CSPM, was invited to attend in the 
afternoon, and she appeared in the company of Mr Granados. They responded to the 
requests that had been presented to the government. The import of foreign currency was 
rejected  as  being  a  source  of  “black  market”  operations.  Concerning  transport,  the 
shipping company,  Mac Andrews, was discontinuing its Barcelona line, showing the 
increasing effectiveness of Franco’s blockade. Ground transportation was considered as 
an alternative. For this, Granados requested foreign vehicles, because Spanish vehicles 
were needed for military transport. Customs exemptions were refused as “Sr Granados 
explained the Government’s objection to making exceptions to the rule that all goods 
entering the country should be subject to duty”.  For publicity,  David Luscombe was 
appointed to facilitate and promote the agencies’ appeals in their respective countries.
Two matters arose at the end. Jacob highlighted the “alarming delay in getting supplies 
through” combined with the influx of 30,000 refugees from the North into Catalonia, 
where “already the food situation was not too good”. He announced that “if steps were 
not  taken  soon  to  cope  with  this  difficulty,  serious  results  must  inevitably  ensue”. 
Finally, considering the heating needs in the forthcoming winter, and the foreseen lack 
of coal, the Conference asked Sra Matilde Huici to obtain permission for duty free coal 
imports. She “undertook to approach the government on this point and bring a reply to 
the next Conference.”
39 Minute of 3rd Conference on 17 September 1937, p. 3, in Swiss Aid & SCI (1938).
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At  the  fourth  conference,  held  at  Burjassot  on  24  October  1937,40 again  with  the 
presence of Huici, the matters pending remained so she felt the problem of import duties 
had been resolved by  Asistencia Social paying them on agencies’  behalf.  But Jacob 
explained that since Asistencia Social took time to make the payments, customs did not 
release the goods, leading to delays. She promised to take this matter up again with the 
Authorities, but “she thought this must be a temporary difficulty, easily resolved when 
the government was established in Barcelona”. In fact, the problem was the unnecessary 
bureaucratic  system,  making  payments  from  one  pocket  to  another  of  the  same 
Republican government. The government’s arrival in Barcelona on 31 November 1937 
would  only add new problems,  with  conflicts  between the  Catalan  government,  the 
Generalitat,  and  the  central  authorities.  The  import  of  foreign  currency  and  tax 
exemption for coal import were also rejected.
At  the  fifth  and  sixth  conferences,  held  in  December  1937  and  February  1938 
respectively, the same problems were still on the agenda, awaiting solution.
In 1938, living conditions would worsen more and more,  while  the Republic  would 
become weaker. All this affected the attitude of officials. For example, Huici responded 
to  the  problems faced  by Esther  Farquhar  in  obtaining  permits  to  build  a  ‘Gota  de 
Leche’ in Murcia, suggesting “that it would be advisable to start the ‘Gota de Leche’ 
and leave the discussions as to permits etc to be settled later with Sanidad.”41 This was 
the principle: not to change the regulations to facilitate relief work, but to act “illegally” 
and hope that the matter would be resolved later.
Meanwhile, the evolving conditions of the war and the financial problems within the 
agencies would make it impossible to organise further conferences.
40 Minute of 4th Conference, on 24 October 1937, in Swiss Aid & SCI (1938).
41 Minute of 4th Conference, on 24 October 1937, in Swiss Aid & SCI (1938).
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Chapter 5: The work of the agencies (3): 
the American Quakers
5.1 The American Quakers go to Spain
Sylvester  Jones  returned  to  the  USA from Spain  on  5  February  1937,  and  a  joint 
meeting of both the Board of Directors and the Committee on Spain was held on 8 
February 1937. Jones reported on his trip to Spain, making the following points.
1. He was deeply concerned that the Friends should give the required assistance to the 
Spanish people, particularly woman and children.
2. Wherever  he went,  he was assured that  the Spanish people would welcome non-
partisan relief in the spirit of fellowship and goodwill in which it was offered.
3. Statistics were unreliable but according to his information there were approximately 
150,000  refugee  children  in  the  care  of  the  Loyalist  Government,  and  30,000  war 
orphans in the care of the Nationalist Government.
4. The Loyalist side was in urgent need of meat, milk, sugar and flour. He proposed its 
distribution through existing channels in Spain, separate from military structures.
5.  Physical  conditions  on  the  Nationalist  side  were  not  so  distressing,  because  the 
Franco forces had occupied the rural  and food producing areas of Spain. The major 
needs of women and children in this territory were for clothing and medical supplies.
On the basis of this report, the joint meeting agreed that non-partisan relief work should 
be  undertaken  as  soon  as  funds  could  be  acquired.  The  also  agreed  to  draw up  a 
statement explaining the decision to the rest of the members of the Board of Directors, 
giving them until 10 February to raise objections.
Thus 8 February 1937 is the date on which the American Quakers decided to go to 
Spain to carry out humanitarian relief work. Once again we must note that they did not 
distinguish between the two sides: both had received Sylvester Jones warmly and had 
explained their needs. 
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The collaboration offered from the beginning of the Spanish conflict by other religious 
groups close to the Friends was considered and formally accepted.
And, finally, it is important to note the proposal that until other means could be found 
non  partisan  relief  should  be  provided  through  existing  refugee  agencies  (without 
specifying whether private or public). This meant that AFSC did not want to use their 
own organisation  to provide relief.  It  also implied,  though no specific  mention  was 
made here, that they did not want to tie their work to the British Friends. In October 
1936 the Foreign Service Section of  the  AFSC had “expressed the feeling  that  any 
service  rendered  in  Spain  shall  be  in  cooperation  with  English  Friends”.1 But  this 
“feeling” was of the Section, not the Board of Directors, and was not an “agreement” as 
implied by Mendlesohn.2 While the Board mentioned using the channels established by 
the British Friends until AFSC organized their own network, this did not imply close, 
still less exclusive, collaboration.
The joint meeting left all possibilities open, including that of  Auxilio Social, the key 
welfare agency in Franco’s zone, considered below.
5.2 American Friends in Republican Spain
According to Mendlesohn, “the expansion of Quaker work in Spain came not through 
the expansion of the FSC unit,  but with the arrival of the American Friends Service 
Committee in Eastern Spain in April 1937”.3 In fact, the first two AFSC workers, Esther 
Farquhar and Wilfred Jones, would not leave for Spain until 4 May 1937.4
A Board of Directors meeting on 7 April 1937 mentions the preparation of a cargo of 
food and clothing to be shipped to Spain so as to have it ready for distribution when 
their representatives arrived. At that time the first general appeal for funds was going 
out.5 The General Assembly accepted the Committee on Spain’s proposal to send Esther 
E. Farquhar, of Wilmington, Ohio, and Sylvester Jones’ son, Wilfred U. Jones, as relief 
workers to Spain, to be joined by Emma Cadbury in Paris.6
1 AFSC Foreign Service Section meeting, minutes. 22 October 1930, AFSCA.
2 Mendlesohn (2002), p. 51.
3 Ibid, p. 46.
4 Joint meeting of the AFSC BoD and CoS, minutes, 3 May 1937, AFSCA.
5 AFSC BoD, minutes, 7 April 1937, AFSCA.
6 Esther Farquhar was a social worker who had served as a Friends’ missionary in Cuba where she gained 
her knowledge of Spanish and also separated from the Friends’ religious commitment. She volunteered to 
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By 3 May 1937, the day before Farquhar and Jones’ departure, preliminary plans had 
been made for the AFSC representatives in Spain. Farquhar and Jones would meet with 
English Friends for a few days  and then meet Emma Cadbury in Paris. From Paris, 
Esther Farquhar would proceed to Barcelona to join Jacob, while Cadbury and Jones 
would go to Salamanca to meet Nationalist  Officials.  Patrick Malin would sail on 9 
June,  visiting  the  Friends  in  England,  the  Quaker  Centre  in  Paris  and  officials  in 
Geneva,  before  entering  Spain  through  Barcelona.  After  a  week  in  Barcelona  with 
Emma Cadbury, studying relief methods, he would tour loyalist Spain before going into 
Nationalist territory to “determine conditions there”. Dan West, representing the Church 
of the Brethren, would go to Spain in September to replace W. Jones.7
By this time the planned shipment of clothing for Spain was ready and 27 bales of new 
and  used  garments  were  shipped  to  Spain,  16  to  Wilfred  Jones  for  distribution  in 
Nationalist Spain and 11 for distribution by Esther Farquhar; about 20,000 garments 
with a total value of $ 6,770.8 
Farquhar did not see a place for her in Barcelona, under Jacob, so she went to Murcia, 
Valencia and Madrid on a study trip with Mme Small from the SCIU. In Murcia she 
joined  Francesca  Wilson  of  FSC,  who  as  mentioned  before,  was  in  charge  of  the 
canteens in that eastern section of Spain. Her solid expertise in the field of social work 
gave Farquhar a command in developing the relief activities in the territory of about 200 
miles along the coast from Alicante to Almería and inland 45 miles.9
Canteens used some supplies from the Government, as well as milk obtained “through 
Quaker  channels”:  donations  and shipments  were arriving steadily.  Hospital  activity 
was also increasing, and focused on TB (tuberculosis) in children.
Friends already supported the Espuña Hospital together with the SCIU, and they took 
over the administration  of Sir  George Young’s hospital  in  Almería  and hospitals  in 
Alicante and Murcia at the end of 1937. All the activities that could not be financed by 
the Government were covered by money and personnel from the AFSC.10
go to Spain in 1937 and was accepted by the AFSC. AFSC General meeting, minutes, 23 April 1937, 
AFSCA.
7 Joint meeting of the AFSC BoD and CoS, minutes, 3 May 1937, AFSCA.
8 Joint meeting of the AFSC BoD and CoS, minutes, 3 May 1937, AFSCA.
9 West, Dan ‘Report to Committee on Spain’, 1 February 1938, AFSCA; henceforth Dan West Report, p. 
6.
10 Letters from Esther Farquhar to John Reich; CoS 6 October and 4 November 1937. AFSCA
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The “American Quaker Sector”, as the Friends called it, covered about 200 miles of 
coast from Alicante to Murcia and went about 45 miles inland. Reports showed the area 
urgently required children’s relief.  The Government food allowance of 2 pesetas per 
person per day was insufficient, implying generalised hunger. Most relief work focused 
on the eastern part of the territory, where many displaced persons lived on support from 
the Government, the Councils and partisan agencies such as International Red Relief 
and International  Antifascist  Solidarity,  aided  by other  groups,  including  the British 
Committee for the Relief of Victims of Fascism, led by the well known communist, 
Isobel Brown.
By early 1938, AFSC was administering three children’s hospitals, in Alicante, Murcia 
and  Almería;  children’s  colonies  and  workshops  in  Murcia,  Alicante,  Orihuela, 
Crevillente, Lorca, Caravaca and Cieza; canteens for breakfast distribution (cocoa-milk) 
in Murcia and Caravaca; afternoon lunches in Murcia, Lorca and Almería and infant 
welfare  stations  in  Murcia,  Lorca  and  Almería.  Clothing  and soap distribution  was 
operational in Murcia and in Almería (here mainly soap). The main food item was milk, 
followed by cocoa and soap.  Clothing was not  a priority and was never  purchased, 
though donated clothing was distributed.
Distribution norms for soap were established at a 100 gram cake per person per week, 
with a preference for babies. For food, babies under 2 years of age would receive 6 
feeds a day of 125 grams each, through the Gota de Leche program. Children up to 14 
years old, pregnant women, nursing mothers and old people would have a cup of cocoa 
with bread as breakfast.
Relationships  with  Government  bodies  and  councils  were  good.  Given the  massive 
refugee problem and the lack of food supplies, the weakness of official structures forced 
them  to  rely  upon  the  agencies.  Nevertheless,  the  conflicting  bureaucracy  that,  as 
explained  in  Chapter  3,  affected  the  work  of  the  agencies,  continued  to  delay  and 
obstruct relief work. 
Despite  the  increasing  difficulties  they  faced,  relief  workers’  spirits  were  high. 
According  to  Barbara  Wood,  the  AFSC  worker  who  controlled  the  reception  and 
dispatches of supplies in Valencia: “Because of the bitter political feeling, much of the 
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help is partial; the help we give has its source in kindness, attempting to bridge over that 
bitterness”.11
The situation was grave. In Almería, for example, a city of about 65,000 inhabitants 
plus around 10,000 refugees, government agencies had no milk to distribute and bread 
was increasingly difficult to obtain. The city’s only source of milk was the Quakers’ 
“Gota  de  Leche”.  Hospitals  faced  enormous  difficulties  in  obtaining  supplies  of 
medicines and medical materials.12
Conditions in the Murcia region were not much better.  By January 1938 there were 









Smaller  towns  in  the  Murcia  Province  had  at  least  12,000  more  refugee  children, 
making a total of 20,000 children, of whom around 10% received Quaker relief.13
As  the  Government  supply  of  milk  and  chocolate  was  exhausted,  Esther  Farquhar 
requested more supplies of milk and children’s food, and an itinerant nurse to liaise with 
villages for the Gota de Leche program.14
The  American  Friends  assessed  the  situation,  and  established  priorities,  such  as 
improving occupational workshops; obtaining more volunteers; means of transport (a 
new truck was expected from America); and urgent relief to the stream of refugees to 
Catalonia, fleeing from the new territories taken by the Nationalist. In this region, for 
11 Dan West Report, p. 8.
12 Letter from Dan West to Levi C. Hatzler, AFSCA; Dan West report, p. 10, AFSCA.
13 Figures from the Republican Asistencia Social given to AFSC envoys in January 1938 (Dan West 
report, p. 11, AFSCA).
14 Dan West Report, p. 11.
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the first time in the conflict, the AFSC prepared direct relief,15 organising the feeding of 
porridge for breakfast and cocoa in the afternoon to 3,000 refugee children in six cities 
within a 55 mile radius of Barcelona: Vic, Manresa, Terrassa, Granollers, Sabadell and 
Cervera.
5.3 American Friends in Nationalist Spain
5.3.1 The Nationalist humanitarian service: Auxilio Social (Social Relief)
The history of Quaker relief work in Nationalist Spain is linked to that of Auxilio Social 
(“Social Relief”),. While it became part of the Nationalist state structure, Auxilio Social 
was not established by those who led the military uprising, but was rather the personal 
project of Mercedes Sanz Bachiller, the young widow of a Castilian fascist leader. A 
middle class “lady” from Valladolid, Sanz Bachiller was well educated and a devout 
catholic who at nineteen had married Onésimo Redondo.16 Redondo was a leader of the 
small fascist-syndicalist JONS (Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista, Unions of the 
National-Syndicalist  Offensive)  which  in  1934  merged  with  the  Falange  of  José 
Antonio Primo de Rivera, to create the Falange Española y de las JONS. Without being 
personally involved, she followed the Spanish political storms of 1931-1936, focusing 
on women’s position in social life, child care and welfare.
Onésimo Redondo was killed on his way to Guadarrama in the first few days of the 
conflict, 24 Julio 1936. His widow was of course shocked by the news but, inspired by 
the  atmosphere  of  a  crusade  against  the  “Enemies  of  Spain”  that  permeated  the 
Nationalist side at the time, felt the need to work for the cause, in the area of assistance. 
A few days after her husband’s death, Sanz Bachiller  began working at the Military 
Cavalry  Academy  in  Valladolid,  preparing  and  sorting  warm  clothing  for  the 
combatants, because in the “Sierras” of Madrid (Guadarrama) the nights were cold even 
in summer, and it was already becoming clear that the war would not end soon.
The vision of her knitting for the combatants, together with the fact that her brother-in-
law,  Andres  Redondo,  was  using his  contacts  to  try  to  get  her  the  concession of  a 
15 Some relief work was done already at Figueres.
16 Onésimo Redondo Ortega (1905-1936): from a family of rural land owners, lawyer, journalist and 
trade-unionist leader.
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tobacco shop (“Estanco”) which would provide an income for her and her children,17 
gives  us  the  image  of  the  “old  fashioned”  Nationalist  widow.  These  two  typical 
activities for a middle class Spanish widow of the thirties (and much later) — knitting 
and, for those who had good connections, selling tobacco — were not at all what Sanz 
Bachiller had in mind, not even temporarily.  Her vision of women’s place in society 
collided with that of the Falange, reflected in its female branch, the Sección Femenina. 
She  became  the  delegate  of  the  Sección in  Valladolid,  because  the  former  leader 
remained trapped by the war in the Republican zone, but she was against their idea that 
women should have a secondary role and be subject to men.18
She had noticed that the streets of Valladolid were full of destitute children, most of 
them children of leftist supporters killed during the repression that followed the military 
uprising  or  that  had  fled  the  city  to  avoid  being  captured.  From the  first  moment, 
Mercedes faced this humanitarian problem with the principle of avoiding any political 
or  social  discrimination.  She  became  increasingly  conscious  that  the  official  social 
services that existed before the conflict had been disrupted and were unable to cope 
with the problem.
Another key person in  Auxilio Social would be Javier Martínez de Bedoya.  Both an 
intellectual  and  a  man  of  action,  he  had  worked  with  Onesimo  Redondo  from the 
creation of JONS in April 1931 but had broken from him after the merger with Falange 
Española in 1934. Martínez de Bedoya defended trade union freedom, rejecting state 
controlled  unions  that  promoted  Fascist  ideology,  which  produced  in  him  “a 
disillusionment faced with all that political bureaucracy which suffocated him.19 
In September 1936, Martínez de Bedoya visited Mercedes in Valladolid. He expressed 
his condolences for the death of her late husband, and she explained her ideas for her 
future which, as we have noted, were not those expected of a woman in her situation. 
Martínez de Bedoya was very affected by their meeting: “At that very moment, hearing 
her, I understood Mercedes was the great instrument God had placed in my path for the 
realisation of my ideas about the urgent need to combat the hunger and misery that were 
appearing as the result of a war, even more so given that it was a Civil War”.20 They 
17 Bedoya (1996), p. 155.
18 Ibid, p. 104.
19 Ibid, p. 81.
20 Ibid, p. 104.
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spent a long time discussing the problem and formulating their ideas to resolve it. Sanz 
Bachiller  said:  “Javier,  we must be fast:  these mothers need to feel  they are human 
beings, to feel we understand them. I am going to borrow money to start”. 
Immediately,  she phoned a wealthy landowner friend, Teodoro Gimeno, requesting a 
5,000 peseta loan for three months, which was conceded. She then explained to Javier 
— who  noted  everything  down  — what  he  had  to  do  start  up  their  humanitarian 
activities.
From that  moment  on,  Mercedes  Sanz  Bachiller  stopped  signing  as  “the  widow of 
Onesimo Redondo” and returned to her own name.
They named the project Auxilio de Invierno (Winter Relief), following the name of the 
German agency, so as to make the project more acceptable to Falangists. The reference 
to winter, making the project seem temporary and limited to the cold weather, had the 
same effect. The aim of the project was to assist the children of those had died in the 
repression or the war.
In October 1936, General Mola accepted the project and asked Mercedes to prepare for 
the Northern Campaign  and to  be ready to  cope  with  the  humanitarian  work when 
Bilbao was taken: in fact, Bilbao wouldn’t fall until much later, on 19 June 1937.
The first appeal for public funds was made in Valladolid on 28 October 1936: the result 
was 48,000 pesetas. That sum, enormous for the time, marked the start of the work and 
on Friday,  30 October 1936, the first canteen for 100 orphans opened in Valladolid. 
Thereafter  there  was  a  rapid  expansion  into  towns  and provinces  under  Nationalist 
control. On 24 December 1936, Sevilla got its first Auxilio de Invierno canteen.
The  process  was  fast  and  unstoppable.  Donations,  volunteers,  new  activities,  all 
increased and developed, in December 1936  Auxilio  de Invierno became part of the 
structure  of  the  Falange  as  the  “National  Delegation  of  Winter  Relief”  and  the 
Assembly of the Women’s Section named Mercedes as its National Delegate.  Javier 
was  the  General  Secretary  and  in  February  1938  was  also  designated  President  of 
Beneficiencia,  thus controlling  de facto all  relief  work,  excluding the Red Cross,  in 
Nationalist Spain.
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5.3.2 Relief work in Nationalist Spain. The hidden truth of the American 
Quakers and the Nationalists
The presence  and activities  of  the first  Quaker  mission  in  Nationalist  Spain,  which 
followed the fact finding journey of Sylvester Jones in late 1936 and early 1937, have 
been ignored or underestimated by the scarce literature on the subject.
The trip of Wilfred Jones (Sylvester’s son) to Nationalist Spain — accompanied until 12 
June  1937  by  Emma  Cadbury  —  presenting  the  AFSC’s  “Spanish  Child  Feeding 
Mission”,  established  a  solid  basis  for  the  American  Quakers’  cooperation  with  the 
Nationalist  relief  operation,  and  opened  the  way  for  the  subsequent  work  of  the 
International Commission, as we shall see in Chapter 6.
We will  examine  this  mission  as  well  as  the  subsequent  volunteer  work,  generally 
ignored by the literature.
Farah Mendlesohn, in a work of 243 pages fully dedicated to Quaker relief work in the 
Spanish Civil War, refers only three times to Wilfred Jones, and repeatedly commits 
factual errors. Firstly, Mendlesohn describes Jones’ entire mission to Spain as follows: 
“Wilfred  Jones  made  his  way  quickly  to  the  Nationalist  sector  and  established  an 
agreement with the Nationalists that would enable the AFSC to operate in a culturally 
hostile environment [??]. However he stayed only six months, [in fact he left New York 
on 4 May 1937 and was back on 28 August, so less than four months] setting a pattern 
which was to plague the AFSC unit in Burgos. In part because of this rapid turnover of 
staff, there are no overwhelming personalities or individuals who conspicuously shape 
the mission”.21 As we shall see, this account does not give an accurate image of the 
mission.
A little later, Mendlesohn comments that Jones (a Quaker) was replaced by Earl Smith 
(a Methodist missionary from Paraguay) and Dan West (of the Church of the Brethren) 
in June 1937. This is not true; as mentioned above, he left in August 1938.22 Then she 
notes that “until the end of the war and the appointment of Howard Kershner as overall 
Director of the joint mission, only three Quakers – Clyde Roberts, Wilfred Jones and 
Charlie Ewald – were sent to the Nationalist zone”23. Here she underestimates American 
21 Mendlesohn (2002), p. 71.
22 Ibid, p. 82.
23 Ibid, p. 84.
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Quaker relief work because some of their workers were Christians of other confessions, 
such  as  the  Mennonites  and  Church  of  the  Brethen,  while  magnifying  the  British 
Quaker actions in Spain.
Monica Orduña Prada24 and Angela Cenarro25, while they make some references, are not 
very descriptive of the mission,  but then their  works are not centred on relief  work 
during the Civil War. In Spanish literature, only Martínez de Bedoya refers to Wilfred 
Jones’  activities  in  Nationalist  Spain;  he  doesn’t  mention  names  or  details,  but  is 
generally accurate in what he says26. His book is an autobiography, covering a long life, 
and the Quaker experience was only a small part of a life full of events.
This scarcity of literature is surprising because, as we will see below, not only can the 
activity be followed in the minutes  of the AFSC Board of Directors,  Committee on 
Spain and General Assembly, but Wilfred Jones himself wrote a diary, included in the 
AFSC archives, which records his activities in Nationalist Spain, partly typed and partly 
handwritten. It should be noted that none of the research works published on the subject 
even mentions this important document.
5.3.3 Wilfred Jones’s journey
Emma Cadbury and Wilfred Jones, as we have seen, were ready to enter Nationalist 
Spain on 1 June 1937.27 Apart from plans to meet the Red Cross, Wilfred Jones wanted 
to make contact with all Nationalist authorities, because, as he explains in his diary: 
“Since leaving St Jean de Luz it had been more and more my concern that we should 
contact someone even closer to the actual Government than the Red Cross, not only to 
inform them of the purposes for which we had been sent, but that our mission should be 
undertaken  with  the  clear  knowledge  of  Governmental  Authorities.”28 He  was 
24 Orduña Prada (1996), p. 235.
25 Cenarro (2006), p. 30.
26 Bedoya (1996), p. 114.
27 John. F. Reich, Secretary of the CoS wrote to M. Juan de Cardenas, the “unofficial representative of 
Franco’s Government”, to present the Friend’s representatives, W. Jones and E. Cadbury, and asking for 
letters of introduction in their favour (letter from Reich to Cardenas, 4 April 1937, AFSCA). It should be 
noted, as Jones describes in his diary, that when going through the Spanish border he asked the “young 
falangist for the name of his Commander. He looked around cautiously, then leaned over and whispered: 
‘General Troncoso is the Commander’.” Wilfred Jones’ Journal (1937), AFSCA; henceforth Jones, W. 
(1937), p 28. In fact, the safe-conducts were not well drafted, but Troncoso let them in: it was Troncoso 
that controlled the border.
28 Jones, W. (1937), p. 31; E. Cadbury - W. Jones: Delegation to Spain.
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recommended to see Luis A. Bolin,  at  that  time in Franco’s press department.29 An 
American representative of the Associated Press, Charles Foltz Jr., informed him that 
Bolin was absent from Salamanca on a mission to England, and that Paul Merry del Val 
was now in his place. On 8 June, Emma Cadbury and Wilfred Jones visited Merry del 
Val, who was well informed about the Friends, having Quaker relatives in New York.
Wilfred Jones had two objectives in meeting Mr Merry del Val. Firstly, to confirm that 
Franco’s Government “was adequately informed that we were there and on hand to start 
the Spanish Child Feeding Mission in Nationalist  Territory”.30 Secondly,  to secure a 
document of safe-conduct which would “permit him to travel at liberty anywhere”.31
They spent considerable time explaining the purposes of their mission and the wishes of 
the donors, and Merry del Val, after considering their presentation, suggested they ask 
Count of Vallellano, President of the Nationalist Red Cross, for a safe-conduct. 
The following day, 9 June 1937, Cadbury and Jones visited Vallellano in Salamanca, 
who “impressed us very favourably”, according to Jones’ diary. He explained to them 
the three cooperating agencies caring for children in Nationalist Spain: Beneficencia run 
by the Government, under the direction of the Count of Argillo; the Red Cross; and 
Auxilio de Invierno. Cadbury and Jones accepted at that time that the Red Cross was the 
best channel for distributing the food and clothing coming from the United States to 
“those who most need it”. As the distribution centre was in Burgos, not Salamanca, they 
were going to take the invoice for the first delivery there and “then we shall feel that the 
work is really starting”.32
Vallellano asked Jones to organise relief for the Basque children in the Bilbao area, as 
the Nationalist forces were close to conquering that city, as indeed happened on 19 June 
1937. The President of the Red Cross offered free transportation of all goods through 
Nationalist Territory.33
29 Luis A.Bolin was a Spanish journalist representing the Spanish monarchist newspaper ABC in London. 
He chartered the British plane used by Franco to fly from Las Palmas to Spanish Morocco in 17 July 
1936, and accompanied him on the flight.
30 Jones, W. (1937), p. 33.
31 Jones, W. (1937), p. 33.
32 Jones, W. (1937), p. 35.
33 Hoxie Jones (1937), pp. 298-9.
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Vallellano had prepared himself for the American visitors, having contacted the Count 
of Argillo, asking him to indicate institutions at which child refugees needed clothing. A 
children’s colony in Villaviciosa de Odon (Madrid) was designated; the material had to 
be sent to Leganés (Madrid). Vallellano asked Cadbury and Jones to proceed to Burgos 
and deliver the shipment  invoice,  for clothing that had arrived a few days  before at 
Lisbon (Portugal), to the Count of Torrellano, the Red Cross General Secretary. 
On the same day, Manuel Arias Paz, of the Nationalist press department, invited them to 
attend a dinner at the Grand Hotel in the honour of Webb Miller, European Director of 
United Press. Here they met about fifteen people, including Count of Vallellano, Merry 
del Val and Webb Miller, together with other press correspondents and Miguel Arias 
Paz, an “intimate” friend of Franco’s Government. Emma was the only woman at the 
dinner and she and Jones felt “we were undertaking our work with the knowledge of the 
National Authorities in this territory”.34 Jones added: “At the same time, Emma Cadbury 
and I were conscious of the spirit in which our work should be undertaken”.35
In Salamanca they also visited two groups of refugee children in homes run by the 
Catholic Church with help from the Red Cross. These children, whose parents were in 
Madrid, were kept in Summer colonies. As explained above, one of the first actions of 
the  ICRC  in  the  Spanish  Civil  War  was  to  intervene  in  respect  of  such  displaced 
children (see Section 2.3).
On the morning of 11 June 1937 they left Salamanca for Burgos, where they met the 
Count of Torrellano, who received them “enthusiastically”. He explained the needs of 
the  children  at  the  Bilbao,  Santander,  Madrid  and  southern  fronts.  He  added  that 
“should Bilbao fall soon, the need will be desperate and overawing.”36
Torellano urged them to supply canned milk,  olive oil for cooking, cod liver oil,  all 
kinds of clothing and promised the American Quakers a “detailed survey of the needs of 
the children,  which  was in  the process  of  being  prepared”.  Torellano  asked for  the 
goods to be shipped to Count of Vallellano, at the Red Cross in Burgos, and stated that 
free customs and freight permits were granted for all shipments. Emma Cadbury and 
Wilfred Jones then gave Torellano the invoices for the Lisbon shipment, as requested by 
34 Jones, W. (1937), p. 36.
35 Jones, W. (1937), p. 36.
36 Jones, W. (1937), p. 39.
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Vallellano. Finally, Torellano made them aware of the possible delay of a week for the 
arrival of the goods at Burgos, due to the railways being affected by the conflict but 
promised  to  distribute  them according  to  “the advice  of  the Spanish Child  Feeding 
Mission representative and that a detailed account of the distribution would be kept”.37
On 12 June 1937, Emma and Wilfred Jones travelled to the Spanish-French border, via 
Vitoria,  San Sebastian and Irun,  and “no difficulty was encountered in crossing the 
frontier and delivering E. Cadbury safely to St Jean de Luz”.38
Wilfred Jones returned to Nationalist Spain, meeting Miss Herbert, representative of the 
Bishop’s  Committee39 of  England,  in  Vitoria.  She  introduced  him to  the  Duke and 
Duchess of Lecera,  who worked with her in a military hospital.  They recommended 
Jones to contact  Auxilio de Invierno, which had by now changed its name to  Auxilio  
Social (Social  Relief);  as we know, this was already in Jones’ plans. He visited the 
Auxilio Social dining room in Vitoria, which had space for about fifty children. One of 
the volunteers commented to him that “twice the number of children should be fed but 
the funds available could not be stretched that far”.40 That night, Wilfred Jones cabled 
the AFSC: “Can you allocate money, food and clothing immediate and future desperate 
need in and around Bilbao?”
On 24 June Wilfred Jones and the Duke of Lecera arrived at Burgos, visiting General 
López  Puente,  Commander  of  the  Northern  Armies,  and  establishing  contact  with 
Conde, the Falangist leader. In the afternoon, Jones visited Gerardo de Mateo y Merino, 
Provincial  Delegate  of  Auxilio  Social for  Burgos,  who was in  charge  of  the dining 
rooms for the children and had just returned from Bilbao.
Since the start,  Auxilio Social had fed about 150,000 children in Nationalist Territory; 
more than 30,000 per month since March 1937. 
37 Jones, W. (1937), p. 40.
38 Jones, W. (1937), p. 40.
39 General Relief Fund for Distressed Women and Children in Spain, also called “Bishop’s committee” or 
“General Relief Fund” (GRF). Presided by Beatriz, cousin of King Alphonse XIII of Spain, and formed 
and backed by Catholics, it supported relief mainly in Nationalist Spain. In Barcelona it worked through 
British expatriates, in collaboration with the Friends, running some canteens.
40 Jones, W. (1937), p. 45.
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 116
Gerardo de Mateo commented that if the food situation in Bilbao was desperate, the 
condition in Santander would be worse, because 50,000 to 80,000 refugees had fled 
with the retreating armies to Santander, adding to its already pitiful plight”.41
That evening, the Count of Torellano delivered to Wilfred Jones a letter from the Count 
of Vallellano, giving thanks for the clothing shipment received and giving, as requested, 
guarantees concerning the distribution of the shipments received; they would only be 
given to the mothers and children selected by the Quakers and would never used for 
military purposes.42
On 25 June Jones spent the whole day, from 10am to 5pm, touring the Auxilio Social 
dining rooms between Burgos and Miranda de Ebro with Gerardo Mateo. Jones was 
highly impressed by the operation. He was informed about the cost of approximately 
“10 cents per day per child, or 5 cents per meal; which includes all costs less equipment 
(similar  to  the  work  done  by  Quakers  in  the  Welsh  coal  mines)”.  He commented: 
“Auxilio Social is doing its best to meet the desperate situation by giving these warm 
meals to the children who are victims of the war. It is a labour which will have to be 
carried  on  probably  for  years.  The  thing  that  warms  the  heart  is  the  spirit  of 
genuineness, of helpfulness, cheer and brotherhood which it is carried out, regardless of 
the sympathies of the parents of the children”.43 This admiration for the non partisan 
nature of the work of Auxilio Social, reflected how the American Quakers understood 
humanitarian relief.  Mercedes Sanz Bachiller’s  objective was being maintained.  The 
same day, Wilfred Jones cabled the AFSC: “If funds guaranteed can open immediately 
dining room similar to the ones opened [by the AFSC] in [American] coal fields for 
children cost ten cents child daily recommend purchase food here need widespread”.
He  also  recommended  that,  to  guarantee  free  customs  and  transportation  for  the 
shipments to Auxilio Social, they should be consigned to the Child Feeding Mission in 
Burgos, which would then pass the goods to the  Auxilio Social, Red Cross or another 
organisation, as necessary. (This was a change to the procedure suggested in his letter of 
9 June to Clarence Picket, of direct shipment to the Red Cross).
41 Jones, W. (1937), p. 48.
42 Jones, W. (1937), p. 49.
43 Jones, W. (1937), p. 50.
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 117
On 26 June 1937, Wilfred Jones sent the first part of his diary to John Reich, Director of 
the Committee on Spain, accompanied by a letter in which he stated: “I hope we shall 
be able to help with donations to the organisation, Auxilio de Invierno, which is doing 
such magnificent charitable work for children”.44
On 1 July 1937, Jones and Mateo went to the Auxilio Social headquarters in Valladolid. 
As “the National Delegate, a young lady [Mercedes Sanz Bachiller] has been away in 
Germany and will return after some weeks”, Jones met Javier Martínez de Bedoya: “A 
young man with great enthusiasm, who had been responsible to a greater extent for the 
actual organisation of the work.” Jones explained the Spanish Child Feeding Mission; 
Martínez de Bedoya reacted with enthusiasm and fully agreed to the project. Back in 
Burgos, Wilfred Jones experienced an air raid by Republican planes.45
On 3 July 1937, Jones received a cable from John Reich: “Cabling London four hundred 
dollar immediate Bilbao child feeding. Stop. Start three hundred children ten cents each 
daily  stop.  Additional  four  hundred  dollar  available  London.  Stop.  Will  ship  two 
hundred cases Holland milk as soon as possible. Stop. Cable what additional supplies 
needed. Reich”.
The  Auxilio Social people had already left for Bilbao, with four young women from 
Valladolid who were well experienced in feeding work. The purpose was to start dining 
rooms for children. The general impression was that, as Bilbao was a rich town, the 
feeding needs would be limited to a few months.
Wilfred Jones and representatives of Auxilio Social entered Bilbao and promptly set up 
two public kitchens to feed children at AFSC expense. The project was to cover, in 
principle, the needs of 350 to 375 children, twice daily, for a period of three and a half 
weeks.46
The city was also supplied with sixteen bales of children’s clothing, valued at $5,000, 
and 500 cases of Dutch milk, worth $ 1,550, that were delivered to representatives of 
Auxilio Social in Bilbao to feed children.47
44 Jones, W. (1937), p. 40. The letter, included in the AFSC archives, was drafted in Spanish.
45 Jones, W. (1937), p. 55.
46 Joint meeting of the AFSC’s BoD and CoS, minutes, 29 August 1937, AFSCA.
47 Joint meeting of the AFSC’s BoD and CoS, minutes, 29 August 1937, AFSCA.
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At this time, Clarence E. Picket asked Jones to extend his stay in Spain until December, 
but this would be impossible. Jones had to begin a new job on 1 September, and his 
attempt to delay the start date was unsuccessful. 
On 6 July 1937, Wilfred Jones, still in Bilbao, wrote to John Reich about the situation in 
the newly Nationalist town. The Auxilio de Invierno team which Jones had accompanied 
to the city was now in control of all the feeding operations that had previously been in 
Basque nationalist hands. Jones confirmed the widespread feeling that “there will not be 
a need for our help and resources here in the town of Bilbao for more than a month. By 
that time, there should be more than enough resources in a rich town like Bilbao to take 
care of all children’s dining rooms that are opened. There will probably be well over a 
thousand children in need for some time until industry in general picks up and heads of 
family are employed.” But then the action will need to be focused on the small towns 
near Bilbao (Portugalete, Desierto Las Arenas, Algorta, Durango…) where there will be 
much need”. 48.
In the same quoted letter, Wilfred Jones stated:
“Various small organisations are collecting clothing and food to ship to Santander. 
When it is sent… if the Service Committee would like to take food into Santander at 
that time, I can arrange for Auxilio de Invierno to take it in for us. This, however may be 
something you may not consider. Conditions were serious enough when food was first 
brought to Bilbao by Auxilio de Invierno, with queues of 1,500 to 2,000 people for a 
piece of white bread, something they hadn’t seen for months. Santander will be in a 
worse plight due to the influx of those who fled from other locations. Santander is not a 
rich industrial city like Bilbao”.49 
Here is a clear reference to the future relief problem in Santander, more than a month 
before the city fell to the Nationalists, alerting the AFSC of the problem. As we shall 
see, the Quakers would respond promptly with a ship full of supplies.
Jones finished his note with a justification of his using a cable, more expensive then a 
letter, but required by the urgency of the situation: “if you have funds available at this 
time, this would be the place for them. A lot of children have been cared for and fed 
with that  money [the money already sent  by AFSC] but  I  guess that  is  part  of  the 
48 Letter from Wilfred Jones to John Reich, 6 July 1937, AFSCA. 
49 Letter from Wilfred Jones to John Reich, 6 July 1937, AFSCA.
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business. I often feel like throwing money of my own that I brought along into the pot 
when I see these hungry children eating.”50 
The end of the note refers to the forecasted arrival of Patrick Malin and the next cable to 
be sent to Reich concerning the small towns around Bilbao.
In  this  letter  Jones  refers  clearly  to  the  relief  work  that  would  be  necessary  once 
Franco’s troops took Santander and its population of hundreds of thousands; here he 
makes the first proposal of help by the American Quakers.
On 20 July 1937, Wilfred Jones wrote again to John Reich, alerting him of the need for 
canned milk, since the cattle had been slaughtered during the siege. He added:
“Everything has gone so wonderfully here that  we can be very pleased. Two dining 
rooms are operating and it is a sight for our eyes to see them. The challenge of the work 
is here, with all the difficulties, heat and inconveniences of the first month in Nationalist 
Bilbao,  the  sight  of  seeing  the  children  eat  in  the  dining  room with many of  their 
mothers watching from the street through the windows is quite a picture…. Everyone 
has worked like Trojans, the young ladies of  Auxilio de Invierno particularly, sewing 
personally curtains for the dining rooms, and arranging everything necessary to cook the 
simple meals.”51
Wilfred Jones also refers in this letter to the expected early visit of Patrick Malin and to 
his own plan to leave for New York on 18 August 1937.
At the  end of  July,  Malin52 and  T.  Dudley Perkins53 spent  a  week visiting  Burgos, 
Salamanca,  Valladolid  and Bilbao,  meeting  with the  Red Cross,  Auxilio  Social and 
Beneficencia representatives, together with foreign relief agencies.54 The dining rooms 
for  children  had  already been  discontinued  as  no  longer  necessary.55 Wilfred  Jones 
explained that things had normalised following the Nationalist takeover, and that the 
50 Letter from Wilfred Jones to John Reich, 6 July 1937, AFSCA.
51 Letter from Wilfred Jones to John Reich, 6 July 1937, AFSCA.
52 AFSC representative in France.
53 On 8 June 1937, a Joint Meeting of the BoD and the CoS noted that Patrick Malin accompanied by T. 
Dudley Perkins Jr. “will sail for Spain on 9 June. P. Malin goes as an observer to both sides of the 
Spanish war. On his return, about September 1, Patrick Malin will give about three months to lecturing on 
conditions on Spain and what we are doing there”. Minutes, 8 June 1937, AFSCA.
54 The SCIU and the Bishops’ Committee.
55Letter from Wilfred Jones to John Reich, 3 August, 1937; Jones, W. (1937).
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needs of Bilbao were covered by the new administration, with no need for child feeding 
programs.
Before Jones’ departure, Malin and Parker visited Spain again and all three met Count 
of Torellano and Martha Müller, SCIU delegate, whose activities in Nationalist Spain 
are examined in Chapter 6.
At that time, a clothing shipment from Philadelphia arrived at Bilbao. The Red Cross 
provided storage space. The goods were sorted and classified for distribution. Wilfred 
Jones  expected  that  Auxilio  Social “will  make some arrangements  for  repairing  and 
making usable the shoes which needed it and for the mothers of children to repair the 
garments that need it”56 The shipment was substantial and of good quality: “They were 
exactly what was needed: baby things, garments, and shoes for children from four to 
about fifteen”.
Just before leaving Spain, Wilfred Jones went with Patrick Malin to see the Conde de 
Argillo, Head of Beneficencia, who informed them about the creation of hostels for the 
growing number of refugees, many of them destitute, who were returning to Nationalist 
Spain across the Irun Frontier. Jones spent half a day in Fuenterrabía on his way back to 
USA, visiting  the former  “Casino del  Miramar”  that  had been turned into a  hostel. 
Refugees  could  remain  there  for  twenty  days,  exceptionally  thirty;  if  they  had  no 
resources,  free  of  charge.  It  was  run  by nuns,  who informed  him that  they  needed 
equipment, but mainly clothing for the coming winter. Jones estimated that 15,000 to 
16,000 people had entered Nationalist territory through the Irun frontier since December 
1936.
The joint meeting of the Committee of Spain and the Board of Directors held on 29 
August 1937 was very important for two reasons. Firstly, Wilfred Jones had arrived the 
previous day and was present to report on his service in Spain; Patrick M. Malin, whose 
ship docked that very day, arrived while the meeting was in session. Secondly, Earl M. 
Smith of Richfield, California and Dan West of Newville, Pennsylvania, were appointed 
to take over Jones’s work in Nationalist territory. 
Jones  reported  on  the  conditions  in  Nationalist  territory  and  the  work  until  their 
departure. The reality was that Friends were present at the key points of need, such as 
56 Jones, W. (1937).
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Bilbao after the Nationalist takeover, in nearby villages and in Castile. Work was done 
in collaboration with Beneficencia, the Nationalist Red Cross but mainly Auxilio Social, 
and this cooperation was considered excellent.
Jones asserted: “Since the Franco Forces have taken the offensive, refugees continue to 
flow towards the loyalist side, away from the advancing battle lines. There are no large 
refugee problems in Nationalist Spain except in captured territory”. He estimated there 
to be 70,000 war orphans, as well as the needy people in captured territory. “There is no 
scarcity of essential foods. The fascist state is well organised. One phase of it is the 
Social Service Department, which specialises in the care of children. No discrimination 
is  made  between  children  of  loyalists  and  Nationalists.”57 He  stressed  the  need  for 
clothing, special children’s food and medical supplies for children. He considered that 
no project  should be continued indefinitely,  since the Nationalist  government  would 
wish to manage it, and was capable of doing so. He advised that just two people would 
be necessary in Nationalist territory “to represent the Service Committee and administer 
emergency supplies”. Malin left his report for a future occasion.
Here we have a clear picture of American Quaker activities from Jones’s arrival in early 
June  1937  until  his  departure  in  mid  August.  Most  importantly,  he  depicts  a  well 
organised and effective Nationalist administration, only requiring help on gaining new 
territory, and taking control of relief once installed. This relief work by the American 
Friends and their cooperation with Auxilio Social has been either ignored or minimised 
in the existing literature.
The  scene  was  set  for  the  arrival  in  Nationalist  Spain  of  two  non-Quaker  AFSC 
representatives: Earl M. Smith, a Methodist, and Dan West, of the Church of Brethren.
5.4 The new team: Earl M. Smith and Dan West
5.4.1 Arrival in Nationalist Spain
On August 23 1937, the AFSC’s Committee on Spain issued a press release announcing 
that on 3 September 1937, “the Rev. Earl M. Smith of Richfield California, on furlough 
from mission work in Uruguay, will sail for Spain where he will oversee the work of 
feeding Spanish war victims… he will succeed Wilfred Jones. Mr Smith, a member of 
57 Joint Meeting of the BoD and the CoS, minutes, 29 August 2008, AFSCA.
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the Board of Foreign Missions of the Methodist Episcopal Church, will be accompanied 
to Spain by Dan West, of Nexville, Pa, who will represent the Church of Brethren.”58
The AFSC’s joint meeting of 29 August 1937, already mentioned, with both the new 
workers going to Spain and Wilfred Jones who had left on 18 August 1937, reveals the 
continuity in their relief work in Nationalist Spain, although for a month there was no 
AFSC worker in that  territory,  since Smith  and West only arrived at  Burgos on 22 
September 1937.59 This detail is important, since the only work on the subject60 states 
that they arrived in June 1937, the source quoted are the Committee on Spain Minutes 
of 14 September 1937 but these do not give that date. Smith and West were in London 
from 12 to 15 September, “getting our bearings and meeting with the Committee [on 
Spain] of the FSC.” From 16 to 19 September they were in Paris, getting the papers to 
leave France and enter Spain; the Spanish safe conducts agreed to by Jordana. On 20 
and 21 September, they made arrangements at St Jean de Luz and Biarritz, crossing the 
border on 21 September and arriving in Burgos the following day.61 
5.4.2 Relief activities: Miss Müller and the early collaboration with the 
Save the Children International Union
Smith and West (“the service team”) chose to carry out relief activity in the territory 
stretching 250 miles along the North coast and 50 miles inland, covering the provinces 
of Asturias, Leon, Palencia,  Burgos, Santander,  Vizcaya  and Guipúzcoa.  While they 
recognised that there  was need in  large cities,  such as Oviedo,  they focused on the 
villages where less help had arrived, mainly due to transportation difficulties.62
Martha Müller had arrived in Nationalist Spain in June 1937, to take charge of the Save 
the Children International Union (Geneva) (SCIU) relief effort there. As we have seen, 
she had already contacted Wilfred Jones. Müller had a precious asset, a small Opel truck 
which she used, in collaboration with the service team, on humanitarian relief journeys 
across Nationalist territory.
The service team activity was based on collaboration with:
58 Press Releases, AFSCA.
59 West (1938), p. 3.
60 Mendlesohn (2002), p. 71.
61 West (1938), p. 3.
62 Ibid, p. 5.
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a) Nationalist Red Cross and its branches in Palencia, Burgos and Vizcaya.
b) Auxilio Social in all seven provinces.63
c) Mayors, school teachers and village priests, who organised the distribution of 
relief goods.
d) Other agencies that helped to distribute the goods provided by the Service Team 
in the capitals of the seven provinces, such as SCIU and the GRF.
Besides  Beneficencia, the main other collaboration was with Müller of SCIU, who as 
we  presented  in  Section  4.1.6  accompanied  the  Service  Team on  many  occasions, 
travelling  to  Bilbao,  and  between  Bilbao  and  Burgos  for  administrative  work, 
distributing clothes in Cilleruelo and trips to start the dining room at Los Corrales. Miss 
Müller  made  four  relief  trips  with  Smith:  to  mining  villages,  mountain  villages  in 
Vizcaya,  one through Santander  to  Burgos  and another  out  through Asturias,  Leon, 
Palencia and back to Burgos.
By October 1937, Miss Müller left and lack of funds meant that there was no SCIU 
delegate in the Nationalist  zone. Thus the canteens were run by  Auxilio Social with 
supplies from SCIU. The new SCIU delegate, Annemarie Byloff, arrived in Spain in 
early  June  1938.  She  was  met  at  the  border  by Smith,  together  with  a  new AFSC 
worker, David Blickenstaff; like Dan West, a member of the Church of the Brethren. 
They  travelled  together  to  Burgos.  The  three  of  them,  along  with  the  new  AFSC 
workers that would arrive in the following months, travelled and worked together, as 
described in Section 6.3.2. West would write: “Our relation with the SCIU has been a 
happy one and we are very much indebted to them for the use of their touring car.”64 
The relief consisted of food and clothing. As there was no starvation, to the knowledge 
of the service team, the food consisted of cocoa, milk (condensed and dried) and cod-
liver oil, much in demand by doctors. When West wrote his report, the purchase for the 
winter was 12 barrels, of 26 gallons each.65
63 Smith and West emphasised their satisfaction with Auxilio Social’s work. Joint Meeting of the BoD and 
the CoS, minutes, 19 October 1937, AFSCA.
64 West (1938), p. 5.
65 Ibid.
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The service team judged that clothing was more strategic than food. Of the first $3,500 
allocated to the team, about $3,000 was spent on underwear, blankets, shoes and socks. 
Other  outer  clothing  was  also  distributed,  obtained  from  American  donations  and 
purchases made in England. 
The Service Team established the following distribution norm for clothing per child: 1 
set of underwear;  1 pair of warm socks; 1 pair  of good shoes; 1 set of warm outer 
garments  (dress,  shirt,  coat or overcoat).  The SCIU also distributed clothing,  with a 
more generous norm than the service team, giving two sets of underwear and socks per 
child. As West explains, the team “judged it better to have more children warm and 
dirtier than fewer warm and cleaner”. 66
At the AFSC joint meeting of 19 October 1937 a report from West advised that, in the 
last shipment, the clothes were too old and worn out to be any use. It was agreed to 
investigate the matter, since the shipment consisted principally of new clothing; it was 
suspected that the goods had been substituted.
Dan West, reporting for the team, estimated that 1,300 children were warmer because of 
their  distribution  of  the  first  shipment  “in  the  six  weeks  before  1  January  1938”67: 
distribution  had  not  been  possible  before  15  November  1937.  It  was  impossible  to 
estimate how many children were fed by the service team.
Transportation was a key problem; a truck was urgently needed. The Committee on 
Spain agreed at its meeting of 3 December 1937 to purchase a truck, to be shipped to 
Nationalist Spain. The cost of the truck would not “affect the $ 1,500 monthly relief 
commitment”, established for the activities in Nationalist Spain.68 A 1½ ton Ford truck 
was scheduled to be shipped on January 8 1938.69
At the end of January 1938 it was clear that the initial assessment of some Red Cross 
officials, that there was little need on the Nationalist side, was not correct. In rural areas 
and orphanages West and Smith saw “needy children, skin diseases and cold faces in 
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 CoS, minutes, 3 December 1937, AFSCA.
69 CoS, minutes, 31 December 1937, AFSCA.
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November winds… bare feet in rainy December… and we had likely not been in the 
neediest places yet”.70
By September 1937, there were 40,000 women and children evacuees from France to 
Nationalist territory, most of them totally destitute, pro-Francoist woman and children 
that  left  Spain  and  returned  to  their  homes  when  the  Nationalists  advanced  into 
Republican Territory.  Many had been in Republican prisons, a factor which had not 
been taken into account in the Nationalist Red Cross previsions71.
When winter came, Auxilio Social was fighting desperately to cope with the increasing 
number of children in need of food and clothing. In the Leon province, many villages 
were burnt by the retreating Republican forces and all the cattle had gone. Asturias was 
the neediest of the seven provinces covered by relief action.72
West reported: “At present clothing heads the list, but as the weather gets warmer, milk 
will come first, soap next, then staples such as rice, fish and others”.73
We  have  dealt  in  this  chapter  with  the  period  in  which  the  American  Quakers 
established themselves in Spain, developed their relief work, and then responded to the 
challenge of public attention being diverted from the Spanish struggle, as new conflicts 
arose elsewhere in the world.
In  the  next  two  chapters,  we  shall  deal  with  the  arrival  of  a  new  agency,  the 
International Commission (IC), and we will follow the process of disengagement of the 
agencies  from the  conflict  and the  way in  which  each  of  them reacted  to  Franco’s 
victory.
70 West (1938), pp. 8-9.
71 Ibid.
72 Ibid, p. 9.
73 Ibid, p. 13.
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Chapter 6: Full scale war (1). The work of 
the agencies and the International 
Commission for the Assistance of Child 
Refugees in Spain: relief in years of misery 
6.1 The International Commission: refilling empty bags
At the end of 1937, with northern Spain already in Nationalists hands and Málaga lost 
by the Republicans the new Republican Government under Juan Negrín struggled to 
strengthen the state and to build the Popular Army, with Soviet support, to fight what 
was already a full scale war. Franco’s blockade of Republican trade was increasingly 
effective. Food, coal and fuel shortages were dramatic, and the work of the agencies 
needed to be increased.
The  Nationalists  had  started  the  war  with  sufficient  food  supplies  because  they 
controlled most of agricultural  Spain, but their advances and the growing population 
under their control meant they also needed supplies of all kinds.
The ICRC continued its work along the lines detailed above, coping with the changing 
situation  and  the  increasing  number  of  war  and  political  prisoners  and  displaced 
civilians and receiving increased and varied demands for help.
Save the Children (SCIU), after ending its agreement with the British Friends (FSC), 
continued its activities in both zones and linked up with Service Civil  International, 
collaborating in Olgiati’s Swiss operation (Swiss Aid – SA), and with the American 
Friends in Nationalist territory.
A significant change occurred in Quaker relief work. While maintaining FSC’s work in 
Barcelona,  activity  spread  to  other  Republican  locations  and  into  Nationalist  Spain 
through the active presence of the American Quakers, the AFSC, who arrived in South 
Eastern Spain in 1937 and later went into Nationalist territory.
The international situation was also worsening and the multiple crises — not only war, 
such  as  in  China,  but  also  the  German  refugee  crisis  and  the  Great  Depression —
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stretched the agencies. In late 1937, FSC and SCIU organised a joint Christmas Appeal 
in Europe,1 while in the USA the Protestant Federal Council of Churches made a similar 
appeal for Chinese, Spanish and German refugees.2 In America, the Chinese struggle 
diverted attention from the Spanish conflict, since the Japanese aggression was seen as a 
threat by public opinion.
Given the scale of need, Edith Pye,3 a British Quaker activist and an expert in fund 
raising, took the initiative. She attempted lobbying the League of Nations in Geneva 
without success; they created the office of “International Commissioner”, with no real 
powers or budget. Her consultations with the British Government were more fruitful, 
obtaining a commitment to contribute to aid in the same proportion as other nations.4 
She also successfully negotiated with the British Foreign Office the creation of a new 
body to serve as a charitable organisation to channel funds obtained from Governments, 
private institutions  and individual  donations to the main agencies,  coordinating their 
work, as well as having a direct presence in relief in Spain.
The Quakers Edith Pye,  Hilda Clark and T. Edmond Harvey,  took a leading role in 
organising the International Commission for the Assistance of Child Refugees, which in 
December  1937 became the  “International  Commission  for  the  Assistance  of  Child 
Refugees in Spain” (IC). 5 The aim of the IC was “to relieve the suffering brought by 
war”,  with  the  emphasis  always  “on  children,  but  work  was  also  done  for  adults, 
specially mothers, old people and disabled veterans”.6
Twenty four  Governments  were involved in  the  project:  Australia,  Belgium,  Brazil, 
Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Great Britain, Germany, The Netherlands, 
India, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Puerto Rico, Sweden, 
Switzerland,  South Africa,  the USA and Yemen,  with contributions  from $1,000 to 
$50,000.7 
1 CoS, minutes, 28 October 1937, FHL.
2 BoD, minutes, 6 October 1931, AFSCA.
3 Pye first visited Spain in January 1937, with Olgiati (CoS, minutes, 15 January 1937, FHL) and in 21 
December 1936 she met Mme Small of the SCIU and travelled throughout with Dr Pictet of the SCIU.
4 MoSC, minutes, 13 October 1937, FHL.
5 And again renamed “International Commission for the Assistance of Spanish Child Refugees” when the 
exodus to France of more than 500,000 Spaniards by 1939 made relief necessary across the border.
6 Kershner (1950), p. xviii.
7 Kershner (1950), p. xvi.
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The British and American Quakers, together with Save the Children International Union 
(SCIU) and Service Civil International (SCI) were important participants, channelling 
IC aid to Spanish children through their existing operations in both the Republican and 
Nationalist  areas of Spain,  and also setting up new feeding stations and other relief 
efforts representing the IC. 
From the beginning of 1938, when the IC started to release funds to the participating 
agencies  — FSC/AFSC,  together  with  the  ICRC  and  the  SCIU  in  Nationalist  and 
Republican Spain — it  became possible  to feed more children on both sides of the 
conflict.
But  by  March  1938  Nationalist  advances  provoked  a  new  exodus  of  refugees  to 
Alicante, Murcia and Almería, disrupting communications and relief supplies, while the 
start of bombing in Barcelona, on 16 March 1938, added more strain.
6.2 Work by the British Quakers and the IC
“Although relief in Nationalist Spain was proceeding smoothly under the AFSC, there 
were serious discussions in progress as to whether FSC workers would be allowed to 
continue relief under a Nationalist Government.  Following the advice of the Foreign 
Office,  the  FSC decided  to  send  a  representative  to  talk  to  Nationalist  officials  in 
Burgos.”8 It is surprising that after nearly two years of conflict, the FSC was going to 
look to Franco’s side The FSC issued “certificates to their Spanish employees in the 
hope that these would offer some protection in the case of political recrimination”.9 We 
must assume that the FSC realised that their close connection in relief work with local 
government and state authorities in Republican Spain could lead to problems on the 
Nationalists taking power.
The start of the Battle of the Ebro on the night of 24-25 July 1938, when the Republican 
armies crossed the Ebro River front line, gave new hopes to Republican supporters. The 
crisis  in  Czechoslovakia,  faced  with  German  demands  for  Sudetenland,  led  the 
Republican  Government  to  believe  that  the  Spanish  war  would  become  part  of  a 
European conflict, to the benefit of the Republic. It also calmed any unrest among relief 
8 Mendlesohn (2002), p. 93, referring to the minutes of a meeting of the FSC CoS of 28 April 1938.
9 Mendlesohn (2002), p. 93, referring to the minutes of a meeting of the BoD of the AFSC of 16 April 
1938 and also to the minutes of a meeting of the FSC CoS dated 5 April 1938.
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workers. Supplies from the IC permitted the expansion of the relief program, increasing 
the number of children fed by the Friends by 2,000 in Nationalist Spain and by 5,000 in 
South-East Spain.10 The IC presence was now the driving force for the expansion of 
Quaker relief work. 
6.2.1 South-Eastern Spain
In August 1938 the following projects were operating:
- 3 hospitals: two in Murcia and one in Alicante. The Almería hospital had closed.
- 2 milk canteens for babies (Lorca and Almería).
- Lunch for refugees in Murcia
- A warehouse for food and clothing in Murcia.
- Breakfast for school children and old people in Murcia together with a project of food 
for refugees in transit.
- A dining room for local children in Almería.
Smaller projects were also running:
- “Goodwill suitcases” from American children to Spanish children
- A workshop and evening schools in Murcia.
“International  Commission  Canteens”  were  opened  in  Almería  and  Crevillente 
(Alicante) with a capacity of 400 and 500 children respectively.
There the problem was not food but transportation, and many times they were forced to 
limit  the  orders  to  staples,  because  a  more  varied  food  supply  would  significantly 
increase costs.11
10 CoS, minutes, 29 April 1938 and 2 June 1938, FHL.
11 Letter from Clyde E. Roberts to John Reich, 3 August 1938, AFSCA.
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6.2.2 Catalonia
The situation  was  much  worse  in  Catalonia12.  Already in  April  1938,  Alfred  Jacob 
stated: “The hopelessness of the search for food affects everybody. Nothing is available 
in the shops, not even the omelette powders, soup cubes and sugar beets there used to 
be.”13 Dorothy Thomson wrote to John Reich on 25 April 1938: “The process of the 
relief work by the Quakers in Catalonia has been a sustained action with progressive 
expansion of the activities, either directly by the FSC, or in collaboration with other 
local charities or direct foreign support.”14 At the end of 1938, the relief canteens with 
Quaker support were: 15





Lluis Companys refuge FSC
S. Andres Norway Friends
CATALONIA 3.500






12 Catalonia had been divided from the rest of the Republican zone when Franco’s troops took the 
Mediterranean port of Vinaròs on 15 April 1938.
13 Letter from Alfred Jacob to Fred Tritton, 26 April 1938, AFSCA.
14 Letter from Dorothy Thompson to John Reich, 25 April 1938, AFSCA.
15 Details from CoS minutes and correspondence of Committee members and Friends in the field.




Rubí European cities with Asistencia Infantil
Caldes de Malavella Birmingham/Asistencia Infantil
La Noguera (Manresa) Denmark/Pro Infancia Obrera
Soler botey FSC/Ayuda Infantil
According  to  these  figures,  the  Quaker  canteens  in  Catalonia  covered  about  7,500 
children.  Adding the approximately 3,000 children helped by food supplied through 
Barcelona  Social  Services,16 more  than  10,000  children  were  being  helped  in  this 
Republican  territory  at  this  moment.  Taking  into  account  the  continuous  flow  of 
children,  with  new  children  arriving  while  others  left,  perhaps  30,000  to  35,000 
different children received Quaker relief in Catalonia.
As we have seen,  in many cases other  organisations  were involved:  Ayuda Infantil, 
Asistencia Infantil, and Pro Infancia Obrera were Spanish agencies created by unions, 
parties and organisations that had experience in such work, bringing a valuable  link 
with local authorities.
6.3 The Save the Children International Union (SCIU) 
6.3.1 A renewed relief effort
At its Executive Committee meeting on 2 March 1938, Mme Small  pointed out that 
SCIU had no delegate in Spain. She stated that they had two qualified candidates, but 
financial problems meant only one could be employed. She proposed sending first just 
one to Nationalist Territory, and later another to Republican Spain.
In Nationalist Spain, the relief organised by Miss Müller was continuing, with Auxilio  
Social in charge of the Los Corrales canteen. This was operating satisfactorily and the 
16 FSC CoS; correspondence Barcelona-Jacobs; letter from Dorothy Thompson to John Reich, 25 April 
1938; FHL.
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SCIU, which financed it, extended its grant for three months. Cod-liver oil, clothing and 
shoes were being supplied by the SCIU and sent to Nationalist territory where they were 
received directly by Auxilio Social or else distributed by the American Quakers, Smith, 
West and Blickenstaff.
No change was expected for the moment in relief work in Catalonia and the rest of the 
Republican  zone,  as the distribution  of supplies  through other  persons  and agencies 
worked acceptably.17
In April 1938, Annemarie Byloff became the new SCIU delegate in Nationalist Spain, 
being paid SF300 per month plus expenses, and with the standard personal insurance for 
SCIU delegates.  Her contract  does not mention the International Commission,  which 
was already functioning.18
Apart from its delegates in Spain, SCIU was also represented on the Commission itself, 
by Mlle  Ferriere  of  its  Executive  Committee,  while  SCIU provided the  IC’s  office 
support in Geneva.19 
6.3.2 Work in Nationalist Spain: coordinated relief by the AFSC, Save the 
Children International Union (SCIU) and the IC
Before entering Spain, Byloff met the Nationalist Red Cross delegate, the Count of La 
Granja, and the French Ambassador, Herbette, at St Jean-de-Luz, on the French side of 
the border, where she also dealt with the transport of new milk supplies arriving for 
Nationalist Spain. From there, she travelled to Burgos with the Quaker workers, Smith 
and Blickerstaff, arriving at the city on 15 April 1938. Thus began a close relationship 
in Nationalist Spain between Byloff and the Americans, forming in fact a new SCIU-
Quaker team. They were so active that they spent little time in Burgos, their base.
From April 24 to April 28, 1938, Byloff travelled with Smith and Blickenstaff to the 
Aragon Front, visiting Zaragoza, Huesca, Lleida, (the first Catalan city to surrender to 
Franco,  on  3  April  1938),  Fraga,  and villages  such as  Valdemud  and Heruez,  near 
Huesca.  They  contacted  the  Auxilio  Social delegates  and  visited  canteens  and 
17 Executive Committee, minutes, Session 233, 2 March 1938 (and related explanatory note), AEG-SCIU.
18 Annemarie Byloff, AP:92.16.7:4, AEG-SCIU; letter from M A MacKenzie (SCIU member) to A 
Byloff, 9 April 1938, AEG-SCIU.
19 The IC headquarters were located in Geneva in 1938, being moved to Paris in 1939 by Howard E. 
Kershner (Vice-President and Director-Commissioner) and returning to Geneva in 1940. 
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distributed food and clothing. She noted that there were no abandoned children, since 
families took care of them and new orphanages were being established. There was a 
great need for clothing. They also visited Belchite and Median, virtually destroyed by 
the battles. 
On this first trip, Byloff  realised that new canteens were needed, and presented two 
options to Geneva. One was to establish them directly through the SCIU/IC. The other, 
in her opinion the most feasible option, was to work through Auxilio Social, by that time 
the predominant organisation, Beneficencia having been put under the control of Javier 
M. de Bedoya, Auxilio Social Secretary.20 Mme Small accepted this second option. She 
proposed  to  only  finance  new  canteens  in  locations  selected  by  A.  Byloff,  and 
established and managed by Auxilio Social. It was also agreed to include the children in 
the existing colonies as “Children to relieve” under the rules of the Commission.21
From 1 to 7 May 1938, the three agency workers travelled in a Quaker truck to Huesca, 
Tardienta, Huerries, Zaragoza, Morella, Alcañiz and back to Zaragoza. The Red Cross 
in Zaragoza helped them overcome the military’s reluctance to permit their trip, and the 
three of them travelled to Caspe and Vinarós, on the Mediterranean, which the Francoist 
troops had only reached a few days before, on 15 April 1937, dividing the Republican 
zone in two.
They studied the menus of the  Auxilio Social canteens, and visited places where the 
creation of new canteens was convenient.22 
From 14 to 17 May 1938, the three took clothing and condensed milk from the Quakers 
to Teruel and the villages of Argente, Perales and Alfambra; they also distributed food 
in these places.
They organised cooperation with the Nationalist  Red Cross, supplying some of their 
canteens. It was agreed with the Count of Vallellano to visit Leon, Segovia, Málaga and 
Cádiz, where he thought the IC could cover children’s needs.23
20 Annemarie Byloff, ‘Report on the journey to the Aragon Front with the American Quakers Smith and 
Blickerstaff’, AP: 92.16.7:4, AEG-SCIU.
21 Ibid; letter from Mme Small to A. Byloff, 5 May 1938, AEG-SCIU.
22 Annemarie Byloff, ‘Report on voyage to the Aragon Front from 1 to 7 May, 1938’, 11 May 1938, AP: 
92.16.7:4, AEG-SCIU. 
23 Annemarie Byloff, ‘Report’, 19 May 1938, AP: 92.16.7:4, AEG-SCIU.
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On 20-21 and 24-25 May the SCIU-Quaker team travelled to Zaragoza and Huesca to 
visit existing canteens, such as that of Auxilio Social at Barbastro, and explore villages 
thought to be most  in  need of new canteens.  During this  journey Byloff  learnt  that 
Smith would return to America, to be replaced by a Quaker, Clyde Roberts. Also Judge 
Hannson, President of the Commission, informed Byloff that they would be able to feed 
more children and the proposed Red Cross canteen at Tardienta was authorised.24 
The SCIU Executive Committee on 25 May 1938 agreed that: “Dr Byloff’s letters show 
she is working well. At the moment, she is mainly working, together with the American 
Quakers, to set up International Commission Canteens”.25 The meeting also noted that 
the  Commission  had  received,  until  then,  SF  385,000  and  was  waiting  to  receive 
another SF 17,000 in donations. The IC was providing breakfasts for 15,000 children in 
Republican  Spain  and  full  meals  to  2–3,000  children  in  Nationalist  Spain.  The 
difference in the figures was due to the worse food situation in the Republican zone and 
also to the higher price of a full meal compared to a breakfast. We should note here that 
the SCIU, providing the administrative support for the Commission Headquarters and 
its Director, was very well connected and informed about IC activities. 
The  Commission  was  gradually  enhancing  its  role,  and  channelling  more  funds  to 
agencies. By early 1938, the agencies were close to collapse, except for the ICRC and 
perhaps the American Quakers. The British Quakers and the SCIU had almost no funds, 
and independent agencies’ relief in Spain was seriously affected. The agencies’ own 
contribution  to  relief  spending  in  Spain  diminished  as  the  donations  they  received 
decreased. In fact, during 1938, agencies’ activities consisted increasingly of providing 
personnel to do relief work financed by the IC. The central role of the IC in child relief 
in Spain at this time has been almost ignored by the scarce literature on relief in the 
Spanish Civil war.
On 10 June 1938, Byloff  reported to the SCIU and the Commission,  explaining the 
humanitarian problems while awaiting a canteen in Huesca: “The worst is the adults 
arguing  between  them and  the  Berruelo  children  are  hungry.  I  ask  if  it  should  be 
possible, while a final decision is taken, for either the Union or the Commission to give 
the  money  to  purchase  food  for  these  children  until  the  matter  of  the  canteens  is 
24 Annemarie Byloff, ‘Report’, 27 May 1938, AP: 92.16.7:4, AEG-SCIU.
25 Executive Committee, minutes, session 235, 25 May 1938, AEG-SCIU.
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resolved. The children in need are about 900, and Auxilio Social has a dining room for 
250 children, serving them alternately”.26
On 28 July 1938, Byloff met Charles Ewald, the new American Quaker replacing Clyde 
Robert, who in turn had replaced Earl Smith in early June 1938. Ewald was fluent in 
Spanish, something very useful for their work. They continued visiting, with trips to 
Teruel, Daroca, Monreal, and a well run orphanage in Carrion de los Condes.
In late  August,  Malcolm de Lilliehöök,  the IC Commissioner,  arrived in Nationalist 
Spain  accompanied  by  David  Blickenstoff.  Together  with  Byloff,  they  went  from 
Valladolid to Burgos, where they visited Pilar Primo de Rivera, as well as Merry del 
Val and Llorente, undersecretary of the Falange. They were to visit Martínez de Bedoya 
and Mercedes Sanz de Bachiller before Lilliehöök’s trip to Bilbao, San Sebastian, and 
Jaca. Lilliehöök’s departure was planned for 9 September.
6.3.3 Shrinking Republican Spain. Linking with SCI.
As we have seen,  the SCIU had prioritised  placing  a  delegate  in  Nationalist  Spain, 
Annemarie  Byloff.  The  SCIU  maintained  its  activity  in  the  Republican  zone, 
represented by volunteers such as Mrs Petter and Sister Imbelli. In May 1938, Rudolf 
Olgiati  accepted  SCIU’s  request  that  he represent  them in  the  Valencia  -  Murcia  - 
Almería zone (“triangle” as they called it).27
On 19 October 1938, Mrs GM Petter, who as mentioned previously had worked as an 
SCIU volunteer  in  Barcelona,  was  employed  as  “representative  of  the  SCIU in  the 
Commission  for  a  specific  [Republican]  Spanish  zone”.  She  had  been  the  other 
candidate that Mme Small had in mind at the Executive Meeting of 2 March 1938. 
Mrs Petter had abandoned the SCIU joint operation with the Quakers in Barcelona due 
to her discrepancies with Jacob, but had continued doing relief work in Spain. She had 
focused on the care of displaced children in the different regions that then made up 
Republican Spain, travelling constantly to trace lost children and check conditions in 
orphanages, colonies, houses and suchlike. In this she was in permanent contact with 
other organisations, such as Swiss Aid, the Red Cross, de SCI of Rodolfo Olgiati and all 
26 Annemarie Byloff, ‘Report to the International Union (SCIU) and the Commission’, 10 July 1938, AP: 
92.16.7:4, AEG-SCIU. 
27 Executive Committee, minutes, session 232, 2 March 1938, AEG-SCIU.
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kinds of authorities. She also managed the distribution of supplies across that sector of 
Republican Spain.
On employing  her,  the  SCIU valued  her  recent  voluntary  work for  the  agency and 
agreed to pay her 150 sterling per year, but only contracted her for three months, with 
subsequent monthly extensions, due to their financial fragility. It was clearly established 
that she would work mainly with relief and funding from the IC.28
6.4 Service Civil International (SCI): the effectiveness of the Swiss 
Connection
In  1938,  SCI,  through its  General  Secretary,  Rodolfo Olgiati,  had  a  unique  role  in 
humanitarian relief in Spain. Olgiati — who as we have seen had been in Spain from the 
beginning of the war, mostly on the Madrid-Valencia axis — had also been appointed 
director of Swiss Aid (SA) in February 1937. In May 1938 the SCIU appointed him as 
its representative for the Valencia-Murcia-Almería triangle; and when the IC became 
active, they selected him as Delegate for their canteens and relief across Republican 
Spain,  excluding  Catalonia.29 In  fact,  all  the relief  provided in  Spain  by the “Swiss 
Connection” was in his hands, excluding the ICRC, with which Olgiati liaised. In his 
multiple roles he was permanently active and travelling.
By June 1938, thirty two SCI volunteers (including seven sisters) had worked in Spain, 
with thirteen volunteers remaining, four of them sisters.
The  IC’s  request  to  Olgiati  to  recruit  volunteers  and  distribute  supplies  required 
negotiations with Swiss Aid (SA).30 It was agreed that SA would remain independent, 
while SCI would take responsibility for field work in Spain for SA and the IC.31 Only 
Swiss  workers  could  be  employed  for  SA  work,  while  other  nationalities  could 
28 Letter from George Thelin, Vice President of SCIU to Mrs G.M. Petter, 19 October 1938, AP: 
92.16.7:3, AEG-SCIU.
29 LCF Bibliothèque: SCI International Archives – 20365 International Commission 1 - letter of 
presentation to the Republican Authorities of R. Olgiati as Delegate: 30 June 1938; Declaration dated 4 
July 1938, signed by Dr Juan Negrín, Republican prime minister and, from April 1938, also Minister of 
Defence); authorizing Rodolfo Olgiati to travel throughout all Republican territory and asking to the 
Authorities to provide him with all kind of help, mainly transportation.
30 See Section 2.5
31 On the LGF Bibliothèque: SCI International Archives: 20365 – International Commisión – 1 
Correspondence/Reports/Minutes May – December 1938 – A draft agreement, both in English and 
French, to be signed by the I.C. Commissioner M. Lilliehöök and SCI President, Pierre Ceresole, is kept.
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participate in SCI work for the IC. Thus one of Pierre Ceresole’s ideas was fulfilled: 
“International collaboration with international financing”.32
Thus the number of volunteers increased to more than twenty, including Karl Ketterer, 
Willi Begert and Ralph Hegnover, all well known CSI workers. Luckily: “During two 
years, no one has been wounded, no serious accident has affected the daily evacuation 
convoys. It can be considered a miracle”.33
Under  this  new scheme,  SCI was in  charge of  130 IC canteens,  serving more  than 
100,000  people.34 SCI,  and  Olgiati  personally,  were  in  regular  contact  with  other 
members  of  the  IC,  mainly  SCIU,  with  their  delegate  Mrs  Petter,  and  the  Quaker 
operation in Barcelona and in the South-East.
6.5 The International Commission (IC)
6.5.1 The IC under Captain Malcolm de Lilliehöök
While the IC was based at Geneva, until January 1939, the Swedish officer, Captain 
Malcolm de Lilliehöök, was IC Commissioner with the administrative backing of the 
SCIU, in whose offices the IC was then located.
On  18  May  1938,  Lilliehöök  issued  a  document  drafted  in  Spanish  entitled: 
“Suggestions  about  the  purpose  and  organisation  of  the  work  of  the  International 
Commission for the help of the evacuee children of Spain”.35
The first point of the document refers to assisting “evacuee children”, defined as “those 
who by reason of the war had been forced to leave their homes, including whose… 
house had been destroyed.” The purpose was to provide them with a hot meal or its 
equivalent,  every day.  Other points include the membership of the Commission; the 
help requested from the Spanish authorities; suggestions from local Mayors about the 
32 BUG: Bulletin du SCI nº 13, Willi Begert Report: p. 63
33 Monastier (1955), p. 48.
34 Monastier (1955), p. 50
35 Document drafted in Spanish with the IC letterhead, entitled: ‘Sugestiones sobre la finalidad y 
organización del trabajo de la Comisión Internacional de Ayuda a los Niños evacuados de España’, 
18/5/38, in ‘Correspondence/Reports/Minutes, May-December 1938’. SCI International Archives. 20365-
1. LCF Bibliothèque; henceforth SCI (1938).
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location of canteens; a list of evacuee (refugee) children under 14 years of age and the 
promise to provide the premises and facilities for the canteens.
In June-July 1938, Lilliehöök travelled  to  Republican  Spain,  visiting  Barcelona  and 
other parts of Catalonia,  Valencia,  Alicante,  Murcia, Lorca, Almería,  Ubeda,  Bailén, 
Jaén, Pozo Blanco, Cabeza de Buey, Villanueva de la Serena, Almádena, Ciudad Real, 
Villa Rubio, Tambleque, Madrid, Cuenca and back to Valencia; “some 3,000 kms.”36
Following his visit, he made a wide ranging and important report.
Lilliehöök spoke of the overall situation: “From a purely military point of view, the 
situation is unstable and does not offer any prospects of developing in a manner that 
would facilitate our work”. “Politically… added difficulties result from unsatisfactory 
collaboration between the various branches of administration. This makes for very slow 
progress with regard to all activities that touch more than one Ministry,  as often the 
‘competent’  authorities stubbornly resist any propositions that  have not originated in 
their own department”. Here he confirms a problem which we have already seen with 
the  Republican  bureaucracy.  Lilliehöök  continues:  “This  lack  of  coordination  is 
especially regrettable with regard to child welfare work, as the children depend not on 
one, but on several Ministries. Thus ‘Asistencia Social’, although the most important of 
the social departments, has no control over children under a certain age or belonging to 
certain special categories, who may — or may not — depend on ‘Instrucción Pública y 
Sanidad’ or the Ministry of Justice’.”
Lilliehöök notes that the lack of coordination mentioned above means that “no reliable 
statistics regarding the number of refugee and evacuated children are available.” Using 
private sources —the official sources were demonstrably inaccurate— he calculated that 
in Madrid there were nearly 200,000 refugees of different ages up to 15 years. For the 
entire Republican zone, he estimated around 400,000 child refugees, of whom 25%, or 
100,000, suffered malnutrition, 50% under-nourishment, while the remaining 25% were 
in  a  state  of  pre-starvation.37 Concerning  children  in  need  as  a  whole  in  Catalonia, 
Lilliehöök disagreed with Edith Pye’s estimate of 40,000; he was convinced that the 
real figure was 100,000. 
36 ‘Memorandum regarding the proposed relief work of the International Commission in Republican 
Spain’, 7 July 1938, signed by Malcolm de Lilliehöök, Commissioner, in SCI (1938); henceforth 
Lilliehöök, Memorandum, 7 July 1938.
37 Lilliehöök, Memorandum, 7 July 1938.
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In  Catalonia,  there  were  62  canteens,  serving  14,000  children.  He  found  that  they 
worked well and should be expanded as quickly as possible. He proposed new canteens 
as  follows:  50  (of  not  more  than  300  children  each)  within  two  months  (by  15 
September 1938); another 100 canteens two months later (by 15 November 1938); and a 
further 100 canteens by 15 December. Including those already existing, there would be 
around 300 canteens, serving 90,000 children.
Soap was “practically not to be had anywhere, at least of a quality suitable for personal 
use”.  Lilliehöök  argued  that  soap  was  essential,  and  should  be  included  in  IC’s 
distributions to children, until then restricted to food. He argued “The present situation 
is simply intolerable for moral as well as sanitary reasons. The IC can not go on feeding 
the children just as if they were pigs. One must attempt to combine material help with a 
determined effort to raise the moral of these poor children. It is thus both necessary and 
feasible to insist on the children being at least fairly clean when they arrive for meals at 
the I.C. Canteens, but his reasonable demand becomes a bad joke if no soap can be 
found”.38 Clothes, shoes and fuel were also urgently needed.
Lilliehöök  found  that  importation  and  transportation  were  increasingly  difficult. 
Barcelona port was excluded due to the risks and delays involved, but shipments for 
Catalonia  could  be  sent  to  Marseille  or  Bordeaux  and  from  there  by  road.  He 
recommended opening a shipping centre at Marseille, jointly with the FSC. For the rest 
of  Republican  Spain  all  imports  had  to  be  by  sea.  All  ports  with  the  exception  of 
Valencia  were  too  small  or  unusable  due  to  daily  bombings.  He  wrote  that  the 
“importation of goods by the sea… will eventually require diplomatic action in order to 
have one or more ports declared neutral”. This problem would later be resolved. (See 
Section 6.5.4)  There were also serious  problems for inland transport.  For the IC to 
supply “300 grams of solid food per day to 400,000 children, a total of some 1,200 tons 
will have to be transported”,39 but all the lorries available were needed for evacuations 
or military movements.
Of the IC’s resources in Republican Spain —essentially the representatives of the IC’s 
constituent  organisations—  Lilliehöök  states:  “These  foreign  collaborators  —15  at 
present— constitute the basis of the relief work, and generally speaking, nothing much 
38 Lilliehöök, Memorandum, 7 July 1938, p. 18.
39 Lilliehöök, Memorandum, 7 July 1938, p. 10. 
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can  be  achieved  anywhere  without  their  assistance  in  regard  to  both  preliminary 
investigation,  starting of the work and constant  supervision.  To a very great  extent, 
therefore,  the  possibility  of  expanding  the  relief  work  depends  on  the  number  and 
quality of the foreign collaborators”.40 He added that the great diversity of refugee need 
meant  that  these collaborators would need the maximum freedom of action to work 
effectively.
Concerning organisation,  as Republican territory was divided,  two centres  would be 
necessary to organise IC’s work, one for Catalonia and one for the rest, with overall 
supervision from outside Spain. The IC representative in each part of Republican Spain, 
should remain in office as long as the work continued, so as to avoid the negative effect 
of a change. The representatives would have medical advisers and cars. He proposed 
inviting the AFSC in the South of Spain to collaborate with the IC representative in 
Madrid.  Lilliehöök  was  clearly  worried  by  the  IC’s  responsibilities  and  limited 
resources,  and  proposed  making  an  urgent  appeal  to  a  body  with  much  greater 
resources.
His memorandum ends with some practical proposals and arrangements for the sending 
of supplies to both parts of Republican Spain. Part of these would be supervised by 
Olgiati who, Lilliehöök stated, “is not limited to the opening up of new canteens, but is 
free to use the goods as required also for other relief work amongst the refugee and 
evacuated children in this part of Spain.”41 Lilliehöök’s trust in Olgiati is evident. He, 
and not the FSC, is the representative in Catalonia with free hands to act in accordance 
with the needs assessed by him.
Lilliehöök  aimed to  reach 400,000 daily  rations  at  a  cost  of  2  British shillings  per 
month. This would mean an annual cost of £480,000: adding 10% for administration 
and distribution expenses (£48,000) and 6% for miscellaneous (£28,800) the total cost 
would be £46,400 per month or £550,800 per year. The proposed 3 month arrangement 
would cost £139,200. 
In late  August  and early September  1938, Lilliehöök travelled  to  Nationalist  Spain, 
visiting  various  authorities  and  observing  relief  work.  After  returning  to  Geneva, 
Lilliehöök produced a second memorandum on 24 September 1938, in which for the 
40 Lilliehöök, Memorandum, 7 July 1938, p. 7. 
41 Lilliehöök, Memorandum, 7 July 1938, p. 17. 
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first time he assesses the welfare situation in Nationalist Spain. He states clearly: “The 
Commissioner, after… is happy to be able to state that he has found no evidence of 
either starvation or even under nourishment amongst the children.” Lilliehöök reports: 
“The governmental organisation and specially Auxilio Social are attending to the needs 
of the whole civilian population in a very efficient manner, bringing supplies of standard 
foodstuffs: bread, meat, sugar, vegetables, dried fish, to special depots in the various 
provinces to be further distributed to all towns and villages” (my emphasis). 
Nonetheless, there were specific problems: “It is only natural that the smaller children 
can not be supplied everywhere with the special kind of food which they require, such 
as milk and fats such as cod liver oil.” It was agreed with the corresponding Nationalist 
authorities  to  concentrate  on  supplying  these  two items.  They would  be  distributed 
either as breakfast or as “merienda” (afternoon tea) to children up to five years of age, 
with the details to be agreed by local Authorities and Commission representatives. The 
aim was to reach about 20,000 children at a cost of 4 British pence per child and week; 
a total of £4,000 for three months.42
In this second memorandum, Lilliehöök updates his earlier evaluation of the situation in 
Republican Spain on the basis  of field  reports.  While  his  estimate of 400,000 child 
refugees is confirmed, the situation of civilians had worsened: “supplies of basic foods 
such as bread, sugar, fats, are absolutely inadequate and the distribution is extremely 
irregular”. Lilliehöök describes the Republican authorities’ efforts as “tremendous”, but 
seriously  affected  by  disorganisation.  He  notes  that  80  IC  canteens  were  already 
working  and  40,000  children  been  fed.  Following  new  appeals  governments  or 
organisations had given or promised £37,000 and the American Red Cross had donated 
5,500 tons of wheat flour (worth £50,000). The IC would also receive “an adequate 
supply of motor lorries for the inland distribution that will also be put at the disposal of 
the Commission”.
Lilliehöök believed the IC could increase the number of canteens from 80 to 500 and 
the children fed from 40,000 to 150,000 before the end of September 1938. He also 
proposed improving the supply of dried and condensed milk,  dried fruits, conserves, 
42 Malcolm de Lilliehöök, Memorandum, 26 October 1938, pp. 1-2, in SCI (1938). 
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dried fish (cod), salted herring, fats (butter, margarine, and cod liver),  oil, sugar and 
cocoa).43 
Lilliehöök underlined  “the frightful  need of clothing  and shoes  which  unfortunately 
exists on both sides”; a serious problem due to the incoming winter. In the name of the 
IC, he appealed for donations of all these products, to be distributed by the Commission 
to the children of both sides. In fact, in both zones agencies were providing clothing, 
shoes, milk and necessary fats, but there was not enough to cover the need.
Lilliehöök  submitted  a  third  memorandum  on  25  October  1938.  He  deals  with 
administrative difficulties in the Geneva bureau, and returns to the relief problems in 
Republican Spain. The AFSC managed the shipping of American wheat to Spain; the IC 
would have to plan the distribution within Spain. He proposed distribution through the 
canteens and colonies of the different foreign agencies (IC, FSC, AFSC and SCI-SA), 
as  well  as  through  “Spanish  agencies”  (in  reality,  different  levels  of  Republican 
authorities), such as schools, comedores infantiles, children’s hospitals, Gotas de Leche 
and children’s  colonies.  Lilliehöök  explained,  “through the Schools  and  Comedores 
Infantiles it will be possible to reach rapidly a great number of children below school 
age. This will be helpful in regard to bettering the present unspeakable condition of the 
2–4 year olds”. This age group, which seems to have been forgotten by the authorities, 
was in urgent need of milk. Lilliehöök suggested a worldwide campaign, proposing the 
slogan: “America is giving wheat, you must give milk”. And once again, he insisted on 
the urgent  need for  clothing,  shoes,  fuel  and soap,  suggesting that  a  new “efficient 
machinery  organised  to  deal  with  this  matter”  be  set  up  because  “the  present 
arrangements are hopelessly inadequate”.
Meanwhile, Lilliehöök stated that in Nationalist Spain, “certain matters have changed so 
considerably  as  to  affect  the  very  basis  of  the  intended  work”.44 The  Nationalist 
government had accepted a shipment of American Wheat (some 15,000 barrels). They 
did not wish to receive any milk or cod liver oil, but urgently needed clothes, shoes and 
blankets. 
Finally,  Lilliehöök points out that during more than two years of war the League of 
Nations had taken no action, being unable even to cooperate with Edith Pye’s initiative 
43 Lilliehöök, Memorandum, 26 October 1938, p. 23. 
44 Lilliehöök, Memorandum, 26 October 1938, p. 5.
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which led to the birth of the IC. Now the League was now taking some steps, too late, 
and without real effects. 
6.5.2 Howard E. Kershner and American aid 
In April 1938 the IC had proposed to the Quakers that their workers in Spain distribute 
relief supplies from the Commission.45 On 27 May 1938, the Committee accepted Edith 
Pye’s proposal that the FSC coordinate the feeding of 15,000 children in the Barcelona 
area, and the AFSC that of 5,000 children in the Valencia and Murcia areas and 7,000 in 
Nationalist Spain. Distribution would be of cocoa with milk and Swedish bread, which 
the IC considered the “most nourishing and the easiest to dispense”.46
On 2 December 1938, the AFSC asked Howard E. Kershner, a successful American ex-
businessmen  turned  humanitarian,  to  go  urgently  to  Spain  to  coordinate  relief 
distribution. His original plan had been to go to a Friends’ centre in Shanghai.47 The 
American  Government,  through  the  American  Red  Cross,  had  agreed  to  donate  3 
million bushels of wheat each month for the AFSC to distribute to children in Spain, 
with the promise to support AFSC during the winter. The Committee agreed to “ask 
Howard E. Kershner to go to Spain as soon as possible to act as relief administrator for 
whatever supplies we can secure”.48 
On 10 December 1938, part of the Committee on Spain, including Clarence E Picket 
and John F Rich, met Kershner to respond urgently to problems concerning the milling 
of the wheat; the American Red Cross had rejected a Spanish Republican government 
offer to cover the cost. The Committee presented two possibilities to the Red Cross: to 
receive raw wheat, whose processing the AFSC would negotiate in Spain, France or 
even the USA; or for the Red Cross to ask the millers to retain as payment part of the 
flour produced.
The meeting also considered in detail Kershner’s work and responsibilities should he go 
to  Spain.  A  memo  presented  by  Kershner  was  approved  in  principle,  but  it  was 
understood that conditions on the ground would determine his relationship with other 
45 CoS, minutes, 22 April 1938, AFSCA.
46 CoS, minutes, 27 May 1931, AFSCA.
47 Kershner (1950), p. 5.
48 CoS, minutes, 2 December 1938, AFSCA.
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representatives  and organisations.  He would depend on the voluntary cooperation of 
those in the field.
The final matter was to establish a minimum relief programme that could justify the 
presence of H. E. Kershner in Spain.49
A further  meeting  of  the  Committee  on  Spain,  on  16  December  1938,  agreed  that 
Kershner and his wife Gertrude should leave as soon as possible. At least 10,000 barrels 
of  flour  were  due  to  leave  in  January  and  the  Committee  wanted  to  be  ready  to 
administer  a  large  increase  in  relief  supplies,  should  the  efforts  of  the  President’s 
Committee50 and the IC be successful. The Kershners would sail on 4 January.51
On 3 January 1939 the Committee finalised a statement to both Spanish governments, 
Nationalist and Republican, concerning the American government’s offer to ship flour 
to  France,  provided  the  respective  Governments  assumed  the  cost  of  its  onward 
transport to Spanish territories. Immediately after that meeting, a joint meeting with the 
Board of Directors prepared the trip to Spain for the Kershners together with a new 
AFSC worker for Spain, Emett Gulley, who would set up IC canteens in Almería. Rufus 
Jones, the AFSC President, presented the IC’s request that Kershner become a member 
of the Commission. The AFSC rejected this proposal, “on account of the sensitiveness 
of the American people and the American Government”. The Committee also suggested 
that Howard Kerschner travel to Nationalist Spain before visiting the Republican zone, 
to resolve all trans-shipping matters.52 
Farah Mendlesohn implies that Kershner visited Nationalist  Spain first, due to “anti-
Republican prejudice and ignorance”:53 she is wrong on several grounds. Firstly,  this 
order  was  decided  by  the  AFSC  leadership,  not  Kershner.  Secondly,  Republican 
territory  was  by  now increasingly  reduced.54 Thirdly,  the  outcome  of  the  war  with 
Franco’s victory looked quite real, there was some logic in prioritising the Nationalist 
zone.  And it  is  not true that Kershner had any “anti-Republican prejudice”.  In fact, 
49 CoS, minutes, 10 December 1938, AFSCA.
50 Private Committee promoted by President Roosevelt and formed by prominent businessmen to raise 
funds for the AFSC to be used for the processing of surplus wheat, all this in connection with the 
American Red Cross. See CoS, minutes, 16 December 1938, AFSCA. 
51 CoS, minutes, 16 December 1938.
52 CoS and BoD, minutes, 3 January 1939, AFSCA.
53 Mendlesohn (2002), p. 145.
54 See the map of the progression of the battle fronts in Catalonia, Document B in Annex to the Thesis. 
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before entering any part of Spain, he contacted the Republican authorities, by then in 
France. He discussed with Marcelino Pascua, the Republican Ambassador in Paris, the 
possibility of using Girona as a supplies depot,55 and struggled to supply Madrid and 
cities in the south before these fell  to Franco.56 He criticised the fact  that  “the non-
intervention  agreement,  promoted  chiefly  by  England  and  the  United  States,  had 
succeeded in keeping supplies of war materials from going to the Republican side but 
had not in the slightest degree interfered with Franco’s reinforcements of men, bomber 
planes, guns and munitions sent in steady stream by Germany and Italy.”57 Kershner’s 
position is debatable, but in no way shows pronationalist bias. 
However, neither did Kershner have the special sympathies for the Republic shown by 
some relief workers, and insisted on working with the Nationalist authorities so as to 
provide relief as effectively and to the largest number of children possible. He was not a 
political activist but an administrator for the Quakers and also later for the IC, without 
forgetting the peace testimony and his Christian beliefs, as we shall see.
In the event, after his arrival in France in early January 1939, Kershner did first visit 
Republican territory and not the Franco is Zone. Contrary to some accounts, Kershner 
was well aware of the situation in the Republic and, especially, in Catalonia. He was in 
permanent  contact  with Edith Pye in London, Lilliehöök in Geneva and the Quaker 
workers in Catalonia. The key issue was the refugees leaving Barcelona and other towns 
and cities. There were “hundreds of thousands… on the roads of Spain”, whose “only 
hope of safety was to escape from Spain”; they headed for France.58
Both Pye and Lilliehöök proposed to Kershner the possibility of establishing a neutral 
zone in  Catalonia  near  the border,  where children  might  be fed and refugees  could 
receive general care.59 Kershner had also contacted the French Foreign Ministry to ask 
whether French authorities would admit the refugees and provide food, but they “did 
not believe immediate action would be necessary and the situation might not became 
critical for days, possible not for weeks”. The proposed neutral zone was accepted by 
the  Republican  Ambassador  to  France,  Marcelino  Pascua but  Quiñones  de  Leon, 
55 Kershner (1950), p. 11.
56 Ibid p. 72.
57 Ibid p. 8.
58 Ibid p. 18.
59 Ibid pp. 18-19.
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Franco’s representative, “was not able to conclude an agreement”. Evidently, Franco, 
whose armies were approaching the border without significant opposition, did not want 
to create a “neutral” territory inside his future state.
Barcelona fell into Nationalist hands, without any real fight, on 26 January 1939, but 
Quaker and IC workers in the Catalan capital “continued their work unmolested.” This 
was partly a result of prior diplomacy by the AFSC. Already in April 1938, Clarence 
Picket  reported  a  conversation  with  Juan  de  Cardenas,  Nationalist  representative  in 
USA, who encouraged the AFSC to plan to continue working in Spain following a 
Nationalist victory. Paul Merry del Val, head of the Press Bureau of the Ministry of the 
Interior for Nationalist Spain had written to Earl Smith: “I do not know if the good news 
we are having [of Nationalist advances] will mean that you will be leaving soon. I hope 
not and I truly believe that such a thing should not happen. I personally think that your 
real work is about to start”. This was interpreted by the Committee on Spain to mean 
that AFSC workers would be “welcome to continue in Spain, should the Nationalist 
army be victorious”.60 They agreed that: “Recognising the financial limitations of the 
Committee and the possible difficulty of securing funds after a Nationalist victory, they 
would continue the plan of relief work in Spain for at least a year”.61 Clarence Picket 
met de Cardenas shortly before the fall of Barcelona, with the latter admitting that “for 
the first time the Nationalist Government has a serious refugee problem on their hands” 
and  asking  “whether  it  should  be  possible  to  increase  the  allotment  of  flour  to 
Nationalist Spain in view of the capture of parts of Catalonia which were in great need”. 
Picket  had  accepted  on  the  condition  that  FSC  could  continue  its  activities  in 
Barcelona.62
On 28 January an IC meeting in Barcelona agreed to expand relief work, adapting it to 
the new circumstances: relief workers were notified in both Nationalist and the remains 
of Republican Spain.
On the afternoon of 30 January 1939, after receiving an urgent call informing him that 
refugees were already entering France, Kershner took the night train to Perpignan, near 
the  French-Spanish  border,  where  some  of  the  Barcelona  staff  had  established  a 
temporary headquarters at the Regina Hotel. He arrived early, and at 11am Kershner 
60 CoS, minutes, 22 April 1938, AFSCA.
61 CoS, minutes, 22 April 1938.
62 CoS, minutes, 27 January 1939, AFSCA.
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went,  with  four  other  workers  and a  Catalan  driver,  into  Spain  “among  throngs  of 
refugees  and  scenes  of  ‘ineffable  tragedy’,  fugitives  covered  the  roads,  but  in  the 
countryside peasants were working on their farms and goats were grazing, life seemed 
to be moving in normal fashion”63. After the inspection visit and back on the French 
side of the border, Kershner visited a new canteen established at Pont-a-Malines. 
In the event, there was greater need for relief on the Republican side: in the existing 
Nationalist territory, the food situation had changed little. In Catalonia, which had just 
been taken, relief continued to arrive. The British and American Quakers maintained 
their work, with the addition of the Auxilio Social services. IC’s main worries were not 
in  Nationalist  Spain,  but  for  the  population  in  the  Republican  zone,  suffering  a 
prolonged lack of food, care and general welfare.
6.5.3 New flags: arduous times
As the  war  ended,  foreign  agencies  in  Republican  Spain  were  operating  children’s 
hospitals, colonies and dining rooms, infant milk stations and women’s workshops. One 
day, a relief worker saw people putting up one flag after another. Those who had no flag 
hung out scarves or even sheets. Cathedral bells started ringing. “Well, it has happened” 
wrote the worker. There was no longer any Loyalist side. She was working on the other 
side now.64
The magic had gone. The sentiment that had moved the “Aid to Spain” movement was, 
in  most  cases,  “aid  to  the  Spanish  Republic”.  The  need  continued  and  even  more 
children were hungry, but with the Republic gone and a new regime, many workers left.
Kershner explains: “the experience of those who were unable to make the adjustment 
had  been  entirely  in  the  Republican  zone”.  In  contrast:  “My  executive  work  had 
necessitated dealings with both sides. I had formed friendships with individuals, among 
the Nationalists as well as the Republicans. The adjustment was not difficult for me”. 
He also maintains that some of the workers that left returned to their countries, mainly 
USA  and  Britain,  to  promote  a  pro-Republican  campaign,  accusing  Franco’s 
63 Kershner (1950), p. 21.
64 Kershner, Howard E., untitled, undated report, AFSCA, p. 1.
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government of failure to cooperate with the IC and forcing the workers to leave. This 
was not only false, but was also very negative for relief work. 65
Kershner fought against this, and when, once the war finished and the IC left Spain, he 
presented the real motives for the IC’s departure, as shown by the minutes of different 
IC and AFSC committees. The Nationalist relief structure was mostly ready to take on 
relief operations, despite the many difficulties, above all, the lack of financial support. 
Only the relief of refugees outside Spain — in France, North Africa and Latin America 
— still partially attracted public opinion, as we shall see in Sections 7.2.3 and 7.2.4.
The AFSCA and IC’s longstanding idea of a controlled process of disengagement was 
very important for the future of the IC and Quaker operations. 66 As Kershner said: “If 
therefore we had not  succeeded in  June 1939 in restoring the  good standing of the 
Quakers in the estimation of the Spanish authorities, the important relief work done in 
France from June 1940 to the end of 1942, would have been impossible,  as Quaker 
workers and Quaker supplies would not have been allowed to pass through Spain on 
their way to France”.67
6.5.4 The work of Howard E. Kershner: the International Commission and 
the Quakers
When Kershner and his wife sailed for Europe, on 4 January 1939, Nationalist forces 
were advancing rapidly. Barcelona fell on 26 January and by 10 February 1939, Franco 
controlled  the  whole  frontier  with  France.68 Madrid  surrendered  on  27  March  and 
General  Aranda  took  Valencia  on  30  March.  On  31  March,  Almería,  Murcia  and 
Cartagena were occupied and Franco controlled all of Spain.69
By the time Kershner took office as the AFSC’s Director of Relief, the Spanish Civil 
War was effectively over, and he already considered Spain as a single territory in which 
to organise relief. 
65 Kershner (1950), p. 100.
66 “A telegram from Hans Gramm emphasized the importance of closing the work in Spain gradually and 
with the good will of the Spanish officials… The Committee was united in this opinion, with the desire to 
keep channels for future usefulness in Spain”. CoS, minutes, 28 April 1939, AFSCA.
67 Kershner (1950), p. 114.
68 Thomas, H. (1990), p. 881.
69 Ibid p. 915.
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Kershner visited Nationalist Spain in early February 1939, together with Judge Hanson, 
International  Commission  (IC)  President70,  David  Blickentaff,  Chief  of  the  AFSC 
Mission in Nationalist Spain, and assisted by Samuel Ybargoyen, the Uruguay Consul 
in Lyon (France), who due to his knowledge of English, French and Spanish, had been 
attached  to  Kershner.  Kershner  by  now  also  represented  the  IC  and  was  its  Vice-
President and Director, a situation reluctantly accepted by the AFSC.
The main purpose of the visit was to clarify the position of the IC once the Nationalists 
had finally  won the  war.  Kershner  states  “The International  Commission  wished to 
continue sending food and other help to them [the Nationalists] but in order to do so, 
certain points must be granted to us by the Nationalist Government”.71
The IC delegation met General Espinosa de los Monteros,72 who agreed the following 
terms:
1. The lives and property of IC workers would be respected and they could continue to 
aid children.
2. Shipments to Republican Spain would be exempt from blockade and not bombed, 
fired upon or interfered with in any way.
3. The Nationalists would not re-export any grain from Spain during the period of IC’s 
operations.
4. All Customs regulation would be waived, so supplies could be delivered promptly to 
IC workers.
5. AFSC, FSC and IC would have complete supervision of all  supplies they sent to 
Spain  as  well  as  the  right  to  allocate  them,  control  their  distribution  and  inspect 
operations.
6. The origin of these goods would be publicised.
Javier  Martínez  de  Bedoya,  General  Secretary  of  Auxilio  Social and  head  of 
Beneficencia, also agreed to these points. Finally, the Nationalist Government gave its 
70 See Document A in the Annex to the Thesis for the membership of the IC Board of Directors.
71 Kershner (1950), p. 37.
72 H. Kershner refers to him as “similar to an Under-Secretary of State in our Government”, ibid p. 43. He 
was in fact Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
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consent on 24 February 1939, with a telephone call from the Nationalist government 
representative  in  France,  Quiñones  de  Leon.  Though  Franco’s  government  never 
confirmed it in writing, what was known as “the Burgos Agreement” was observed by 
both parties. Kerschner explains: “Just after the agreement had been put into operation, 
Mr Pollock of the British Foreign Office (FO) informed me that the British Consul at 
Palma, Headquarters of the Spanish Fleet, had wired him that the Spanish Admiralty 
had received orders not to molest our ships. Every ship that I listed [in the meeting with 
the Nationalists in Burgos] was mentioned by name in the order… During and after the 
war I had occasion to negotiate many matters with the Nationalist government and with 
individual  officers.  I  gladly  bear  witness  to  the  fact  that  though  agreement  was 
sometimes difficult to reach, once reached it was meticulously kept. It is a fact that all 
our ships went under Franco’s airplanes, over his submarines and past his battleships, 
and came safety to port in Republican Spain”.73
Let us now summarise the state of relief work at this time. As we shall see, Kershner 
was an executive, interested in providing effective relief, but also a Quaker, who wanted 
this work to transmit a spiritual message.
6.5.4.1 Spain
At the close of the war, the IC was operating with a staff of 31 foreign workers (largely 
Quaker personnel) in Spain and a large number of native helpers. From the end of the 
conflict, Auxilio Social distributed all relief in Spain and, accordingly, the Quaker staff 
was  reduced  to  10,  who  with  credentials  and  safe-conducts  from  the  National 
Delegation of Auxilio Social were able to travel freely anywhere in Spain.
They visited  Auxilio  Social dining rooms,  talked  to officials  and private  individuals 
present, and observed the operations, as well as, in the words of Kerschner, “carrying a 
message of love and friendship from the Governments and the people of the 24 nations 
who have contributed to the resources of this Commission. These devoted workers are 
carrying  on  a  work  of  prime  importance  for  the  promotion  of  good-will  and  the 
people”.74
73 Ibid pp. 45-46.
74 Kershner, Howard E. (no date) ‘Among the Spanish war victims’, AFSCA, p. 4.
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In some places  there were difficulties.  Some relief  workers,  such as Alfred Jacob’s 
team,  were not  willing  to  work in  the new situation.  On occasions,  IC goods were 
confiscated, though mainly subsequently recovered. Overall however, Kershner felt that 
the relief succeeded “in leaving the impression to the Spanish people that our profession 
of love and impartiality is entirely genuine, and that this principle is a deep and abiding 
motivation for our activities”.75 
6.5.4.2 France
After the massive evacuation from Catalonia in February 1939, with more than 500,000 
Spanish  refugees,  the  work  of  the  IC  turned  to  the  200,000  women  and  children 
scattered across France in refugee camps. With eight people, two cars and two vans they 
organised  an  operation  to  supply  clothing  and  bedding.  They  initially  assigned 
1,300,000 French Francs (FF), and additional contributions were expected.
At  that  time,  about  65,000  refugees  had  either  returned  to  Spain  or  gone  to  other 
countries, mainly in Latin America. The IC cared for about 2,000 refugees in Mexico 
and negotiated  with  Chile  and other  countries  to  find  new homes  for  refugees.  An 
allocation of FF 2,000,000 was used for this purpose.
The  IC  also  cared  for  men  in  concentration  camps  in  southern  France,  supplying 
clothing for the sick and wounded in hospitals, items such as paper, pencils and books, 
medical products or vitamin concentrates as well as laboratories for early diagnosis of 
tuberculosis and other diseases. They planned the construction of an extension to an 
existing hospital in the south of France, to care for tuberculosis cases, at a cost of about 
FF 4,000,000. The Pax Colony,76 as it was called, with about 50 orphan children, would 
be maintained for at least 1 more year.
They dealt with the problem of the mutilated Republican soldier refugees in the French 
camp. As Kershner stated: “It is not likely that these victims can go to any other country 
or return to Spain. France does not want them and they will become a perpetual charge 
upon charity”.77 In Africa, Spanish refugees were permitted ashore at Oran, Algeria, by 
the French colonial authorities, because the British Government promised the IC would 
75 Kershner, Howard E., untitled, undated report, AFSCA, p. 12.
76 A children’s colony established in France, in a Seine castle, funded by a donation of FF 269,800 from 
two Loyalist officers who visited Kershner in Paris in March 1939. Kershner (1950), p. 56.
77 Kershner, ‘Among the Spanish war victims’, p. 6.
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 152
care  for  them.  Kershner  forced  the  French  position.  After  six  days  packed  on  the 
“Stanbrook”, an unseaworthy vessel anchored in the harbour of Oran, the thousands of 
refugees  were  disembarked  and  placed  in  camps.  Britain  promised  the  French 
Government to “fumigate and reclothe them and… that as soon as arrangements could 
be  made,  they  would  be  removed  to  Mexico,  the  removal  financed  by  the  British 
Government.”78 This plan was complicated by the impending World War and in the end, 
the refugees went different ways, going into Algerian industry or agriculture, to work on 
the Tran-Siberian Railway or joining the armies of the diverse countries.79
6.6 Howard E. Kershner and Peace Testimony
At the AFSC Committee on Spain of 24 February 1939: “The Secretary reported that he 
had communicated with the State Department concerning Howard Kershner’s desire to 
urge Burgos to offer amnesty to Republican Spain as a basis  of a peace.  The State 
Department  and  the  Committee  as  well  felt  that  he  should  not  attempt  these 
negotiations, but the Committee asked he should be urged to do what he saw fit as an 
unofficial representative”.80 
While Kershner focused on effective relief work, he also tried, despite the unfavourable 
circumstances, to promote the reconciliation that was at the heart of Quaker thought. 
Then based in Paris, he spoke with Dr Negrín, exiled in the French capital, who asked 
Kershner to speak on his behalf with the new Spanish administration. In exchange for 
an amnesty for the Republicans, Negrín offered to surrender himself, as well as to hand 
over the substantial amounts of money, gold and jewels the Republican government had 
deposited  in  Mexico.  Kershner  replied  that  while  he  personally  supported  such  an 
amnesty, he was not authorised “to be a party to political negotiations”. Kershner would 
soon be received as IC representative by General Franco. Negrín asked him: “would it 
not be possible to present my offer unofficially?”81
Kershner received several visits by Republican officials in Paris, all backing Negrín’s 
proposal. Finally he accepted it, although he was not convinced that Negrín’s sacrifice 
would “satisfy the Nationalist desire for reprisals”, after the bitterness created by the 
78 Kershner (1950), p. 80
79 Ibid p. 81.
80 CoS, minutes, 24 February 1939, p. 2, AFSCA.
81 Kershner (1950), p. 167.
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war.82 Kershner submitted the proposal to all the Committee members he could find, 
and all agreed. 
Kershner  departed  for  Spain  on  1  November  1939.  After  stopping  at  some refugee 
camps in France, he crossed the border through St Jean-de-Luz. Accompanied by the 
Argentinean ambassador, Mr Ibargoyen, he arrived at Madrid where the IC was closing 
down its operations, and all but three of its workers were leaving Spain. Kershner spent 
most of his time drafting the Letter and Memorandum to be presented to Franco. He 
consulted  Ibargoyen  as  well  as  Alfred  Jacob,  then  in  Madrid.  He  also  spoke  with 
Mercedes Sanz Bachiller, of Auxilio Social, and one of her officers, Luis Burgos.
In  his  letter  to  Franco,  Kershner  states  that  “If  Your  Excellency would  consider  it 
advisable to declare a general amnesty, I believe nearly all of these people [the Spanish 
refugees in France] would return to Spain promptly.” Kershner affirms that “most of the 
Spanish people in France are very worthy citizens and would of course prove of great 
value to your country.” In addition, he points out, the very significant aid the IC was 
sending to refugees in France would henceforth go to Spain, which “would represent 
importations of foodstuffs and supplies”. Finally, the declaration of an amnesty “on the 
part of Your Excellency would not only be extremely popular in America, but equally 
popular in France, England, the Dominions, Scandinavia and many other countries.”
The letter was accompanied by a private memorandum. Here, Kershner underlines the 
IC’s relief work in all parts of Spain, during and after the war, and the good relations 
established with many Spaniards. He makes the following appeal to Franco on the basis 
of religion: “In the name of Him whom you and I both honour as our Saviour and strive 
to serve, I make bold to plead with Your Excellency to extend to the Spanish refugees in 
France and other lands the hand of forgiveness and love, even as our Lord has taught us 
to love our enemies.” He explains the suffering of more than 170,000 Spanish refugees 
in France,  exiles in a country that had just entered a war. He suggests:  “I sincerely 
believe that there lies before Your Excellency the unique opportunity to be the greatest 
man  in  the  history  of  Spain.  By  receiving  the  refugees  home  from  foreign  lands, 
forgiving political offenders, and thus ushering in a new era of love and prosperity and 
winning forever the loyalty of a united Spanish people, Your Excellency will not only 
be a happy ruler in Spain, enshrined securely in the hearts of your countrymen, but you 
82 Ibid.
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will also be loved and respected abroad. You will be setting an example which sooner 
or later other nations must follow if our Christian civilisation is not to disappear.”
Both documents were written on an IC letterhead83 and Kershner always spoke in the 
name of the Commission, not the Quakers.84
Kershner was summoned to meet the “Generalísimo” on Tuesday, 7 November 1939, at 
4.30pm. He arrived at 4pm as instructed, but at 4.15pm he was informed that urgent 
matters had forced Franco to cancel the appointment.
Back from the failed appointment, Kershner visited Mercedes Sanz Bachiller who, fully 
agreeing with the plea,  offered to present it  to Franco. Kershner never received any 
answer, nor was he given any explanation for the cancelled meeting.  Very possibly, 
Franco’s officials, knowing of the plea for amnesty, had decided that it was better never 
to receive it, so as not to be seen to reject it.
While this refusal reflected Franco’s attitude, Kershner’s presentation of the plea was in 
line with his Christian vision, trying to find a way to help the thousands and thousands 
of prisoners and refugees. Kershner believed that most Quakers also agreed with the 
attempt. He replied as follows to those who opposed it:
“What harm ever comes from a plea for kindliness and generosity toward one’s fellow 
men? In the early history of the Society of Friends, there were many individuals who 
travelled widely to express their concerns to kings, princes and other leaders of people. 
Something of that bold, outspoken presentation of concerns and convictions has been 
lost by the Quakers. The sooner it is restored, the better.”85
83 See Annex to Thesis, Documents C and D.
84 “I am sure that the Quakers would be in harmony with the Spirit of my memorandum but not all of 
them, perhaps, would have agreed about the wisdom of presenting it”. Kershner (1950), p. 173.
85 Ibid p. 174
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Chapter 7: Full scale war (2). The work of 
the agencies
7.1 The Red Cross and the vanishing Spanish Republic
7.1.1 Prisoner exchanges
During 1938, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) continued with its 
relief effort in the Spanish conflict. There was a serious setback in the care of prisoners 
when  on  30  July  1938  the  Burgos  government  suspended  all  visits  to  condemned 
prisoners  and access  was  forbidden to  the  San Pedro  de  Cardeña  camp,  where  the 
International Brigade prisoners were held. A warning from Colonel Patry1 of the ICRC 
to General Espinosa de los Monteros, Under Secretary of State for Foreign affairs of the 
Burgos Government,  about the possible repercussions of this decision on pro-Franco 
prisoners in Republican territory, mainly in Barcelona, had no effect; the war finished 
without a formal end to this suspension. By then, ICRC delegates had visited 75 places 
of detention, with a total of 78,655 prisoners.2
New prisoner exchanges were made successfully:
- In January 1938, 40 Basque officers with death penalties or long prison terms 
were  exchanged  for  41  Nationalist  officers  of  the  same  rank  held  by  the 
Republicans.
- In July 1938, 4 Russian and 2 Spanish aviators for 4 German and 2 Spanish 
pilots. 
- On  28  July  1938,  14  Republican  pilots  were  exchanged  for  14  nationalist 
aviators. All imprisoned members of the Spanish Parliament (Cortes) were freed 
on both sides.
- In August, 8 German civilians were exchanged for 8 Soviet sailors.
1 George Patry had been Vice-President of the ICRC since 1936.
2 Junod (1963), p. 101.
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- Also in 13 August 1938, 159 Basque fighters (Gudaris) and 130 other prisoners 
in Nationalist prisons were exchanged for 191 “asylum seekers” in the French, 
Cuban  and  Uruguayan  embassies  in  Madrid,  58  Nationalist  officers  and  40 
civilians under death sentence.
- On 22 September  1938, 4 German civilians,  a nationalist  pilot  and two pro-
Franco  families  were  exchanged  for  the  equivalent  number  of  prisoners  in 
Nationalist Spain.
- On  7  October  1938,  14  Italian  Legionnaires  were  exchanged  for  14  North 
American militiamen.
- In January 1939, 5 German aviators, a woman and her daughter were exchanged 
for 6 Republican pilots.
With the war nearly over:
- On  29  March  1939,  175  Italian  Legionnaires  were  exchanged  for  175 
International Brigaders from the San Pedro de Cardeña Prison; and
- 110 members of the Soviet merchant marine, prisoners in Palma de Mallorca, 
and 7 “Komsomol” crew prisoners in Puerto de Santamaría (Cádiz) were freed 
and repatriated under the control of the ICRC.3
7.1.2 The fall of Catalonia
The retreat following the end of the Battle of the Ebro, on 16 November 1938, sealed 
the fate of the Republic, bringing closer the fall of Catalonia. The retreat dramatically 
increased the existing refugee problem. Also, the ICRC became seriously concerned 
about the fate of the political prisoners in Republican hands in Catalonia.
At the end of  1938, the ICRC was working on the evacuation  to  France and other 
destinations  of  about  300  wounded  International  Brigaders  at  the  request  of  the 
Commission for the withdrawal of foreign volunteers.4
3 Durand, A. (1984), p. 346.
4 Commission of 15 army officers of various nationalities established by the League of Nations to control 
the withdrawal of the International Brigades after the proposal made to the League by the Republican 
Government in September 1938. The Commission was led by the Finnish General Jalander, the British 
Brigadier Molesworth and the French Colonel Homo. Thomas, H. (1990), p. 853.
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The Negrín Government decided to transfer the State bureaucracy from Barcelona to 
Figueres,  in  the  province  of  Girona.  Both  the  Catalan  Government  and the  Basque 
Government in Exile were based at Barcelona, and also abandoned the city in an exodus 
of thousands of civilians, using all kinds of transport.
The Red Cross considered that their priority was to protect the lives of the prisoners 
held by the Republicans until the arrival of Franco’s troops, also focusing on the care of 
the new prisoners created by Franco’s occupation of Catalonia.
7.1.3 Saving the Nationalist prisoners
Marcel  Junod  and  Ronald  Marti  of  ICRC  (the  latter  had  been  ICRC  Delegate  in 
Barcelona  until  April  1937),  went  from Perpignan  to  Girona, and  after  visiting  El 
Collell,  an old convent  which was now an SIM5 prison holding 232 prisoners,  they 
arrived at Barcelona on 17 January. They intended to visit all the prisons in Barcelona, 
without  exception.6 Many  families  of  prisoners  visited  the  ICRC  delegation  to 
Barcelona to plea for their safety. 
Junod met the British representative,  John Leche, and the French Ambassador, Jules 
Henry.  Uncomfortable  with  the  estimated  5,000  prisoners  being  held  in  Barcelona 
prisons,  Junod  consulted  Negrín about  their  fate.  On  23  January,  the  Republican 
Government decided to transfer all prisoners following its move to Girona. However, as 
Junod  pointed  out,  the  covering  orders  were  either  implemented  too  late or  were 
disregarded by the prison directors or their guards.
On 26 January, the female director of the “Las Corts” women’s prison telephoned the 
ICRC delegation, asking for instructions concerning the inmates. After some difficulties 
at an army control post, Junod and Martin arrived at the prison, where inmates received 
them with: “¡Viva La Cruz Roja!” (“Long live the Red Cross!”). The Director told them 
that she was prepared to open the cells and free the prisoners, but wanted Red Cross 
protection for herself and her guards. A truck miraculously appeared, in which Junod 
transported the old and sick inmates. The younger ones left the prison alone or with 
their families waiting outside.7 
5 SIM: Servicio de Información Militar (Military Information Service): Republican security body, mostly 
controlled by the Communist Party.
6 Junod (1963), pp. 149-53.
7 Junod (1963), pp. 97-8.
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Montjuïc Castle, an old fort above the Barcelona harbour, was under heavy fire from 
Nationalist warships. The fortress was also a prison, as the Nationalist High Command 
knew.  Mme  Perdomo,  a  Belgian  nurse  in  the  ICRC  Delegation,  responded  to  the 
bombardment  by going with the ICRC driver,  Pedro Clotet,  to  Montjuïc,  where the 
attack was causing deaths and injuries. Perdomo contacted Junod and Martin and, after 
negotiations  with the authorities,  the ICRC gave protection to the prisoners and did 
everything  possible  to  avoid  their  transfer  to  Girona.  The  white  flags  flown on the 
fortress  survived  attempts  to  remove  them by  some  Republican  army  officers,  and 
remained there to try to avoid further naval fire. When Nationalist troops entered the 
city on 26 January 1939, the Red Cross flag was flying over Montjuïc, and about 1,000 
prisoners were freed from its prison.8
The prisoners at the Modelo prison, about 600 in number, were transferred by train to 
Girona,  guarded  by  soldiers  of  the  communist  Lister  Division.  It  was  a  hazardous 
journey, through mountains and snow. On 6 February 1939, while they were resting, a 
group of retreating soldiers arrived and the prisoners feared they would be killed. In 
fact, the guards decided to set them free. Some went into France and were interned at 
the Amelis-Les-Bains castle. The French authorities retained the Nationalist prisoners, 
hoping to exchange them for French prisoners in Nationalist hands.
News arrived from International Brigaders that nearly 50 Nationalist political prisoners 
held at El Collell had been killed the day Barcelona fell to the Nationalists.
The ICRC representatives Colonel Patry and Marcel Junod arrived at Perpignan on 12 
February,  contacting  the  “Prefect”,  or  Governor,  of  that  French  region  and  the 
Nationalist  Red  Cross  representative,  Count  of  La  Granja.  In  Prats  de  Molló  they 
discovered totally destitute Republican militiamen and Nationalist prisoners. Patry and 
Junod had a small  truck full  of  bananas and condensed milk which they distributed 
between  the  Francoists  and  Republicans.  Distributions  were  also  made  to  the  300 
military and civilian prisoners in the Amelie-Les-Bains castle. They used a number of 
cars  abandoned  by  escaping  Republicans  to  organise  the  transport  of  630  military 
prisoners from Prats de Molló to Le Perthus. 
8 On 10 February 1939, Julia La Haye Johnkheer, declaring herself (without proof) a volunteer ICRC 
nurse in Barcelona, wrote an open letter to the Director of La Vanguardia, the main Barcelona 
newspaper, giving a very similar version that of Marcel Junod, but asserting that it was she, and not 
Perdomo, who had gone to Montjuïc, ‘Rapports et correspondance du Marcel Junod, Délégué General 
pour l’Espagne. Rapport’. B CR 212 GEN 61. ICRCA.
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Junod  confirmed  at  this  time  that  Nationalist  prisoners  from  the  battle  of  Teruel, 
including  the  officer  that  had  surrendered  Teruel  to  the  Republic,  Colonel  Rey 
d’Harcourt, and the Bishop of Teruel, Anselmo Polanco Fontecha, had been killed by 
Republicans in Can Tretze, a rural property near Figueres.
7.1.4 Art and the Red Cross
On its successive movements, the Republican Government took with it the national art 
collection;  including the most  valuable  part,  from El  Prado Museum,  and important 
pieces from the Liria Palace, the Alba family and the Academia of San Fernando.
In November 1936, the collection left Madrid for Valencia, with the Government. With 
the transfer to Barcelona in 1937, the art  followed, and when, on 23 January 1939, 
Negrín  established  the  Republican  Government  at  Figueres 30km from the  French 
border,  the  national  treasure  again  followed.9 President  Azaña  was  at  the  Perelada 
Castle; the Government and Parliament at Figueres Castle and Prime Minister Negrín at 
a nearby country property, the “Masia del Torero”. In the end, they did what some had 
proposed at  the start  of the conflict  — to safeguard the invaluable art collection by 
removing it from the scene of the civil war — and the Republican Government asked 
for the help of the League of Nations’ International Museums Office, under Salvador de 
Madariaga.  The  request  was  refused  by  the  League’s  General  Secretary,  Joseph 
d’Avenol, citing the non-intervention principle. The French Government took the same 
position.
An independent  and private  committee  was needed for the task,  and the ICRC was 
asked  to  fulfil  this  role.  The  proposal  was  accepted  by  Azaña  and  the  Republican 
Government and the agreement was signed on the night of 2 February 1939.
Between 4 and 11 February, the art collection crossed the French border and was taken 
to Château Aubiry, near the village of Ceret, property of Mme Bardoux Job, the local 
Red  Cross  President.  The  treasure  then  was  transported  in  22  wagons  by  French 
railways to Geneva, in 1,668 crates weighing 140 tons. It was stored at the League of 
Nations  building,  near  the  ICRC  offices.  After  the  end  of  the  war  and  following 
negotiations with the new Spanish government, the art was returned to Spain on 10 May 
1939. The ICRC had undertaken a “humanitarian art safety operation”.
9 Books, tapestry and silver objects were placed underground at the Carmelite Convent.
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7.1.5 The forgotten asylum seekers
At the end of 1938, when most of the diplomatic representations abandoned Madrid — 
due either to the supply problems in the city or because they had recognised Franco’s 
Government  —  the  ICRC  was  left  protecting  the  refugees.  They  were  successful, 
because when Madrid fell to the Nationalists, on 27 March 1939, after 30 months of 
isolation,  all  the refugees were safe.  The ICRC had reached an agreement  with the 
Madrid authorities, and episodes such as the invasion of the Finnish Embassy in 1936, 
where all the refugees were taken by the Republicans, were not repeated. The ICRC also 
negotiated with the new authorities the evacuation of 17 high ranking Republicans that 
had been offered asylum by the Chilean Embassy.
7.1.6 The victors and the defeated
Captain George Graz and Captain Jean d’Amman, ICRC delegates at Bilbao and San 
Sebastian  respectively,  were  fully  committed  from  February  1939  onwards  to 
regularising the supply of aid to Catalonia and also to caring for the new inmates in 
Catalan prisons. Arrests increased and the military courts proceeded, in public sessions 
fully reported in the newspapers.10 The Nationalist  prisoners interned in France who 
returned to Spain through Irun in the north or La Jonquera in Catalonia were held in 
camps and only released after obtaining the guarantee of two people with a Nationalist 
background.
The Republican military and civilians that opted to return to Spain were only accepted 
through the Irun crossing. They arrived in a very bad condition, complaining about the 
treatment  they  had  received  in  France.  They  went  through  a  classification  process 
similar to that faced by the Nationalist prisoners, About 55,000 people, mostly men, 
crossed the border. D’Amman was at the border crossing and witnessed the process.
On 27 February 1939, France and Britain formally recognised the Nationalist authorities 
as the only Spanish Government; President Azaña resigned on the same day. Madrid, 
still under Republican control, was in a terrible state. Between 400 and 500 people were 
dying weekly of hunger; shops were empty; heating did not work and health conditions 
in general were deteriorating. There was political tension between Negrín’s supporters 
10 Amman, ‘Report, 22/5/1937-12/8/1939’, p. 8, in D’Amman, Jean, (1939) ‘Rapports de Jean 
d’Amman’, B CR 212 GEN-46, ICRCA; henceforth D’Amman (1939).
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and those in favour of surrender. Socialists, Republicans and anarchists confronted the 
communists,  who  favoured  continuing  the  fight,  and  formed  a  Junta  presided  by 
Colonel  Casado  on  13  March  1939.  After  the  surrender  of  Madrid  on  28  March, 
Alicante and Valencia were taken by Franco’s troops on 29 and 30 March respectively.
Meanwhile, the ICRC had been working on the final prisoner exchanges, of General 
Miaja,  the defender  of Madrid,  for Miguel  Primo de Rivera,  brother  of the Falange 
founder, and of 168 Italian prisoners for the Brigaders at San Pedro de Cardeña.
Delegate  Hahn was party  to  both operations.  The Italian  exchange became difficult 
when the captain of the British ship refused to embark more than 51 Italians, which was 
the  number  of  Brigaders ready  to  be  exchanged.  Nevertheless  Hann  obtained  the 
approval of the Admiralty, through the British consul, to embark all the Italians.
With the war over, Geneva consulted with Hahn concerning the ICRC’s future in Spain 
and the possible protection of political  prisoners, Hahn felt  that  no intervention was 
possible because it was an internal Spanish matter and had nothing to do with a foreign 
organisation: “we must finish between now and 15 August, notify the authorities and 
return home. We must allow the new state to establish its will.” Even intervention in 
favour of foreign prisoners of war was not considered because this matter corresponded 
to their respective countries.11
7.1.7 The ICRC’s last days in Spain
D’Amman was with the Nationalist Red Cross convoy that entered Madrid from the 
North, following its occupation by Nationalist troops, to take control of the Republican 
Red Cross organisation. He was able to meet Arbenz, the ICRC Delegate in Madrid, 
“and his employees, miraculously free all from the crossfire of the communist week”.12 
The Count of Vallellano, Nationalist Red Cross President, asked the ICRC to keep the 
Madrid and Barcelona delegations open and to maintain the information service. There 
were now supplies  in  Madrid’s  shops,  arrived  from Nationalist  warehouses,  but  the 
population had no money. Most of the workers and employees had been dismissed and 
11 An exception was made for the Russians, since the USSR had no diplomatic relations with Franco’s 
Spain. Ibid; D’Amman, ‘Report (16 March – 15 April 1939)’ ; both in D’Amman (1939).
12 Ibid. The reference is to the internal conflict in Madrid between pro and anti-Casadistas.
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had to be “cleared” by the new authorities before they could work. Barcelona, on the 
contrary, with less supplies, was in great misery.
Again,  the  ICRC  at  Geneva  analysed  the  situation,  considering  whether  the  ICRC 
should  maintain  its  presence  in  Spain,  with  the  Civil  War  over  and the  two zones 
merged into the “New Spain”.
D’Amman reported that:
1. The prisoners of war were subject to the mercy of the victors. Some would be tried 
and sentenced,  others interned in  camps for an indefinite  period.  The ICRC had no 
competence in this matter.
2. The foreign prisoners, in his opinion, would be deported sooner or later. The only 
ones who could benefit from the presence of an ICRC delegate were those without a 
passport or a nationality.
3. The political prisoners were of no concern to the ICRC.
4. With respect to the questions of children abroad, information service, hospital visits 
and the distribution of food and clothing, d’Amman felt that things were normalising.
5. He proposed closing the delegations, starting with San Sebastian and St Jean de Luz, 
but  maintaining  Madrid,  where  the  Count  of  Vallellano  was  interested  the  ICRC’s 
presence to back up the new Red Cross.13
D’Amman’s view was considered in Geneva, but it  was decided not to abandon the 
matter of the prisoners. The Scandinavian and Swiss Red Crosses pressed to improve 
the lot of their nationals imprisoned in Spain. D’Amman visited prisons and received 
complaints that the Spanish prisoners were being liberated at the rate of 2,000 or 3,000 a 
day,  but foreigners were still  being held in Valdenoceda,  near Burgos and in a new 
camp at Aranda de Duero.
On 20 May 1939, the ICRC delegation at St Jean de Luz was closed and that at San 
Sebastian was reduced.
13 D’Amman, ‘Report, 22/5/1937-12/8/1939’; D’Amman ‘Report, 16 April 1939’ ; both in D’Amman 
(1939).
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7.2 The departure of SCI 
By February 1939 the official position of SCI was clear: “Service Civil International is 
keen to continue its relief work to the Spanish Civil population as long as the misery, 
hunger and the distress of the people continues or, at least, as long as are allowed to 
provide such relief”.14
In Catalonia, two drivers and one sister, using the two buses “Dunant” and “Dufour”, 
worked  ceaselessly  on  the  evacuation  to  France  of  children  from the  colonies  and 
collaborated with the ICRC in distributing supplies.
In the central Republican territory around Madrid, SCI continued distributing the food 
supplied by the IC and worked in collaboration with Swiss Aid. Also in Madrid, the 
SCI’s canteen for expectant mothers, their canteen for the aged, and the dining room for 
weak and sick children which they opened in mid January, continued at full activity. 
Eleanor  Imbelli,  the SCI sister  that  had arrived in  Spain in  1937, employed  by the 
SCIU, summarised in July 1939 some of the SCI actions in Spain during the first half of 
that year:
“In the whole central region around Madrid, and the provinces of Cuenca, Albacete and 
Valencia, a region bigger than all Switzerland, in six months SCI organised 137 
canteens, fed about 60,000 children a day, with an average of 400-500 children per 
canteen, some of them with nearly 1,000 and others much less, with infant care services 
by qualified MDs.”15
Sister Imbelli refers also to the American wheat supplied by the American Government:
“with the tons of flour received from America, we organised bread distribution to the 
schools in Valencia, Cuenca, Albacete, Almansa and Hellin, without accounting for the 
distribution we did to other organisations. With our schools distribution about 50,000 
children received a small piece of bread of 100 grams a day”.16
Everything changed in February 1939, when the Burgos Agreement between the IC and 
Franco’s government affected the regions of Spain where the Nationalist Auxilio Social 
had never been present.
14 Bulletin du SCI 14, 25 February 1939, p. 70, BUG.
15 Bulletin du SCI 15, 30 June 1939, p. 75, BUG.
16 Bulletin du SCI 15, 30 June 1939, p. 75.
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The SCI, having worked throughout the war in Republican territory,  and given their 
workers’  pro-Republican  sympathies,  was unable  to accept  working through  Auxilio  
Social, even if this was justified in the interests of increasing the effectiveness of the 
relief work. This was what AFSC and SCIU had been doing, with good results, from the 
start of the war, confirmed subsequently by the IC’s experience.
The SCI’s reaction is summarised in the words attributed to Rodolfo Olgiati: “If the 
Civil Service cannot work in Spain, we can still work for the Spaniards,”17 They were 
not prohibited from working; rather the agency and their staff were reluctant to work 
with the Nationalists.
The SCI established the centre for their refugee relief activities in the South of France at 
Chateau du Lac in Sigean (Aude department). This became the distribution centre from 
which trucks delivered food and clothing to nearby Departments, where the abandoned 
children were cared for. A provisional maternity hospital was established at Brouilla 
(Pyrénées-Orientales)  where  sister  Betty  worked,  organised  and  managed  by  SCI, 
serving  refugee  women.  At  Martys,  also  in  Aude,  a  farming  colony  for  boys  was 
established18 and by the summer of 1939, the IC, the Quakers and the French branch of 
SCI jointly rented the large Chateau-sur-Seine that lodged and cared for 50 Spanish 
child refugees.19
The Swiss Neutral Committee (Swiss Aid) closed their Secretariat at Zurich, and the 
SCI at  Berne took over its  activities  by June 1939. In January 1940 the Committee 
prepared to close down, leaving a reduced Committee to deal with ongoing relief action 
until the funds had been exhausted.
The SCI, on 14 January 1940, became founder member of the “Cartel Suisse de Secours 
aux  enfants  victimes  de  la  Guerre”  (“Swiss  cartel  for  the  assistance  of  child  war 
victims”),  a  non-denominational  and  politically  neutral  body  that,  accepting 
Switzerland’s charitable duty,  sought to implement all  kinds of relief  work for child 
refugees or war victims.20
17 Monastier (1955), p. 49.
18 Bulletin du SCI 15, 30 June 1939, p. 76, BUG.
19 Monastier 1955, p. 53.
20 Bulletin du SCI 17, 1 February 1940, p. 88, BUG.
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The SCI was forced to close the maternity hospital and the boys’ colony at Brouilla, and 
the boys’  colony at  Martys,  because all  the male volunteers,  French nationals,  were 
called up for World War II. The Sigean centre, with an average of 150 Spanish child 
refugees, could be maintained.
At  that  moment,  the  arrival  of  French  evacuees  from  the  war  zone  worsened  the 
conditions of the Spanish refugees in France. The SCI announced that, as the misery 
was general  in France,  no collections  were possible there,  and the project  would be 
maintained until the exhaustion of the remaining funds.21
The effects of the Spanish Civil War and relief in World War II overlapped, and SCI 
would also be present in the latter conflict, but that is another story.
7.3 The Save the Children International Union: coping with the new 
Spain
At the Executive Committee meeting of 9 December 1938, Mlle de Morsier, the SCIU 
Under Secretary, noted that the agency’s own activities in Spain were very limited, due 
to  the  lack  of  funds,  and  most  work  was  in  collaboration  with  the  International 
Commission. Regarding this collaboration, she suggested it might be better to stop all 
intervention than to maintain such a low level of activity. The Committee’s opinion was 
to continue their presence, at least during the winter, and to do what they could. This is 
significant in connection with what was presented to the Committee:
“On  general  lines,  collaboration  with  the  Commission,  very  close  at  the  start,  has 
become very difficult. Mr Lilliehöök, the Commissar tries as far as possible to separate 
the  Commission  from  the  Union  (SCIU).  Since  November  he  has  organised  the 
Secretariat on different premises and would like to withdraw the SCIU from the work in 
governmental  Spain.  The difficulties  reached such a high degree that  Miss Pye,  the 
Commission’s promoter, came to Geneva a fortnight ago. She understood perfectly that 
the SCIU, by virtue of its  neutrality  principle  and due to the need in governmental 
territory, wants to collaborate on both sides.”22
21 Bulletin du SCI 16, 8 October 1939, p. 83, BUG.
22 Executive Committee, minutes, 9 December 1938, AEG-SCIU.
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They make two accusations against the IC and Lilliehöök. Firstly, the SCIU questions 
the IC’s proposal to create its  own secretariat;  until  then the SCIU had handled the 
administration. However, on 16 September 1938, Captain Gracey had proposed in an 
SCIU Executive meeting to ask the Commission to contribute for the work done for it 
by the SCIU Secretariat.23 Given that the IC was rapidly increasing its size and activity, 
it  was logical for it  to have its own administrative staff and organisation,  instead of 
paying SCIU.
The second accusation, that the IC wanted to push the SCIU out of Republican Spain, 
makes  no sense;  on the  contrary,  the Commission  was increasing  its  efforts  in  that 
territory. Most of the SCIU’s work in Spain, in both zones, was only possible with IC 
resources.  The  IC  was  clearly  committed  to  neutrality,  working  in  both  zones;  the 
differing resources they allocated to the two zones at any given moment reflected the 
changing needs in those zones. 
Nonetheless an SCIU member, Thelin, argued that: “the whole Spanish question shows 
that  the  SCIU  must  henceforth  establish  better,  in  advance,  the  conditions  of 
collaboration  with  any  other  organisation  if  we  want  to  avoid  the  difficulties 
experienced,  first  with the Friends and then with the Commission”.24 If we consider 
Thelin’s arguments, the issue becomes clear: the disagreement concerns the Quakers. 
The IC was a Quaker project, a product of Edith Pye’s tenacity and the British Foreign 
Office’s receptivity,  and the Friends were the predominant organisation in the IC (in 
early 1939, six of the Commission’s twenty members were Quakers). As we have seen, 
the  SCIU could  not  undertake  any substantial  relief  action  except  on behalf  of  the 
Commission.  We can surmise  that  the weakening of its  connection  with the IC, on 
ceasing to provide secretarial services, had left the SCIU feeling isolated concerning 
relief work.
But, most important, in the minutes of the same Executive Committee of 9 December 
1938 the following point on the agenda was “Action in Czechoslovakia”. New relief 
scenarios  were  arising  and  diverting  from the  Spanish  struggle,  whose  end already 
seemed close with Franco’s victory.
23 Executive Committee, minutes, 16 September 1938, AEG-SCIU.
24 Executive Committee, minutes, 9 December 1938, AEG-SCIU
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By mid June 1939, as the funds for Spain were practically exhausted, the Administrative 
Commission  proposed  informing  Anne-Marie  Byloff  of  the  termination  of  her 
engagement as of 31 July 1939, but Mme Small and Mlle Ferriere proposed a delay, 
since Byloff  could act in Spain in a way that would be difficult  for any future new 
personnel, should the SCIU subsequently have to increase its role in the war.
The  World  War  started  in  September  1939,  and  the  Commission  considered  the 
extension of its relief to French and British evacuee children in France. Thelin argued 
that the care of Spanish children needed to be guaranteed first.25
In France it was possible to act for more than 2,800 refugees at the Arandon camp, with 
funds from the Save the Children Fund in Britain. Mlle Imbelli, the SCI sister working 
for the SCIU, was put in charge of reorganising the camp, benefiting from the goodwill 
of the new Departmental Prefect.26
With the action in Spain terminated, the activities for the Spanish refugees in France 
were also diluted with the involvement of this country in the war effort.
7.4 The International Commission and the Quakers: closing down 
activities in Spain
At  the  end  of  April  1939,  Clarence  E.  Picket  reported  in  the  American  Quakers’ 
Committee on Spain that it was expected that “Quaker relief work will be closing soon, 
because the Spanish government is taking over all relief work”. The Committee agreed 
on the importance of “closing the work in Spain gradually and with the good will of 
Spanish officials”, so as to keep channels open for possible future work in Spain.27 The 
Committee on Spain thus took the same attitude as Kershner, who maintained good 
relations with the new Spanish government, helping the AFSC’s work in France during 
World War II.
Howard E Kershner and John F Reich travelled to Spain between 9 and 30 June 1939, to 
study the situation across the territory and meet the relevant authorities. Their resulting 
report included the following points:28
25 Executive Committee, minutes, 28 September 1939, AEG-SCIU.
26 Directive Commission nº 75, minutes, 31 October 1939, AEG-SCIU.
27 CoS, minutes, 28 April 1939, AFSCA.
28 H E Kershner and J Rich, ‘Confidential Report’, July 1939, AFSCA:
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1. The food situation would improve with the good harvest in Spain. Nevertheless, the 
transportation and distribution problems meant that  the existence of supplies did not 
mean that all places would be covered.
2. “Auxilio Social” was doing all it could: “this institution seems to be well conducted 
and to be making a great effort to feed the needy people… It is feeding about 800,000 
people per day, mostly children, but the need is far beyond their capacity. They asked 
for the IC to remain in situ far beyond August to carry on their program.” 
3. “We are very pleased to report that our staff has been able to influence the movement 
and distribution of food… they have always been able to carry a friendly message from 
the Governments, organisations and individuals… that have made our work in Spain 
possible.”
4. Future activities: “Although we do not see the possibility, on account of the lack of 
resources,  of  being  able  to  send food to  Spain  beyond  1  September  1939,”  a  very 
important service of re-uniting families could be established. Such an office was created 
in Madrid (with branches in Bilbao, Valencia and Barcelona) in order to facilitate the 
repatriation from France of the children sent there, upon the request of their parents. 
The IC office in Paris worked on locating the children and organising their return to 
Spain. About FF 1,000,000 was budgeted for this operation.
5.  Activities  outside  Spain:  To continue  in  France  and  North  Africa,  attending  the 
Spanish refugees once they were there.
The Committee on Spain considered the report on 1 August 1939.29 They also received a 
telegram from Kershner, explaining that the Spanish Government had obtained about 
200,000 tons of wheat from Argentina, payable in pesetas; enough to cover the needs 
until the coming harvest. Kershner’s opinion, accepted by the Committee, was that the 
emergency within Spain had passed, and efforts should focus on the refugees in France 
and North Africa. Especially, they should look for places to resettle those who did not 
want  to  return  to  Spain  or  those  whose  politics  made  a  return  impossible  or  very 
29 CoS, minutes, 1 August 1939; Kershner and Reich ‘Confidential Report’; both at AFSCA.
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hazardous.30 The Quakers contacted the Paris Committee formed by the former Spanish 
Republican Ambassador Azcárate with the purpose of facilitating migration to Mexico.
By  September  1939  the  AFSC was  working  on  a  resettlement  project  for  German 
refugees in Mexico, and prepared to explore a possible colony in France for Spanish 
child refugees. To emphasise the widening in its scope, while not changing its name, the 
Committee on Spain became a refugee section to act as an “Executive Committee on 
Spanish Refugee Problems” within the structure of the AFSCA.31 
In January 1940, the AFSC was helping to locate and settle Spanish refugees in Santo 
Domingo and Mexico. Daniel and Elizabeth Jensen, a couple  who already worked in 
Mexico, were appointed for a six-month period, to be extended to one year, to work on 
the resettlement of Spanish refugees and for a Conference concerning this problem in 
Mexico City on 14-17 February. 32
Organised  by  groups  from  Latin  America  and  the  USA  1940,  this  “Continental 
Conference for Spanish Refugee Aid” was affected by the factional conflict within the 
former  Loyalist  Government  (for  and  against  Negrín).  Reich  had  contacted  both 
factions and was sent to Mexico to meet them two days before the Conference.33
Back  in  Philadelphia  in  March  1940,  Reich  brought  good  news  about  refugees  in 
Mexico. Of around 8.000 refugees, only 517 were in need of relief. Most of the others 
were doing well, having established a number of industries, including a large foundry 
employing 250 men, a furniture factory and other businesses, such as bakeries, grocery 
shops… Kershner and the IC played an important role in this; in cooperation with SERE 
(the  Republican  body  supporting  the  refugees)  they  had  provided  refugees  with 
clothing,  equipment  and loans.  In  contrast,  the refugees  in  Santo Domingo suffered 
“appalling conditions”.
30 The American Quakers’ Committee on Spain had already raised this matter with the Board of Directors 
in early April 1939. “The Committee on Spain requests the Board of Directors to approve its exploring 
the possibilities of transporting Spanish refugees from France for permanent establishment in other 
countries: specially, in Central and South America, with the understanding that the funds for such a 
project would be raised by other organisations and administered by the Committee on Spain”. CoS, 
minutes, 5 April 1939, AFSCA.
31 CoS, minutes, 28 September 1939, AFSCA.
32 CoS, minutes, 11 January 1940, AFSCA.
33 CoS, minutes, 9 February 1940, AFSCA.
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Rich reported that the war in France was interfering very seriously in the handling of the 
Spanish refugee problem in that country,  with a much stricter attitude by the French 
Government.34
7.5 The International Committee of the Red Cross: the other side of the 
border
At the end of January 1939, there were no more than 45,000 Spanish refugees in France 
(about 25% of them children).35 The real exodus happened in February and early March 
of 1939. According to the ICRC’s calculations, more than 230,000 refugees ended up 
scattered across nearly 800 locations in 75 French districts.36
At the request of Marcel Junod and Ronald Marti, Georges Patry, vice-president of the 
ICRC, led a visit to Spanish refugee camps on French soil. After contacting the French 
authorities and the French and Nationalist Red Crosses, the ICRC mission focused on 
what they considered to be the greatest priority, the conditions of the military prisoners 
from both sides. Their camps were really concentration camps, the best known being 
Argelés,  Saint-Cyprien,  Le  Boulou  and  Port  Vendres.  Patry  summarised  the  ICRC 
mission’s impression: “You know there are 120,000 refugees contained by iron fences, 
on a beach where the cold mistral blows: how can this be? Of course, after two years, 
the militia men are used to a hard life… and so, some are well and some are exhausted. 
Why didn’t they prepare for the arrival of such a large number of refugees”?37
From then on, the ICRC pressed the French Red Cross, in their Departmental sections, 
to increase their efforts for the refugees. At Le Boulou, Port Vendres and Marseilles, 
hospital ships, with military and Red Cross crews, doctors and nurses, cared for around 
1,200 wounded refugees, mainly republican militiamen.38
34 CoS, minutes, 6 March 1940, AFSCA.
35 Report of George Bonnet, French Foreign Affairs Minister, to the French Parliament, 26 January 1939, 
AMAEF.
36 XVIIe Conference International de la Croix-Rouge, ‘Rapport complementaire sur l’áctivité du Comité 
international de la Croix-Rouge relative a la Guerre Civil en Espagne (du 1 Juin ou 31 Aout 1939) et a ses 
suites’, Nº 6 Geneve, Mai 1949. The French “Rapport Valière” gave a figure of about 215,000 civilian 
refugees. Vichy Europe – Espagne (275), AMAEF.
37 Revue Internationale de la Croix Rouge 242, February 1939, pp. 87-97, ICRCA.
38 Durand, A. (1984), p. 368.
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With Junod kept in bed by flu, the ICRC member Mme Frick-Cranen, assisted by Mme 
Bucher, was in charge of assessing the number of refugees in the camps. In early March 
they counted 250,000 militiamen and 230,000 civilians. 
Mme Frick Cranen proposed that relief tasks be directed by the ICRC and carried out by 
different  agencies.  The  French Red Cross,  in  addition  to  using  their  nurses,  should 
activate  their  local  Committees  in  conjunction  with  two  existing  French  ad  hoc 
agencies: the “Spanish Children’s Aid Committee” and the Catholic “Spanish Refugee 
Aid Committee” both of which were well informed concerning the refugees. The Red 
Cross Societies League should continue to cooperate in relief work.
The work was to be concentrated in the camps existing at the end of March, as follows:
Department Camp
Pyrénées Orientales Argelès-sur-Mer, Saint Cyprien and Le Barcarès 
Hérault Agde
Tarne-et-Garonne Septfonas
Ariège Le Vernet, Mazère 
Basses-Pyrénées Gurs
 “When war broke out, 145,000 (refugees) remained. Many joined the French army or 
were enrolled compulsorily in labour detachments”.39
By the end of 1939, the humanitarian agencies covered by my study were no longer 
present in Spain, and by 1940 the relief action in France had been much affected by that 
country’s  fall  to  Germany.  The  Quakers  (Americans  until  1942 and thereafter  with 
personnel  from neutral  countries,  such  as  Ireland)  were  involved  in  relief  work  in 
France for quite a bit longer – though obviously in increasingly difficult circumstances. 
The AFSC archive in Philadelphia has reports on their work in 1942-3 and in 1944-5.
In the following chapter we shall proceed to extract conclusions from the findings in the 
body of this thesis.
39 Durand, A. (1984), p. 369.
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Chapter 8: Conclusions
The preceding chapters present a historical  account  of the humanitarian work of the 
selected  agencies  during  the  Spanish  Civil  War.  Here  we  will  consider  the  main 
conclusions which can be extracted from this research, concerning the issues outlined at 
the beginning of the thesis, and already broached within the text.
8.1 Independence and non-partisanship
The  selected  agencies  were  clearly  independent  of  governments:  though  the 
International Commission (IC) was supported by many Governments, the agencies had 
a significant majority on its governing body.1 However, the subject of non-partisanship 
is more complex. The Spanish conflict was clearly ideological, as were many relief and 
solidarity operations, notably the pro Republican “Aid to Spain” movement in Britain. 
This solidarity helped motivate the intervention in Spain of both the British Quakers and 
Save the Children, but also raises questions about their impartiality,  especially in the 
case of the Quakers. Similar questions can be raised about SCI, whose workers had 
clear pro Republican sympathies. Thus by autumn 1936, both the British Quakers and 
SCI were acting in Spain, but only in Republican territory, having taken no real steps to 
establish themselves in the Nationalist zone. While being non-partisan in their founding 
principles — and in the case of SCI, in their documented declarations at the time (see 
section 2.2) — they went to Spain moved by the suffering of the population on the 
Republican side and feelings of hostility towards the military uprising.
As we have seen, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) collaborated 
with the authorities of both sides and carried out relief work in both zones. However, 
the actions of some of their Delegates, such as George Graz’s treatment of the neutral 
zone in the North (see section 4.1.5), could raise doubts concerning ICRC’s neutrality. 
This was more than outweighed, however, by the ICRC’s proven record in working 
with both sides in the conflict.  An anecdote illustrates this. When Marcel Junod left 
Spain at the end of the war, Franco’s police chief, Colonel Ungría, showed him the file 
the Republican police had kept  on him.  Under the name of the ICRC delegate,  the 
Republicans had written ¡Ojo! (doubly underlined),  meaning “Keep an eye on him!” 
1 See the membership of the IC’s Board of Directors, Annex to Thesis, Document A.
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Meanwhile,  the  Nationalists  “kept  an  eye”  on  Junod as  a  “renegade  and  miserable 
idiot”.2 The  fact  that  both  sides  were  wary  of  him  shows  he  had  maintained  his 
neutrality.3 
In the strictest sense, the only completely non partisan agencies acting in the Spanish 
conflict were the American Quakers, the ICRC, Save the Children International Union 
(Geneva) (SCIU) and the International Commission (IC); these were the only agencies 
which worked on both sides of the political division. However, while the British Friends 
and the Service Civil International were influenced by their workers’ pro-Republican 
feelings, my research has not shown that in practice they refused aid to the Nationalists 
on  political  grounds.  Rather  both  the  British  Quakers  and  SCI  accepted  the 
“impression” given them by Alfred Jacob, who convinced them that Franco rejected 
foreign aid. And even Jacob’s Republican sympathies did not prevent him from acting 
in favour of the right wing supporters trapped in Barcelona, as we have seen in Section 
3.1.4. Furthermore, while the British Quakers never themselves worked in Nationalist 
territory,  they cooperated with AFSC in the management of relief activities covering 
both sides.
We can thus consider that the British Quakers and SCI were de facto independent and 
non partisan, whatever their workers’ sympathies.
8.2 The failure of the League of Nations and the role of the International 
Commission (IC)
One  important  overall  point  in  the  Spanish  Civil  War,  and  specifically  concerning 
humanitarian relief work during that conflict, is the complete failure of the League of 
Nations to play any significant role at all. This failure had to be made up for by the 
ICRC and above all the International Commission (IC).
It is a typical error to believe that the ICRC had powers that, in fact, they were never 
given. The ICRC in theory should have limited itself to the military aspects arising from 
the  Geneva  Conventions,  but  was  forced  to  take  on  much  wider  responsibilities. 
Delegates faced these as well as they could, in accordance with the instructions from the 
2 Junod 1963, p100.
3 In Madrid, it was widely believed that Junod was a freemason. This contributed to the suspicions of him 
held by the Nationalist police. Ibid, p70.
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Committee on Spain, with which they maintained contact by daily telephone calls and 
with frequent trips to Geneva. 
The  organisation  that,  in  theory,  should  have  addressed  the  humanitarian  situation 
created by the war, the League of Nations, did nothing to resolve the conflict nor to 
offer relief.
It must be remembered, for instance, that when Edith Pye was struggling in 1937 to 
create an instrument to deal with the increasing needs of the population in Spain, the 
League of Nations’ answer was to create the post of “International Commissioner”, with 
neither powers nor finances and who, once named, did nothing (See Section 6.1). With 
the support of the British Foreign Office, Pye created what became the IC. As we have 
seen, it  was this body that coordinated the collection of donations from abroad, and 
which facilitated and coordinated the work of the agencies on the ground.
The International Commission (IC) appeared at the time when it was most needed, in 
1938, during the advance of Franco’s armies. On the one hand, this caused a flood of 
refugees into the shrinking Republican zone. On the other, the Nationalists governed an 
increasing population, and needed more supplies to feed and dress them and keep them 
warm. Meanwhile, the deteriorating international situation, and simply the passing of 
time, drew international public attention away from the Spanish conflict, and reduced 
the flow of donations to the independent relief agencies in Spain.
The IC’s arrival meant the SCIU could renew their relief work in Spain; it substantially 
complemented  the  British  and  American  Quakers’  efforts  —already drained  by  the 
appeals for the Sino-Japanese war— and it made possible the SCI volunteers’ work and 
the ICRC’s food relief. Howard E. Kershner’s appointment in December 1938, and the 
American wheat surplus which arrived through him and the IC, made it  possible to 
respond to the humanitarian disaster of the last months of the war and the situation 
created by the Spanish refugees in France.
Kershner  and the American  Quakers  ensured an orderly  disengagement  from Spain, 
working  with  Auxilio  Social and  transferring  activities  to  them  as  required,  in  the 
interests  of relief  work continuing  and leaving  aside ideological  positions.  Kershner 
later insisted on the importance of the good relations established with the new regime in 
Spain: “If… we had not succeeded in June 1939, in restoring the good standing of the 
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Quakers in the estimation of the Spanish authorities, the important relief work done in 
France from June 1940 until the end of World War 2 would have been impossible, as 
Quaker  workers and Quaker supplies would not  have been allowed to  pass through 
Spain on their way to France. During these years we were wholly dependent upon the 
good will of the Spanish authorities in the prosecution of our operations in France and 
Switzerland.”4
At the end of the conflict,  the League launched an initiative which was supposed to 
create a powerful humanitarian body which would help the many thousands of Spanish 
refugees, but it came to nothing (See Section 6.5.1). 
Ten years and a World War had to pass before a new organisation, the United Nations, 
gave birth in 1949 to the UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Work Agency). During 
the Spanish Civil War, there was a grave lack of such a recognised and authoritative 
international body.
8.3 Humanitarian aid and religious belief 
The agencies considered in this thesis were established by committed Christians: think 
of George Fox and the Quakers; Henry Dunant and the Red Cross; Pierre Ceresole and 
the Jebb sisters5, among others. It was clear that the agencies worked in the spirit of the 
biblical story of the Good Samaritan. 6 Where others passed by, ignoring the wounded 
man on the road, this figure offered help, and did so moved not by any shared origin, 
culture or religion — in theory, Samaritans and Jews were hostile — but by a religious 
“love for the other”. This poses the question of whether religious or spiritual belief is a 
necessary element of this type of independent, non partisan charitable work. However, 
any attempt at an answer would take us beyond the field of this thesis and into theology, 
so we must leave this question on the table.
There is another aspect of the issue that does concern us directly, which is how some of 
the agencies themselves understood the relationship between their relief work and the 
promotion of their religious ideas.
4 Kershner 1950, p115.
5 Eglantyne and Dorothy.
6 The Bible, Gospel of Luke, chapter 10, verses 25-37.
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In  the  Quaker  vision,  their  help  for  others  in  itself  helped  to  spread  their  “Peace 
Testimony”,  without it  being necessary explicitly to promote Quaker religious ideas. 
However, as we have shown in this thesis, the British Quakers’ work in the Spanish war 
showed clear favouritism towards the Republic, and many of their workers appeared 
motivated by political, not religious, ideas. This puts into question Farah Mendlesohn’s 
argument  that  the  Quakers’  Spanish  workers,  “whatever  their  private  opinion,  were 
publicly involved in relief that was provided as part of a witness to peace. As such, they 
and the work they performed within that context were automatically expressions of that 
witness.”7 She  seems  to  argue  that  these  workers’  relief  activities  could  somehow 
automatically promote religious beliefs which they themselves did not share.
However,  she  adopts  the  opposite  view  when  considering  the  American  Quakers 
(AFSC).  They  also  wished  to  transmit  their  Peace  Testimony  and  their  hope  for 
reconciliation  through  their  relief  work.  Mendlesohn  argues  that  since  some  of  the 
AFSC’s workers were Mennonites, Methodists or from the Church of the Brethren, their 
activities were not “Quaker work”, but she does not substantiate her argument. From the 
moment in 1936 when the proposed religious Quaker Centre in Madrid was abandoned 
for a child-feeding operation in Barcelona, any specific religious activity took a second 
place. Like the British Quakers, the AFSC wanted to give Peace testimony through their 
non partisan relief work, but Mendlesohn seems to criticise this as merely humanitarian 
activity.8 She draws  a  contrast  between  “the  secular  professionals  whom the  AFSC 
workers often seemed anxious to emulate, and the religious missionaries within whose 
paradigm the FSC Unit appeared to operate”. She continues: “In contrast to professional 
social workers of the period, the Friends emphasised that their role was to facilitate and 
empower, to work with people not for them – an approach with spiritual benefits for 
both Spanish and foreign personnel.” In a situation in which the daily problem was 
supplying  food to  the  canteens,  material  to  the  hospitals  or  itinerant  nurses  for  the 
mothers  of  the  “Gota  de  Leche”,  prioritising  “spiritual  benefits”  in  this  way seems 
questionable. Milk was milk, and food was food in both territories, independently of the 
degree of spirituality of those caring for the children, and whether these belonged to 
Auxilio Social or were workers or volunteers of the Republican Asistencia Social. 
7 Mendlesohn 2002, p171. 
8 “The Burgos unit was involved very much in distributing humanitarian war relief: a short term 
expression of sympathy to the ‘innocent’ victims of war”. Mendlesohn 2002, p181.
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In any case, whatever the differences between them, both the American and the British 
Quakers  were  moved  by  traditional  Quaker  pacifism  and  beliefs  to  help  Spanish 
children  and  acted  in  accordance  with  these  principles,  adapting  themselves  to  the 
situation in either  territories.  All  AFSC workers in Spain were Christians,  whatever 
their denomination, and effectively Quaker workers, because they went to Spain under 
the Quaker banner. And whatever the reservations about the political sympathies among 
the British Quakers, theirs was also a clearly Quaker operation. I am prepared to accept, 
with a few reservations, Farah Mendlesohn’s conclusion:
“From 1936 to 1942 British and American Quaker relief workers were active in feeding 
and clothing over 150,000 children of Republican and Nationalist  Spain.  From their 
initial beginning as a Quaker mission centre in Barcelona9 the Friends developed their 
work along the East Coast of Republican Spain and in the villages around Burgos10. In 
order to remain active they had to recognise the often secularised or hostile context in 
which they worked and during this  period came to sublimate their  religious witness 
within  an  apparently  wholly  practical  project.  Yet  within  this  context  the  Friends 
actively witnessed to the testimonies to peace and social justice which lie at the heart of 
Quaker belief: for the Friends in Spain, feeding the children was a sacred, not a secular 
activity”.11 
8.4 Rodolfo Olgiati and the Swiss connection
The  Spanish  relief  work  of  Service  Civil  International  (SCI)  had  a  name:  Rodolfo 
Olgiati, its General Secretary. This young Swiss-Italian went to Madrid in late 1936; 
shocked by the situation, he decided to work for the care of the needy in the besieged 
Republican capital  and their  evacuation.  The evacuation of children from Madrid to 
València, in collaboration with “Swiss Aid” (AS) and the ICRC, was the SCI’s first 
ever action during an armed conflict. 
Olgiati worked as director of Swiss Aid’s work in Spain; he cooperated with the ICRC 
in the Madrid evacuations and, after being in charge of the activities of the SCIU in the 
9 It would be better to speak of the proposal for a Quaker mission centre in Madrid, because when 
Barcelona was selected, the war had already started and the action had become a child feeding operation.
10 Here she again attempts to minimise the Quaker presence in Nationalist territory, which as we have 
seen was not limited to “the villages around Burgos”, but by the end of the conflict extended to the whole 
of Spain.
11 Mendlesohn 2002, p184.
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Valencia-Murcia-Madrid  triangle  he  became  the  International  Commission’s 
representative for all the work in Madrid and Valencia. Meanwhile he continued to lead 
SCI in its first experience in a country in war, mobilising volunteers for the work. 
Olgiati  himself  and  most  SCI  workers  were  pro-Republican,  and  only  worked  in 
Republican territory, but he personally was able to continue and adapt to the “change of 
flags”, transferring the SCI’s Spanish refugee work to France, while keeping the more 
than 130 IC canteens operating in Madrid, until their full transfer to  Auxilio Social in 
late 1939.
Olgiati  was,  in  my  opinion,  the  most  remarkable  personality  in  independent  relief 
during the Spanish conflict and its aftermath in France.
How SCI’s work was affected by Pierre Ceresole’s absence from Spain from the early 
days of the conflict is an unresolved question. It is very possible that the more spiritual 
personality of the SCI’s founder would have been less able than Olgiati to adopt the 
practical solutions presented by the latter.
8.5 Lessons of Spain for subsequent humanitarian relief work
Marcel Junod, ICRC delegate to Spain in the Civil War, returned to the agency on the 
start of the Second World War (WW2). He considered that:  “What happened in the 
Spanish  War  should  have  been  lesson enough.  The  blind  destruction,  the  summary 
executions,  the firing squads, the wholesale  shooting, the persecution of classes, the 
persecution of religion, the mass arrests of political prisoners, were all a warning of 
what horrors were to come. I remembered the bodies of the little children in Barcelona. 
I remember Bilbao with its destroyed houses and the howling mobs who had tried to 
sink the prison boats in the harbour and drown the hostages…”12
However, while the humanitarian disaster of the Spanish Civil War did not deter future 
conflicts, it did help the relief actors in WW2 to better prepare themselves to provide 
aid.
For the SCIU, their three years carrying out very varied relief work in Spain gave them 
invaluable experience in the follow up and care of displaced children that the SCIU was 
12 Junod 1963, p104.
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going to put to the test in future conflicts. But, according to Mr Thulin, a member of its 
Executive  Committee:  “The Spanish  affair  shows that  in  the  future  we [the  SCIU] 
should  specify,  well  in  advance,  the  conditions  for  our  collaboration  with  other 
organisations if we are to avoid the difficulties experienced, first with the Friends, then 
with the Commission”.13
The Quakers also learnt a lot. The American and British Friends had between them a 
total  of 62 relief  workers in the Spanish conflict  — either within Spain or based in 
France — 37 representing the AFSC and 26 the FSC. Of course, these numbers are 
small compared with the 1,193 Quakers serving abroad during the First World War or 
1,232  in  WW2.14 The  important  point  was  that  the  Spanish  conflict  brought  new 
challenges: mass air bombardments of cities; refugees from all sides and political hues; 
conflicting ideologies; and foreign intervention. Quaker workers learnt to rapidly assess 
relief  needs  in  a  given city  or  region.  They also  gained experience  in  dealing  with 
authorities of all kinds, which would be especially useful in France in WW2, where the 
Quakers’ Spanish refugee work with the International Commission morphed into aid for 
the child refugees of all origins then flooding continental Europe. In almost every aspect 
of relief  work, Quaker workers benefited from their  experience in the Spanish Civil 
War.
The experiences in Spain would mark the ICRC’s subsequent work. For example, the 
experience of the News Service would underlie the work of the “Central Agency of War 
Prisoners” during WW2.
In WW2, the ICRC never had more than 150 delegates in the field at any time, and only 
12 in the European territories occupied by Germany. As in Spain, in the words of Junod: 
“we were a handful of Swiss to whom millions of men asked for the alleviation to their 
misfortune, a letter from a loved friend, news from their family, a touch of humanity 
from their jailers, a presence at the bottom of a dungeon giving them the smell of a lost 
free world, the food to relief their hunger saving them from a dreadful death”.15 And as 
in Spain, the results were often frustrating. Three longstanding Swiss residents in Tokyo 
agreed to represent the ICRC during WW2: “only three times in three years were they 
13 SCIU Executive Committee minutes, session 237, 9 December 1938: “Action en Espagne”, AEG:AP.
14 Ormerod Greenwood (1975), p. 194. In WW1, there were 640 in the Friends’ Ambulance and the 
Anglo-Italian Ambulance Units and 473 in the War Victims Committee. 
15 Junod 1963, p238.
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authorised to pay a short visit to the Korea camps, twice to Formosa [Taiwan] and only 
after a year of absolute silence could they go to Manchuria and visit just one camp in 
Moukdem. No visits to Burma, Malaysia, Borneo… or the island of Corregidor in the 
Philippines.”16
On 24 January 1944, still during WW2, the ICRC President Max Huber gave a lecture 
at  the  Swiss  Federal  Institute  of  Technology  Zurich  entitled:  “The  tasks  of  the 
International Committee of the Red Cross during the War”. He described the need to 
expand ICRC’s very reduced peace time structures17 so as to have the financial  and 
human resources necessary to respond to a conflict, in which the ICRC was called to 
“improvise  constantly”18 in  order  to  face  unforeseen  tasks.  After  mentioning  the 
predictable activities — war prisoners, the news service and the distribution of aid — he 
mentioned a new task, “that can seem very distant from the original objective of the Red 
Cross”:19 aiding the civilian population. In fact, this was contemplated by Henry Dunant 
after the First Geneva Convention, asking for the Red Cross to be able to aid the civil 
population  affected  by  natural  disasters.20 Huber  asked  himself  why  the  ICRC had 
assumed this new responsibility, of such undefined limits and very difficult in political 
and legal terms. His response: “because in most cases, the ICRC is the only one that can 
fulfil well this humanitarian task”.21
Thus, when analysing the ICRC’s action in the Spanish Civil War, taking into account 
the mistakes committed by its delegates and the other limitations in its work, we must 
recognise that the ICRC showed itself to be an agency dedicated to helping people in 
need. Going beyond the opinions of some of its delegates, who were sometimes perhaps 
too tied to a nonexistent rulebook, the ICRC attempted to provide humanitarian relief in 
a non-partisan way.
And this can be the closing consideration that includes all the agencies being studied.
16 Junod 1963, p192.
17 On the eve of Spanish Conflict, the ICRC head office in Geneva had very few employees and a budget 
of little more than 100,000 Swiss Francs.
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The humanitarian disasters of the Spanish Civil War did not deter future conflicts, but 
did help the relief actors in the coming conflict,  the Second World War, to be more 
prepared to face up to situations and to provide assistance.
In the present study, we have focused on humanitarian relief during the Spanish Civil 
War which was not specifically directed to “friends”, but was rather aimed at alleviating 
the suffering of  all the parties in the conflict. This relief had the peculiarity of being 
provided  by  foreign  agencies  whose  delegates  and  key  workers  were  nationals  of 
countries not involved in the conflict. 
The “foreigner” status of those who provided relief accentuated the charitable, selfless 
nature of their work. The Spanish people welcomed these foreigners who voluntarily 
went to Spain to deliver humanitarian aid, acting as “good Samaritans”. Unlike those 
passersby  who  ignored  the  injured  person  in  the  road,  the  Samaritan  helped,  as  a 
foreigner moved not by friendship or relationship of race or culture, but by “love for the 
other”.
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i. Board of directors, International commission 
for the assistance of child refugees in Spain
President: Judge Michael Hanson (Norway)§
Vice-President and Director: Howard E. Kershner (USA)
Vice-Presidents: Viscount Cranborne (G.B.)
Professor Bertil Olhin (Sweden)
Madame E. Chevalley (France)
Madame G. Malaterre Pellier (France)
Treasurer: François de Condolle
Members: Dr Harriette Click (GB)
Dr Hilda Clarck (GB)*
Pierre Ceresole (Switzerland)
The Honorable Mrs Crowsley (GB)
Professor J C Drunmond (GB)
Mlle Suzane Ferriere (Switzerland)
T. Edmund Harvey MB (GB)*
Dr de Navailles-Labatut (France
Clarence E. Pickett (USA)*
Miss. Edith M. Pye (GB)*
Dr Audrey Russell (GB)
Professor Noel F. Hall (GB)
Howard Sturges (USA)*
§ Also head of the Nansen committee for refugees of the League of Nations.
* Quaker
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ii. Map: evolution of the campaign in Catalonia
Source: Thomas, H. (1990), p. 717.
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iii. Kershner’s letter to Franco, November 1939
I have the honour to call to the attention of Your Excellency a matter which may prove of 
interest to yourself and of benefit to the Spanish people. Your Excellency is of course aware that 
we have expended many millions of pesetas in supplying food, clothing and medical supplies to 
Spanish children and aged people during the tragic days of the late civil war. We have recently 
inaugurated a programme of sending from America to Spain an additional two million pesetas 
worth of medical supplies, milk and infant food. In addition to this last-mentioned sum we have 
a much larger amount which we are using to assist the French Government in caring for the 
Spanish people in France. Many of them are known to our workers who distribute clothing and 
supplies to them, and are known also to myself. We believe that most of them are fine people, 
acceptable citizens of any country, and not connected with any criminal activity.
If Your Excellency would consider it advisable to declare a general amnesty, I believe nearly all 
of these people would return to Spain promptly. I know that most of them have long been very 
homesick for their native country. Of course those who have been guilty of any wrong doing 
would probably not return in any event, but any promise of freedom from difficulty in the event 
of their return would probably bring back 90 per cent of the Spanish refugees at once.
If Your Excellency should see fit to do this, this Commission would come to Spain with its 
entire resources to assist in caring for these people until they could be returned to their homes 
and re-established in their own communities. The greater parts of our funds are now in America 
so that the help which we would render would represent importations of foodstuffs and supplies 
into Spain.
A move of this nature on the part of Your Excellency would be so popular in North America 
that I think we could confidently make a new appeal that additional resources be placed at our 
disposal for assisting the Spanish people. Under the circumstance mentioned above we would 
take pleasure in issuing such an appeal.
I need hardly add that this move on the part of Your Excellency would not only be extremely 
popular in America, but equally popular in France, England, the Dominions, Scandinavia and 
many other countries. Most of the Spanish people in France are very worthy citizens and would 
of course prove of great value to your country. Even though a few criminals did slip through on 
the basis of your amnesty decree, they would soon be caught for new offenses in Spain and the 
goods accruing to your country as the result of the return of this great number of excellent 
citizens would certainly outweigh the harm arising from the few unworthy persons who might 
come back with the others.
As one who has long been interested in Spain and its people, and who has devoted his entire 
time to this work of assistance, and as Director of this Commission which has received grants 
from twenty-four governments and from innumerable organisations and individuals all over the 
world, I cannot too strongly urge upon Your Excellency the most careful consideration of this 
matter. Moreover, now is the time to do it before these people become involved in the present 
war and so lost to Spain forever.
With my very best wishes to Your Excellency and Your Excellency’s Government in your 
effort to restore happiness and prosperity to the Spanish people,
I have the honour to remain,
Most respectfully yours,
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iv. Kershner’s memorandum to Franco, 
November 1939
Will Your Gracious Excellency allow me to add a few very personal and confidential words to 
the content of my letter. I do so with great humbleness of heart and from a deep concern for the 
welfare of the Spanish people.
As Director for the International Commission for the Assistance of Spanish Child Refugees it 
has been my duty and privilege to send large amounts of food and clothing to all parts of Your 
Excellency’s country during the late war, and even larger amounts since the war.
During the past year I have several times travelled all over Spain. I have made hosts of friends 
in your beautiful country and I believe, with real satisfaction, that I have won the affection and 
love of many Spaniards.
In the name of Him whom you and I both honour as our Saviour and strive to serve, I make bold 
to plead with Your Excellency to extend to the Spanish refugees in France and other lands the 
hand of forgiveness and love, even as our Lord has taught us to love our enemies.
There are at present more than 170,000 Spanish refugees in France where many of them are 
suffering from cold, hunger, and neglect. They are exiles from their native land and their dearest 
wish is to return home. With France at war, their lot will be very difficult in that country and if 
Your Excellency does not accept their return, many of them will find places in the army or in 
industry and so be lost to Spain forever.
Forgiveness is the Christian law of life. Throughout the course of human history vengeance and 
punishment even though merited have aroused new hatreds and have prevented the achievement 
of true peace and prosperity.
I sincerely believe that there lies before Your Excellency the unique opportunity to be the 
greatest man in the history of Spain. By receiving the refugees home from foreign lands, 
forgiving political offenders, and thus ushering in a new era of love and prosperity and winning 
forever the loyalty of a united Spanish people, Your Excellency will not only be a happy ruler in 
Spain, enshrined securely in the hearts of your countrymen, but you will also be loved and 
respected abroad. You will be setting an example which sooner or later other nations must 
follow if our Christian civilisation is not to disappear. Who knows but what such action on your 
part might be the turning point in world history. You might strike a light in Spain which would 
illuminate the world.
This action on your part might catch the imagination of other rulers and lead to a worldwide 
movement toward security and peace based on justice and mutual good will. Surely no man ever 
faced a greater, more historic opportunity.
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Appendix 1: A historical approach to the 
independent, non-partisan humanitarian 
agencies
1. The Quakers: beliefs, behaviour and action
1.1 Introduction
The Society of  Friends,  also  known as  the  Religious  Society  of  Friends  and better 
known as the Quakers, was founded c. 1647 by George Fox, a Leicestershire weaver 
turned wandering preacher,  whose message  to  the human race  was that  ‘Christ  had 
come to teach his people himself’.22 A Church, a priest or a book were not necessary in 
order  to  listen  to  the  direct  and  individually  received  word  of  God.  In  answer  to 
Voltaire’s  question, ‘How can you pretend to know whether your discourse is really 
inspired by the Almighty?’, Andrew Pit, an impressive Quaker, replied,
Whosoever shall implore Christ to enlighten him, and shall publish the truths contained 
in the Gospel, of which he inwardly feels, such a one may be assured that he is inspired 
by the Lord.23 
Their  religious  observances,  therefore,  consisted  of  men  and  women  –  who  were 
completely equal – gathering in private homes or Meeting Houses, where they would sit 
in intense contemplation until one of them spoke as the spirit – which they held to be 
the Holy Spirit of God – moved them. 
How they came by the name ‘Quaker’ is not know for certain. In his Journal,  George 
Fox said that in 1650:
Justice Bennett was the first to call us ‘Quakers’, because I bade him quake and tremble 
at the word of the Lord.24 
22 Fox (1997), p. 27
23 Voltaire (1927), pp. 192-212.
24 Fox (1997), p. 22.
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There was, nonetheless, an earlier  English sect whose adherents trembled and shook 
with emotion  during their  religious  services and Bennett  was probably applying the 
term to Fox’s Society as well.25
First among the codes of public behaviour of the Quakers was an absolute pacifism: 
never raise one’s voice in anger; never answer violence with violence; never pick up a 
weapon nor threaten anybody with an instrument that could be used as a weapon; join 
no army or armed group or police service and with no government whose power stands 
upon force, which is almost to say with no government at all. They argued that, when 
talking to another person, whether a close relation or not and regardless of his or her 
station in life, Quakers should use ‘thou’ and ‘thee’, and to more than one person, ‘you’ 
and ‘ye’.  This was seen as a guard against  vanity,  which shored up class divisions. 
Thus, terms as ‘Sir’, ‘Your Worship’, ‘My Lord’ and ‘Your Excellency’, not to mention 
‘Your Grace’ and ‘Your Majesty’, were forbidden on all occasions as irreligious. Since 
they viewed the swearing of oaths as the taking of God’s name in vain, they refused to 
swear them even in courts of justice, and hence they constantly got into trouble with 
every authority, be it civic, military, legal or clerical.
The Quakers also took a determined stance against war. Their Peace Testimony, first 
expressed in a statement to Charles II in 1661, attests to the Quakers’ opposition to war 
and military service, and is based on the teachings of Christ to love one’s enemies.26 
This is an active testimony, as the Quakers do not believe in passive resignation, but in 
an  active  policy  of  protests  and  demonstrations  against  policies  of  war  and 
confrontation.  The  Peace  Testimony,  with  its  emphasis  on  brotherly  love  and 
forgiveness, would be the fundamental reference point for the Quakers and that which 
moved them to relieve the sufferings of others in need. 
The first stage of their evolution into the large and respectable Society of today was 
made possible by the Toleration Act of 1689. Persecution by the authorities ceased, the 
price being that whereas Anglican clergy could no longer interrupt and denounce their 
Meetings, Quakers could no longer interrupt and denounce the services of the Anglican 
Church or of any other Church. Moreover, the Act enabled the Quakers to survive as 
self-supporting communities, for their teachings were at least coherent while those of 
25 Brewer´s “Dictionary of Phrase and Fable” (2000), see entry ‘Quaker’.
26 Statements by the Quakers to King Charles II (1661) FHL.
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many of their rival congregations were less so. All a Quaker had to do to keep the Faith 
was to listen to the ‘Word of the Lord’ at Meetings, obey a few rules relating to dress, 
speech  and  marriage  (a  Quaker  could  not  marry  a  non-Quaker,  but  converts  were 
always welcome), and to adopt a peaceful trade and deal fairly.27 
This deceptively simple code of conduct was put to the severest test during the colonial 
wars in  America,  in the 1740s and 1750s,  and,  above all,  by the American  War of 
Independence (1775-1783). As a consequence, the religious side of Quakerism became 
quieter and more private, while, over the next two centuries, the Quakers achieved fame 
for  their  skills  in  making  things  and  selling  them.  Indeed,  the  list  of  well-known 
manufacturing and trading companies originally founded by Quakers,  even in heavy 
industry and banking, particularly in the U.K., is extraordinary: Barclays Bank, Lloyds 
TSB, Cadbury (now Cadbury-Schweppes), Rowntree, Mackintosh and Clark’s Shoes 
amongst others. Ironically, the porridge ‘Quaker Oats’ has no Quaker connection.
As the Quakers began to form themselves into an organized movement at the end of the 
17th century they elected ‘Yearly Meetings’ which would act as directive bodies to agree 
on matters of general policy, the chief Meetings being in London and Philadelphia. In 
turn these ‘Yearly Meetings’ appointed ‘Meetings for Sufferings’ to supply money and 
help to the families of Quakers who had been imprisoned or hanged or had suffered 
some other serious misfortune. Gradually then, the Quakers expanded from Quietism, 
the  original  basis  of  their  practice,  as  they  were  increasingly  obliged  to  defend 
themselves,  without  resorting  to  violence,  against  their  persecutors  and  when  they 
realized, as they became better established, that Christ’s parable of the Good Samaritan 
had to be taken literally.
27 In 1757, in a Militia Act of the British parliament, the Quakers were exempt from the duty of serving in 
the King’s Army when called.
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1.2 Quaker developments: from the American Revolution to the Franco-
Prussian War 1774-1870/1
Thus, in 1774, a century and a quarter after the creation of the Society, the Philadelphia 
Friends suggested to the New York Meeting for Sufferings, that a fund be raised ‘for the 
relief of the necessitous of every religious denomination’ (my italics) in Boston, where 
the closure of the port by the British authorities, in response to the ‘Boston Tea Party’, 
was causing much hardship not only in Boston itself but in the surrounding villages.28 
This was the first active humanitarian intervention by the Friends, and their method of 
relief followed the same basic pattern for well over a century. The process would begin 
as the result of individual appeals from members that activated the body responsible for 
moving on such an issue,  i.e.  the Meeting for Sufferings.  This was followed by the 
setting-up of ad hoc committees that organized the collecting of funds. Indeed, until the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1, the Friends simply collected funds and sent them to 
committees in the conflict zones. Advice was given to the Friends about the formation 
of  these  committees  by  local  doctors,  priests  and  mayors,  a  formula  that  created 
unsatisfactory  situations  due  to  the  traditional  diversity  in  the  political  and  moral 
attitudes of those involved.29 
The first Quaker relief intervention in Boston was a huge success. The fact that ₤6,000 
(in 1774 money) was raised and distributed among 10,000 people in the neighbouring 
settlements, of whom the majority were not Quakers, is an indication of how solidly 
based by then was the prosperity of the Quakers in America. In Boston itself, after the 
British  had  left,  Quakers  went  from house  to  house  distributing  aid  to  all,  without 
distinction.30 Moreover, the Meetings for Sufferings, the fundamental organizing body 
during the Boston relief effort, became the antecedent of the permanent Quaker bodies 
for international humanitarian relief that exist today. 
28 The ‘Boston Tea Party’ refers to the protest by the American colonists against the British government, 
on 16 December 1773, against the increase in taxes to the colonists. It took place in Boston harbour, when 
protesters destroyed crates of tea bricks in ships that belonged to the British East India Company. This 
incident has been considered the start of the American Revolution, and became one of its main icons. 
Cadbury (1943), p. 314.
29 This, of course, was not the case in Boston, but persons of similar standing, ‘selectmen’, advised the 
committee.
30 As Moses Brown (1738-1836), a well-known Quaker industrialist active in one of the relief parties said 
of the Boston experience, ‘It hath been a sort of school to us’. Cadbury (1943), p. 314.
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The American War of Independence divided the Quakers between those who supported 
the rebellion, of whom about 1,000 joined Washington’s army, and, although most of 
them probably did little if any fighting, were disowned by the Meetings, and those who, 
rejecting the violence of the Patriots, stayed passively loyal to the Crown or declared 
their neutrality. As a result, many Quakers were arrested as traitors by one side or the 
other.
From the end of the American War of Independence in 1783 to the Franco-Prussian war 
of  1870-1871,  the  Quakers  became increasingly involved in  humanitarian  efforts  in 
Europe and America, and thus consolidated their reputation for justice, fairness and lack 
of prejudice. For example,  in the Irish uprising of 1798, led by the United Irishmen 
under Wolfe Tone31, some Quakers were allowed to help the Catholic Irish as well as 
the British wounded among the prisoners. The yearly meeting of the national meeting of 
Friends in 1796 had banned all men from keeping guns in their homes, and anyone who 
disobeyed this order was disowned by the organisation. This position as men of peace 
enabled the Quakers to offer aid to the wounded and prisoners, to British soldiers and 
United Irishmen alike, a precedent that was remembered in the Irish Troubles of the 
twentieth century.32
Their reputation was further strengthened by their opposition to slavery, the first people 
in Britain and America to do so. Fox had denounced it in 1671 and the Philadelphians in 
1696 and the few Quakers who owned slaves had either freed them or been expelled 
from the congregation.  Nevertheless, it  was not until 1783 that the London Quakers 
formed an association whose purpose was to abolish slavery everywhere, and it was at a 
meeting in March 1804, attended by several non-Quaker veterans of the anti-slavery 
movement, that the British and Foreign Bible Society was inaugurated.33 In this way, 
through the Anglican and Non-Conformist clergy, whose wealthy parishioners included 
bankers,  merchants  and  philanthropists,  the  Quakers  established  connections  with 
persons of substance abroad.
31 Theobald Wolfe Tone (1769–1798), was a leading figure in the United Irishmen (the Irish 
independence movement) and is regarded as the father of Irish Republicanism. He died from a wound 
after being sentenced to death for his part in the 1798 rebellion. 
32 Hatton (1993), pp. 40-41.
33 This was the same Bible Society that sent George Borrow as an agent to sell bibles to Spain thirty years 
later. These non-Quaker veterans were William Wilberforce, Granville Sharp, Charles Grant, Zachary 
Macaulay and Henry Thornton.
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On the basis of this increased support, the Quakers set up a fund, for the ‘Distressed 
Inhabitants of Germany’,  to relieve the suffering of thousands of Germans and their 
families  during  and  after  the  Napoleonic  wars.  Nearly  ₤50,000  was  raised  from 
collections  throughout  Great  Britain  made  by  Churches,  Quaker  meetings  and 
philanthropic societies. The money was sent to Germany through confidential channels 
and  distributed  by  local  Committees  of  ‘Reverend,  Clergymen  and  Merchants’.34 It 
should  be  noted  that  important  links  existed  between  the  London  Community  of 
Merchants and Bankers (both Jewish and non-Jewish) with German backgrounds, and 
their counterparts in Germany, such as the Oppenheimers, Arngsteins, Rothschilds and 
Akermans.  Moreover,  Quaker connections  with Moravian, Brethren,  Mennonites and 
Pietists35 in  Germany  were  of  great  use  in  the  assessment  and distribution  of  local 
needs.36 
These early humanitarian interventions by the Quakers, clearly seen during the German 
relief  operation  from  1805  to  1816,  reveal  that  the  Quakers  were  always  open  to 
collaborations with other organisations, even when their collaborators were not inspired 
by  evangelical  pity.37 Indeed,  the  German  relief  operation  was  an  example  of 
ecumenical  work  not  seen  again  until  after  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War.38 
Undoubtedly this was due to the connections established between the Friends and other 
organisations within the anti-slavery movement,  such as the Bible  Society,  based as 
much on friendship ties as on shared doctrine.39 
The  Quakers  were  also  actively  involved  in  relief  operations  in  territories  where 
problems  ensued  after  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  held  between  1814  and  1815.  The 
Vienna Congress ‘system’ was an attempt to stabilise Europe after the Napoleonic Wars 
and  prevent  the  spread  of  nationalism,  on  the  basis  of  the  restoration  of  the  old 
monarchical  territorial  system.  The  numerous  conflicts  that  the  ‘Congress  system’ 
engendered saw the Quakers active from 1815 in Eastern Europe, Turkey and Russia, 
34 London received ‘satisfactory and minute accounts of the actual distribution’ from these local 
committees. Ormerod Greenwood (1975), p. 12.
35 Protestant Churches and movements connected in one way or another with the Quakers.
36 Canton (1904), pp. 38-39.
37 Although the Quakers often experienced enormous difficulties in collaborating with other forces, as 
during the Greek operations from 1822 to 1867, this did not prevent them from launching general 
initiatives of humanitarian aid with other forces. Allen (1847), Vol.1, pp. 339. 
38 With the exception of the collaboration that Eglantyne Jebb, founder of Save the Children and its 
Protestant agency, SCIU, received from Pope Benedict XV in 1919.
39 Ormerod Greenwood (1975), p. 17.
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whilst the problems in Ireland, particularly the ‘Great Hunger’ of 1846/7, also continued 
to require a Quaker response. The Friends also sent relief to the victims of the Indian 
famine in the late 1830s, and to Syria between 1860-78, when the country was ravaged 
by war.40 The Quakers attempted, without success, to mediate with the Tsar to avoid the 
Crimean War, but were subsequently banned from the main scenario of the war, and 
forced  to  restrict  their  relief  effort  to  Finnish  territory,  which  was  then  a  Russian 
possession41 and a must forgotten site of the confrontation with Russia.
In 1827-1828, the long-standing divergence  between the Quietists  – who taught  the 
supremacy  of  the  ‘Inner  Light’  and  eschewed  social  commitment  –  and  the 
Evangelicals,  activists  who  held  that  good  works  were  equally  incumbent  upon  a 
Christian,  widened  into  a  schism  which  threatened  to  discredit  the  whole  Quaker 
movement.  This division in America led to the separation between the evangelicals, 
who called themselves ‘Orthodox’, and the Hicksites, who included both ‘quietists’ and 
‘liberals’.42 In Britain it produced the ‘Beaconite’ controversy in 1835, with more than 
300 members abandoning the Society.43 
It  seems  clear  –  looking  through their  correspondence  and records  –  that  Quakers’ 
intervention in relief work during the 55 years between the defeat of Napoleon in June 
1815  and  the  outbreak  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  in  July  1870,  was  mostly 
unstructured  and  driven  by  the  personal  efforts  of  the  organisation’s  most  devoted 
members. In essence, the Friends collected donations and sent them to local committees 
of  notables,  who  then  distributed  them according  to  local  needs.  This  fundamental 
structure of fundraising for needy causes would continue during subsequent years, but, 
40 There was often collaboration between Scottish, Irish and English Quakers in the collection of 
donations for relief, such as the help given to Polish exiles in Britain during this period.
41 Their position in favour of a settlement with Russia was presented as ‘unpatriotic’ by the British press 
of the time.
42 The Hicksites were followers of Elias Hicks (1748-1830), and included the socially inactive Quietists, 
and the ‘liberals’, those who valued reason over emotion and questioned the infallibility of the Bible, 
which provoked their rejection by the evangelical ‘Orthodox’ sector.
43 The Beaconite controversy took its name from a pamphlet of January 1835, published by a Quaker 
Minister Isaac Crewdson, entitled ‘A Beacon to the Society of Friends’, which defended a new approach 
more based on the Bible and the outwork of Christ with well addressed sermons and the end of the silent 
‘tedious’ meetings historically associated with the Friends. There also seemed to be some connections 
with the American Hicksites. The controversy widened the gap between the exponents of the more 
mystical or introverted theology and those who sustained the more evangelical posture than the 
philanthropic activities that blossomed in the first third of the 19th century, supported and helped in the 
downfall of the existing barriers between Friends and other Christian Confessions. Braithwaite Thomas, 
(1912).
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as  we  shall  see,  the  Quakers  would  become  much  more  actively  involved  in  the 
distribution of resources, and thus re-structure their relief activities accordingly.
1.3 The Franco-Prussian War 1870-1
In  the  many  histories  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870-71,  which  describe  the 
campaigns, battles and sieges of the conflict, it is difficult to find much information on 
the terrible effects of the fighting upon the people who lived in the areas where the 
armies passed or clashed.44 If we wish to find out more about the human tragedies of 
war, one of the best primary sources are the letters, reports and personal accounts of the 
Quakers who went to the war on missions of relief. The Quakers drew attention to the 
terrible  human suffering caused by war, and believed that  it  was their  obligation as 
Quakers to do something to ameliorate it. The only way this could be achieved, they 
argued, was by going to the assistance of both sides in any conflict.  Moreover, this 
assistance  must  never  be  allowed  to  furnish,  even  indirectly,  armaments  of  any 
description to the combatants. 
The  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870-71,  between  two  of  Continental  Europe’s  major 
powers, was the result of Prussia’s growing military power and Napoleon III’s over-
estimation of the strength of French forces and his  own military leadership.45 There 
were, of course, deeper causes of the conflict; the rapid industrialisation in the German 
lands, particularly the south, and the desires of the German Chancellor, Bismarck, to 
unite all the German lands under Prussian leadership.46 War was declared on 15 July 
1870, and by 1 September the Prussians had defeated one French army and had captured 
Napoleon III. A second French army was besieged in Metz, until it surrendered on 23 
October. On 4 September, the Third French Republic was declared.
The  Prussians  followed  up  their  victory  by  laying  siege  to  Paris,  with  an  army of 
240,000 troops, a siege that lasted until the city surrendered on 28 January, 1871. In 
March,  while  peace  negotiations  were  underway,  the  National  government  was 
44 The Encyclopaedia Britannica (1924 edition), for example, contains nine pages dedicated exclusively 
to the military aspects of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71.
45 Napoleon III believed that French armies would sweep through Germany like his uncle, Napoleon 
Bonaparte, had done seventy years before. 
46 Germany, as such, did not exist as a single nation until unification in 1870-1. Unification in 1871 was 
itself the product, in part, of Prussian success in the Franco-Prussian War. For a good, succinct account of 
the unification of Germany, and the role of Bismarck in this, see Carr, W. (1974), pp. 120-135. 
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overthrown  by  the  Commune,  and  siege  conditions  thus  continued.  In  May,  the 
Communards  themselves  were  crushed  by  a  French  army  loyal  to  the  National 
government  led  by  premier  Thiers.  The  Prussians,  on  this  occasion,  were  merely 
bystanders. 
Although the Franco-Prussian War was relatively short – less than a year – it consisted 
of a few crucial battles involving very large forces. For example, there were more than 
650,000 soldiers around Metz, which held about 180,000 defenders. The sieges, too, 
have  been  unmatched  in  any  subsequent  war,  except  perhaps  by  some  Russian 
operations during World War II. Armies also lived off the land, taking grain, livestock 
and  other  necessities  from  the  local  farmers.  Houses  were  often  taken  from  their 
owners, and stripped of linen and bedding. The distress to the local populations during 
this war was dramatic and hence the urgent need for widespread relief. 
Moreover,  sanitary  conditions  were  totally  inadequate.  For  example,  23,489  French 
soldiers died within six months due to smallpox as conscripts were called up without 
having been vaccinated.  John Bellows47 refers to a Dutch surgeon, working with the 
French, who told him that, ‘in one of the French “Ambulances” (Field Hospitals) the 
survival rate of amputations was of only 2 out of 42 operations and in another, out of 12 
amputations, none had lived. Dressings were done every four days and operations were 
performed with kitchen knives in the curee’s house at Amanvilliers, where blood flowed 
down to stairs and out of the front door into the street’.48 
The outbreak of war was responded to by a series of humanitarian initiatives by various 
benevolent institutions: the International Committee of the Red Cross, the ‘Soeur De la 
Charité’, the ‘Société de St. Vincent de Paul’ and their equivalents in Germany, and 
other  ad hoc  bodies  set  up  by  a  variety  of  initiatives,  which  included  the  London 
newspapers The Telegraph and The Daily News.
The Quakers involvement in the Franco-Prussian conflict started on 7 October 1870, in 
a Meeting for Sufferings held in London. John Hodskin raised the matter by suggesting 
the setting up of a ‘Friends War Victims Fund’, which was accepted by the meeting and 
47 Commissioner from Gloucester (1831–1902)
48 Bellows (1871), p. 56.
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10 Friends were appointed to frame an appeal in answer to the plea from a number of 
civic and religious dignitaries in North-East France headed by the Mayor of Briey.49 
An Executive Committee of 15 was established which sat every weekday for two to five 
hours from 19 October 1870 to 8 May 1871, and thereafter  twice a week. From 17 
October 1870 to 3 April 1871 a large committee of 51 members met once a week.50 
Afterwards  the  committee  met  when  summoned.  In  order  to  ensure  that  all  the 
collections went to the relief effort, a ‘War Victims Fund Committee’ was established to 
raise funds among Friends to cover administrative expenses. It was also decided to send 
Quaker delegates, ‘Commissioners’, into the field, and it was assumed they would pay 
their own expenses. The ‘War Victims Fund Committee’ was run by three brothers, 
Joseph (41 years old), William (43 years old) and Ernest Beck (28 years old), who acted 
as Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary, respectively.
A ‘Ladies Committee’ was formed in London, in October 1870, under the direction of 
Christine  Majolier  Alsop51,  with  local  committees  throughout  the  country.  Other 
members included Augusta Fry, Richenda Elizabeth Reynolds, Emilia de Bussens and 
Ellen Jackson.52 A warehouse was loaned to the Friends, which included sewing, lifting 
and weighing machines, and here, as well as at the Quakers’ own Bedford Institute, 
around 100 women were employed in sorting, cleaning, mending and packing clothing 
and other assorted donated goods, as well as in the making of new garments. They were 
helped by ‘Ladies’ volunteers from the Committee and under the supervision of a paid 
textile technician. 
49 Meeting for Sufferings, minutes, 7 October 1870, FHL. Unknown to the Quakers at the time was the 
fact that this letter, containing the said appeal to the British people, was not so spontaneous, but had been 
drafted by the correspondent of the New York Times, Gustav Müller.
50 This committee consisted of the executive committee of 15, 8 MPs, some of whom had relief 
experience, such as Jonathan Pim and William Bennett from the Irish campaign and Thomas Harvey and 
Joseph Cooper from the Finnish relief effort. Meeting for Sufferings, minutes, 7 October 1870.
51 Christine Majolier, French Quaker who became Christine M. Alsop by her marriage to the English 
gentleman M. Alsop, was born in France in 1805. Working with the British Friends in many humanitarian 
missions, by her French origin she was fully committed to the Franco-German War 1870-71. For more 
information, see Gillett Braithwaite (1882).
52 Some of these were from old Quaker families, such as Augusta Fry, granddaughter of Elizabeth Fry 
(1780-1845), prison and social reformer and well-known Quaker philanthropist, Richenda Elizabeth 
Reynolds (1808-1884), from an old Quaker family, who, with her mother, Richenda Fry, ran a Seaman’s 
Institute in Caen. Non-Quakers like the German Emilia de Bunsen joined the nursing service at the start 
of the war, while Ellen Jackson, from Liverpool, who spoke fluent French and good German and had 
relief experience worked also with the Quaker Ladies.
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Quaker relief was organized as in previous interventions, depending on committees of 
local people in the conflict areas, but in this case the committees were formed through 
two types of bodies: one was the local committees, which carried out direct action in 
towns and villages, and the other regional committees in the ‘departments’53, to check 
on and avoid local shortcomings or imbalances. As in previous conflicts, advice was 
given to the Friends about the formation of those committees by local doctors, priests 
and mayors. 
Special mention should be made of the work of the Quaker Commissioners, who were 
introduced for the first time during the Franco-Prussian War. The Commissioners were 
official representatives of the Society of Friends54, acting under the instructions of the 
Friends War Victims Fund. Their field work was determined by the lists supplied by the 
local committees and was extremely varied: organizing, distributing goods, delivering 
donations, indeed in any way that their help was needed.55 
While inexperienced in the new field of relief, all were reputable and active people in 
their own right. There were 37 Commissioners in all, with 27 members and 10 non-
members  of  the  Society  of  Friends  selected  under  the  principle  established  by  the 
Meeting for Sufferings that requested ‘to find competent individuals to undertake the 
service’.56 There were 31 men and 6 women, this being the first time, on French soil, 
that women served beside men in the field. This outcome had been unplanned; it was 
simply that the urgency of the situation demanded that women work side by side with 
men. 
There was a small team of Ladies’ Commissioners, among whom were the non-Quaker 
nurses  Elizabeth  Anne Barclay57 and Amelia  de Bunsen,  and the Quakers  Richenda 
Reynolds  and Augusta Frey.  The women organized,  sorted and distributed the large 
quantities  of  clothing  donated  by  Friends  and  visited  and  helped  the  sick.  The 
difficulties of organizing this relief were enormous, given that the railways had been 
53 French administrative term for regional zones.
54 See Document A for model of letter of introduction used by the Quaker Commissioners in the Franco 
Prussian War (1870-1871), and Document B for a list of the Quaker Relief Commissioners in said 
conflict, both in Annex to Appendix 1.
55 In the areas around Metz, the Commissioners provided 13,000 kilograms of flour and 7,999 kilograms 
of potatoes between early December 1870 and the end of March 1871.
56 Meeting for Sufferings, minutes, 19 October 1870, FHL.
57 E.A. Barclay arrived in France in August 1870 at the behest of the recently formed National Society for 
Aid to the Sick and Wounded in War (in the spirit of the Red Cross priciples).
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taken over by the military and that horse transport was the only form available, which 
often caused innumerable delays.
Quaker Commissioners also advised and helped in reorganizing farming around Metz, 
by  introducing  new  techniques  of  harvesting  and  seed  distribution  and  supplied 
complete sets of Fowlers steam ploughs and cultivators.58 Potatoes and corn seed were 
also  distributed  to  the  needy peasants  in  time  for  the  spring  sowing,  together  with 
barley, oats and other seeds. A total of ₤11,000 was spent on this, which covered about 
11,000 acres of cultivated land. In the Dijon and Belfort areas, 700 Swiss cattle were 
purchased and distributed to make up for the losses of war, while in Paris relief was 
primarily in the form of financial assistance and clothing, though agricultural help was 
provided to the surrounding rural areas. By May 1871, a total of 75,000 pounds had 
been  obtained  from  donors,  the  most  important  being  from those  in  the  U.S.  and 
Canada.59 
It must also be taken into consideration that the small Quaker team of Commissioners 
lived  and  worked  in  Metz  under  the  shadow  of  the  smallpox  epidemic  and  other 
diseases affecting the area.  Of the twelve men and women that worked in the Metz 
district,  eight had been ill  and one of them, Ellen Allen from Dublin,  died.  Allen’s 
uncle, Richard Allen, lost the sight of one eye through a severe erysipelas attack.60
Amongst  the Commissioners  there was Robert  Spence Watson,  a law lecturer,  John 
Bellows, a writer, William Jones, who owned chemical works, and sportsmen such as 
Henry Tuke Mennell and Thomas Whitwell from the Alpine Club, and Ernest Beck, 
who went canoeing all over Europe. These were mature men, in their 40s and 50s, the 
oldest being Richard Allen from Dublin, 67, and Arthur Albright from Birmingham, 59. 
These were men who usually spoke both French and German. The principle had been to 
send mature people into the field and have the home organisation run by a triumvirate of 
young Friends, the Beck brothers.
The Quaker intervention during the Franco-Prussian War was a full-scale operation that 
reflected a new stage of development of the Quaker relief system. The Quaker presence 
58 This was land cultivation machinery developed from 1845 by the Quaker, John Fowler Jr. (1826-1864). 
Shocked by the horrors of the Irish potato famine of that year, Fowler resolved to devote his time and 
resources to bringing down the cost of food production. 
59 Jones (1899), p. 82.
60 Sessions (1991), pp. 17-25.
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covered the scene of the conflict  ‘from the frontier of Luxemburg to the frontier  of 
Spain’61, and Quaker Commissioners had visited all French districts affected by the war. 
The operation had two successive phases, with the main centres of activities covering 
the Lorraine and the Argonne, in and around the cities of Metz, Paris and Orleans, the 
corn-growing area of La Baunne, and from Chartres south and east to Tours and Le 
Mans. This first phase lasted a year until the summer of 1871, when full-scale activity 
was over. Although the Commissioners had experienced great difficulties in reaching 
their  destinations,  often having to travel  by horse due to the disruption of the main 
railway  lines,  they  managed  to  perform their  duties  with  remarkable  efficacy,  and 
overall the operation was a success.
The second phase was not strictly a Quaker project, as the Quaker relief operation was 
considered over by the summer of 1871.62 The second phase, from the summer of 1871, 
could be said to have been a one-man show, undertaken by the Quaker James Long, 
with Ellen Jackson acting occasionally. Long had been involved since the beginning of 
the Quaker  relief  effort,  and  was described  as  being ‘an Englishman  looking  as  an 
Indian fakir or as a Holy Beggar from Tolstoy’s Russia, who had risen from what was 
thought to be his death bed to go and serve with the Quakers in France’.63 Long had 
produced fresh projects of his own, starting with a cattle drive from Spain to the Loire 
with  ostentatious  propaganda  that  included  a  flamboyant  exhibition  of  the  cattle  in 
Blois, banquet included.  He followed this with the building of ‘la Cité d’Alsace’ in 
Belfort, consisting of a village of wooden houses to lodge Alsatian workmen refugees 
from Germany. This project also ended with a flashy banquet, and a ‘victory tour’ by 
Long.64 Long’s last project was of a very different order, and unplanned by him – the 
Garonne floods of 1875 to which Long responded by going there with relief.65
The Franco-Prussian war proved to be a watershed in the development of the Quaker 
relief system. It was the first major modern war and thus demanded new and untried 
methods to bring relief to large areas of France. It could be said that the Quakers had 
61 Long (1872), p. 66.
62 A final report was made in 1872 and the last recorded meeting of the General Committee is dated 4 
April 1873, without formal minutes. 
63 Ormerod Greenwood (1975), p. 71.
64 Ormerod Greenwood (1975), p. 59.
65 In June, 1875, the Garonne and Ariege valleys suffered catastrophic floods that killed 1,000 people and 
5,000 heads of cattle and affected a huge area thirty miles wide and 200 miles long. Long travelled to 
France in the winter of that year, in biting cold (20 degrees below zero), and helped around 8,700 
individuals. Bellows (1871), pp. 67-8.
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responded  with  imaginative  efficacy,  with  their  local  committees  and  able 
Commissioners,  and  the  Quakers’  efforts  could  be  considered  a  success,  a  fact 
recognized by the French government when it granted the Legion of Honour to three 
Quaker  Commissioners:  Richard  Allen,  James  Long  and  Robert  Spence  Watson.66 
Moreover, Quaker relief had increasingly taken the form of direct aid and training to 
countries  ravaged  by  war,  such  as  the  introduction  of  agricultural  innovations  and 
support for those on the land, while entire factories were established to cater for the 
clothing  needs  of  war-torn  communities.  Certainly,  the  Quaker  intervention  in  the 
Franco-Prussian  war  had  raised  their  profile,  symbolically  represented  by  the 
introduction of the red and black star during the conflict, the emblem of Quaker relief 
used  by  them  ever  since.67 The  conflict  also  revealed,  however,  the  difficulties  of 
maintaining the principle of impartiality, for even though the Quakers ‘set out to help 
the French and Germans equally’68, in practice, this may not have been the case. It must 
be remembered  that  the British population,  the Quakers  included,  were clearly  pro-
German in this conflict, and this was revealed by some dispatches from the field, such 
as this one from Henry John Allen, who spoke of:
the power, the culture and the mildness of the Prussian, and the folly, the power of self-
deception and the disorganisation of the French.69
It is difficult to know exactly how these sympathies were translated into practice, as the 
only written accounts we have of Quaker relief  are the depositions given by French 
civilians to the Legion of Honour committee, which praised the extraordinary efforts 
make  by  the  Quakers  to  ameliorate  the  suffering  of  those  affected  by war  and the 
expression of  gratitude  by Ministers  and local  authorities  on November  1871 when 
attesting on an official address: “…our country will never forget that in our day of dire 
necessity, your society, and through your example others in England, have stretched out 
66 This honour was also bestowed on three French workmen whom James Long had nominated. After the 
awarding of the Legion of Honour, the Quakers started a campaign of proselytism, in an attempt to show 
the French people the religious motives for their benevolence. This campaign, opposed by some sectors in 
France, had little impact, and no converts were made. 
67 The British Minister in Brussels, Savile Lumley, advised the Commissioners to find a symbol by which 
they, their baggage and transportation might be recognized, and whereby they might even be able to 
obtain reductions in freight charges. The ‘Daily News Fund’, whose Commissioner was using the red and 
black star, suggested that the Quakers might share it. 
68 Motto of the first two Commissioners to be sent to the conflict, Henry John Allen and William Jones. 
69 Henry J. Allen, ‘Dispatch from Strasburg’, 31 October 1870, FHL.
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 228
to us a brotherly hand”.70 Therefore, the extent to which political preferences affected 
relief work during the Franco-Prussian War is still unknown.
1.4 On the road to world conflict
From the end of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 up to the outbreak of the First 
World War in 1914, the Balkans – the territories most affected by the slow decline of 
the Turkish empire – became the main centre of Quaker relief activities. Quaker relief 
workers were present during the Bulgarian crisis of 1876-79, in Bulgaria and Armenia 
in  1896-7,  Macedonia  in  1903  and  during  the  1912-13  Balkan  wars.  In  all  these 
interventions Quaker help was directed to providing food and clothing, and sometimes 
housing  and  school  building,  as  in  Bulgaria  in  1876.71 Another  institution  run  by 
Quakers – though not an official concern of the Society of Friends – was the Bulgarian 
Medical  Mission,  under  the  direction  of  Elizabeth  Bevan Tonjoroff72,  in  Plovdiv  in 
southern Bulgaria. As was customary in Quaker relief operations, committees and funds 
were established,  and Quakers travelled to stay for periods of various lengths in the 
countries in conflict. Though these individuals were representatives of the Friends and 
wore the Red Star, a team of Commissioners was not created to take charge of the relief 
operation, given the nature of the terrain in these conflicts.
The atrocities that initially stirred consciences produced a continuous stream of goods 
and monetary donations. However, this situation changed when news of atrocities was 
superseded by news of other tragedies, and thus funds were drained. This was the case 
with the Armenian Relief Committee that had been set up in 1896. Popular indignation 
reacted against the Turks and provoked a substantial influx of donations. At the Yearly 
Meeting  held  in  early  1897  it  was  said  that  ₤180,000  had  been  ‘forwarded  to  the 
Armenians’, while in April of the same year only ₤400 had been received.  It would 
seem  that  a  backlash  occurred  when  it  was  suggested  that  the  Armenians  had 
exaggerated their distress, and that a part of the fund had gone to Turkish banks. The 
70 Sessions (1991), p. 67 
71 This relief in Bulgaria was mainly the work of the incorrigible James Long, and thus was not strictly a 
Quaker mission, though around a fifth of the funds raised in England (6,000 pounds) came from the 
Quakers. Long provided housing for some 600 families, opened 20 new schools and reconditioned four. 
Jones (1899), pp. 224-59. 
72 (1847 – 1907) Young English Quaker Governess that in Bulgaria married the Protestant convert called 
“the Tolstoy of Bulgaria” and dedicated all her life to help and heale and, in general, to the welfare of the 
other. See Ormerod Greenwood (1951).
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operation was terminated in May 1899, although a Friend remained in Constantinople 
with the Armenian Mission in an unofficial capacity.
The Friends were also involved in relief operations in Russia, in the Volga and Don 
basins, after  Herbert  Jones – son of one of the first Commissioners to go to France 
during the Franco-Prussian War in 1870 – returned from the Pamirs and Volga regions 
with news of the famine there. A Committee was formed in 1891, and famine relief, 
food  and  money,  was  sent  with  delegates  to  Russia.73 This  operation  met  with 
opposition at home, and newspapers accused the Quakers of only being interested in 
problems abroad while ignoring the situation at home.74 
Accusations  were  also  made  about  the  way the  money  was  spent  due  to  extensive 
Russian corruption and mismanagement.75 When the Committee presented its report to 
the Meeting for Sufferings in December 1892, they asserted that the money received, 
about 37,000 pounds, had been used to relieve the situation in the whole area affected 
by the famine and spent in food distribution, spring sowing and sanitary treatments to 
fight typhus and cholera. The Quakers were also involved in helping Russian religious 
groups close to the Friends’ beliefs and undergoing persecution for their pacifist views, 
such  as  the  Dukhobors.76 The  latter  were  resettled  in  Canada,  with  the  help  of  the 
American Friends who took over the support previously given by London.77
During this period of some fifty years, the Quakers were clearly driven by a mixture of 
religious affinity and evangelical pity, but in no case was proselytizing the motive of 
their effort, even though in some isolated cases the Friends’ religious attitude would 
provoke a positive response. However, financially, their relief operations were always 
dependent on the consciences of the British public. As we have seen, a cause always 
started with strong support, as public opinion was moved by a particular tragedy, but it 
would lose steam and be forgotten in a short period of time. This would mean that 
73 Meeting for Sufferings, minutes, 6 November 1891, FHL.
74 ‘Blind to the situation at their own door, The Manchester members of the Society of Friends, for 
instance, who have sent so much good English brass to Russia, what do they feel about the matter?’ 
Sunday Chronicle, Manchester, 17 August 1892. 
75 ‘Russia is a vast empire of pre-ethical dishonesty’, The Fortnightly Review, December 1891. 
76 The Dukhobors were a religious group prominent in rural Russia during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. They were doctrinally similar to the Quakers, rejecting the priesthood and sacraments and the 
authority of both Church and state. They were, of course, also pacifists. The Columbia Encyclopaedia,  
Sixth Edition. (Columbia University Press, 2008)
77 Minutes of the Friends Committee to Assist the Douchabortzis or Dukhobors Vol. II, FHL.
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action was discontinued or lay practically dormant until a new cause would again move 
public opinion.
1.5 A British conflict: Relief to South Africa (1900-1905)
On 11 October 1899, war broke out between Great Britain  and the Republic of the 
Orange Free State and Transvaal a war that became commonly known as the Boer War. 
After  British defeats  in  December  1899, what  had been viewed as  a  mere  skirmish 
developed into an all-out conflict. The same month, the Quakers set up a Committee to 
study the need to establish a War Victims Relief Committee,  but nothing was done. 
Soon, news about the effects of a fierce ‘guerrilla war’ and the concentration camps set 
up by the British arrived in Britain. Visitors from the war zones described the brutality 
of the British, the burning of farms and conditions in the concentration camps. Although 
this led to public debate (and denials by the Army), the Quakers did not react to this, 
because, as they said afterwards,
“no clear line was established and the course taken by the war, the relief given in Cape 
Town and elsewhere by other Funds, and the impossibility of obtaining information 
from the Dutch states and other circumstances continued to block our way”.78
Certainly,  during  the early  stages  of  the  war  the Friends  in  London were receiving 
contradictory information about the situation in South Africa. In 1900 the Quakers sent 
Joshua and Isabella Rowntree, Quakers who had previously worked in the Cape Colony 
and Natal, to assess the situation in South Africa. The Rowntrees, who had remained in 
Cape Town, had sent  back reassuring information  about  conditions  there.  However, 
Emily Hobhouse79,  a  non-Quaker,  who had travelled to the Boer states of Transvaal 
Republic and Orange Free State in the same year,  sent back alarming reports of the 
situation there, which was supported by reports from those who visited these states. 
Many of these reports during the following year, from Quakers in the field, undoubtedly 
confirmed the dreadful conditions in the camps, but, as their 1902 Report shows, the 
Friends could not publish, because: 
“A correspondence so written would, if published, give rise to controversies beyond its 
province to deal with, and likely to hinder our work. And lastly, it has been more than 
78 Yearly Meeting Proceedings, 1908, p. 146 (Closing the Relief Fund), FHL.
79 Emily Hobhouse, daughter of an Anglican clergyman, became a leading campaigner against the 
concentration camps set up by the British during the Boer War. Oldfield (2006), pp102-6. 
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once stated to the authorities that our Friends went to relieve and appease, not to inspect 
and report”.80 
Therefore, the Quakers were evidently aware of the horrors perpetrated by the British in 
South Africa, and, although they feared publicizing this situation for the reasons stated 
above,  they  could  have  responded  with  emergency  relief.  It  would  appear  that  the 
Quakers found it difficult to respond quickly to the South African emergency, partly 
because of the distance and the lack of experienced relief workers in the ‘Friends South 
African Relief Fund’81 but also undoubtedly because of the political implications. This 
is somewhat puzzling, as politics had not determined their actions in Ireland. Perhaps 
this  was  because  of  the  level  of  brutality  shown in South  Africa,  especially  in  the 
concentration camps, and the very public campaign that exposed it.82
Hence, the Quakers responded late to the South African emergency,  and on a small 
scale.83 Emily Hobhouse took the initiative, and focused on Boer women and children, 
whilst  ignoring  the  other  communities  of  British,  Bantus  and  Indians.  Quaker 
Commissioners,  more  aware  of  the  wider  needs  of  the  conflict,  contacted  these 
communities  with  relief  and  also  visited  Boer  prisoners84,  sent  books  to  camps, 
distributed vegetable seeds, replanted gardens and helped to find school accommodation 
for children in special need. 
When in  November  1901 camp conditions  improved  and rations  and supplies  were 
sufficient, the Friends engaged in supply distribution suggested that nurses and teachers 
were  needed  more  than  relief  workers.  This  appeal  was  answered  by  a  number  of 
Quaker women going to South Africa as nurses, orphanage matrons and teachers.85 
The  small  Quaker  relief  operation  was  discontinued  and the  Relief  Fund  closed  in 
190886 but the Quakers, with a presence in the South African Women and Children’s 
Distress Fund, became more involved in the ‘Boer Home Industries’, an aid society that 
80 Report, 1902, FHL.
81 Formed in 1900 by the Meeting for Sufferings, it channelled Quaker relief in South Africa and closed 
in 1908.
82 It should be remembered that the repression used by the colonial British against the Irish is legendary, 
as any Irish history work confirms. It was, however, very little publicised in the English press, and 
therefore virtually unknown to the English public. See, for example, the classic T.A. Jackson, Ireland Her  
Own (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971). 
83 In the course of the conflict and its aftermath, 20 Commissioners and helpers worked in South Africa.
84 The Friend (2) iii, 1922, p. 192, FHL.
85 Yearly Meeting Proceedings, 1908, p. 146, FHL.
86 Yearly Meeting Proceedings, 1908, p. 146.
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succeeded  the  former  in  1904,  under  the  driving  force  of  Emily  Hobhouse.  Lace 
production,  the first  idea,  was abandoned and wool textile  activities became central, 
whose ‘tweeds’ proved to be a great success at  the Cape Town Exhibition of April 
1908.
The South African intervention was the first conflict in which the traditional Quaker 
way of organizing through ad hoc  committees proved to be so slow and cautious that 
others, such as Emily Hobhouse, took the initiative. Indeed, the Quakers’ involvement 
came late,  was minimal  and revealed  that  the Friends  had no clear  direction  in  the 
conflict, although some individual Friends made an important contribution. It could be 
the case that the Friends were disoriented by the level of brutality shown by their own 
kinsmen in the Boar War, and this led to a loss of focus and a lack of direction. The 
Quakers’  intervention  in  the  Boar  War  again  reveals  the  impossibility  of  total 
‘impartiality’ in any conflict, despite the brave attempts, and desires, of the Friends to 
achieve it.
1.6 The Quakers and the First World War
Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August 1914, and ten days later the Society of 
Friends  had  established,  as  official  bodies,  the  following  committees:  War  Victims 
Relief  Committee  (Eastern  Europe),  War  Victims  Committee  (France),  Emergency 
Committee  for  Aliens  and  the  National  Relief  Committee  Auxiliary.  All  of  these 
committees followed the traditional system used in previous conflicts,  but there was 
also a movement to take the Quakers deeper into the war to ‘perform acts of healing’.87 
This stated intention challenged the traditional Quaker attitude to reject being part of a 
military system and thus led to a protracted debate within the movement. 
Formally,  of course, the Quaker Peace Testimony and their refusal to be conscripted 
prevented them being involved in military action88, but the point at issue here was to 
what extent the Friends’ intervention in the war – providing sanitary services to the 
armies, for example – could be seen as being part of the military machine. The very 
87 Friends Christian Fellowship Union meeting, minutes, 14 August 1914, p. 7.
88 The Quakers had been exempted from the militia in England in 1757, but the Military Service Act, 
1916, was unique in that it also provided for exemption on conscientious grounds. This Act was, 
however, somewhat ambivalent, and there was a debate about how it should be implemented, and who it 
should cover. Therefore, there was no clear definition and it was thus left to those implementing the Act 
to deal with this matter on a case-by-case basis. 
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scale of the conflict demanded a much more embedded presence on the battlefield by 
relief  workers  and thus  placed  the  Friends  in  something  of  a  dilemma.  The Young 
Friends, for example, proposed the setting up of an Ambulance Service, arguing that 
they would be treating men as human beings and not soldiers, and that being part of an 
ambulance service did not mean being part of the war on the battlefield. 
Although there were numerous appeals for guidance in the matter, the Young Friends 
did not present the proposal for an Ambulance Service to the Meeting of Sufferings, 
which took place on 10 September 1914. This latter meeting did, however, address a 
letter to members to clarify the situation. After recalling its Peace Testimony against 
war and its opposition against military laws in Australia and New Zealand89, the letter 
asked for  coherence  with  its  principles  and proposed ways  of  providing  war  relief, 
within  the  framework  that  Quaker  relief  actions  had  assumed  in  past  conflicts,  but 
added that, 
we see danger to principle in undertaking any service auxiliary to warfare which 
involves becoming part of a military machine90
Nevertheless, the Ambulance Service scheme went ahead, in an ‘unofficial capacity’, 
and was a huge success. The recruitment of volunteers for the unofficial Ambulance 
services91 was three times that for the official ‘War Victims Relief Committee’. It is 
clear, therefore, that the majority of young Quakers were adhering to another ‘version’ 
of the Peace Testimony, one that was more appropriate to the needs of a major modern 
war.  In  September  1914,  60  participants  gathered  at  a  training  camp  at  Jordan’s, 
Buckinghamshire92, and were ready for service six weeks later. However, they had no 
place of action, as the British Army was reluctant to accept an independent unit with 
‘Quaker  scruples’.93 But  when  the  Belgian  Army  collapsed  in  October  1914,  the 
emergency situation allowed the Joint War Committee of the Red Cross and the Order 
of St. John of Jerusalem to ask for their services, providing facilities and equipment, but 
89 The ‘Imperial Defence Plan’ of 1910 introduced conscription in these two countries, and did not 
include exemption for the Quakers, as had been the case in England since 1757. 
90 Meeting for Sufferings, minutes, 10 September 1914, FHL.
91 The Minutes of the War Victims Relief Committee did not refer to the unit as a ‘Friends’ ambulance 
unit until 24 July 1915, because much discussion took place about the acceptance of it as a ‘Friends’ 
project.
92 This was the first of 21 camps used by the service.
93 From the Military Report (Sanitary), September 1914. Ormerod Greenwood (1975), p. 185.
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insisted on the unit being renamed the ‘First Anglo-Belgian Field Ambulance’ and any 
reference to the ‘Friends’ was dropped. 
A Committee  was set  up to  run the Ambulance  Unit,  with  Sir  George Newman as 
Chairman, and on 30 October 1914, a party of 43, including 3 doctors, 6 dressers and 8 
ambulance  cars  left  London.  The Unit’s  first  action  started  even before  arriving  on 
continental soil, as, a few miles out of Dover, their ship arrived at the position were the 
cruiser ‘HMS Hermes’ had been torpedoed and was sinking. After taking care of the 
survivors being transferred to Dover, they restarted their trip and arrived in Dunkirk. 
There they encountered sheds full of almost unattended wounded, French and Belgian, 
with a few German and British. 
With  its  headquarters  in  Dunkirk,  and  under  the  umbrella  of  the  Red  Cross  Joint 
Committee, the Unit, again called the ‘Friends Ambulance Unit’, became fully involved 
in the relief effort, together with the French ‘Service de Santé’. It was authorized to 
establish an Auxiliary Military Hospital, and began the task in cooperation with French 
forces,  and  in  association  with  another  voluntary  unit,  headed  by  the  Hon.  Lionel 
Holland. In fact, during the first winter of the war the Friends were involved in civil 
rather than military relief, and in May 1915 they formed a Joint Committee, ‘Aid Civile 
Belge’,  with  some Belgian  civilians.  When  the  war  turned  into  trench  warfare  and 
became static in the spring of 1916, ‘Aid Civile Belge’ took over all non-military work 
from  the  Friends  Ambulance  Unit, becoming  a  purely  civilian  organisation.  This 
civilian  work  consisted  mainly  of  caring  for  refugees:  evacuation  and  transferral, 
feeding and providing clothing and medical care, and the setting up or supplementing 
improvised hospitals. 
In the case of military action, both the British and French were reluctant to embed these 
kinds of private and voluntary services with their own sanitary personnel. The French 
were less concerned about this, however, and, by December 1914 the Unit with its 24 
cars was already active from six bases behind French lines, linked with the medical 
services  of  several  French Divisions  and Army Corp.  However,  as  service with the 
British Army was still denied to the Unit, the service had an uncertain future, and with 
its activity reduced, some volunteers left.94 But, when on 23 May 1915 Italy declared 
94 The nature of voluntary work was such that volunteers had the freedom to come and go from the Unit 
more or less as they pleased. 
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war  on  Austria,  a  new  opportunity  for  action  arose,  and  the  call  for  a  ‘British 
Ambulance for Italy’ started the process. Promoted by the historian G.M. Trevelyan, the 
proposal was a great success and the new ‘Anglo-Italian Ambulance Unit’ included 16 
Quakers among its total of 66 in its first expedition, later followed by 7 other Friends. 
As  the  Italian  Army had a  different  opinion  about  voluntary  service,  the  Unit  was 
directly  involved in  the fighting,  and in  September  1917,  at  the  battle  of  Monte  S. 
Gabriele, the Unit lost most of its equipment, including many cars. The Unit was also 
involved in Gorlitz95, the Amoretto retreat96 and other important actions of the war and 
suffered significant casualties. Table (1) shows the importance of the whole effort of the 
Ambulance project.
Table 1: Ambulance Project, September 1914 – February 1919










Casualties on service 21
Hospital ship cases97 24,000
Hospital train cases 520,000
* 41,000 stretcher cases included
** November 1914: 43; May 1915: 200; November  1915: 465 (when conscription started), November 
1916: 600
*** Included in figures for FAU 
Sources: Lawson (1961); and Tatham & Miles (Eds.) (1919).
It should be also noted that the Italian Ambulance Unit drove 1.5 million kilometres and 
the  Friends  Ambulance  Unit  3.5  million  kilometres.  Also,  that  1,800  men  passed 
through the ranks of the unit;  that  it  provided staff  for 12 hospitals  in England and 
95 This battle was launched by the Italians on 6 August 1916 who succeeded in establishing a bridge head 
across the River Isonzo by taking Goritzia. Casualties amounted to 51.000 killed, wounded or taken 
prisoner.
96 The Battle of Caporetto was fought between 24 October and 9 November 1917 on the Austro-Italian 
Front near the town of Kaberid, in present Slovenia, and represented an enormous disaster for Italian 
forces with 11,000 killed, 20,000 wounded and 275,000 taken prisoner. 
97 The FAU served for a short time living on two ships: the “Glenart Castle”, torpedoed in the 
Mediterranean without victims on 1st March 1917, and on board the “Western Australia”, which was 
suspended on May 1917 after a year of service in the Channel.
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 236
France; and that 140,000 pounds were raised for the FAU. The ₤10,000 that remained at 
the end of the service was transferred to one of the ‘official’ Quaker schemes in the 
War, the FWVRC, which we shall examine below. 
Apart from the ‘unofficial’ Ambulance scheme, many official Friends’ projects were 
also carried out during the war. The Friends’ War Victims Relief Committee, (FWVRC) 
staffed by those adhering to the ‘orthodox’ notion of the Quaker Peace Testimony, was 
involved  in  more  traditional  relief  operations,  helping  refugees,  being  active  in 
maternity  units  and  nursing  services,  in  building  and  in  agriculture.  The  FWVRC 
contained members  and non-members,  but if  the FAU was primarily a male project 
(only 54 women served abroad), the FWVRC contained a greater number of women. 
During the 1914-18 war, 156 women out of a total of 473 women served abroad, and in 
the  period  after  the  war  until  1923,  about  800 women  had done  service  in  foreign 
countries.  Moreover,  the  activities  of  the  FWVRC extended  to  Serbia,  Poland  and 
Russia. Whilst the FAU could be considered a practical organisation, the FWVRC was 
of a more moral and utopian type.
The First World War witnessed Quaker relief operations carried out in the manner of 
past  conflicts,  with  experienced  systems  of  delegates  or  Commissioners,  with  local 
committees in conflict zones, helping in traditional ways, though adapted to changing 
times. However, this period also saw the emergence of a new Quaker Peace Testimony, 
which relieved suffering on the battlefields, forming part, physically if not legally, of 
the  combatants,  represented  by  its  ambulance  work,  and  the  connected  auxiliary 
services.  If  the  Evangelical  spirit  drove  the  activity,  the  actual  sanitary  work  was 
permeated by the more secular sentiment of solidarity, and again raised the profile of 
the Quakers in the field of humanitarian relief.
1.7 The Quakers in the Inter-War Period
The Quakers had been conscious – since the signing of the Armistice in November 1918 
– of the famine affecting Germany, aggravated by the blockade imposed by the Allied 
Powers,  which  lasted  seven  months  after  the  Armistice.  In  spite  of  enormous 
difficulties,  a  relief  operation  was  established,  in  cooperation  with  the  American 
Friends, which evolved into separate schemes being run by the American and British 
Friends. There appeared to have been some problems between the British and American 
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Friends during this operation, as the Americans, supported by Herbert Hoover, wanted 
the service to be rendered ‘under the American flag’.98
The relief work carried out in Austria since 1914, however, was organized by a joint 
Anglo-American mission that used about 1,000 Austrian volunteers.  Another Anglo-
American operation took place in Poland, following a typhus epidemic, and in early 
1920 the Quakers were able to restart their activity in Russia, to alleviate the famine. In 
Russia,  however,  the Americans  split  from London,  as  the  former  were part  of  the 
American Relief Administration, which was opposed to any presence in what had been, 
since 1917, the Soviet Union.
The activities  undertaken by the Friends War Victims  Relief  committee,  which was 
active in Serbia, Poland and Russia during the First World War, were continued after 
the war by the “Emergency Committee for the Assistance of Germans,  Austrian and 
Hungarians in Distress”, created in August 1914, and which remained active until 1922. 
It was set up to help the citizens of enemy countries forced to register as ‘enemy aliens’ 
and interned in prison camps. The activity of this Committee was not popular with the 
British  public,  though it  did  obtain  the  support  of  key Church  figures,  such as  the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and the Cardinal Archbishop of Westminster. 
The Friends were also involved in the upheavals that engulfed Austria from February 
1934 to March 1938.99 Under the experienced Quaker relief worker Hilda Clark100, the 
Friends mounted an impressive relief mission to help the socialists and their families 
after their rebellion was crushed in February 1934. Some 5,000 pounds was distributed 
to more than 8,000 families in need.  When the Nazis suffered repression after  their 
aborted  putsch  in  July  1934,  however,  the  Quakers  found  it  difficult  to  react  so 
positively, despite the pressure put on them by German churchmen and the chairman of 
98 Herbert Hoover, (1874-1964), head of the American Relief Administration and future 31st President of 
the USA, himself a Quaker, was extremely aware of the dire situation in Germany after the war, and thus 
provided funds for the relief operation. However, the ‘exclusive’ way in which this relief was handled 
caused problems with the British Friends and other relief agencies. Vining (1959), pp. 172-3. 
99 In February 1934, a demonstration by Socialists in Vienna was repressed violently, after five days of 
fighting, by the Austrian army under the orders of the Right-wing Chancellor, Dollfuss. After crushing 
the Socialists, Dolfuss then promulgated a fundamentally fascist constitution in May, which, however, 
was not sufficient for the Austrian Nazis, who murdered Dolfuss in an aborted Nazi coup in July 1934. 
Dolfuss’ successor, Schuschnigg, then proceeded to repress the Nazis, and many fled, were imprisoned or 
killed. They were not, however, defeated, and their constant pressure seriously weakened Schuschnigg’s 
government over the following years. The Austrian Nazis finally achieved their aim in the Anschluss with 
Nazi Germany in March 1938. 
100 Dr Hilda Clark (1881-1935) was a relief worker and suffragist, who had been active in relief 
operations throughout Europe since the First World War. 
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the  American  Quaker  organisation.101 Although  the  Quakers  did  help  some  Nazis 
later102, after relief to the socialists ended in the autumn of 1936103, the Quakers, again 
under the able leadership of Hilda Clark, concentrated their efforts on helping Jews to 
escape persecution,  by giving them advice on obtaining visas,  and by helping them 
directly with grants.104 
1.8 An Assessment: the Quakers’ relief operations until 1936
The relief operations mounted by the Friends, since the eighteenth century American 
Revolution,  were essentially motivated by evangelical  pity,  and doctrinally based on 
their foremost statement of intent, the Peace Testimony. As we have seen, though the 
pattern of engendering relief action remained the same – an individual member would 
launch an appeal to a Meeting of Sufferings – the organisation of relief itself changed 
dramatically over time. 
The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1 was a major landmark in this process, when Quaker 
delegates, Commissioners, were sent throughout France to oversee the relief process, 
and  relief  was  administered  on  a  much  larger  scale.  Moreover,  the  scope  of  relief 
developed over time, Quaker interventions in relief – before the Franco-Prussian War – 
had  consisted  mainly  in  the  collection  of  funds,  which  would  be  sent  to  local 
committees established in conflict zones.105 Increasingly, however, the Quakers became 
involved in food and medical relief  and the making and sending of clothes.  Indeed, 
entire factories were dedicated to supplying clothing apparel during the Franco-Prussian 
War. Longer-term objectives also began to come into play: agricultural techniques were 
taught, schools built and administered and Quaker nurses and midwives sent to improve 
101 The German Methodist Benjamin Heinrich Unruh (1881-1959) approached the Quakers with a 
donation and a proposal of relief for the Austrian Nazis, as did Rufus Jones, chairman of the American 
Friends Service Committee that warned that it “would seem like discrimination to continue to help 
socialists and not Nazis”. After consultations with the AFSC, the Friends Service Council and the 
Austrian and German Quakers, the proposal was turned down. Schmitt (1997) pp. 86-89 and Letter from 
Rufus Jones to the AFSC, 3 September, 1934, AFSCA. 
102 From their centre in Berlin, the Quakers defended 126 pro-German activists in Lithuania, who had 
been detained there for their work in favour of the transfer of Memel (now Klaipeda) to German control. 
They visited these prisoners and helped their families, until they were freed in March 1938. See Schmitt 
(1997) p. 92
103 Some 76,000 pounds had been spent in this relief operation. 
104 The staff in Vienna was increased to 20 to attend to the work of the Jewish community.
105 Funds were normally collected from wealthy Quakers and other well-off acquaintances, but 
increasingly – given the British people’s greater knowledge of world events through newspapers – 
collections were also made in churches, Quaker meetings and public gatherings.
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sanitary conditions in post-war zones. The First World War was another milestone in 
the history of Quaker relief operations, when the Young Friends were involved on the 
battlefield as ambulance staff, suffering significant casualties in the process. Moreover, 
this  work  on  the  battlefields  meant  that  the  Young Quakers  had  to  re-interpret  the 
Quaker  Peace  testimony,  thus  revealing,  yet  again,  the  dynamic  nature  of  Quaker 
organisations, and their commitment to relieving the distress of those in need. 
Despite these enormous achievements – and the Quakers’ stated desire to administer 
equally to both sides in a conflict  – the Friends discovered the difficulties  of being 
totally  impartial  in their  efforts,  revealed  during the Franco-Prussian War,  but  most 
clearly  during  the  Boer  War  and  the  events  in  Vienna  between  1934  and  1938. 
Organisational inadequacies also played their part in the limitations of Quaker relief 
operations,  again  most  evident  during  the  Boer  War.  The  lack  of  a  permanent 
international body to oversee relief operations undoubtedly contributed to the slowness 
of  response  to  a  conflict  situation.  The  ‘Continental  Committee  of  the  Meeting  for 
Sufferings’ (CCMS) was set up in 1818 to administer continental European activities, 
mostly in France, Germany, Norway and Denmark, while the missionary organisation, 
the ‘Friends Foreign Mission Association’ (FFMA), created in 1868, sent missionaries 
to India, Ceylon (present-day Sri Lanka), Madagascar, China and Syria. This body was 
not officially recognized as a Quaker organisation until the end of the First World War 
in 1918.106 The Continental Committee was discontinued in 1919, and superseded that 
year  by  the  ‘Council  for  International  Service’,  designed  to  establish  Quaker 
‘embassies’, first in Europe and then to the rest of the world. In 1924, this latter body 
took  over  the  remaining  activities  of  the  ‘Friends  Emergency  and  War  Victims 
Committee’ established at the start of World War I, and finally, in 1927, merged with 
the officially recognized ‘Friends Foreign Mission Association’ to form the ‘Friends 
Service Council’ (FSC). Thus, in 1927, for the first time, the Quakers had a permanent 
international relief body to oversee their operations, an organisation which would be put 
to the test most severely during their interventions in the Spanish Civil War.107
106 As the old Meeting for Sufferings retained its competence to deal with any matters it chose, there were 
doubts about the acceptance of an important Mission instrument such as the FFMA as a formal Quaker 
body. 
107 The FSC, seen as a permanent body when established, saw its mission as one akin to the American 
Friends Service Committee (AFSC) of the American Quakers, set up in 1917, which wished to provide 
even non-Quaker conscientious objectors to war with an alternative to military service, seeing in them a 
source of voluntary workers. 
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2. The Red Cross
2.1 Henri Dunant and the Battle of Solferino
The reality of the care given to those wounded in the battles of the nineteenth century is 
well summed-up in this quote from a history of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross:
“The military surgeons attached to the French Army were good but scarce: 4 
veterinaries for every 1,000 horses, but only one surgeon for the same number of 
men”.108
The lack of an adequate system of relief for those wounded in war was acutely felt by 
Henri Dunant, a Swiss Calvinist, who laid the foundations of what was to become one 
of the major relief organisations of the twentieth century, the Red Cross.
Jean Henri Dunant was born in Geneva in 1828, into a devoutly Calvinist family of 
some  standing  in  Genevan  society,  who  were  known  for  their  charitable  works  in 
helping the sick, the poor, orphans and parolees. It would appear that the young Dunant 
was particularly affected by a visit to the Toulon prison in France, where he saw first-
hand the  suffering  of  prison  inmates.  Dunant  grew up during  a  period  of  religious 
awakening known as the Reveil,  and at the age of eighteen joined the ‘Geneva Society 
of Almsgiving’, and spent most of his free time visiting prisons, the sick, the poor and 
the dying. He read to prisoners every Sunday afternoon – Travel, History and Science – 
and in 1852 founded the Geneva chapter of the YMCA.109 
A bank employee, Dunant was assigned by a colonial company (Compagnie Genevoise 
des Colonies de Sétif), and visited Algeria, Tunisia and Sicily in 1853.110 Three years 
later, he set up a business to operate in foreign colonies, and having been granted a land 
concession, formed a corn-growing and trading company, the Financial and Industrial 
Company of Mon-Djémila  Mills’  (Société  financière  et  industrielle  des Moulins des 
Mon Mons-Djémila). Unfortunately the land and water rights were not clearly assigned 
108 Boissier (1963), p. 26. 
109 The Young Men’s Christian Association was founded in London in June 1844 by George Williams, a 
23-year old sales assistant in a draper’s shop. He and his group of fellow drapers organized the first 
YMCA to substitute Bible Studies and prayer. It was a response to the dreadful and unhealthy living 
conditions in the big cities during the industrial revolution.
110 Inspired by these travels, Dunant wrote his first book, An Account of the Regency in Tunis, published 
in 1858.
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and the colonial authorities proved to be particularly uncooperative. Therefore, Dunant 
decided to appeal directly to the French emperor, Napoleon III, who was fighting with 
his army in Lombardy at the time. France was fighting as an ally of Piedmont-Sardinia 
against Austria, which had occupied most of Italy.
Having been  recommended  to  see  the  emperor  by  the  aunt  of  the  French General, 
Beafort  d’Hantpoul,  Dunant arrived in  Brescia,  Italy,  in  June 1859, but,  finding the 
emperor had left, went by chariot to Castiglione della Stiviere the next day. That very 
same day,  a few kilometres  east  of Castiglione,  on the edge of the small  village of 
Solferino, a battle had taken place for three hours in the afternoon. The most bloody 
battle  since  Waterloo,  this  murderous  ‘one  day  tournament  between  armies’111 left 
30,000 injured, dying and dead remaining on the battlefield, and there appeared to be 
little attempt to provide aid.
Dunant proceeded to the church in Castiglione, the Chiesa Maggiore, where more than 
500  injured  were  kept,  while  around  200  were  kept  outside.  Dunant,  shocked  and 
horrified, took the initiative and organized the civilian population to provide assistance 
to  the  injured,  an  action  that  was  deeply  resented  by  the  local  population.  9,230 
wounded  were  placed  in  Castiglione  (8,056  French,  1,123  Austrian  and  61  from 
Sardinia-Piedmont), with only 10 doctors to care for them. Lacking sufficient materials 
and supplies,  Dunant himself  organized the purchase of needed material  and helped 
erect makeshift hospitals. He succeeded in obtaining assistance from some of the local 
population,  and  the  slogan  ‘Tutti  fratelli’  (We  are  all  brothers)  was  coined  by  the 
women.112
Leaving Castiglione  several  days  later,  Dunant  proceeded on his  journey to  see the 
emperor,  but  his  flattering  pamphlet  of  the  emperor  and his  petitions  regarding  his 
Algerian venture were flatly turned down by Napoleon III.113 He did, however, plead the 
cause of the wounded, suggesting that the Austrian doctors imprisoned by the French 
should  be  freed  and  used  to  help  the  injured,  a  plea  that  was,  indeed,  successful. 
111 Ignatieff (1998), p. 118.
112 Around 15 other foreigners helped the wounded at Castiglione. 
113 Dunant was deeply impressed by Napoleon III, and had written a glowing pamphlet of the emperor 
comparing him to Charlemagne. He also believed that this might be useful in his attempt to deal with his 
Algerian problem, which he thought could only be solved by the intervention of the emperor himself. In 
fact, the emperor never received Dunant, and the letter refusing the pamphlet was probably given to him 
by the emperor’s private secretary 
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Although this practice had occurred occasionally in past conflicts, Dunant’s intervention 
with the French authorities on this occasion assured that this practice would become 
customary in the future. 
Dunant  continued  his  work  at  Castiglione,  returning  home  at  the  end  of  June  and 
arriving  in  Geneva  the  same  day,  10 July  1859, on  which peace  was  agreed  at 
Villafranca by Napoleon III and Franz Joseph of Austria. Haunted by the carnage at 
Castliglione, and having failed to get his Algerian project off the ground, at the end of 
1861  Dunant  began  writing  a  book  about  his  experience  of  war.  Completed  in 
November 1862,  Un Souvenir  de Solferino (A Solferino Memory) outlined Dunant’s 
vision for a system of relief  for those wounded in war.114 The reality of the battle’s 
aftermath are summed up by Dunant:  the abandonment of the wounded; the lack of 
cooperation  from the  local  population,  who were  deeply  fearful;  the  respect  of  the 
military for the wounded enemy and the equality in the treatment of the wounded of 
both sides; and the need to use the doctors of the defeated side to heal the wounded. 
Given this reality, Dunant proposed that during periods of peace Aid Societies should 
be  formed  with  the  purpose  of  taking  care  of  the  wounded  in  war  and  staffed  by 
dedicated voluntary workers who would be trained for the task. He also proposed the 
holding of an international congress, to establish international and agreed principles that 
would be the basis for the Aid Societies in the various countries of Europe, and the 
issuing of rules necessary to govern their activities. 
The book had a profound impact on the Geneva lawyer Gustave Moynier, who presided 
over a benevolent private institution, Société d’Utilité Public (Public Utility Society). 
Moved by the horrendous picture of the war wounded painted by Dunant, Moynier set 
up a permanent sub-committee within his society, ‘The International Committee for Aid 
to  the  Wounded  in  Situation  of  War’,  the  embryo  of  what  was  to  become  the 
International  Committee  of  the  Red  Cross.  The  committee  was  formed  by  five 
members: Henri Dunant, Gustave Moynier, Theodore Maunoir (doctor), Louis Appia 
(doctor) and General Henri Dufour, famed for his actions during the Swiss Civil War of 
1847 and a well-known humanitarian.
114 Dunant published the book himself – 1,600 copies – and sent it to monarchs, policymakers, the 
military, well-known philanthropists and writers and friends all over the world.
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The first meeting of the Committee took place on 17 February 1863, and soon after the 
Committee’s  name  was  changed  to  ‘Comité  International  de  Secours  Aux  Blesses’ 
(International  Committee  for  Assistance  to  the  Wounded),  with  General  Dufour  as 
President, Moynier as Vice-President and Dunand as Secretary. At the second meeting 
on 17 March a  series  of points  were agreed,  the most  salient  of which were:  a)  to 
promote  the  formation  of  societies  in  each  country  that  would  be  in  charge  of  the 
development of activities, including the establishment of a voluntary sanitary corps; b) 
the societies must  be accepted by the authorities and the voluntary sanitary workers 
corps subject to the military authorities and under their rules during military campaigns; 
and c)  these  corps  would  be placed  at  the back  of  the army,  and should create  no 
problem for the army. Moreover, it was agreed that these corps would take their own 
food, medicine and other necessary material, provide their own transportation and be no 
cost to the army. The corps would, however, be called by the army when needed and 
dismissed  at  the  army’s  command.  The  corps  itself  would  be  well  organized  along 
hierarchical lines, and a Managing Committee would supply the corps when needed, in 
consultation with military leaders.
With these agreed principles, in August 1863 Dunant and Moynier proposed the holding 
of  an  international  conference  in  Geneva  and  Dunant  travelled  around  Europe  to 
promote it. A ‘Concordat Draft’, based on the principles outlined above, was presented 
together with the invitation.115 In Berlin, while proposing the conference to a Congress 
of Statistics being held there, Dunant met the chairman, Dr Basting, a Sanitary Officer 
in  the  Dutch  Army and an admirer  of  Dunant,  who suggested  the  inclusion  of  the 
concept  ‘neutrality’  for  the  sanitary  workers  involved  in  relief  work.  Thus,  an 
‘addendum’,  containing the notion of ‘neutrality’  – written by Dunant without  prior 
consultation with the International Committee – was included in the invitation to the 
conference.116 Dunant  continued  his  travels  throughout  Germany  with  the  amended 
statues.  In  Saxony,  the  king  accepted  to  be  the  patron  of  the  conference,  while  in 
Potsdam, at an official reception given by King William I to which Dunant was invited, 
Dunant  contacted  representatives  from Prussia,  Russia,  Spain,  Bavaria  and Norway. 
During the following weeks, Dunant and Dufour succeeded in securing assurances from 
115 See Document D with the ‘Concordat draft’ text. Dunant had travelled throughout Europe earlier in 
the year distributing his book, and had received positive reactions in various countries (Holland, Prussia, 
Italy, the Grand Duchy of Baden and Hesse.)
116 See Document E with the Addendum.
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French, Austrian, Bavarian and British contacts to attend the conference, and, finally, on 
26 October 1863, at the Athenée Palace, the Geneva Conference opened.117 
2.2 The Geneva Conference 1863
The  conference  was  attended  by  31  representatives;  16  representing  states  and  4 
representing philanthropic  institutions.118 Moynier,  who effectively presided over the 
conference,  proposed:  a)  the  formation  of  a  society  in  every  European  capital  that 
received assurances from its own government that, in the event of a conflict, its offer of 
help shall be accepted; b) when war starts, every society (i) organizes help for its own 
country’s army by providing a voluntary corps that is placed to the back of its army and 
places them as far away as necessary so as not to disturb the army’s movement, but also 
at a distance which allows them to provide assistance once the battle  starts;  (ii)  the 
voluntary workers shall be sent to the places where needed at the request of the army’s 
first in command; (iii) help should be provided to the wounded of both sides in battle, 
with no distinctions; (iv) the voluntary workers should not be treated by any party as an 
enemy, and the workers should wear a distinctive sign that allows them to be recognized 
and respected, such as that worn by a priest or a nun of the Sister of Charity order.119 
The above proposals, Moynier pointed out, made it necessary to achieve an agreement 
between nations, whose text, after praying for God’s benediction of the conference, was 
read out by Moynier,  together  with its  ‘Supplement’.120 Dunant,  acting as Secretary, 
spoke  about  having  received  around  40  letters,  including  those  from  the  kings  of 
Belgium, Denmark and Portugal and others from medical and philanthropic societies, 
all of which were ready to support the Committee’s efforts. Other issues discussed at the 
conference were those affecting war prisoners (brought up by Prince Demidoff from 
Russia),  which, he argued, should be helped and allowed to receive mail  from their 
families. The Russian War Minister, Dimitri Milutine, though expressing sympathy for 
the proposed initiative, argued that governments should be left to modify the pertinent 
117 Some of these contacts were made with Ministers of War in their respective countries. This was the 
case with Bavaria, France and Britain. At the last meeting of the International Committee just prior to the 
conference, there appeared to be a negative reaction to the ‘addendum’ on neutrality attached by Dunant 
to the invitation to conference. However, in the minutes, drafted by Dunant, there is no reference to the 
‘neutrality’ controversy. (Minutes of the ICRC, ICRCA) 
118 For a full list of those attending, see Document F.
119 Sisters of Charity are nuns of a French order dedicated to the care of the sick and wounded.
120 See Documents D and E.
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international law of their respective countries, but should not be forced to do so by the 
Committee.  This  idea  was  important  and  affected  the  subsequent  debates  in  the 
conference, as they now had to focus solely on the operational aspect of the societies 
and their workers, and thus refrained from trying to establish an international law for the 
wounded.
Though some delegates showed some hesitation vis-à-vis the proposal at first121, during 
four  days  of  discussion,  after  analyzing  the  draft  agreement  article  by  article,  the 
proposal to set up a Sanitary Voluntary Corps was approved. It was also agreed that 
these voluntary workers would wear a distinctive sign, to show their neutrality during a 
conflict. Dr Appia proposed the wearing of a white bracelet with a red cross insignia, 
while the conference expressed the wish that this distinctive sign be used by all  the 
sanitary services of the armies, so that combatants would be able to clearly distinguish 
those non-combatants who were sanitary personnel.122 The notion of neutrality, which 
Moynier believed could cause problems at the conference, was approved unanimously, 
and the conference – which was not official, but launched as a private initiative – closed 
on  30  October  1863.  Its  practical  result  is  reflected  in  the  ‘Resolution  and  Wishes 
Adopted’, which became the fundamental charter of the Assistance to the Wounded in 
War.123
After the conference the main objective of the Committee was to establish societies in 
as many countries as possible, and to get the neutrality of sanitary workers recognized 
by governments through the signing of a Convention. Those who attended the Geneva 
conference were written to, and told what the Committee was expecting from them.124 
The first society was established at Württemberg in December 1863, followed by the 
Grand-Duchy d’Oldenbourg  in  January  1964  and  Belgium and  Prussia  in  February 
1864. Disappointingly, Holland, Austria and Britain were not responsive, arguing that 
they already had an adequate sanitary situation for their armies, although Holland was 
121 The British delegate, Rutherford, believed that the proposed societies would be superfluous, given the 
enormous strides taken by the British in sanitary matters during the Crimean War, while a member of the 
French delegation, Prevail, argued that the presence of non-military people on the battlefield would cause 
difficulties for the military. The Prussian and German-speaking delegation, though supportive of the 
proposal, wanted the voluntary corps to be placed in hospitals at the rear of the battlefield. However, the 
spirited defence of the proposal by the ICRC delegate, Dr Mannoir, opposing Mr Bordier from the French 
delegation, was crucial in gaining support for the draft agreement. See ICRCA, minutes of the Geneva 
Conference, 26 October 1863. 
122 Boissier (1963), p. 109.
123 See Document G.
124 See Document H.
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probably more concerned about having a private association tending the wounded on 
the battlefield.125 The Russians, though favourable, were reluctant to accept the idea of 
voluntary workers.
The Committee, which met on 12 March 1864, was considering how best to promote 
the resolutions and wishes of the Geneva conference, when a new European conflict 
erupted – the war which pitted Austria and Prussia against Denmark. The Committee 
decided to send two delegates: Captain Van de Veldt (Dutch delegate to the Geneva 
conference) to meet the Danes, and Dr Appia to meet the Prussians.126 The Committee 
approached the Swiss government in June, and the Federal Council (the Swiss Cabinet 
of Ministers) decided to call for the holding of a Diplomatic Conference on 8 August 
1864,  where all  European sovereign  states  were invited,  as  were  the  United  States, 
Mexico and Brazil.  It  was hoped that at the proposed conference these states would 
formally accept  the ‘Resolutions  and Wishes’ of the Geneva conference  of  October 
1863, and convert them into a Convention. 
On  8  August  1864,  General  Dufour  opened  the  ‘International  Conference  for  the 
Neutralisation of the Sanitary Military Service on the Battlefield’, and, after 15 days of 
discussion,  the  text  of  the  ‘Convention  pour  l’Amélioration  du  Sort  des  Militaries 
Blesses’ (‘Convention for the amelioration of the conditions of the wounded and sick of 
the Armed Forces in the Field’) was finally drafted, and signed on 22 August. This text, 
which  became  the  1st Geneva  Convention,  was  signed  the  same  day  by  12  of  the 
attending  states:  Grand-Duchy of  Baden,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Spain,  France,  Grand-
Duchy  of  Hesse-Darmstadt,  Italy,  Holland,  Portugal,  Prussia,  Switzerland  and 
Württemberg, and this agreed Convention remained open for other states to sign. Thus, 
the 1st Geneva Convention of 1864 – a short agreement with 10 articles – had still not 
come  into  force.  The  1864  agreement  simply  confirmed  that  the  negotiations  had 
reached  a  certain  stage,  but  still  awaited,  as  Pierre  Boissier  said,  that  the  powers 
‘transformed the engagement into a marriage’.127
125 Britain was adamant that the reorganisation of the sanitary corps during the Crimea covered the needs 
of its army, while Austria believed that the already existing ‘Austrian Patriotic Helping Society’ for the 
military met its needs. 
126 Both were also delegates of the Geneva Section, which had been established on 17 March 1864.
127 Boissier (1963), p. 223.
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2.3 The  Red  Cross  faces  the  realty  of  war:  the  building  of  the 
organisation
Although the Committee of the ‘Assistance to the Wounded in War’ sent two delegates 
(wearing the armband with a red cross on a white background) to observe the war by 
Prussia and Austria against Denmark in 1864128, the Austrian-Prussian War of 1866 was 
the first time the Geneva Convention of 1864 was applied, and the first time the national 
relief  societies  had  been  active.  By  1866,  14  states  had  ratified  the  Geneva 
Convention129, among them Prussia. Austria, on the other hand, though it ordered its 
Army to follow the Convention,  did not ratify it.  The Italians,  who had ratified the 
Convention,  joined  the  war  on  the  Prussian  side,  in  an  attempt  to  recover  Italian 
territory occupied by the Austrians. 
The result  of  the  war,  which ended in  September  1866 with a  resounding Prussian 
victory at Sadowa, revealed a clear lesson for the future humanitarian order emanating 
from the Geneva Convention. In Prussia, where the Central Committee of the Red Cross 
was  accepted  by the  government  and worked closely with the Army,  the charitable 
effort  of  private  individuals  and  institutions  had  been  well  channelled  to  help  the 
wounded on the battlefield. In the battle of Sadowa, for example, with more than 40,000 
wounded and killed (two thirds of whom were Austrian), transportation and hospital 
treatment  (where  chloroform was  first  used)  worked  with  remarkable  efficiency.  In 
Austria, however, where there was considerable material relief in the hands of a few 
private agencies, the absence of the Red Cross organisation was evident in the lack of 
qualified  personnel  and  adequate  transportation,  and,  perhaps  more  importantly, 
inadequate cooperation with the military authorities,  who were in charge of sanitary 
operations.130 
Certainly,  the  success  of  the  Red  Cross  in  its  relief  operations  during  the  Austro-
Prussian War of 1866 gave the organisation a much higher profile, and immediately 
128 The war by Austria and Prussia against Denmark entailed a dispute between these powers about the 
status of the province of Schleswig-Holstein, which Prussia argued was an integral part of Prussia. For a 
full debate on this issue, and the way in which Prussia used this dispute to extend its power, see Carr, W. 
(1974), pp. 102-16.
129 The states that had ratified the Geneva Convention by 1866 were: France, Switzerland, Belgium, The 
Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Grand Duchy of Baden, Greece, Great Britain, 
Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, Württemberg, Prussia and Turkey.
130 This situation was confirmed by the American doctor, Evans, who was a member of the American 
Sanitary Commission. Boissier (1963), p. 241.
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after the war three new states adhered to the Geneva Convention,131 and three new Red 
Cross  Societies  were formed in  Russia,  Austria  and Belgium.  Following up on this 
dynamic, the Red Cross had a presence at the Universal Exhibition in Paris in October 
1867,  with  its  ‘International  Exhibition  of  Societies  for  the  help  of  the  Wounded 
Military’.  Prior  to  the  Exhibition,  a  conference  was  held  in  Paris  in  August,  in  an 
attempt to study the 1866 conflict and how the national societies had performed. The 
conference was attended by representatives of the Red Cross and those of 16 national 
committees  of national  societies,  6 governments,  2 cavalry orders and 4 individuals 
without mandate.132 Three sub-committees had been formed before the conference to 
study and present proposals on the following topics: a) the extension of the neutrality 
statute to the voluntaries sent by the Red Cross Societies following the armies; b) the 
obligation to send back all the wounded to their respective countries, and not just those 
unfit for military service; and c) the proposal to introduce in the military rules of the 
respective states all  the necessary changes to adapt them to the Geneva Convention 
articles, when ratified by each state. 
The Paris conference, held on the 25 August 1867, was addressed by Moynier, who put 
forward the following proposals: 1) extension of the Convention to war on the sea; 2) 
that  the personal  properties  of those killed  or wounded should not  be touched;  this 
prohibition meant, in effect, that a ‘battlefield police’ should be established by the states 
in conflict; 3) the practice of placing the killed of the enemy in common graves without 
identification should be stopped; a clear sign or a document in the uniform should be 
taken before burial and sent to the civil or military authority of the place where the 
deceased was born; and 4) the obligation of providing a list of the killed, wounded and 
sick to the respective state in conflict should be established.133
As the Paris Conference could not revise the Convention134, a Diplomatic Conference 
was  called  in  October  1867  to  clarify  matters.  The  issues  brought  up  at  the  Paris 
Conference were discussed, such as the neutral status of voluntary workers, which, due 
131 These states were Saxe-Royal, Portugal and Russia.
132 One of whom was Henry Dunant, who resigned as secretary due to his involvement in the bankruptcy 
of the Geneva Credit Bank. 
133 There was also a suggestion at this conference that the ICRC should be transferred to Paris. Moynier 
was against this proposal, and argued that Geneva was a neutral place that could act as an amalgamating 
body for the increased number of national societies.
134 The Convention could only be revised by being ratified by the member states at a diplomatic 
conference. 
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to French opposition, was rejected, as, it was argued, neutral status could only be given 
to those forming part of their own Army Sanitary Service. It was established, however, 
that wounded prisoners, once treated, should be sent back to their country of origin, 
though  officers  would  be  exempt  from  such  treatment,  given  the  strategic  and 
intelligence  risks  involved.  Moreover,  nine  articles  were  written  adapting  the 
Convention  rules  to  the  Navy.  A  further  two  conferences  took  place  during  the 
following years:  in Saint  Petersburg in  October  1868, where,  at  the request  of Tsar 
Alexander  II,  the  use  of  certain  explosive  bullets  was  prohibited,  while  the  II. 
International Conference of the Red Cross, in Berlin in 1869, established an ‘Office for 
Correspondence  and  Information’,  the  forerunner  of  the  ‘Central  Agency  of 
Investigation’. 
2.4 The Franco-Prussian War 1870-1
The Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 was the first major test for the Committee and the 
effectiveness of the Geneva Convention. For the first time all the various aspects of Red 
Cross  organisation  were  in  place:  Prussia  and  France  had  signed  the  Geneva 
Convention; both had their own national Red Cross societies; and they had even notified 
the  Swiss  government  requesting  that  the  additional  articles  of  the  1868  Paris 
Conference  be  accepted,  though  they  had  still  not  become  part  of  the  Convention. 
Moreover,  there were now 23 national  Red Cross societies in neutral  countries who 
were prepared to take part in the relief effort.135 
Despite  these  organisational  advances,  the  reality  of  the  Franco-Prussian  War  relief 
effort  proved to be far  from adequate.  Essentially,  there  were enormous differences 
between the French and Prussian relief  efforts.  Prussia  was well  organized,  and the 
Army Sanitary Services coordinated effectively with the Red Cross Society.136 On the 
contrary,  the French lacked organisation, and there was no coordination between the 
Army and the Red Cross. This resulted in a tragic reality:  on the Prussian side, only 
135 Through extremely hard work, and the personal intervention of Moynier, a Provisional Committee for 
the Aid of the Wounded in the Ottoman Empire was formed in Istanbul, in June 1868. This was the first 
non-Christian state to have a representation in the international movement of the Red Cross. The societies 
that were established soon after in other Muslim countries, such as Iran, chose the Red Crescent logo, and 
thus were called ‘Red Crescent Societies’ though they were considered part of the International Red 
Cross. 
136 The Prussian Red Cross society had 1,956 local committees with 250,000 members scattered around 
the country.
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10% of the wounded treated in hospitals died, while on the French side three times more 
men (318.000) died from inadequate medical treatment than did from enemy fire. As 
Boisier says: 
To cure their wounded and sick, the French Army had a Military Sanitary Corps that 
was similar to the one at Solferino, with the same problems and lack of resources.137
Although the French Red Cross made a great effort to cope with the situation, as did 
private  organisations  and  Red  Cross  societies  from  neutral  countries138,  there  were 
overwhelming problems on the French side, such as the lack of information vis-à-vis the 
rules of the Convention, despite leaflets outlining these rules in French being distributed 
by the Prussians. Perhaps more importantly, both the Prussian and the French Red Cross 
societies were limited to helping their own co-nationals, as the generals of both sides 
had not accepted the idea of volunteers from the opposing side being present behind 
their own lines, and, sadly, ambulances were used to transport arms.
Nevertheless, some progress was made during this war. On 18 July 1870, three days 
after the declaration of war, the ICRC notified the National Red Cross societies that an 
‘Office of Correspondence and Information’ had been established in Bale (Switzerland), 
following  the  agreements  of  the  1869  Berlin  conference.  The  Office  had  a  triple 
purpose: a) to centralise information about war prisoners; b) to publish lists of injured 
soldiers; and c) to allow prisoners of war to be searched. The Bale Office also acted as a 
coordinating  body  between  the  French  and  the  Prussian  Red  Cross  Societies,  and 
informed the neutral Red Cross societies about the needs of the wounded. 
There is little doubt, however, that the reality of war had revealed the limitations of the 
Convention  in  terms  of  concrete  relief  work,  which  undoubtedly  provoked 
disillusionment among members of the organisation. Indeed, the Red Cross movement 
underwent  a  severe crisis  after  the Franco-Prussian War,  revealed  in  the fact  that  a 
meeting  of  the  organisation  did  not  take  place  until  1880,  ten  years  later.  For  the 
limitations and weakness of the movement could be seen clearly when the organisation 
involved itself in a conflict that confronted two leading powers, as in the war of 1870-
71.  Neither  the  ICRC nor  the  national  societies  dared  propose  anything  that  could 
provoke the fracture of the movement born in 1863.
137 Boissier (1963), p. 321.
138 Russia and Switzerland sent military doctors to help both combatants, while Luxembourg, Holland 
and other countries sent doctors, nurses and ambulances.
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Nevertheless, there were other, internal organisational issues involved in the crisis of 
these  years.  Moynier,  amongst  others,  had  toyed  with  the  idea  of  winding  up  the 
activities of the ICRC, once the National Societies were established and working. This 
had been the original mandate of the ICRC, and it had now been fulfilled.139 However, 
the deficiencies encountered during the Franco-Prussian War – particularly those of the 
National  Societies  –  convinced Moynier  that  the ICRC, based in Geneva,  was now 
much more relevant. The ICRC, based in a neutral country like Switzerland, could be an 
active player in the relief field, and able to assume humanitarian actions in a way that 
the National Societies never could. It could also remain neutral in a Europe in shock 
from  the  dramatic  change  in  the  balance  of  power.140 Moreover,  the  international 
organisation could work with national societies to improve their performance, and be a 
crucial coordinating body between them. 
Over the following years, various initiatives were taken vis-à-vis the conventions to be 
followed during war, and in particular the issue of prisoners of war and the ICRC’s role 
in civil conflicts  (i.e. civil war). At the 1st Peace Conference in The Hague in 1889, 
‘dum-dum’  bullets  –  considered  particularly  wounding  and  deforming  –  were 
prohibited141, while the Geneva Conference in 1906 discussed how the handling of the 
wounded and sick could be improved,  and resulted in: 1) More detailed and precise 
terminology than that of the 1864 Geneva Convention; 2) new provisions on the burial 
of the dead and transmission of information; and 3) the voluntary Aid Societies were for 
the first time expressly recognized.  It also changed provisions that had been proven 
impracticable, such as the duty to repatriate the wounded, which was transformed into a 
mere  recommendation  and  the  prerogatives  of  the  inhabitants  bringing  help  to  the 
wounded, which reduced the numbers to reasonable proportions.
The  VII  International  Conference  held  in  London  in  1907  proposed  the  idea  of  a 
prisoners of war statute, and called on the national societies ‘in order that they, forced 
by  the  circumstances,  have  the  obligation  to  assist  (in  accordance  with  the  Hague 
Convention of 1899) prisoners kept in their  territory’.  This was followed by the 2nd 
139 As David P. Forsythe says, “In fact, the Red Cross idea almost perished during the Franco-Prussian 
War”. Forsythe (2005), p. 24.
140 The ignominious defeat of France in the Franco-Prussian War, and the emergence of a united 
Germany under Prussian leadership in 1871, revealed a dramatic change in the power balance in 
continental Europe. 
141 These bullets were called ‘dum-dum’ because the British arsenal of the same name close to Calcutta 
(India) had stored munitions of this type. 
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Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907, a conference proposed by the President of the 
United States, Theodore Roosevelt. At this conference 44 countries signed an agreement 
on how prisoners of war should be treated and banned the use of any sort of reprisal 
against the defeated.
Shortly before the First World War, the IX International Conference in Washington in 
1912 discussed the role the ICRC should play in internal conflicts (i.e. civil wars), but 
agreement could not be reached. The discussion evolved around the question of the role 
of the national societies in these kinds of conflicts, as a strict interpretation only allowed 
for  their  functioning  in  international  conflicts.  The  ICRC  recognized  the  lack  of 
definition of such societies in civil conflicts, but stated that it was clear that there was a 
possibility of intervention, as its statutes referred to helping the ‘injured in campaign’, 
and did not specify if these were ‘military’ or ‘belligerents’ – thus all those injured were 
considered civilians. Although the conference did not obtain a consensus on the matter, 
a resolution was approved which created a body of ‘neutral delegates’ to be credited 
before the governments of countries in conflict.
Indeed, the issue of the ICRC’s role in civil conflicts had surfaced much earlier, when 
the International Committee was first involved in a civil conflict,  the Second Carlist 
War in Spain, 1872-6. Something similar to the Red Cross had existed in Spain since 
the early 19th century. After the uprising against the Napoleonic invasion on May 2nd 
1808, a  ‘Society of the Holy Cross and the 2nd of  May’  was established,  under the 
patronage of the order of St. John of Jerusalem and with the humanitarian values of the 
Catholic Church. Spain had sent two delegates to the 1863 Geneva Conference142, and 
had signed and ratified the 1st Geneva Convention in 1864, and a Spanish society had 
been established, the ‘National Committee for Aid to the Military Wounded’, organized 
with the help of the order of St. John of Jerusalem. The Society had been declared a 
Public  Utility,  and  in  1870  the  Society,  now  called  the  Red  Cross,  delivered 
humanitarian  aid  during  the  Franco-Prussian  War  of  1870-1  (its  first  foreign 
intervention) and then intervened directly during the Second Carlist War of 1872-6. 
Although  the  ICRC had  not  officially  contacted  the  Spanish  Red  Cross  during  the 
Second Carlist  War – believing  that  the ICRC’s  role  was  restricted  to  international 
conflicts – Gustave Moynier knew its president, Dr Landa, and through him the ICRC 
142 Dr Nicasio Landa, Commander of the Army Sanitary Corps, and Joaquín Agulló, Count of Ripalda. 
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made contact with the Carlist Pretender, Carlos of Bourbon. After negotiations, it was 
agreed  by  the  generals  of  both  sides  that  they  would  not  execute  prisoners  or  the 
wounded. But what right had the ICRC to contact a party – the Carlists – that was not a 
registered  state  or  territorial  entity?  As  a  result  of  the  ICRC’s  intervention  in  this 
conflict,  the  Committee  produced  a  conclusion  on  this  issue  that  would  have  great 
importance for the future, when it stated:
Any power that offers in its military organisation enough warranties of order, has the 
right to be considered in war as a state.143
It was this stance, when Civil War erupted in Spain more than sixty years later, in 1936, 
which allowed the ICRC to communicate and negotiate with Franco, given that at that 
time there were still not any clear legal grounds to regulate civil conflicts. 
The question of the treatment of prisoners of war was also discussed at the Washington 
Conference of 1912. Following the wish expressed at the London Conference of 1907, 
the  conference  expressed  the  view  that  the  National  Red  Cross  Societies  should 
organise, in peace time, special commissions who would be in charge, during wartime, 
of collecting and conveying to the ICRC the aid received for military prisoners, and the 
ICRC, through its neutral delegates – created at this conference – would control and 
ensure the distribution of such aid sent to individual military prisoners. Aid that was not 
individually  designated  would  be  distributed  to  the  rest  of  the  prisoners,  while  the 
national societies would assume the costs incurred by the ICRC and the work of its 
neutral delegates.  Such wishes expressed by the Conference, though not ratified by a 
Convention, clarified the position of the ICRC and opened the pathway for the active 
presence of the ICRC in future conflicts. This was put to the test during the First World 
War,  when  there  was  intense  intervention  in  favour  of  prisoners  of  war  from  all 
countries involved.
2.5 The Red Cross facing a world conflict in the 1914-1918 war: a major 
test
Despite  Moynier’s  belief  in an active future for the ICRC after  the Franco-Prussian 
War, the organisation played little part in the conflicts of the late 19th century. It played 
a minor role in the Balkans, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and the Boer War. During 
143 Moreillon (1973), pp. 26-27.
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the Spanish colonial wars of the late 19th century, the ICRC played a conservative role, 
denying the Spanish request to help negotiate the release of Spanish soldiers captured 
by Philippine insurgents, arguing that this request fell outside its mandate.144
In effect, the ICRC considered itself an organisation with a moral influence that could 
be exercised over states and national societies, in order that the latter intervened in the 
humanitarian relief of the victims of war.  The ICRC influenced others to act and gave 
financial help to other bodies, but the organisation itself did not intervene directly. The 
structure of the organisation reflected this, as on the eve of the world conflagration, in 
August 1914, the ICRC had no administrative staff.145
The First World War (1914-1918), however, dramatically changed the ICRC’s role, and 
the organisation was forced – due to the scale of human suffering involved – to become 
a more active protagonist in the relief field. The National Societies of the Red Cross of 
the countries affected by the conflict carried out medical aid to the wounded, while the 
ICRC became increasingly associated with prisoners of war, in particular the issue of 
prisoners’  human  rights.  A new body,  The  International  Prisoners  of  War  Agency, 
created on 14 August 1914 and headed by the General-Secretary of the ICRC, Paul Des 
Gouttes,  became the  centre  of  this  activity,  and  evolved  into  a  large  administrative 
operation,  employing  30  volunteers.  The  Prisoners  of  War  Agency  collected 
information  about  the  numbers  of  prisoners  and their  situation,  often  visiting  them, 
informing them and exchanging them when possible, while simultaneously providing 
aid and other measures of relief.146
The Prisoners of War Agency of the ICRC coordinated its activities with the Vatican, 
which, in 1915, had created a Special Service of Research for missing persons. Pope 
Benedict  XV,  who,  a  few years  later  would  meet  the  Save  The  Children  founder, 
Eglantyne  Jebb,  had met  the ICRC president,  Gustave Ador,  on a visit  to Rome in 
January 1916, and from then on an effective coordination of research and information 
regarding prisoners and the civilian populations  of countries in conflict  ensued. The 
Prisoners of War Agency ceased its activities on 31 December 1919, and the ICRC now 
144 Pitteloud (Ed.) (1999), pp. 609-10.
145 Durand, A. (2002), p. 35.
146 To give some idea of the enormous amount of work performed by the Prisoners Agency, a 
questionnaire sent to prisoners in July 1916 – asking for information regarding the disappeared, dead or 
wounded in their units – yielded replies which, solely from the French prisoners, covered 228 books of 
400 pages, including 90,000 pieces of information absent from the official lists. 
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directed its attention to the repatriation and relief of civil populations and the medical 
missions. The issue of prisoners of war continued to be an enormous problem, however, 
as there was a total  of 2,500,000 prisoners (1,500,000 from the Central  Powers and 
1,000,000 from Russia) at the end of the war. The ICRC thus set up a new body in 
1920,  the  Research  Service,  whose  mission  was  to  search  for  missing  persons  and 
provide documentation for ex-prisoners, while trying to help their families survive the 
dreadful conditions reigning in post-war Europe.
Apart from its relief activities, the ICRC played an important role as guardian of the 
Geneva Convention agreements, and vetted their fulfilment by the signatory countries 
involved. To this end, the ICRC kept in contact with the 38 National Societies in service 
during the war, and made continuous efforts to prohibit chemical warfare. Certainly, the 
profile of the ICRC and the National Red Cross Societies had been greatly enhanced 
during World War I, as Geoffrey Best confirms: 
The fundamental principles of protecting the sick and wounded, and of treating 
prisoners decently, survived the war intact, strengthened, indeed, by so many millions 
of people becoming acquainted, in the course of so prolonged a war, with the work of 
the ambulances and hospitals on the one hand, and the predicaments of the POW’S and 
their families on the other. The ICRC and the National Red Cross societies came out of 
the war raised in reputation and regard.147
The work of the ICRC – principally its efforts in helping detainees – was recognized in 
1917, when the ICRC was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.148 
2.6 The aftermath of the First World War 
After  the  Armistice  was  signed in  1918,  the  main  challenge  for  the  ICRC was  the 
repatriation  of  the  displaced,  the  continuing  work  with  ex-prisoners149,  and  the 
humanitarian  crisis  produced by the  Russian  revolution  of  1917 and the  Hungarian 
revolution  of 1919.  The first  intervention  in  aid  of political  prisoners took place  in 
147 Best, G. (1983), p. 52.
148 The work with detainees had been carried out by 41 delegates through 524 visits, a figure that merits 
attention when considering that 17 delegates and 5 deputy delegates served the ICRC during the Spanish 
Civil War. Knitel (1967), p. 43. See Chapter 3, above. 
149 Part of this work was to provide ad-hoc documentation for ex-prisoners to enable them to exercise 
their national rights, a task provided by the ICRC during the Spanish Civil War for both sides, as we shall 
see. 
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Russia in 1918 and in Hungary in 1919, while the insurrection in Herzegovina in 1918 
and the internal problems in Montenegro in 1919 led to the creation of the first missions 
in aid of the victims of internal conflicts. Edouard Frick, the delegate before the Soviet 
authorities150 after establishing the new Red Cross, brought up the matter of political 
prisoners, and alluded to the right to intervene in internal problems or conflicts.151
Further  definition  of  the  role  of  the  ICRC  in  civil  conflicts  took  place  at  its  X. 
Conference, held in Geneva in August 1921. Resolution 14, which was approved, stated 
that the Red Cross is above political and social opinions, religion, races, classes and 
nations, and that all victims of civil wars and social and revolutionary clashes have the 
right to be attended to. ‘Ius gentium’152 cannot be violated, and reprisals and the taking 
of hostages of family members is outlawed. Although in principle the National Societies 
were to be in charge of performing and monitoring compliance with this  resolution, 
given the peculiar nature of internal conflicts, which could hinder the work of these 
societies, it was agreed that the mandate of intervention in relief work be entrusted to 
the ICRC. The XV. ICRC Conference, held in Tokyo in 1934, also dealt with the issue 
of civil conflict, and authorized the ICRC to:
Deploy in favour of civil victims the same activities due to be performed as to the 
military prisoners153
However,  this  formulation  was  somewhat  vague  and  never  specified  what  these 
activities  consisted  of,  because  the  Diplomatic  Conference  which  was  supposed  to 
redefine them never took place. Therefore, on the eve of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, 
while there had been ample discussion and agreement about the role of the ICRC in 
civil conflicts, the lack of precision and diplomatic assent of these agreements meant 
that, in practice, the ICRC, and the National Societies, acted, on the whole, in an ad hoc 
manner, in an attempt to bring humanitarian relief to all those involved.
150 Frick acted as the head of the Relief Mission, formed in December 1918, in favour of Russian 
prisoners.
151 The ‘old’ Red Cross had been dissolved by the Soviet authorities and Frick had been entrusted with 
establishing a new one. In alluding to the question of intervention in internal conflicts, he referred to the 
discussion at the X. Conference, although this was not expressed in any convention. 
152 The Right of the People, understood as Human Rights.
153 ICRCA, art. 25. Draft International Convention (Tokyo 1934). 
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2.7 The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on the eve of 
the Spanish Civil War
The ICRC was, and still is, a private organisation based on Swiss law, with Protestant 
roots,  but  based  on a  liberal  and  philanthropic  ethos.  The  central  office  during  the 
Spanish Civil War was Villa Moinier in Geneva, and its President Max Huber, Doctor 
in  Law.  All  its  members  were  Swiss  and  linked  to  families  that  had  traditionally 
contributed members to the Committee. Originally Committee members had come from 
the Swiss French Cantons (although Max Huber was from Zurich), but over time the 
Committee had evolved to embrace a much wider representation of Swiss territory. The 
majority (90%) of the 114 members  in 1931 were university graduates  from liberal 
professions154 and mainly Protestant.  155 In 1933 the budget of the ICRC was 150,000 
Swiss francs, and had a staff of twelve. It was financed by the national societies, the 
recently created ICRC Foundation and income from its various investments. 
2.8 The ICRC and the neutral delegates
The image of the ICRC, in the field of action, was created by its ‘neutral delegates’, 
those directly nominated by the Committee for relief action. Those designated as neutral 
delegates  were  normally  well  known to  the  Committee,  or  indeed  members  of  the 
Committee itself, and many held, at the same time, important diplomatic or government 
posts.  For example,  Edouard Odier,  Vice-President  of the ICRC (1917-32),  was the 
Swiss  Ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg  under  the  Tsarist  government,  and  Voldemar 
Wherlin, ICRC delegate to Moscow until 1938 (heading the so-called Wherlin Mission 
of the ICRC in the Soviet Union between 1920-38, designed to help the 8,000 or so 
Swiss nationals living in the Soviet Union), had represented the Nansen Committee of 
the League of Nations.156
Although the greater involvement of the ICRC in conflicts from the First World War 
required an increase in the number of delegates, the selection of delegates continued to 
be based on personal contacts and known ability. The delegate Marcel Junod (medical 
154 Fiscalini (1985), pp. 62-63.
155 The first Catholic member, Guiseppe Motta, was designated in 1923, and Cornelio Sommaruga, also a 
Catholic, was President from 1987 till 1999.
156 The High Commission for Refugees established on June 27, 1921, by the League of Nations under the 
direction of the Famous Norwegian Explorer Fridtjof Nansen (who had been heavily involved in the relief 
to Russian refugees from the civil war in the Soviet Union). 
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doctor,  1904-1961),  contacted  in  October  1935  to  cover  a  post  in  Ethiopia,  where 
conflict had erupted after the Italian invasion in 1935, had been appointed through a 
friend who had been part of Junod’s Movement of Help to Russian Children in 1927. 
Junod  visited  the  zone  when  under  the  control  of  Haile  Selassie,  the  Abyssinian 
emperor, before the country was totally controlled by the Italians. The ICRC did not 
have an authorized presence in the territory, and therefore he was back in Geneva by 
July 1936, where he received the Spanish assignment.
The Swiss Army was another  source of recruitment  for the neutral  delegates  of the 
ICRC. The delegate, Raymond Courvoisier, a member of the Swiss Army, was told by 
his colonel that his mission in Spain ‘would be accounted for in his career’, proof, it 
would seem, of the strong connections between the Swiss Army and the ICRC. The 
delegates  were francophone,  mainly bachelors  and members  of  the military sanitary 
corps.  The recruitment  was  temporary,  for a  month,  but  that  could be extended for 
successive months until one of the parties demanded the termination of the contract.157 
The ethos of the ICRC, and the desired attitude of its neutral delegates, can be seen in 
these quotations from ICRC delegates’ instructor Sydney Brown in 1936:
When you are on the spot, thousands of kilometers away from Geneva, you have to lean 
mainly on your imagination. There are the texts of the Red Cross, but above all there is 
its spirit.158 
And Marcel Junod speaking about the guiding principles of the philosophy of the ICRC, 
which should inform the work of the delegates:
The ICRC delegate shall work with an absolute detachment from his own interests, and 
must be resolved not to serve either directly or indirectly one interest against another 
interest. A delegate must only attest, and then to act as he can and as best he can. He has 
no other mission than to prevent and alleviate the sufferings of the victims, military as 
well as civilian.159
157 See attached as Document J the model Agreement used for the enrolment of Delegates. 
158 As a retired delegate, Hugo Slim, referred to in November 2005, when he presented his paper, ‘The 
Influence of Geneva. Eleven Genevan ideas on the world today’, given to the Comité Romand de la 
Association des Anciens Délégués du ICRC (AAD) (ICRC – Geneva, 2005). He referred to ‘pragmatism’ 
as one of the virtues of the delegate, expressed by instructor Brown. 
159 Junod (1963), pp. 82-3.
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3. Service Civil International (SCI)
Pierre Ceresole, the man who conceived of SCI, was born in Lausanne, in the Swiss 
canton of Vaud, in August 1879. Ceresole was from a well-off political family160 and 
well-educated, having obtained a degree in engineering and a PhD. A rather dreamy and 
mystical youth161. Ceresole, after training in mathematics and physics in Göttingen and 
Munich, left Europe for the United States in 1908. There, teaching French Literature in 
the Hawaiian Islands, he discovered the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson, leader of the 
19th century Transcendentalist movement.162 In Emerson Ceresole believed he had found 
a kindred spirit, a rebel with a deep respect for Nature, including human nature, which 
undoubtedly influenced Ceresole’s ideas of promoting world peace. He also fashioned 
himself on Emerson, as both intellectual and man of action, and Ceresole believed that 
the abolition of war was the next step to ending slavery and experimenting with new 
ways of living, through a Christian revolution, which would lead to ‘The Confederation 
of the Peoples of the World’.163
Over  the  following  years,  working  as  an  engineer,  first  in  Japan  and  later  in 
Switzerland, Ceresole put his ideas into action. During the First World War, in 1915, 
Ceresole refused military service and was sent to prison. This was the beginning of his 
campaigns against  military service and refusal to pay military tax that Ceresole was 
involved in throughout his life, and saw him in and out of prison until his death in 1945. 
Throughout the First World War Ceresole lectured against war, and in 1918, evidently 
influenced by William James and his notion of a ‘moral substitute for war’ and ‘peace 
armies’164, Ceresole presented his idea of the civil service for peace thus: 
There are two ways of organizing a Civil Service; 1) it could be organized on a purely 
160 His father, a judge, had been a colonel in the Swiss Army and President of the Swiss Confederation in 
1873. The Swiss President is elected yearly by Parliamentarians of the Confederation.
161 Seventeen-year old Ceresole was said to have had a ‘mystical’ experience while walking in the Swiss 
forest of Gantenaz.
162 Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1883) was a poet, essayist and philosopher, and considered an excellent 
orator. Emerson was leader of the Transcendentalist movement, whose ideal spiritual state is one that 
“transcends” the physical and empirical. This can only be realized through the individual’s intuition, and 
not through the doctrines of established religion. In 1836 he wrote the essay ‘Nature’, which presented his 
approach to life. 
163 Anet (1974), p. 42.
164 William James (1842-1910), psychologist and philosopher, wrote significant works on religion and 
mysticism. Ceresole had studied the series of lectures that James had given in Edinburgh in 1902, on 
‘Varieties of Religious Experiences’, including mystical experiences, and in the same year James had put 
forward his idea of a ‘moral substitute for war’, where he invited young students to form peacetime 
armies to help enemies or neighbours in times of trouble. James (2002), p. 328.
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national basis by making it a special branch of national service in which men, satisfying 
certain conditions, could enroll in a service independent of the army, or 2) another 
solution would seem more desirable, that is that the department responsible for 
organizing the service should be considered an international institution, which forms the 
real, concrete core of that universal homeland to whose creation we look forward to.165
In 1918, Ceresole went to Bilthoven, Holland, to attend a meeting of the Fellowship of 
Reconciliation, a movement of Christian Pacifists formed in England during World War 
I. The meeting was attended by Protestants, Catholics, Orthodox Catholics, Quakers and 
Freethinkers, and deeply impressed Ceresole.166 There, he glimpsed the possibility of a 
Civilian Service for Peace, a constructive alternative for those who opposed war. His 
meeting with Quakers was of considerable importance, though he wished to extend the 
Quakers’ wartime relief missions to armies of men and women on a permanent footing, 
who would be from all countries, races and religions, but united by the idea of helping 
others. 
The  idea  of  the  civil  service  for  peace  finally  materialized  in  1920,  in  Esnes,  near 
Verdun  in  France.  Under  the  direction  of  Ceresole,  a  small  group  of  Germans, 
Austrians,  Hungarians,  Dutch,  Swiss  and  Americans  –  all  of  them  pacifists  and 
conscientious objectors – worked for five months repairing the war damage wrought on 
this  small  French village.  The  first  project  at  Esnes  was funded by Maria  Van der 
Linden167 who donated her small fortune and later became fully dedicated to the cause. 
She was to be the first ‘sister’, the cook and nurse for the small group. The project also 
had some support from the French Government.168
In June 1921, Ceresole, in a circular addressed to recruit volunteers, set up a Civilian 
Service  without  official  support,  having  been  refused  official  status  by  the  Swiss 
government.  At the end of 1921 a  Committee  was formed,  and Pierre  recruited  his 
brother,  Ernest,  a Swiss Army colonel,  to  the project.  Over the following years  the 
Service acted in France repairing war damage, in Switzerland in reconstruction work 
after serious avalanches and floods in 1922, and in flood-ravaged Liechtenstein in 1928, 
165 Anet (1974), p. 24.
166 Ceresole was greatly heartened by a speech by a German man, who wanted to go to France and help 
repair the devastation caused by German soldiers during the First World War: “We have been discussing 
for two days. That’s enough. My brother was a German soldier. He fought in France. He did his part in 
ruining that country. I want to do my part in restoring it. To reconstruct.” Ibid, p. 62. 
167 Dutch member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation.
168 Ibid, p. 65.
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where  around  700  volunteers  from  10  countries  and  from  more  than  50  different 
professions worked for six months. 
Throughout the 1920s, Ceresole and the Civilian Service carried out relief  efforts in 
Switzerland and France, often being involved in large-scale projects involving hundreds 
of volunteers.169 During the depression of the 1930s, the idea of work camps became 
very  popular  in  England,  which  introduced  the  idea  of  volunteers  dedicating  their 
holidays to this service, and thus the composition and the duration of the Camps became 
more varied. The principle of unspecialized labour in the camps was maintained, with 
the majority of the volunteers being Sixth-Formers or university students, while a small 
number were somewhat older. Wales was the scene of many camps during this period, 
where volunteers tried to increase the food supply for unemployed miners through the 
creation of garden projects. Refugees and displaced persons from Central Europe after 
World War I and during the interwar period were also integrated into the camps. 
In 1934, SCI embarked on its most ambitious project hitherto and extended its activity 
to  Bihar  in  Northern  India,  where  an  earthquake  had destroyed  many villages.  The 
earthquake had been accompanied by floods of unprecedented severity, which had led 
to the displacement of villages to other locations while dikes were being constructed. 
And it  was here,  where Pierre Ceresole  had travelled  personally in 1934 and 1935, 
while SCI was still engaged in the Bihar project, that news arrived, in July 1936, of the 
military uprising in Spain. 
4. Save the Children
4.1 The Save the Children Fund and its founder, Eglantyne Jebb
Francesca  Wilson,  Jebb’s  biographer,  called  her  ‘the  rebel  daughter  of  a  country 
house’170, while her colleagues at the Fund nicknamed her the ‘White Flame’, due to her 
pale complexion and frail appearance, the result of a thyroid disease which affected her 
all of her life. Eglantyne Jebb, was, indeed, born in a country mansion on 25 August 
169 Such as the landslide that crushed the Swiss village of Someo in September 1925, where, for 57 days, 
310 men took part in the relief operation organized by SCI, the heavy floods that affected Aquitaine in 
France in 1929, where 250 volunteers laboured throughout the summer, and the relief effort in Aargau in 
Switzerland, where storms had destroyed orchards. 276 volunteers were recruited for relief work there. 
Ibid, p. 81.
170 Wilson (1967). 
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1876 in Lyth, Ellesmire, Shropshire, educated at Oxford and profoundly religious. As 
Francesca Wilson says, “like Florence Nightingale, Eglantyne was tormented by a sense 
of mission and a feeling of guilt until she had found what her mission was”.171 
Working first as a teacher on graduation, then for the ‘Charity Organisation Society’, 
Eglantyne  became increasingly aware of the poverty and appalling social  conditions 
then prevalent in large parts of the country.172 Her baptism of fire, however, occurred in 
1913, when working for the Macedonian Relief Fund (MRF) in the Balkans.173 In 1912, 
a ‘Balkan League’ of Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece and Montenegro was able to defeat the 
Turks and free Macedonia. When Eglantyne arrived in Macedonia in March 1913, the 
war was over, but the refugees from the war, both victors and vanquished, numbered 
some 10,000.174 The MRF was feeding and taking care of some 6,000 of them. This 
experience left a lasting impression on Eglantyne, as Francesca Wilson says: 
In Skopje, Eglantyne saw for the first time the plight of refugees, who were then a rare 
phenomenon, far from what they were, alas, soon to become. She visited the rooms, 
crowded with two or three families, where grown-ups had to take turns to sleep; and 
watched shivering children waiting for the soup or bread the MRF doled out to them. 
This made a great impression on her. Without these experiences, she would not perhaps 
have been to determined to ‘save the children’ later on.175 
During the First World War, Eglantyne was involved – together with her sister Dorothy 
– in  attempting  to  counteract  the one-sided propaganda written  in  the British press. 
They  imported  newspapers  from Germany,  Hungary  and  Austria,  and  their  articles 
included such subjects as the aims and causes of the war, peace discussions, reprisals, 
treatment of prisoners, atrocities, the idea of the League of Nations, and the impact of 
the  war  on  the  conditions  of  life  in  the  affected  countries.  Published  in  the  highly 
prestigious  university  weekly,  ‘Cambridge  Magazine’,  these  articles  especially 
highlighted  the  social  conditions  in  the  countries  affected,  particularly  the  case  of 
171 Ibid, p. 9.
172 Eglantyne taught at a primary school in Marlborough, where many pupils were from poor families. 
The Charity Organisation Society, based in Cambridge, was an organisation that coordinated the efforts 
of various charities, and its approach was considered more ‘scientific’, as it focused on real needs and 
dispensed with indiscriminate giving. Her research on social conditions in Cambridge, ‘Cambridge, a 
study in Social Questions’, was published in 1866.
173 The MRF had been set up by Noel Buxton, the brother of her brother-in-law, Charlie. 
174 In June, 1913, the Balkan Wars recommenced, but Eglantyne was back in England, poor health having 
prevented her from returning to the area.
175 Wilson (1967), p. 141.
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German and Austrian women and children,  who were suffering fatalities  due to  the 
Allied blockade in 1917, with only turnips and cabbage to eat and without milk to nurse 
their children. 
The peace resulting from the armistice of 11 November 1918 did not bring an end to the 
starvation, as the blockade against enemy countries remained in force. If the war had 
killed  millions  of  men,  its  economic  aftermath  was  killing  women  and  children. 
Therefore, both sisters and a group of friends founded a pressure group, the ‘Fight the 
Famine Council’,  with Lord  Parmoor176 as  Chairman.  The objective was to obtain a 
cessation of the blockade and to raise a large international loan to revamp Europe’s 
ailing  economy.  The  Council  was  an  instant  success,  and  received  the  support  of 
politicians,  writers,  academics  and  bishops.  However,  it  did  not  achieve  its  main 
objectives, as the victorious powers continued the blockade, and a large loan proposed 
to revamp the dying Europe’s economies, could not be raised. 
4.2 The founding of the Save the Children Fund
Given the lack of support encountered in the ‘Fight the Famine Council’, Dorothy and 
Eglantyne proposed that the council shift its emphasis to organizing relief exclusively 
for children, and thus, on 15 April 1919, the Council set up the Save the Children Fund. 
Launched at  the Royal  Albert  Hall  on 19 May 1919, it  proved to be an unforeseen 
success. The donations that immediately poured into the SCF were mostly small sums, 
but the contribution from the Miners Trade Union – represented at the Albert Hall by its 
President,  Robert  Smillip – was 10,000 pounds, collected by the miners themselves. 
That sum was to increase to 35,000 pounds shortly after, due to new appeals to the 
miners. 
During  these early  years,  the  SCF functioned  as  a  Fund.  The  SCF worked through 
existing organisations, such as the Quakers and the Vienna Relief Fund, which carried 
out  the actual  work of feeding  the starving children of  Europe.  More than  150,000 
pounds were spent daily in feeding 30,000 Austrian children over six years old, while 
milk  was  provided  for  infants  and  food  for  expectant  mothers.  Given  the  lack  of 
equipment and drugs in Austrian hospitals, the SCF contributed towards these expenses 
176 Charles Alfred Cripps, 1st Baron of Parmoor (1852-1941), British politician (former Conservative 
who later joined Labour), was a strong supporter of the League of Nations and Church of England causes.
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too. The SCF also provided relief, through grants, to at least 40 organisations working 
in Armenia, Czechoslovakia and the Baltic states. These operations were overseen by 
SCF doctors177, who were sent to the places to which relief was donated. 
Therefore, the SCF worked effectively through other selected agencies, which meant 
that  the Fund did not have to dramatically increase the number of its  employees  or 
volunteers. It could thus focus almost exclusively on collecting funds for children in 
need. It was, indeed, extremely successful in this endeavour, as Edward Fuller attests, 
when he called the SCF a ‘Brobdingnagian collecting bag’.178 As we shall  see,  this 
method employed by the SCF in its relief work was still in force during the first stages 
of the Spanish Civil  War, from 1936 to 1937 when it  worked with British Quakers, 
providing funds through their  joint  appeals.  These funds were administered  through 
Quaker personnel and supervised by volunteers sent by the SCF. 
4.3 Save the Children, the Vatican connection and the Union
Despite  the  success  of  the  SCF  in  collecting  funds,  the  needs  were  so  great  that 
Eglantyne, an extremely religious person, believed that the Church should be involved. 
Having been turned down by the Archbishop of Canterbury, who refused to make an 
appeal on behalf  of the SCF to the Church of England, Eglantyne  approached Pope 
Benedict XV.179 The Pope’s response was positive, and he issued an Encyclical asking 
all Catholic Churches throughout the world to collect money for the distressed children 
of Europe on Holy Innocents Day (28 December 1919). Given this lead by the Pope, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury made a similar appeal to the Anglican Church. 
Eglantyne  was  granted  an  audience  with  the  Pope,  which  was  a  great  success.180 
Eglantyne deeply impressed the Pope, who donated £25,000 to the SCF and promised a 
new appeal through a Second Encyclical in 1920, an appeal that would be made directly 
on behalf  of the SCF.181 It  was suggested that the Pope nominate a Catholic for the 
executive  of  the  SCF,  as  Catholics  were  under-represented  in  the  Fund.  The  Pope 
177 Some of these doctors were volunteers and some were under contract to the SCF.
178 Fuller (1951), p. 32. Brobdingnagian, an inhabitant of Brobdingnag in Gulliver’s Travels, where 
everything was gigantic. 
179 This request to the Pope was signed by 14 eminent people.
180 The audience, planned for twenty minutes, lasted over two and a half hours. 
181 Eglantyne was surprised that the Pope should entrust such large sums of money to a Protestant 
organisation, especially one that had little Catholic representation on its executive.
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nominated  William Andrew Mackenzie, a former doctor who worked for the Catholic 
publishers Burns and Oats.182
The worldwide appeal by the Catholic Church made possible the next step in the history 
of the SCF – the formation of an international body in Geneva to administer the Pope’s 
projected fund. The ‘Save the Children Fund International Union’ (SCIU) was formed 
at a Constitutive Assembly in Geneva, held on the 6th and 8th of January, 1920, in the 
same hall where Henri Dunant witnessed the birth of the International Red Cross more 
than fifty years earlier. It was founded by the London Save the Children Fund and the 
‘Comité International de Secours aux Enfants’ of Berne (Switzerland) and under the 
patronage of the International  Committee  of the Red Cross.  Leading members  were 
from the  British  Save  the  Children  Fund  and  the  Swedish  Rada  Barnen  (Save  the 
Children), various national organisations of the SCF and the Red Cross, which was an 
extremely important supporter of the Union.183
Unfortunately, because of illness, Eglantyne was unable to attend the first Conference 
of the International Union, held in Geneva in February 1920. It was, however, a great 
success, where representatives from both camps in the First World War were present. 
As the British Quaker, Edith Pye, said of this event:
All the different countries and all the different faiths seemed really to coalesce. It was 
delightful to see the Bishop of Exeter talking to a German YMCA man, etc. etc. One 
felt that the narrow national wall really had fallen at the sound of the trumpet you have 
blown.184
Eglantyne’s dream of the unity of mankind, where all the religions of the world worked 
together, seemed to have become a reality.
182 Mackenzie left his job at Burns and Oates to work for the Fund. 
183 The Constituent Assembly emerged from a ‘Comité d’Iniciative’, formed in Geneva in November 
1919, on which Eglantyne and C.R. Bruxton represented the London SCF; M. Golden, who would later 
be a director of the SCF, but then represented the Anglo-Czech Relief Fund; Dr Mauro, for the 
Internationale Spitals Hilfsaktion in Vienna; Lt. Col. Frederic Frey, Oscar Bosshardt and A. Erb, 
members of the Comité International de Secours; Frederic Ferriere and Etienne Clouzot of the 
International Committee of the Red Cross; and George Werner of the Geneva Benevolent Central Office. 
184 The Quaker Edith Pye was awarded the French Légion d’Honneur for her work at the maternity home 
at Chalons during the First World War. In 1920 she was working with the Friends in Austria. Wilson 
(1967), p. 181.
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4.4 The refugees
Child refugees were undoubtedly one of the largest groups of children helped by the 
SCF at this time, and the countries bordering the Soviet Union the main field of its 
activity, as thousands fled from the revolution. Greece was one of the major recipients 
of refugees, also the result of the Agreement on the Exchange of Population.185 Greece 
received  around  1.5  million  refugees,  some  of  Greek  origin  and  some  from other 
nationalities. More than 1,000 children were fed by the SCF in Athens, where the SCF 
set up an eye clinic, as eye diseases were common there at the time. The sight of many 
children was saved  by  such  a  clinic.  Hospitals  also  treated  children  affected  by 
epidemics, such as malaria. Bulgaria and Albania also received the help of the SCF, and 
model villages were established for refugees, in collaboration with their governments.186
By the middle of 1921, the SCF had collected more than a million pounds in Britain, 
and by then conditions had improved in Central Europe and Germany, where President 
Hoover’s project of serving a ‘meal a day’ to school children had been a great success 
and had almost eliminated famine.187 However, famine again stalked Central Europe in 
August 1921, with a horrendous famine in the Soviet Union. The League of Nations 
assigned relief work in the Russian Saratov district to the SCF where, for the first time, 
the SCF sent out its own workers to supervise their soup and milk kitchens there.
The Fund had, hitherto, always worked through other agencies, to whom it gave grants 
for relief work. Now, however, with its new position of financial stability, the Fund was 
able to send out its own teams who acted as agents to administer relief on behalf of the 
14 member nations of the International Save the Children Union. The relief operation, 
under the auspices of the SCF, worked well,  and more than 157 million meals were 
served to 300,000 children,  demonstrating the efficacy of the slogan ‘One shilling a 
week’ to feed a child. The SCF also acted as agents for the Russian Famine Relief Fund, 
administered by Nansen, through which it donated some 250 million adult rations to the 
needy. Despite the evident success of the Fund’s relief operation in the Soviet Union, 
185 By a Convention signed in Geneva (Switzerland) on 30 January 1923 between Turkey and Greece, it 
was agreed that, as from 1 May 1923, there would be a compulsory displacement of all Turkish nationals 
of the Greek Orthodox Church living in Turkey back to Greece, while all Greek nationals of Moslem faith 
living in Greece would be sent back to Turkey.
186 In 1921 the SCF also obtained the running of the Anglo-Yugoslav Children’s Hospital in Belgrade, 
which was extended to include a sanatorium in 1934.
187 This project was promoted and funded in part by the American Government and was run by the AFSC, 
the American Quaker organisation. 
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there  were,  nevertheless,  criticisms  from  those  who  opposed  the  Fund’s  charitable 
activities in a communist country. Throughout the relief operation, from 1921 to 1923, 
the Jebb sisters tried to counteract these detractions by launching press campaigns and 
showing  films  that  revealed  the  extreme  need  in  Soviet  Russia,  and  which  also 
demonstrated the positive effect of the relief work. Eglantyne certainly seemed proud of 
the Fund’s efforts in this operation, as she said:
In the famine relief in Russia we succeeded in attaining a degree of international co-
operation which had never been approached before.188
Undoubtedly the Fund’s efficient  way of organizing underlay the success of famine 
relief in Soviet Russia. Eglantyne administered the work of the SCF in London in a 
professional manner, and believed that voluntary organisations should employ methods 
at  least  as  efficient  as  their  commercial  counterparts,  and  should  be  governed  by 
‘scientific’  practices.189 In  early  1920 she  hired  a  manager,  Lewis  Golden,  who 
employed  managerial  principles  and  controls,  and  a  publicity  officer  –  a  former 
newspaper journalist – to increase Fund collections, which certainly bore fruit: in two 
years, by 1922, over a million pounds had been collected and the SCF acquired national 
and international status. 
4.5 International law for children
Between 1921 and 1923, Eglantyne and the SCF had focused mainly on the plight of 
children in the defeated countries after World War I. Nevertheless, it had always been 
the aim of the SCF and its supporters to establish a permanent body that could engage in 
on-going welfare work and to extend their activities beyond emergency situations, such 
as earthquakes, floods and other natural disasters, and, of course, the impact of wars on 
populations.  They wished to  set  up  children’s  hospitals,  welfare  centres  and young 
people’s workshops, even in the more developed countries of the West. 
Eglantyne  realized  that  to  continue,  permanently,  to  obtain  support  for  the  world’s 
children,  and  not  only  in  times  of  disaster,  would  require  an  international,  legal 
recognition  of  the  rights  of  the  child.  She  therefore  drafted  the  ‘Declaration  of  the 
Rights of the Child’ in 1923, which was published in the SCF magazine, ‘The World’s 
188 Freeman (1965), p. 7
189 Ibid, p.121
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Children’. This declaration was adopted by the International Union immediately and 
approved by the League of Nations in 1924. From then on, the work of the SCF was 
much more oriented towards training its staff and carrying out research into the best 
ways  of  helping  children.  It  also  promoted  the  ‘First  International  Congress  on 
Children’s  Welfare’  in  1925.  It  campaigned  for  free  school  meals  in  Britain  and 
established a school for poor children. 
By the end of 1928, Save the Children had collected more than 4 million pounds, and 
began considering extending its work to Asia and Africa. Eglantyne,  who wanted to 
hold  an  international  conference  that  would  decide  how  best  to  proceed  with  this 
project, died on 17 December 1928, without having seen this venture take off. Indeed, 
although the  SCF and the  ISCU organized  a  conference  in  Geneva to  consider  the 
condition of children in Africa – and the SCF established a Child Protection Committee 
that promoted the recognition and respect of the rights of children throughout Asia and 
Africa in the 1930s – it was only in the 1950s that the SCF could dedicate a substantial 
proportion of its funds to projects outside Europe.190
4.6 The home front
Although, from 1920 on, the SCF was engaged in relief work abroad, the SCF was also 
very active in Britain during these years, essentially providing welfare services to those 
in need.191 As in other countries, the SCF worked through other organisations, either by 
donating needed material or by supplying financial aid. From 1920 to 1926, the Fund 
helped infant welfare clinics and St. Pancras Borough Council, gave donations to the 
Salvation  Army,  the  Church  Army,  the  Invalid  Children  Aid  Association  and  the 
National Council for the Unmarried Mother and Child. In 1926, the Fund set up its own 
project when it acquired Fairfield House in Broadstairs in Kent. This purchase was the 
result of a medical report that showed that a large proportion of London elementary 
school children were listless, pale and thin. Fairfield House was designed as a holiday 
home for these children, or, better still, as a residential school outside the capital.
190 It did set up a nursery school in Addis Adaba, Ethiopia (then Abyssinia), in 1936. 
191 The problems in post-war Britain were severe, especially as state welfare relief was minimal. The 
increasing focus of the SCF on problems in Britain was also partly due to the criticisms it received for 
“sending money to other countries while there are children at home in need”. Freeman (1965), p. 47.
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During the same year, 1926, a General Strike was called by the TUC in Britain, which 
had  particularly  devastating  effects  in  Wales  and  the  Northeast.  The  Fund  gave 
emergency relief  to  children,  by  distributing  milk,  food and clothing.  The  National 
Union of Teachers (NUT) assisted the SCF in this relief, by supplying technical advice 
and  economic  support,  the  first  in  a  long  line  of  collaborations  between  the  two 
organisations. 
During the post-strike years, and particularly from the onset of the depression in the 
early  1930s,  the  SCF  concentrated  its  efforts  on  Wales,  particularly  in  the  mining 
valleys, one of the most deprived areas in Britain.192 The SCF employed the sponsorship 
scheme used during the years of the European famine, whereby rich schools became 
godmothers  for  schools  in  depressed  areas,  or  individual  children  in  need  were 
‘adopted’  by benefactors.  Subscriptions  were also raised for  these children,  and the 
child’s family would also be helped. When unemployment was considered a national 
emergency, in the winter of 1933, the SCF established an open-air nurseries program, 
staffed by unemployed adults, who cleaned, washed and cared for children between the 
ages of two and five. The nurseries were managed by trained superintendents, whose 
salaries during the first year were paid by Lady Nancy Astor, first woman member of 
parliament. This scheme was so successful, that,  when unemployment receded in the 
late  1930s  the  nurseries,  now  officially  recognized,  continued  their  activity  and 
represented around 20% of nurseries (11) of the 58 nurseries that existed nationally at 
the time.
4.7 The Save the Children Fund and the struggle for child welfare
During the inter-war years the SCF campaigned vigorously for a well-organized system 
of  child  welfare,  focusing  mainly  on  free  school  meals  and  free  milk  for  school 
children.  The  Fund  pressed  for  the  application  of  the  1921  Education  Act,  which 
authorized local government to organise free school meals, but which very few of them 
did. The SCF provided school meals in many places and free milk for children in South 
Wales,  thus  anticipating  the  government  by  several  years.  It  also  provided  country 
holidays for city children.193 The pressure exercised by the SCF in the 1930s finally bore 
192 “The death rate in Merthyr Tydfil, for example, was 103 for 1,000 births at that period, when over the 
whole of England and Wales the rate was only 70 per 1,000”. Freeman (1965), p.49.
193 Freeman (1965), p. 52.
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fruit in the Education Act of 1944, which established many of the welfare provisions 
championed by the SCF, the most important of which was free school meals for poor 
children.
The Fund, therefore, starting as an emergency relief agency in 1919, had, during the 
following years, evolved into a permanent provider of relief for children in need and a 
powerful pressure group for children’s welfare in Britain. Its ability to collect funds and 
to  allocate  them effectively  had  been  the  hallmark  of  its  activities,  inspired  by  the 
thinking of its founder, Eglantyne Jebb. Thus the Save the Children Fund in Britain, and 
the Union in Geneva,  were well-equipped to deal with the civil  war that  erupted in 
Spain in 1936, and to care and support the children involved in the bloodshed.
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Document A: Letters of introduction used by Quaker 
Commissioners in the Franco-Prussian war
Letter of introduction used by all Relief Commissioners in 1870:
[English translation below]
Le Porteur de la présente
Est envoyé par la Société Religieuse des Amis connue on Angleterre par le nom de la 
«Société des Amis» dite des Quakers.
Il part pour apporter des secours à ceux-là seulement quî souffrent des conséquences 
de la guerre actuelle, sans avoir pris part au combât.
Nous, les Membres de la dite Société des Amis, nous -----que toute guerre est contraire 
à la volonté et à l’Esprit de notre Père Céleste tels que cet Esprit et cette volonté nous 
sont démontrés dans la Nouveau Testament ; étant cependant touchés d’un sentiment  
d’amour Chrétien, nous désirons soulager autant qu’il sera on notre pouvoir les  
souffrances et la misère de ceux de l’une ou de l’autre Nation qui n’ont pris aucune 
part au combât, se souvenant que nous sommes tous enfants d’un Père et que le  
Sau------ est mort pour tous.
Nous supplions donc, tous ceux chez qui notre ami se présentera de lui aider a remplir  
son important Mission.
The bearer of this document ______________ is sent out by the Religious Society, know 
in England as the Society of Friends, commonly called Quakers, solely to give relief to 
the non-combatants sufferers through the present War.
We, the members of the above-named a Society of Friends believe all war to be 
contrary to the Will and Spirit of our Heavenly Father, as shown in the New Testament, 
but moved by Christian love, we desire to alleviate, as far as may be in our power, the 
misery of non-combatants, irrespective of Nationality, remembering that all are children 
of one Father and that one Saviour died for all.
We therefore entreat all to whom the bearer may come, to aid him in the fulfilment of 
this mission.
Letter of Introduction used by Relief Commissioners from summer 1871:
[English translation below]
Le Porteur de la présente
Vient de la part de la Société Christienne des Amis, autrement appelés Quakers.
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Plusieurs des Membres de la dite Société ont prés part, d’une manière fort active,  
pendant l’hiver et le printemps passés, à la distribution de secours temporels envers 
ceux qui ont on Bank de souffrances à subir en conséquence de la guerre qui vient  
d’avoir lieu. C’est le même motif d’amour Chrétien que les portes maintenant à tacher 
de faire du bien à leurs âmes.
Ce n’est point un esprit de secte de leurs Frères en France, mais c’est purement pour 
répondre autant qu’il leur sera donné de le faire la connaissance de l’Evangile de notre 
Seigneur et Sauveur Jésus Christ dans toute sa simplicité.
Et nous prions tous ceux a qui le porteur de ce certificat se présentera de vouloir bien 
lui donner l’aide qui sera on leur pourvoir pour l’accomplissement de cette Mission de 
Charité Christienne.
The Bearer of this document. 
comes on behalf of the Religious Society, known in England as “The Society of Friends 
commonly called Quakers”.
Many Members of the above named Society have been active during the last Winter and 
Spring in distributing relief to the Sufferers by the late War, and the same sprit of 
Christian love which led us to care for their perishing bodies now leads us to endeavour 
to do good to their immortal souls.
Uninfluenced by political or sectarian motives our objects is to promote among our 
French brethren the knowledge of the simple Gospel of our Lord Saviour Jesus Christ: 
and we entreat all to whom the Bearer may come to aid in the fulfilment of this Mission 
of Christian love.
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ii. Quaker Commissioners in the Franco-
Prussian war 1870-1871
Name Home Town Age in 1870
Henry John Allen Dublin 32
William Jones Co. Durham 42
Thomas Whitwell Stockton-on-Tees 33
Robert Spence Watson Newcastle 33
Eliot Howard Tottenham 28
William Pumphrey York 53
Daniel Hack, Jnr. Brighton 36
John Bellows Gloucester 40
Elizabeth Ann Barclay
J. Augusta Fry
Richenda F. Reynolds London 62
Amelia de Bunsen London 53
Samuel Gurney Surrey 54
John H. Gurney, Jnr. Norwich 22
Charles Elcock Gloucester
Henry Tuke Mennell Croydon 35
Theodore Neild Manchester 26
John Dunning Middlesbrough 43
Joseph Smith London 51
Thomas Snowdon
Thomas D. Nicholson Birkenhead
Samuel James Capper Liverpool 30
Charles Wing Gray Halstead, Essex 25
Joseph Crosfield Reigate 58
Edmund Pace Upper Clapton 57
William Beck London 47
William B. Norcott Southampton
Walter Ryley Liverpool
Ellen Jackson
Ernest Beck London 28
William Dyne Leytonstone 52
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James Hack Tuke Hitchin 52
James Long
John Burnett Tylor London 43
Arthur Albright Birmingham 59
Wilson Sturge Birmingham 37
J. Fyfe Stewart London 25
Ellen Allen Dublin 42
Richard Allen Dublin 67
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iii. Quaker relief projects
Relief Projects undertaken by the British (and Irish) Friends (Quakers) including some joint 
projects with the American Friends (until the Spanish Civil War).
1709 Help organised for the “Poor Palatines” (German Pietists and other emigrants to 
America), and for French “Prophètes” and other Protestants suffering after 
the revocation of the Edict of Nantes by Louis XIV
1755 Anthony Benezet organises relief for three shiploads of French (“Acadian”) exiles from 
Nova Scotia sent to Philadelphia.
1774 Quaker relief during the siege of Boston “for the necessitous of every denomination”, 
supported by Friends throughout America, in Ireland and in Great Britain. 
A “Donation Fund for the Relief of Friends in America” was still active in 
England in 1786.
1805-16 Relief of suffering in Germany organised by several committees, and supported 
by a committee of Friends, with Luke Howard supervising the general 
distributions of funds through local German committees.
1811 Relief of British prisoners of war in France, and French prisoners of war in Great 
Britain; and for Danish and Norwegian prisoners in England, some of 
whom became Quakers.
1814 Relief of sufferers from tempest and shipwreck in the Scilly Isles.
Antigua Relief Association.
Subscription for Bavarians suffering persecution and desiring Bible 
translation. Secret aid to Dukhobors (c.1815-30).
1823 First report of “A Committee of the Society of Friends managing a fund for the Relief 
of the Distressed Greeks”.
1824-25 Relief of famine in Ireland.
1830 Relief of Polish exiles undertaken by Scottish, Irish and English Friends.
1838 Indian Famine Relief, with Quaker participation; renewed in later famines, notably in 
1877-78, and in 1896-97, and 1900 (under missionary suspices).
1846-47 “The Great Hunger” in Ireland; major relief scheme.
1856-57 Relief in the Hebrides, organised by Donald Ross and E.O. Tregelles.
1857-68 Relief in Finland, for victims of the war between Russia and Great Britain, and 
later for famine victims.
1860 and 1878 Relief in Syria, for victims of massacre and war.
1870-73 First official “Friends War Victims Relief Committee” in the Franco-Prussian 
War; followed by post-war help, and relief of victims of Toulouse floods.
1876-79 “East of Europe War Victims Fund” for relief in Bulgaria and to other victims 
of Balkan wars (renewed in 1896-97).
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1880-81 Irish Famine Relief Fund, followed in 1886 by relief in Aran Islands, etc.
1883-86 Shetland Relief Committee.
1891-93 Russian Famine Relief in the Volga provinces.
1895-96; 1897-1906 Committee to aid the Dukhobors.
1896 Armenian Relief from famine and persecution.
1899-1908 Friends South African Relief Fund, during and after the Boer War.
1903-04 Macedonian Relief Committee.
1912-14 Friends War Victims Relief Committee, Eastern Europe (for victims of the 
Balkan Wars).
1914-19 Friends Ambulance Unit I.
1914-23 Friends Emergency Committee for the assistance of Germans, Austrians and 
Hungarians in distress, united from 1919 with the Friends War Victims 
Relief Committee set up in 1914.
1915-19 Quaker support for Serbian Relief Fund, for the Anglo-Italian Ambulance Unit, 
and other bodies.
1924 Relief in Morocco.
1933 Germany Emergency Committee, later called the Friends Committee for Refugees and 
Aliens (until 1950).
1934-36 Relief in Austria during civil strife; including distribution of Trade Union funds 
and help to German victims of the Austrian government.
G. Pretus, Humanitarian relief in the Spanish Civil War (1936-39) 278




Article Premier.- Il existe, dans chacun des pays concordataires, un comité national, dont le 
mandat consiste à remédier, pas tous les moyens en son pouvoir, à l’insuffisance du service 
sanitaire officiel dans les armées en campagne.
Ce comité s’organise lui-même, de la manière qui lui paraît la plus utile et la plus convenable.
Art. 2.- Des sections, en nombre illimité, peuvent se former pour seconder le comité national. 
Elles sont nécessairement placées dans la dépendance de ce comité, auquel seul appartient la 
direction supérieure.
Art. 3.- Chaque comité national doit se mettre en rapport avec le gouvernement de son pays et 
s’assurer que ses offres de service seront agréés en cas de guerre.
Art. 4.- En temps de paix, les comités et leurs sections s’occupent des améliorations à introduire 
dans le service de santé militaire, dans l’installation des ambulances et des hôpitaux, dans les 
moyens de transport pour les blessés, etc., et en poursuivent la réalisation.
Art. 5.- Les comités et les sections des divers pays peuvent se réunir en congrès internationaux 
pour se communiquer leurs expériences, et se concerter sur les mesures à prendre dans l’intérêt 
de l’œuvre.
Art. 6.- Au mois de janvier de chaque année, les comités nationaux présentent un rapport sur 
leurs travaux pendant l’année écoulée, en y joignant les communications qu’ils jugent utile de 
porter à la connaissance des comités des autres pays.
L’éxange de ces communications et de ces rapports s’opère par l’entremise du comité de 
Genève, auquel ils sont adressés.
Titre II
Dispositions spéciales en cas de guerre
Art. 7.- En cas de guerre, les comités des nations belligérantes fournissent les secours 
nécessaires à leurs armées respectives, et pourvoient en particulier à la formation et à 
l’organisation de corps d’infirmiers volontaires.
Ils peuvent solliciter l’appui des comités appartenant aux nations neutres.
Art. 8.- Les infirmiers volontaires s’engagent à server pendant un temps limité, et à ne 
s’immiscer en aucune façon dans les opérations de la guerre.
Ils sont employés, suivant leur désir, au service de campagne ou à celui des hôpitaux.
Les femmes sont nécessairement affectées à ce dernier.
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Art. 9.- Les infirmiers volontaires portent, dans tous les pays, un uniforme ou un signe distinctif 
identique. Leur personne est sacrée et les chefs militaires leur doivent protection.
Lors d’une entrée en campagne, les soldats de l’une et l’autre armée sont informés de 
l’existence de ces corps et de leur caractère exclusivement charitable.
Art. 10.- Les corps d’infirmiers ou secoureurs volontaires marchent à la suite des armées, 
auxquelles ils ne doivent donner aucun embarras, ni occasionner aucun frais. Ils ont leurs 
moyens de transport, leurs vivres, leurs provisions de médicaments et de secours de tout genre.
Ils son mis à la disposition des chefs d’armées, qui ne les utilisent que lorsqu’ils en sentent le 
besoin. Pendant la durée de leur service actif, ils son placés sous les ordres de l’autorité militaire 
et astreints à la même discipline que les infirmiers ordinaires.
[English Translation]
Chapter I
Article First – There is, in each of the signatory countries, a national committee whose 
commission consists in the remedy, with all the means and resources at hand, the insufficiency 
of the official sanitary service in the armies in operation.
This committee shall organise itself as deemed most appropriate and useful
Art. 2.- Sections can be created, unlimited in number, in order to assist the national committee. 
These sections shall necessarily depend on the committee, to which the senior management 
solely belongs. 
Art. 3.- Each national committee must contact the government of its country and ensure that its 
service offers shall be admitted in the event of war.
Art. 4.- In peacetime, the committees and their sections shall engage in the improvements to be 
introduced in the military health services, in the installation of ambulances and hospitals, 
transport means for wounded, etc, and in following their execution.
Art. 5.- Country committees and sections can gather in international congresses in order to share 
their experiences and agree measures to be taken for the sake of the work.
Art. 6.- During the month of January of each year, the national committees shall submit a report 
of their work during the previous year, enclosing the information they deem worth to be made 
known to the other countries.
This exchange of information and reports shall be made through the intervention of Geneva 
committee, to which they shall be addressed.
Chapter II
Special dispositions in the event of war
Art. 7.- In the event of war, the committees of the countries at war shall give the necessary 
assistance to their respective army, providing particularly for the training and organisation of 
volunteer nurses corps
They can request support from the committees of neutral countries. 
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Art. 8.- The volunteer nurses shall commit to serve for a limited term, and not to intervene in 
any way in war operations.
They shall be employed, according to their will, in the campaign or hospital services.
Woman shall necessarily be affected to the latter.
Art. 9.- The volunteer nurses shall wear, in all the countries, an identical uniform or distinctive 
sign. Their person is sacred and the military officers must protect them.
When entering in campaign, the soldiers of both armies must be informed of the existence of 
these corps and that their nature is solely charitable. 
Art. 10.- The volunteer nurses or helpers shall follow the armies, which they must not hinder in 
any way, nor cause any expense. They shall have their own transport means, food, and all kind 
of medicine and aid supplies.
They shall make themselves available to the army officers, who will use them only when they 
consider necessary. During their active service, they shall be under the orders of the military 
authorities, and subject to the same discipline of the ordinary nurses.
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v. Addendum to the Concordat draft text
Supplément à la convocation d’une Conférence International à Genève”, 15 septembre 
1863
«En conséquence de l’accueil favorable fait à son plan dans le Congrès de statistique, le Comité 
de Genève propose, en outre du projet de concordat:
1) Que chaque gouvernement de l’Europe daigne accorder sa protection spéciale et son haut 
patronage au Comité général national qui doit être créé dans chacune des capitales de l’Europe, 
et qui sera composé des personnes les plus honorables et les plus estimées.
2) Que ces mêmes gouvernements déclarent, que désormais, le personnel médical militaire et 
ceux qui en dépendent, y compris les secoureurs volontaires reconnues, seront regardés comme 
personnes neutres par les puissances belligérantes.
3) Qu’en temps de guerre, les gouvernements s’engagent à faciliter les moyens de transport du 
personnel et des provisions charitables que ces sociétés enverront dans les pays envahis par la 
guerre.
Enfin le Comité de Genève désire que la Conférence internationale étudie et discute les moyens 
de réaliser cette œuvre éminemment humanitaire et philanthropique, tout en respectant les lois, 
les habitudes et les usages des différentes nations de l’Europe.
Il désire également que la Conférence examine comment, dans une lutte entre grandes 
puissances, on pourra porter les secours les plus efficaces sur le théâtre de la guerre, pour les 
ressortissants de l’une et l’autre armée, en évitant soigneusement toute idée d’espionnage, et 
tout ce qui serait en dehors du but spécialement charitable et chrétien de cette œuvre excellente. 
Le Comité de Genève espère donc que les gouvernements de l’Europe voudront bien donner, à 
leurs délégués à cette Conférence, les instructions nécessaires à ces divers égards.»
English translation
Supplement to the calling of an International Conference in Geneva, 15 September, 1863
“As a result of the favourable reception given to its plan during the statistics Congress, Geneva 
Committee proposes, further to the concordat project:
1) That each European government agrees to give its special protection and high patronage to 
the national general Committee to be created in every European capital city, which shall consist 
of the most honourable and estimated persons.
2) That the said governments declare that, thereafter, the military medical personnel and their 
dependants, including the acknowledged volunteer aids, be considered neutral persons by the 
powers at war. 
3) That in wartime the governments undertake to provide the transport means for charitable 
personnel and supplies these societies will send to the countries invaded by war.
Finally Genève Committee wishes the international Conference to study and discuss the means 
to carry out this work essentially humanitarian and philanthropic, while respecting the law, uses 
and customs of every country in Europe. 
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It wishes also the Conference to examine how, in a fight between great powers, would it be 
possible to carry the most efficient aid to the war scenario, for the nationals of both armies, 
avoiding carefully all idea of espionage or any other idea beyond the essentially charitable and 
Christian aim of this excellent work. Geneva Committee expects that then the European 
governments would be ready to give to their delegates to this Conference, the relevant 
instructions.”
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vi. Participants at the Geneva Conference, 1863*
Dr Unger, Physician-in-Chief of the Austrian Army
Dr Steiner, Physician-Commander, representing the Grand Duchy of Baden
Dr Dompierre, Head Physician Artillery Corps, representing Bavaria
Dr Landa, Surgeon-Commander, and Joaquín Agulló, Count of Ripalda, representing Spain
Mr de Preval, Junior Intendant of the Imperial Guard and Dr Boudier, Physician-in-Chief, 
representing France
Mr Chevalier, French Consul in Geneva
Dr Rutherford, Inspector-General of Hospitals, representing Great Britain
Mr Mackenzie, British Consul in Geneva
Dr Oelker, representing Hanover
Major Brodrück, Battalion Staff Commander, representing the Grand Duchy of Hesse
Mr Capello, Italian Consul in Geneva
Prince Henry XIII of Reuss, delegated by the Order of St. John of Jerusalem
Dr Basting, Physician-Commander, and Captain Van de Velde, former naval officer, 
representing the Netherlands
Dr Loeffler, Physician-in-Chief of 4th Army Corps, and Dr Housselle, Counsellor and Member 
of the Ministry of Health, representing Prussia
Captain Kireiew, aide-de-camp of the Grand Duke Constantin and Mr Essakoff, Librarian to the 
Grand Duchess Helene Pavlovna, representing Russia
Dr Gunther, Chief Military Physician representing Saxony
Dr Skoeldberg, Administrative Officer of QM Medical Supplies, and Dr Edling, Physician-
Commander, representing Sweden
Drs. Hahn and Wagner representing Württemberg 
Dr Lehman, Chief Military Physician, and Dr Briere representing Switzerland 
Professor Sandoz, representing the Neuchatel Society of Social Science
Mr Moratel, from the Society of Public Welfare of the Canton of Vaud
Mr de Montmollin, Mr de Perregaux and Dr Engelhardt, Divisional Physician in the Swiss 
Army, in a private capacity
* The list is that given in International Review of the Red Cross, No. 32, November 1963, p. 569. Joaquín 
Agulló from Spain has been added, though he is not included in their list, because he is known to have 
participated, and is noted as such in Spanish sources. See for example Clemente (2001), p. 37
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vii. Resolutions of the Geneva Conference, 1863
[English Translation below]
La Conférence internationale, désireuse de venir en aide aux blessés, dans le cas où le Service 
de santé militaire serait insuffisant, adopte les résolutions suivantes:
Article Premier.- Il existe dans chaque pays un comité, dont le mandat consiste à concourir en 
temps de guerre, s’il y a lieu, par tous les moyens en son pouvoir, au Service de santé des 
armées.
Ce comité s’organise lui-même de la manière qui lui paraît, la plus utile et la plus convenable.
Art. 2.- Des sections, en nombre illimité, peuvent se former pour seconder ce comité, auquel 
appartient la direction générale.
Art. 3.- Chaque comité doit se mettre en rapport avec le gouvernement de son pays, pour que 
ses offres de service soient agréées, le cas échéant.
Art. 4.- En temps de paix, les comités et les sections s’occupent des moyens de se rendre 
véritablement utiles en temps de guerre, spécialement en préparant des secours matériels de tout 
genre et en cherchant à former et à instruire des infirmiers volontaires.
Art. 5.- En cas de guerre, les comités des nations belligérantes fournissent, dans la mesure de 
leurs ressources des secours à leurs armées respectives ; en particulier, ils organisent et mettent 
en activité les infirmiers volontaires, et ils font disposer, d’accord avec l’autorité militaire, des 
locaux pour soigner les blessés.
Ils peuvent, solliciter les concours des comités appartenant aux nations neutres.
Art.6.- Sur l’appel ou avec l’agrément de l’autorité militaire, les comités envoient des infirmiers 
volontaires sur le champ de bataille. Ils les mettent alors sous la direction des chefs militaires.
Art. 7.- Les infirmiers volontaires, employés à la suite des armées, doivent être pourvus, par 
leurs comités respectifs, de tout ce qui est nécessaire à leur contretien.
Art. 8.- Ils portent dans tous les pays, comme signe distinctif uniforme, un brassard blanc avec 
une croix rouge.
Art. 9.- Les comités et les sections des divers pays peuvent se réunir en congrès internationaux, 
pour se communiquer leurs expériences et se concerter sur les mesures à prendre dans l’intérêt 
de l’œuvre.
Art. 10,- L’échange des communications entre les comités des diverses nations se fait 
provisoirement par l’entremise du Comité de Genève.
Indépendamment des résolutions ci-dessus, la Conférence émet les vœux suivants:
A) Que les gouvernements accordent leur haute protection aux comités de secours que se 
formeront, et facilitent autant que possible l’accomplissement de leur mandat.
B) Que la neutralisation soit proclamée, en temps de gue4rre, par les nations belligérantes, pour 
les ambulances et les hôpitaux, et qu’elle soit également admise, de la manière la plus complète, 
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pour le personnel sanitaire officiel, pour les infirmiers volontaires, pour les habitants du pays 
qui iront secourir les blessés, et pour les blessés eux-mêmes.
C) Qu’un signe distinctif identique soit admis pour les sorps sanitaires de toutes les armées, ou 
tout au moins pour les personnes d’une même armée attachées à ce service.
Qu’un drapeau identique soit aussi adopté dans tous les apys, pour les ambulances et les 
hôpitaux.
English Translation
The international Conference, in its wish to help the wounded whenever the military health 
Service proves insufficient, adopts the following resolutions:
Article First.- There is in each country a committee whose mandate consists in helping, in war 
times, if necessary, with every means at reach, the armies’ health services.
Art. 2.- Sections can be created, unlimited in number, in order to assist this committee, to which 
the general management correspond. 
Art. 3.- Each committee must contact the government of its country so that its service offers are 
admitted should the case arise.
Art. 4.- In peacetime, the committees and their sections shall see to the means of becoming 
really useful in war time, particularly preparing all kind of material aid and seeking the training 
and education of volunteer nurses.
Art. 5.- In the event of war, the committees of the countries at war shall provide, to the extent of 
their resources, aid to their respective army; particularly, they will organise and launch the 
volunteer nurses, and will implement premises, in agreement with the military authorities, to 
heal the wounded.
They can request support from the committees of neutral countries.
Art. 6.- Upon request or with the agreement of the military authorities, the committees shall 
send volunteer nurses to the battlefield, who will be then placed under the direction of the 
military officers.
Art. 7.- The volunteer nurses employed following the armies must be provided, by their 
respective committees, of all that is necessary for their maintenance.
Art. 8.- They shall wear, in all countries, as uniform distinctive sign, a white armlet with a red 
cross. 
Art. 9.- The committees and sections of each country can gather in international congresses in 
order to share their experience and agree measures to be taken for the sake of the work.
Art. 10.- The exchange of information between the committees of the countries shall 
provisionally be made through the intervention of Geneva Committee.
Notwithstanding the resolutions above, the Conference express the following hopes: 
A) That the governments grant their highest protection to the aid committees to be created and 
facilitate as much as possible the fulfilment of their commission. 
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B) That neutrality is declared, in war time, by the belligerent countries, for ambulances and 
hospitals, and that it is also admitted, as completely as possible, for the official medical 
personnel, for the volunteer nurses, for the inhabitants who bring help to the wounded and for 
the wounded themselves. 
C) That an identical distinctive sign is admitted for the medical corps of all the armies, or at 
least for the persons belonging to the same army affected to this service.
That an identical flag be also adopted in all the countries for hospitals and ambulances.
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viii. Draft Letter to participants at the Geneva 
Conference
[English Translation below]
Monsieur et honoré Collège
Pour les travaux de la Conférence de Genève ne soient pas stériles, il est fort désirable que les 
personnes qui y ont pris part, et spécialement les délégués des gouvernements, veuillent bien 
permettre au Comité central provisoire de compter sur leur obligeante coopération. C’est avec 
l’espérance qu’elle ne lui fera pas défaut que je prends la liberté de vous adresser en son nom 
les demandes suivantes, afin que l’œuvre commencée marche avec ensemble, et parvienne le 
plus tôt possible à sa pleine réalisation.
Quant à la formation d’un comité de secours dans votre pays, veuillez nous faire savoir si vous 
êtes disposé à en prendre l’initiative, et si nous pouvons nous reposer sur vous du soin de son 
organisation d’après les bases votées par la Conférence ?
Quant aux vœux que nous avons formulés, pouvez-vous vous charger de les transmettre à votre 
gouvernement, et de nous faire savoir officiellement dans quelle mesure il est disposé à y 
adhérer ?
A cet égard, le Comité genevois, après avoir réuni les éléments d’une enquête européenne, fera 
tout ce qui dépendra de lui pour que les bonnes dispositions qu’il aura rencontrées se traduisent 
par des faits.
Pour aider à discerner nettement les points sur lesquels il sera possible d’arriver à un accord 
international, je vous demande la permission de vous rappeler et de préciser les questions à 
adresser à chaque gouvernement:
1º Le gouvernement est-il disposé à accorder sa haute protection au Comité de secours 
pour les blessés qui se formera parmi ses ressortissants, en suite des résolutions de la 
Conférence de Genève, et à lui faciliter autant que possible l’accomplissement de son 
mandat?
2º Le gouvernement adhérait-il à une convention internationale ayant pour objet:
a) La neutralisation en temps de guerre,
Des ambulances et des hôpitaux militaires,
Du personnel du Service sanitaire officiel,
Des infirmiers volontaires recrutés par le Comité de secours,
Des habitants du pays qui iront secourir les blessés,
Des militaires blessés?
b) L’adoption d’un uniforme ou d’un signe distinctif identique pour les personnes attachés 
au Service de santé, et d’un drapeau identique pour les ambulances et les hôpitaux?
Si cette dernière proposition était agréée, y aurait-il quelque objection à ce que le brassard et le 
drapeau blancs, avec une croix rouge, fussent généralement admis?
J’espère, Monsieur et honoré collège, que vous voudrez bien me faire connaître le plus tôt 
possible vos intentions, ainsi que le résultat de vos démarches, et je saisis cette occasion pour 
vous prier d’agréer l’expression de mes sentiments dévoués.
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Le Président de la Conférence
G. Moynier.
English translation
Sir and Hon. Colleague
For the Geneva Conference works not to be sterile, it is very desirable that the persons who 
have taken part, and particularly the governments delegates, be so kind as to allow the 
provisional central Committee to count on their amiable cooperation. It is in the hope that such 
cooperation shall not be lacking that I take the liberty to address you in its name the following 
requests, so that the work started progresses in a coordinate way et reaches as soon as possible 
its fulfilment.
With regard to the creation of an aid committee in your country, could you please let us know 
whether you would be ready to take the lead, and whether we can rely on you its organisation 
according to the basis approved by the Conference?
As for the wishes we have expressed, could you please undertake to transmit them to your 
government and to let us know officially to which extent it is ready to adhere thereto?
In this respect, the Geneva Committee, after gathering the elements of a European survey, will 
do its best so that the good will found is translated in acts.
In order to help to clearly differentiate the points on which an international agreement could be 
reached, I request your permission to remind you and make more specific the questions 
addressed to each government:
1º Is the government willing to agree its high protection to the aid Committee for the 
wounded to be created by its nationals following the resolutions of Geneva Conference, 
and to make as smooth as possible the fulfilment of its mandate?
2º Would the government adhere to an international convention whose object would be:
a) Neutrality in war time,
Of ambulances and military hospitals,
Of hospital and ambulance personnel,
Of volunteer nurses recruited by the aid Committee,
Of the inhabitants of the country who bring help to the wounded,
Of the soldiers wounded?
b) The adoption of an identical uniform or a distinctive sign for the persons attached to a 
health Service, and an identical flag for ambulances and hospitals?
Should this last proposal be agreed to, would there be any objection to the general admission of 
a white flag and armlet with a red cross on?
I look forward to hearing from your intentions and from the result of your steps,
Yours sincerely,
The President of the Conference,
G. Moynier.
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ix. Convention for the amelioration of the 
condition of the wounded in armies in the 
field, 1864
[English Translation below]
Convention pour l’amélioration du sort des militaires blessés
Article Premier.- Les ambulances et les hôpitaux militaires seront reconnus neutres, et, comme 
tels, protégés et respectés par les belligérants, aussi longtemps qu’il s’y trouvera des malades ou 
des blessés.
La neutralité cesserait si ces ambulances ou ces hôpitaux étaient gardés par une force militaire.
Art. 2.- Le personnel des hôpitaux et des ambulances, comprenant l’intendance, les Services de 
santé, d’administration, de transport des blessés, ainsi que les aumôniers, participera au bénéfice 
de la neutralité lorsqu’il fonctionnera et tant qu’il restera des blessés à relever ou à secourir.
Art. 3.- Les personnes désignées dans l’article précédent pourront, même après l’occupation par 
l’ennemi, continuer à remplir leurs fonctions dans l’hôpital ou l’ambulance qu’elles desservent, 
ou se retirer pour rejoindre le corps auquel elles appartiennent.
Dans ces circonstances, lorsque ces personnes cesseront leurs fonctions, elles seront remises aux 
avant-postes ennemis par les soins de l’armée occupante.
Art. 4.- Le matériel des hôpitaux militaires demeurant soumis aux lois de la guerre, les 
personnes attachées à ces hôpitaux ne pourront, en se retirant, emporter que les objets qui seront 
leur propriété particulière.
Dans les mêmes circonstances, au contraire, l’ambulance conservera son matériel.
Art. 5.- Les habitants du pays qui porteront secours aux blessés seront respectés et demeureront 
libres.
Les généraux des Puissances belligérantes auront pour mission de prévenir les habitants de 
l’appel fait à leur humanité et de la neutralité qui en sera la conséquence.
Tout blessé recueilli et soigné dans une maison y servira de sauvegarde. L’habitant qui aura 
recueilli chez lui des blessés sera dispensé du logement des troupes, ainsi que d’une partie des 
contributions de guerre qui seraient imposées.
Art. 6.- Les militaires blessés ou malades seront recueillis et soignés, à quelque nation qu’ils 
appartiennent.
Les commandants en chef auront la faculté de remettre immédiatement aux avant-Postes 
ennemis les militaires blessés pendant le combat, lorsque les circonstances le permettront et du 
consentement des deux partis.
Seront renvoyés dans leur pays ceux qui, après guérison, seront reconnus incapables de servir.
Les autres pourront être également renvoyés, à la condition de ne pas reprendre les armes 
pendant la durée de la guerre.
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Les évacuations, avec le personnel qui les dirige, seront couvertes par une neutralité absolue.
Art. 7.- Un drapeau distinctif et uniforme sera adopté pour les hôpitaux, les ambulances et les 
évacuations. Il devra être, en toute circonstance, accompagné du drapeau national. 
Un brassard sera également admis pour le personnel neutralisé, mais la délivrance en sera 
laissée à l’autorité militaire.
Le drapeau et le brassard porteront croix rouge sur fond blanc.
Art. 8.- Les détails d’exécution de la présente convention seront réglés par les commandants en 
chef des armées belligérantes, d’après les instructions de leurs gouvernements respectifs et 
conformément aux principes généraux énoncés dans cette Convention.
Art. 9.- Les Hautes Puissances contractantes sont convenues de communiquer la présente 
convention aux gouvernements qui n’ont pu envoyer des plénipotentiaires à la conférence 
internationale de Genève, en les invitant à y accéder ; le protocole est à cet effet laissé ouvert.
Art. 10.- La présente Convention sera ratifiée, et les ratifications en seront échangées à Berne 
dans l’espace de quatre mois, ou plus tôt si faire se peut.
En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs l’ont signée et y ont apposé le cachet de leurs 
armes.
Fait à Genève le vingt-deuxième jour du mois d’août de l’an mil huit cent soixante-quatre.
English Translation
Convention for the amelioration of the condition of the wounded in armies in the field
Article First. Ambulances and military hospitals shall be recognized as neutral, and as such, 
protected and respected by the belligerents as long as they accommodate wounded and sick.
Neutrality shall end if the said ambulances or hospitals should be held by a military force. 
Art. 2. Hospital and ambulance personnel, including the quarter-master's staff, the medical, 
administrative and transport services, and the chaplains, shall have the benefit of the same 
neutrality when on duty, and while there remain any wounded to be brought in or assisted.
Art. 3. The persons designated in the preceding Article may, even after enemy occupation, 
continue to discharge their functions in the hospital or ambulance with which they serve, or may 
withdraw to rejoin the units to which they belong.
When in these circumstances they cease from their functions, such persons shall be delivered to 
the enemy outposts by the occupying forces.
Art. 4. The material of military hospitals being subject to the laws of war, the persons attached 
to such hospitals may take with them, on withdrawing, only the articles which are their own 
personal property.
Ambulances, on the contrary, under similar circumstances, shall retain their equipment. 
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Art. 5. Inhabitants of the country who bring help to the wounded shall be respected and shall 
remain free. Generals of the belligerent Powers shall make it their duty to notify the inhabitants 
of the appeal made to their humanity, and of the neutrality which humane conduct will confer.
The presence of any wounded combatant receiving shelter and care in a house shall ensure its 
protection. An inhabitant who has given shelter to the wounded shall be exempted from billeting 
and from a portion of such war contributions as may be levied. 
Art. 6. Wounded or sick combatants, to whatever nation they may belong, shall be collected and 
cared for.
Commanders-in-Chief may hand over immediately to the enemy outposts enemy combatants 
wounded during an engagement, when circumstances allow and subject to the agreement of 
both parties.
Those who, after their recovery, are recognised as being unfit for further service, shall be 
repatriated.
The others may likewise be sent back, on condition that they shall not again, for the duration of 
hostilities, take up arms.
Evacuation parties, and the personnel conducting them, shall be considered as being absolutely 
neutral.
Art. 7. A distinctive and uniform flag shall be adopted for hospitals, ambulances and evacuation 
parties. It should in all circumstances be accompanied by the national flag.
An armlet may also be worn by personnel enjoying neutrality but its issue shall be left to the 
military authorities.
Both flag and armlet shall bear a red cross on a white ground. 
Art. 8. The implementing of the present Convention shall be arranged by the Commanders-in-
Chief of the belligerent armies following the instructions of their respective Governments and in 
accordance with the general principles set forth in this Convention. 
Art. 9. The High Contracting Parties have agreed to communicate the present Convention with 
an invitation to accede thereto to Governments unable to appoint Plenipotentiaries to the 
International Conference at Geneva. The Protocol has accordingly been left open. 
Art. 10. The present Convention shall be ratified and the ratifications exchanged at Berne, 
within the next four months, or sooner if possible.
In faith whereof, the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the Convention and thereto affixed 
their seals.
Done at Geneva, this twenty-second day of August, in the year one thousand eight hundred and 
sixty-four.
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x. Draft contract of the neutral delegates
[English Translation below]
Modèle de Convention établi pour tous les délégués envoyés en Espagne194
Entre le Comité International de la Croix-Rouge, d’une part, et Monsieur …., d’autre part, il a 
été convenu ce qui suit:
1. Le Comité International de la Croix-Rouge charge M. …, en qualité de délégué-adjoint, 
d’une mission en Espagne, sous la direction de M. le D’ Marcel Junod, chef de mission.
2. La durée de la mission de M…. est d’un mois à compter du …. au …. 1936. La durée de la 
mission pourra être prolongée de mois en mois, par tacite reconduction.
3. Le Comité International de la Croix-Rouge paiera à M. … :
a) une allocation de francs suisses 750 (sept cent cinquante francs) à titre de 
traitement mensuel ;
b) les frais de voyage, aller et retour, payables en francs suisses, sur présentation de 
pièces justificatives, visées par le chef de mission ;
c) les frais d’une assurance contre les accidents et maladies pour une somme de 
francs suisses 75.000 (soixante-quinze mille) en cas d’invalidité, aux termes 
énoncés dans la police d’assurance.
4. M…., s’engage à exercer la plus grande économie dans ses dépenses.
5. M. …, s’engage :
a) à se conformer exactement aux instructions qui lui ont été ou lui seront données par 
son chef de mission, M. le D’ Marcel Junod ;
b) à observer la plus stricte neutralité dans ses propos et dans ses actes ; à s’abstenir 
de toute manifestation ayant un caractère politique ou confessionnel, ainsi que de 
toute activité ayant un caractère commercial ; à se souvenir constamment de sa 
qualité de représentant de la Croix-Rouge Internationale ;
c) à s’astreindre à la plus grande discrétion ; il lui est notamment interdit, soit au 
cours de son voyage, soit à son retour, de faire des communications quelconques 
dans les journaux, de se prêter à des interviews, de faire des conférences sans 
l’autorisation expresse du comité International de la Croix-Rouge;
d) à s’abstenir dans ses conversations privées ou dans ses actes de tout ce qui pourrait 
nuire à l’action ultérieure du Comité International de la Croix-Rouge.
Fait en double, à Genève, etc…
194 ACICR 212/1, 63
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English Translation
Model convention drafted for all the delegates sent to Spain195
Gathered, 
For the first party, the Red Cross International Committee, and for the second party Mr …., 
It is agreed as follows:
1. The Red Cross International Committee entrusts Mr …, in the capacity of deputy-delegate, 
a mission in Spain, under the direction of Mr le D’ Marcel Junod, head of the mission.
2. The duration of Mr ...’s mission is a month, starting the …. until the …. 1936. The duration 
of the mission can be extended monthly, by tacit renewal.
3. The Red Cross International Committee shall pay Mr … :
a) an allowance amounting to Swiss francs 750 (francs seven hundred and fifty) by 
way of monthly remuneration ;
b) trip expenses, return, payable in Swiss francs, against evidencing documents, 
checked by the head of the mission;
c) expenses for an accidents and medical insurance for the amount of Swiss francs 
75,000 (seventy five thousand) in the event of disability, in the terms set forth in 
the insurance contract.
4. M…., undertakes to be most economical in his expenses.
5. M. …, undertakes:
a) to strictly follow the instructions given or to be given to him by his head of 
mission, Mr le D’ Marcel Junod ;
b) to observe the most strict neutrality in his comments and actions; to refrain from 
any representation of a political or confessional nature, as well as from any activity 
of a business nature ; to remember permanently his capacity of International Red 
Cross representative ;
c) to subject himself to the utmost discretion; it is particularly forbidden, either during 
his trip, or on his return, to make any statements in press, give interviews, give 
conferences without the express authorisation of the Red Cross International 
Committee;
d) to refrain in his private conversations or his actions of all that could hinder any 
subsequent Red Cross International Committee action.
Signed in duplicate, in Geneva, etc…
195 ACICR 212/1, 63
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xi. Territorial partition of Spain, end of July 
1936
Source: Thomas, H. (1990), p. 216.
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xii. ICRC Delegates during the Spanish Civil War
Republican zone
General Delegate: Dr Marcel Junod
Deputy: Daniel Clouzot
Madrid: Dr Georges Henny 16/09/36 - 08/12/36
Capt. Eric Arbenz From 11/1/37
Barcelona: Dr Horace Barbey 25/9/36-28/1/37
Dr Roland Marti 1/12/36-14/4/37
Prof. Philippe Halm 04/37-31/3/38
Valencia: Dr Roland Marti 04/37-31/04/38
Bilbao: Capt. Georges Graz 08/11/36-14/06/37
Lt. Raymond Courvoisicr 07/07/37-27/10/37
Santander: Captain Pierre Weber 12/36-06/37
Captain George Graz 14/06/37-24/08/37
Alicante : Captain Eric Arbenz 15/12/36-24/12/36
Nationalist zone
General Delegate: Comte Horace de Pourtales 
(Main Delegate)
12/36-11/38
Burgos: Dr Raymond Broccard 16/09/36-25/11/36
Captain Jean d’Amman 05/05/37-15/02/38
San Sebastian: Lt. Raymond Courvoisier 12/36-28/02/38
Captain Jean d’Amman From 15/2/38
Saragossa: Paul de Rham 15/12/36-15/1/37
and back on 10 February 
1937 until 20 February 1937
Seville: Dr Werner Schumachcr 12/12/36-31/01/37
France (for the Spanish 
conflict):
St Jean de Luz Lt. Raymond Courvoisier 
Muntadas (attached Delegate)
01/1937-02/1938
Marseille Captain George Graz 09/37-10/37
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Appendix 2: Politics and humanitarian 
relief in the Spanish Civil War: the 
Evacuation of Basque children to England 
in May 1937
1 Introduction
In  April  2007,  I  attended  an  Oxford  University  Seminar  to  celebrate  the  70th 
anniversary of the arrival of Basque children, who had been evacuated from Bilbao to 
escape the bombing during the Spanish Civil War. I heard the oral testimony of two of 
the  “niños”,  Herminio  Martínez  and  Helvecia  Hidalgo,  then  both  in  their  eighties. 
Herminio, the son of poor Castilian immigrants to Bilbao, told of the hazardous journey 
he had experienced at the age of 11, moving from camp to camp in Britain, with his 
eight  –  years  old  brother.  Helvecia,  from a  socialist  family  and then  aged 14,  was 
somewhat  luckier,  having  been taken under  the protection  of  a  well-known Quaker 
family, the Cadburys, soon after she arrived. 
Despite their different experiences of evacuation, both Herminio and Helvecia agreed 
on one important point, i.e. the devastating emotional impact it had on the rest of their 
lives. Helvecia was reunited with her mother eleven years later, but their relationship 
was seriously affected by the long absence and their different cultural experiences in the 
intervening years. Herminio believes that his capacity for affection was severely stunted 
by the trauma of evacuation and loss at such an early age.  Moreover, these Basque 
“niños” questioned the wisdom of evacuating such small children, less than a month 
before Bilbao was finally taken by the Nationalists, an event that was clearly foreseen. 
Surely,  it would have been possible to send them to other areas of Spain, where the 
bombardments  were  not  so intense.  In  that  way,  they could have been more  easily 
reunited with their families in Bilbao when the war ended. 
This encounter with the Basque “niños” stimulated and broadened my interest in the 
subject of the evacuations and the displaced children that was fundamental in the work 
of the International  Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Save the Children 
International Union (SCIU). It led me to embark on a more profound study of their 
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evacuation to England, to highlight the plight of civilian victims of war, how politicians 
can use a humanitarian situation to further their own political “agenda”, and the role of 
some humanitarian children’s aid organisations that have to try to avoid to be used by 
these politicians.
The motives for choosing the evacuation to England and not one of the many others to 
France, Belgium, Soviet Union, Mexico and other countries, was that, in addition to the 
fact that the voices of surviving Basque “niños” sent to England awakened my interest, 
the displacement of these Basque children to England was the clearest example of what 
I wanted to present. In this episode we find the Basque Government and its political 
objectives — those of the National Joint Committee for Spanish Relief (NJCSR)196 and 
Leah Manning,197 with their evident attempt to use the evacuation to involve the British 
Government  on the Republican  side — and the process of negotiation  of  a  Neutral 
Zone, promoted by the ICRC and backed by some of the agencies, with the inconsistent 
position of a British Consul, Ralph Stevenson, and a last “moment of silence” by the 
ICRC Delegate, all of which we shall study in this investigative work. 
I  began by consulting  secondary sources  on the  subject,  which are  fairly extensive. 
Some  of  these,  such  as  Claudena  M.  Skran’s  Refugees  in  inter-war  Europe.  The  
Emergence of a Regime, 198 and Sir John H. Simpson’s The Refugee Problem: Report of  
a  Survey199, locate  the  case  of  the  Basque  refugee  children  in  the  context  of  the 
European refugee phenomenon, dealing with the British Government’s attitude on the 
subject. Other works, such as Yvonne Cloud’s The Basque Children in England 200, look 
closely at  life  in the colonies,  the repatriation,  the destiny of the children and their 
integration  into British  society on the eve  of  World War  II.  Dorothy Legarreta  has 
produced a very thorough work about the refugee children during the Spanish Civil War 
The Guernika Generation: Basque Refugee Children of the Spanish Civil War.201
196 An ad hoc agency established in Britain to channel the relief efforts of various organisations and 
existing agencies.
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James Cable’s  The Royal Navy and the Siege of Bilbao202 pays more attention to the 
period preceding the evacuation  and the role of the Royal  Navy in  the blockade of 
Basque ports by Franco’s forces. He records, in some detail, the relationship between 
the  British  and  Basque  Governments  and  their  connections  to  the  Republicans  and 
Nationalists, but do not introduces into the picture the key element the proposals for a 
Neutral Zone represented. Adrian Bell’s Only for three months: The Basque Children in  
Exile203 published the first extensive British work dedicated to this subject, while Oliver 
Marshall’s  pamphlet  Ship  of  Hope204 provides  an  oral  recollection  of  some  of  the 
Basque children’s experiences.
Other British scholars have concentrated on the “British dimension” of the evacuation 
and the role of the NJCSR, the body created in Britain shortly after the military coup in 
Spain, which became the coordinating vehicle for the “Aid to Spain” movement. Jim 
Fyrth’s  book  The Signal  was Spain –  The Spanish Aid  Movement  in  Britain  1936-
1939205 explores the relationship between the Labour Party, the Trade Union Congress 
(TUC) and  the  Communist  Party  within  the  NJCSR,  as  did  Tom Buchanan’s  The 
Spanish Civil  War and the British Labour Movement206 and Britain and the Spanish  
Civil War.207 
In Spanish, with the exception of the references in Luis de Castresana’s book El otro 
árbol de Guernika208 and its sequel La Verdad sobre El otro árbol de Guernika209, very 
little  material  existed  until  Gregorio  Arrien  published  La  Generación  del  Exilio:  
Génesis de las Escuelas Vascas y las Colonias Escolares 1932-1940210, followed by 
other works by the same author and by the paper of Jesús Alonso Carballés, La prensa 
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In all the above literature, however, there is very little about the evacuation itself, or the 
role of the forces that promoted the evacuation. Only Gregorio Arrien, first in his essay 
‘El Gobierno vasco y la evacuacion de niños 1936-1937’212 and later in his book Niños 
vascos evacuados a Gran Bretaña 1937-1940,213 refers in more detail  to the Basque 
Government authorities being part to the evacuation and their  relationship with their 
British counterparts.214 Perhaps the lack of references in Spanish secondary sources was 
the main reason why British scholars made practically no use of the Spanish primary 
sources that were available -though only accessible with difficulty- after Franco’s death. 
Spanish  secondary  sources  are  very  much  based  on  oral  recollections  from Basque 
refugee  children,  with  some  information  on  the  Basque  Government  through  press 
releases. Moreover, there was no official Decree, Order or other legal document issued 
by  the  Basque  Government  and  published  in  the  Official  Gazette215 regarding  the 
evacuations, from the formation of the Basque Autonomous Government in 1936 to the 
cessation  of  its  publication  in  1937,  following  the  end  of  the  Basque  Government 
control of the region.
In conclusion, an analysis of the secondary sources concerning the evacuation of the 
children to Britain show that there is no in-depth work addressing the evacuation itself. 
This  justifies,  in  my  opinion,  the  importance  of  studying,  in  the  context  of  the 
Humanitarian Relief in the Spanish Civil War, the full picture of the evacuation as an 
idea,  the  motivations  behind  the  evacuation  and  its  participants.  This  study  will, 
hopefully,  highlight  the  difficulties  encountered  by  humanitarian  aid  organisations 
within the context of the complex politics of Civil War, and their problematic resolution 
for those most affected: the Basque children refugees. 
2 The War in the North
In mid-August 1936, Nationalist troops under General Mola, mainly  requetés216 from 
Navarra, began an attack on the Basque province of Guipúzcoa, and by 05 September, 
the frontier  town of Irún was captured,  thus sealing the border  between the Basque 
212 Arrien (1986).
213 Arrien (1991). 
214 He mentions Social Assistance, Justice, Culture, Finance and Interior Departments as those dealing 
with the evacuation in Bilbao.
215 Official publication of the Basque Government.
216 Carlist Militias
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country and France. From then on, the northern provinces of Vizcaya, Santander and 
Asturias were cut off from the Republic and communication with the rest of the Popular 
Front  zone  was only possible  by air  or  sea.  Just  ten  days  later,  San Sebastián was 
surrendered by Basque nationalists without a shot being fired.  Gudari  forces (Basque 
nationalist soldiers) had remained in the city to ensure that it was not burned like Irún 
by the retreating Republican forces, clearly revealing the ambivalence many Basques 
felt towards the Republic of the Popular Front.217
Certainly, the situation in the Basque provinces differed fundamentally from that in the 
rest of the Popular Front zone. While certain Basque forces, such as the trade unions, 
Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos (STV), and the Basque party Acción Nacionalista  
Vasca (ANV), rallied immediately to the defence of the Republic,  the forces of the 
leading Basque party,  the  Partido Nacionalista  Vasco (PNV), were divided in  their 
allegiances.  Socially  conservative  and arch-Catholic  –  and supported  mainly  by the 
petty  bourgeoisie  and the  peasantry  –  the  PNV had  little  in  common  with  the  left 
orientation of the Popular Front, and it was generally believed that it was the promise of 
autonomy – the Basque Autonomy Statute was approved on 1 October 1936) – that kept 
the Basques loyal to the Republic.218 
The new Basque Government, set up under the Presidency of José Antonio Aguirre on 7 
October 1936, was dominated by the PNV, and trade unions were excluded. Private 
property and the Church were respected, which the Basque Government’s own police 
force, the Ertzaina, was established to protect. 
After  months  of  inactivity,  the  Nationalists’  northern  offensive  began on 31 March 
1937. The capture of the northern regions — with coal in Asturias and shipyards and 
steel-making  in  Vizcaya  — would  be  crucial  to  the  Nationalists,  which  controlled 
overwhelmingly agrarian regions. Moreover, this was an extremely weak point in the 
Republic’s  defences,  cut  off  from  the  rest  of  the  Republican  territory  and  with 
difficulties of establishing a unified military command.219 The strategy of the Nationalist 
217 Fraser (1981a), p. 189.
218 Ibid, p. 191.
219 As Romero Salvadó points out, the northern provinces could not be helped by sea as the bulk of the 
Republican fleet was engaged in the Mediterranean guarding the supply routes from Russia. A 
coordinated defence was also absent, as concepts of unified military command which would have 
facilitated this were resisted, and, particularly in Vizcaya, military efforts were seen in terms of local 
resistance. Romero Salvadó (2005), p.147.
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general,  Mola, with nearly 40,000 troops and the air support of the German Condor 
Legion,  was  the  systematic  use  of  dive-bombing  and  saturation  bombing  of  cities; 
essentially this was a use of terror bombing on a scale never previously seen in any 
European war, and which was designed to practise techniques which would be used 
during the Blitzkrieg of the Second World War.220 
Despite Nationalist superiority in men and weapons, especially airpower, the Basques, 
under President Aguirre, fought bravely, aided undoubtedly by the mountainous terrain. 
Mola’s expectation of capturing Vizcaya in three weeks proved false, and it took him 
three months to totally subdue the province. Continuous and sustained terror bombing 
of small towns such as the bombardments of Elorrio,  Otxandiano and Durango at the 
beginning  of  April  did,  however,  gradually  undermine  resistance.  The  greatest,  and 
most symbolic destruction, however, occurred in the small market town of Guernica, the 
ancient Basque capital, on 26 April 1937. Guernica was attacked in a military operation 
that has been the subject of much discussion about those responsible, their objectives 
and their victims. The evidence that bombers and fighters of the Condor Legion bombed 
and atacked the town is clear, but the estimates of the number of victims range from the 
200 dead suggested by Vicente Talon221 to the 1,600 that Romero Salvadó affirms. For 
Romero Salvadó, this action was “a clear message,  like Badajoz one year earlier,  to 
those who offered resistance to Franco’s new order”.222 On 29 April 1937, Guernica fell 
to the Nationalists and on 1 May, Mola attacked all along the front223 and proceed to 
advance towards Bilbao. The large refugee population and the lack of a real effort by 
the Nationalists to count the casualties, made it impossible to arrive at an exact figure.
The destruction of Guernica, followed by Mola’s rapid advance towards Bilbao, did not 
just undermine morale in the Basque country,  it  also revealed the tenuous links that 
existed  between  the  PNV-dominated  Basque  Government  and  the  Republic  of  the 
Popular  Front.  Tensions  between the  Basque Government  and the  Republic  had,  of 
course, been present since the beginning of the war, and it was clear that, ideologically, 
the PNV was much closer to the Nationalists. Indeed, negotiations to reach a separate 
settlement  between  the  Basques  and  Franco  continued  unabated  throughout  the 
220 Preston (1986), p. 139.
221 Talon (1973), p. 91.
222 Romero Salvadó (2005), p. 148. 
223 Thomas, H. (1990), p 630.
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conflict.224 As the war in the north intensified from the spring of 1937, tensions between 
the Basque Government and the Republic increased, and there was a widespread belief 
within  the  Basque  administration  that  the  Republican  Government,  then  resident  in 
Valencia,  had  deliberately  discriminated  against  the  Basques  by  its  failure  to  send 
adequate aircraft.225 As the Nationalist  campaign in the Basque provinces proceeded, 
showing that a Republican victory might not be achievable, the Basque Government, 
through various channels226,  insisted that the Civil  War was a Spanish, rather than a 
Basque affair, as the Basques were another kind of people; well mannered and more 
“democratically  oriented”  towards  the  liberal  ideas  best  represented  by Britain.  The 
Basque  Government  argued  that  the  Basque  country  needed  to  be  spared  both  the 
nightmare of a Franco takeover and the “red menace” that they feared the Republic 
represented. Independence or a protectorate under international supervision was deemed 
the best solution. 
Moreover,  just  after  the  bombing  of  Guernica  Basque  President  Aguirre  made  a 
dramatic appeal to the world on April 27, calling for the evacuation of children, women 
and non-combatants from the Basque country to other countries.227 Some evacuations 
from the Basque country had, of course, taken place, particularly at the start of the war, 
when refugees crossed the French border before it was controlled by rebel troops228 and 
later,  when  women  and  children,  supporters  of  the  rebels,  fearing  being  shot  or 
imprisoned, were sent to France and Belgium. Both these countries had also accepted 
some refugee children sent by the Basque Government before Aguirre’s appeal on 27 
224 For more on this subject, see Pretus (2003). 
225 Sir Henry Chilton, British Ambassador to Spain, reports a private letter from Ralph Stevenson, British 
Consul at Bilbao, dated 9 April 1937, from which he extracted a part. The letter refers to various visits of 
relevant Basque officers, one of whom was Sr Joaquin de Eguia, the so-called “First Lord of the Basque 
Admiralty”, in respect of which Stevenson tells Chilton: “Eguia told me, inter alia, that it was the general 
belief of Basque in Government offices from the President down, that Valencia’s failure to send 
promised, adequate aircraft to enable Bilbao to ward off raiders, was really Valencia’s policy to allow the 
independent Basques a dose of such punishment as they will not easily forget.” PRO: FO 371-21369-
W723/37/41.
226 (a) Meeting in the Foreign Office on 3 May 1937; requested by Sir Walter Citrine, TUC General 
Secretary (on behalf of Sr Ignacio de Lizaso) Sir Richard Vansittart and Sr Lizaso, in the presence of Sir 
George Mounsey, in charge of Spanish Affairs [He actually was Assistant Under-Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs in charge of Spanish Affairs during the Civil War] (PRO: FO 371.21291, Docs. 10–16.); (b) 
Memo dated 18 May 1937 from Sr de Lizaso to EMV (full name undisclosed), member of the Wright 
Organisation, a lobbying organisation active in Britain and the United States, which also represented 
South African interests. (References on the U.S. Senate Register) See at Document A (in Annex to 
Appendix 2) the image of a copy authenticated by the seal of the Basque Nationalism Archives – AHNV. 
GE-462, 2 (8 May 1937).
227 See Document B for the copy of the letter addressed to the President of the International Red Cross on 
29 April 1937 and its English translation.
228 Many of them returned later when Guipúzcoa fell totally under Franco’s control.
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April, but evacuations to France and other European countries became more formalised 
after his call. In January 1937 a special Desk was established in Bilbao by the Basque 
Government  to implement a planned evacuation of children to colonies in France.229 
However,  it  was  not  until  21  May 1937 that  the  British  accepted  the  first  Basque 
refugees, when the steamer  Habana sailed from Bilbao to Southampton, escorted by 
HMS Fearless, with 3,881 children, 95 women teachers, 120 younger women teachers 
and 15 Catholic priests aboard. 
3 The Aguirre Appeal and the Evacuation
President  Aguirre’s  appeal  to  the  world  on  27  April,  requesting  the  evacuation  of 
children, women and non-combatants from the Basque country, was made the day after 
the bombardment of Guernica, and thus in the midst of popular revulsion in Europe 
against the terror tactics being employed by the Nationalists in the Civil War. Franco’s 
forces, had, of course, attempted to deny their role in the atrocity, and even claimed that 
the Basques themselves had dynamited the town for propaganda purposes.230 However, 
The  Times correspondent,  George  Steer,  had  been  in  Bilbao,  and  had  travelled  to 
Guernica immediately after the bombing. He reported in his dispatch of 28 April on the 
central role of the Condor Legion in the bombing, and the terror tactics used during the 
destruction of Guernica.231 The impact on public opinion was, immediate, without doubt 
contributing to the favourable response to Aguirre’s call for evacuation.
In Britain,  those supporting the legal Republican Government  had begun mobilising 
immediately  after  the  military  coup,  and  in  July  1936,  the  Spanish  Medical  Aid 
Committee (SMAC) was created to provide medical units for the Republican army. The 
SMAC was promoted by medical workers from the left-wing of the Labour Party, and 
enthusiastically supported by the left-wing Labour MP, Leah Manning, who became its 
Secretary,  with Dr Hyacinth  Morgan232 as Chairman. Thus began the “Aid to Spain” 
229 Euzkadi Roja 9 Jan 1937 and La Tarde 10 Jan 1937.
230 Preston (1986), p. 140; Romero Salvadó (2005), p.148. 
231 After strafing the town for over three hours, the planes of the Condor Legion “plunged low from above 
the centre of the town to machine-gun those of the civilian population who had taken refuge”, ibid, p. 
141.
232 Dr Hyacinth Bernard Wenceslaus Morgan (1885-1956), of Irish origin and born in the West Indies, 
worked in Glasgow mental hospitals and served as a doctor in France in World War I. Back from the 
conflict he practised in London and went into politics as Labour MP from 1929–1931 and 1940–1956. 
Along with Dr Charles Brook he was central in the formation of the Spanish Medical Aid Committee 
(SMAC).
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movement,  which  proceeded  to  organise  a  fundraising  campaign  for  the  Spanish 
Republic all over Britain.
The Spanish Medical Aid Committee would eventually form part of the NJCSR, set up 
in November 1936. The NJCSR, was founded as the result of a visit to Spain by MPs, 
promoted by Wilfred Roberts, Liberal MP for North Cumberland, who travelled in early 
November 1936 with five MPs, two Labour and three Conservative.  After the visit, 
Roberts  drafted  a  report  and  called  for  a  Committee  to  be  formed.  Hence,  on  16 
November 1936, a meeting was held at the House of Commons with representatives 
from 38 organisations. Somewhat later, on 21 November,  the NJCSR was born at  a 
meeting at the London Friends’ House, with 15 founding members, the leading figures 
of which were: Chairman, Kathleen Marjory, Duchess of Atholl (generally known as 
the “Red Duchess”); Wilfred Roberts, Liberal MP for North Cumberland and foremost 
promoter of the project; Isabel Brown from the Communist Party; Leah Manning and 
Ellen Wilkinson, both from the left-wing of the Labour Party and already very active in 
the  “Aid  to  Spain”  campaign;  and  the  independent  Eleanor  Rathbone.  Other 
organisations also part of the NJCSR were the Salvation Army, the Friends,233 the Save 
the Children Fund and SMAC. Henceforth, the NJCSR would become the coordinating 
vehicle for “Aid to Spain”. 
The  Committee  was  created  as  “an  all  party,  non-political,  non-sectarian  body  to 
coordinate relief work and to undertake certain specific pieces of work not being done 
by other organisations”.234 However, in practice, those who had created the NJSCR were 
pro-Republican and, in general, it was the Left — the Communist Party and the Labour 
Left: that is, those who had been active in the “Aid to Spain” movement from July 1936 
— who were the most committed and active force within it.235 This undoubtedly caused 
problems with other organisations within the NJCSR, such as the Friends (Quakers), 
who referred in their meetings to the “partisan” stances of the Committee, despite the 
fact that the majority of the British Friends were pro-Republican. The Save the Children 
233 Represented but keeping their freedom of action (more “cooperation” than “coordination”), FSC, 
minutes, 13/1/1937, FHL.
234 Typed, undated report, Mss 308/3/NJC/1, W. Roberts papers, MRO.
235 “The Aid to Spain campaign was the nearest thing to a People’s Front that came about in Britain”, 
Fyrth (1986), p. 22. 
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Fund voiced similar  complaints,  and both organisations  called  on the  Committee  to 
open all meetings with a statement of impartiality.236 
There were also differences within the NJCSR vis-à-vis the question of evacuation of 
children and non-combatants  from the Basque country.  The Friends were adamantly 
opposed to evacuation, revealed in a letter dated 11 February 1937 from the Friends’ 
representation  in  Spain,  Calle  Urgell,  121,  Barcelona,  to  O.F.  Olden  in  Norway, 
referring to the possibility of Spanish children going to Norway:
“There is a great deal of difference of opinion about the advisability of sending children 
abroad because of the difficulties of language, of housing, of supervision”.237
The Friends’ attitude towards evacuation remained unchanged even after the Guernica 
bombing, as is confirmed by an undated and unsigned report called  Refugee Children  
Colonies suggestion to help: Sending Children Abroad [sic], attached to the Minutes of 
the Committee on Spain on 4 May 1937:
“Not a wholly satisfactory plan because of the differences of languages and customs, 
the relative great expense of travel, the danger of losing track of an occasional child … 
the psychological difficulty of the children themselves”.238
The Save the Children Fund, an organisation with enormous experience in this field, 
was of a similar  mind,  illustrated by a note dated 4 May 1937, with reference to a 
telephone conversation between Lewis Golden, secretary of the Save the Children Fund, 
and Mr J. Cooper, from the Home Office. According to Cooper, 
“Mr Golden said he could not emphasise too strongly that his society, which has 
upwards of twenty years experience succouring refugee children in all parts of the 
world, was absolutely opposed in principle to the removal of young children from their 
native country. Where this has been done the later results were too often deplorable and 
for his part he would sooner see them die in their own land than rot slowly in exile 
where they deteriorate physically, morally and mentally”.239 
236 SCF Council, minutes 17/6/1937, referred to in Buchanan (1997), p. 98.
237 FSC CoS, minutes, 8/3/1937, FHL.
238 FSC CoS, minutes, 4/5/1937, FHL.
239 From Mr Cooper (Home Office) to Mr Roberts (Foreign Office), ‘Proposal to evacuate children from 
Bilbao to the United Kingdom’. PRO: FO 31721370. Docs. 184, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192. 
Registry Number W1947/37/41.
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In a meeting of the NJCSR on 25 February 1937, the possibility of giving refuge to 
Basque children in Britain was rised, proposed by Capt. James McNamara, a right-wing 
Tory MP. He suggested that the children should be brought to England and housed in 
hostels  until  adoption,  in  the  case  of  disappearance  or  death  of  the  parents.  This 
proposal was contested by the left-wing Labour Peer, Lord Listowes, who thought it ill-
advisable  to  bring  children  to  “cold  and Protestant  England”,  and  suggested  that  it 
would  be  better  to  contact  the  French,  who  had  already  begun  to  receive  Spanish 
children.240 By 1 May 1937, however, feeling within the Committee had changed, seen 
clearly  in  a  letter  to  The  Times on  that  date,  in  which  a  large  number  of  NJCSR 
members wrote in support of evacuation. By this time, a broad spectrum of the English 
political class was in favour of evacuation, as can be seen from the political diversity of 
the signatories of the 1 May letter.241 
This  change was undoubtedly related  to  the  bombardments  of  small  Basque towns, 
which commenced at the beginning of April, but particularly the bombing of Guernica 
on 26 April. Basque President Aguirre immediately denounced the bombings of Elorrio, 
Otxandiano  and  Durango  on  4  April  in  a  telegram  to  Sir  Henry  Chilton,  British 
Ambassador to Spain, resident in Hendaye,  France.242 The first call  for a large-scale 
evacuation of Basque children to Britain, however, was issued by Ralph Stevenson, the 
British  Consul  in  Bilbao,  who  cabled  Anthony  Eden  to  that  effect  on  8  April.243 
Stevenson244 informed Eden that he had received assurances from the French Consul 
that  France  would  assist,  and  had  found  President  Aguirre  eager  to  accept  such  a 
240 NJCSR, minutes, 25/2/1937, p. 1, MRO.
241 The letter was signed by Katherine Atholl, Noel Buxton (1860–1948), liberal MP; Arthur Slater 
(1881–1975), politician, academic and Pro-European; Ellen Wilkinson (1881–1847), Labour MP, Leftist 
and supporter of the International Brigades; Irene Word (1895–1980), Conservative MP; Judy Megan 
Lloyd George (1902–1966), Liberal MP (later, in 1955, Labour) and Deputy Leader of the Liberal Party; 
Harold Nicolson (1886–1968), British diplomat and politician who moved from the Fascist party of Sir 
Oswald Mosley to Labour in 1935; Eleanor Rathbone (1872–1946), Independent MP, social reformer and 
enemy of appeasement; one of the first to alert public opinion to the rise of fascism in Europe; Thelma 
Cazelet-Keir (1899–1989), National Conservative MP; Philip Noel-Baker (1889–1982), Labour MP, 
diplomat, academic and disarmament campaigner; Anthony Crossley, Conservative MP; David Grenfell 
(1881–1968), Welsh Labour MP (1922–1959).
242 GE 381-3, AHNV.
243 PRO: FO 37121291.
244 The Madrid newspaper ABC announced in its issue dated Friday, 2 April 1937, p. 9: “The British 
Consul profoundly impressed”: Referring to the reaction of Consul Stevenson when visiting Durango 
after a bombardment of the Nationalist planes: “impressed by the catastrophe and with no comparison to 
the bombardments he saw in the European War”.
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humanitarian project, and that the President had agreed to issue the necessary passports 
“without political discrimination”.245 Stevenson stressed that, 
“…owing to dangers to Bilbao civilian population from repeated aerial bombardments I 
have, in collaboration with French Consul, who is telegraphing in identical terms, 
proposed to Basque Government large scale evacuation of women and children. Basque 
Government are eager to accept proposal and promise to issue necessary passports 
without political discrimination. I submit for consideration most urgently by H.M.G., in 
consultation with French Government, that have suggested themselves here”.246 
There seems little doubt, however, that Stevenson, though deeply moved by the carnage 
from the bombings, was being pressured by sectors of the Basque army and prominent 
Basques  for  a  large-scale  evacuation  after  the  first  bombings  on  4  April.247 Ralph 
Stevenson was sympathetic towards the cause of the Basques and influential with them. 
Captain Mac Grigor,  of  the Fourth Destroyer  Flotilla,  operating on the Biscay Bay, 
reported to the Admiralty about Stevenson:248 “Mr Stevenson, our Consul, obviously 
carries great weight with the Basque Ministers”: And very enlighting is that on 13 April 
1937,reacting  to  the  British  Government  policy  of  accepting  the  efectivity  of  the 
blockade  to  the  Basque  Ports  by  the  Nationalist  navy,  Stevenson  sent  a  despatch 
opposing in fact such policy:
“The Basques,  it  can not be gainsaid,  are  displaying amazing  fortitude … their  last 
resource of food supplies, built upon carefully planed British Charter parties and paid 
for in advance, would now appear to be cut off by Franco diplomacy, or by a change in 
policy, hardly credible, of His Majesty’s Government…. Is he [referring to the Basque 
Men] not superior in every way except numbers, to his Spanish oppressor?”249
No comment. Even the most enfeverished activist of the PNV, strict follower of Sabino 
Arana,250 had probably restrained himself  from printing such unsustained and racism 
tainted expression. 
245 PRO: FO 37121369.
246 PRO: FO 371213691.
247 Stevenson sent a letter on 9 April to the British Ambassador in Spain (resident in Hendaye, France), 
reporting visits from Basque officers and prominent Basques, such as Sr de la Sota (one of the founders 
of the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV), about the evacuation of women and children on a large scale. 
PRO: FO 37121369. W. 7231/37/41, docs. 433, 434, 435. 
248 PRO: AMD 1163512.
249 PRO: FO 37121291.
250 Sabino Arana Goiri (1865-1903): Basque (from Vizcaya) writer, father of the Basque Nationalism and 
founder of the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV). 
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President Aguirre’s representative in London Sr Lizaso was similarly active in trying to 
win over members of the NJSCR for evacuation, as Leah Manning stated to Stevenson 
when she arrived in Bilbao on 24 April:
“I am here at the request of the Basque Government, through their delegation in 
London, and I propose to evacuate Basque children to England for dispersal throughout 
my country until Franco is defeated. All I ask you to do is to present me to President 
Aguirre”.251 
However,  despite  Manning’s  obvious  support  for  such  a  project,  the  scale  of  the 
evacuation proposed by Aguirre when she met him on the 25th April went far beyond 
what she had expected, as she says:
“I asked the president how many children he had in mind, “about 4,000” said he, and 
without waiting for my gasp of astonishment, went on: “They’ll be in family groups, 
aged between five and sixteen, and they will be in the charge of their priests and 
teachers – about 300 adults”. My first coherent thought was that perhaps the Basque 
Government had chartered an ocean liner, maybe one of the “Queens”, but since I had 
lost the power of speech, I said nothing”252.
The  bombardment  of  Guernica  was  to  dramatically  alter  these  perceptions,  and 
Aguirre’s  plea  to  Europe on 27 April  was  followed by a  formal  proposal  from the 
NJCSR  to  the  Foreign  Office  to  offer  refuge  to  Spanish  children  evacuated  from 
Northern Spain.253 The following day, Steer’s article appeared in The Times, which was 
subsequently published in other newspapers.254 The Basque situation was discussed in 
Cabinet the same day, 28 April (by the Committee on Foreign Policy), and it was agreed 
to help Basque child refugees, under certain conditions, and it was proposed that the 
Royal Navy escort refugee ships to friendly ports.255 
Events now moved swiftly. Stevenson’s call to Aguirre to surrender Bilbao and spare 
his people useless slaughter was rejected, the Basques believing that the defences of the 
251 Manning (1970), p. 124. There is a letter, signed by Sr Lizaso (the Basque Government’s 
representative in London), addressed to President Aguirre, introducing Leah Manning and asking for 
cooperation, dated 28 April 1937, GE-242-2, AHNV.
252 Manning (1970), p. 125
253 The Foreign Office then referred this proposal to the Home Office. PRO: FO 3721369. W 8214/37/41, 
Docs. 497, 498.
254 Daily Star, Daily Express and Ce Soir also published Steer’s article the following day. 
255 PRO: FO 37121372. Docs. 6, 7. Telegrams 140, 143.
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city,  the famous “iron ring”, could not be breached.256 Pressure was mounting on the 
British Government to agree to evacuation, with the lobbying campaign by the NJCSR 
and the evident support of British public opinion. There are numerous expressions of 
the pressure exercised  by the  NJCSR. On 6 May 1937,  there  was a  request  by W. 
Roberts  and the Duchess of Atholl  for the Government  to contribute  one pound for 
every pound privately collected. This was opposed by Sir George Mounsey (Assistant 
Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in charge of Spanish Affairs during the Civil War) 
as  a  violation  of  “non-intervention”.257 On 10 May there  were  two letters  from W. 
Roberts to the Foreign Office regarding the evacuation scheme and the funds held by 
the NJCSR (£4,000) and on 13 May there was a letter from W. Roberts to Chamberlain, 
in which he states that the NJCSR intended to go ahead “without authorisation”.258 On 
14 May Leah Manning gave assurances to the Basque Government regarding British 
acceptance.  The  British  Consul,  Stevenson,  asked  her  to  wait.259 On  17  May Leah 
Manning “forced” British Vice-Consul, Sr Angel Ojanguren, in the absence of Consul 
Stevenson, to accept 4,000 children260, and on 18 May the Duchess of Atholl appealed 
to Eden, explaining the risk to Bilbao girls of “about fifteen” to the advancing Moorish 
troops, if the town should fall.261
Guernica was discussed during Parliamentary Questions on 28 April262, and the Spanish 
Ambassador in London, Sr Azcarate, called on Lord Cranborne, Parliamentary Under-
Secretary of State, on the same evening with an official request for British assistance in 
the evacuation of Basque women and children, including the possible reception of these 
refugees  in  France  and  England.  Lord  Cranborne,  although  not  in  favour  of  the 
proposal, agreed to bring the matter before Eden, Foreign Secretary at the time.263
On 29 April, Stevenson called on the Foreign Office to provide British destroyers to 
evacuate the Basque Government (500 people), and the Foreign Office contacted the 
256 Stevenson made his plea to Aguirre on 28 April, two days after the Guernica tragedy. PRO: FO 
37121291. The “iron ring” defences are discussed in Romero Salvadó (1999), p. 148 and Preston (1986), 
p. 142.
257 PRO: FO 37121371.
258 PRO: FO 37121370 (10 May) and PRO: FO 37121371 (13 May).
259 PRO: FO 37121370.
260 Manning (1970), p. 130.
261 PRO: FO 37121370.
262 PRO: FO 37121369, Doc. 338.
263 PRO: FO 37121369, W 8557/37/41, Docs. 36, 37, 38. Sr Azcarate also visited the Home Office on 15 
May.
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British Ambassador, Sir Henry Chilton, stating the possible need to approach Franco in 
relation to the evacuation matter.264 Although on the same day the Home Office and a 
ministerial group265 agreed in principle to the evacuation, there was great reluctance to 
supply British naval protection, which could, possibly, embroil Britain in the Spanish 
conflict, against the stated public policy of non-intervention.266 
Moreover, the British policy of “neutrality” in the Spanish conflict had already been 
seriously exposed in skirmishes on the Cantabrian coast from the beginning of April. 
The Nationalists had announced a blockade of Republican ports on the Cantabrian coast 
on 4 April, and Admiral Lord Chatfield, First Sea Lord, and the British Ambassador, Sir 
Henry Chilton, both clearly pro-Nationalist, had informed the British Government that 
the  blockade  was  effective  because  the  River  Nervión  had  been  mined  by  the 
Nationalists,  and British ships could thus be shelled if  they refused to stop. Despite 
assurances from the Basques that the mines had been cleared, London ordered the Royal 
Navy flotilla to inform all British vessels en route to Bilbao to wait in the French port of 
St Jean de Luz until further orders were issued.267 
Although serious doubts were raised in the House of Commons about the Royal Navy’s 
assurances regarding the effectiveness of the blockade268, it was the action of the small 
British  merchant  ship,  the  South  Seas  Spray,  on  20  April  that  clearly  revealed  the 
hollowness of the Navy’s claim. Ignoring Royal Navy instructions, the ship arrived in 
Bilbao from St Jean de Luz without any interference from Nationalist  warships nor, 
evidently, from mines. Given this lead, other ships waiting on the French Basque coast 
set  sail  for  Spain.  Chamberlain’s  Government  was  deeply  discredited,  as  was  the 
Admiralty, whose First Lord, Sir Samuel Hoare, had evidently received the information 
about the Nervión mines from the Nationalist Navy. 269 
These entanglements on the northern coast throughout April not only discredited the 
Government  and the  Navy,  but  they  had  also threatened  to  expose the  clearly  pro-
264 PRO: FO 37121369, W-8467/37/41, Doc. 540, and PRO: FO 37121369, Doc. 3.
265 These ministers met as the United Kingdom Delegation to the Imperial Conference. PRO: FO 
37121370.
266 In reality Britain had supported Franco from the onset of the Civil War. For an excellent account of 
British support for Franco, see Moradiellos (1990) and Moradiellos (1996b).
267 Beevor (2001), pp. 240-1.
268 There were only four Nationalist ships guarding 200 miles of coast and the Basque shore batteries 
controlled an area beyond the three mile limit. Ibid, p. 241.
269 Ibid.
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Francoist nature of the British Government, the Foreign Office and the Admiralty, and 
thus could seriously undermine the British public policy of non-intervention. Therefore 
it is not surprising that the British expressed caution vis-à-vis the use of the Navy in any 
evacuation from Northern Spain. It could also be the case that the British Government 
did not want to upset Franco by giving succour to his enemies, as the Government was 
certain of his victory in the Civil War, and went to enormous lengths to support him.270 
However, the pressure on Britain to intervene in the evacuation issue was intense over 
the next few days,  both from the Basque Government  and British public  opinion.271 
Nevertheless,  perhaps  the  most  important  factor  in  deciding  the  issue  was  the 
involvement of the French Navy, which, it was noted on 29 April, was already escorting 
refugee ships from Northern Spain.272 The Cabinet Committee on Foreign Policy met 
the next day and a telegram was sent from the Foreign Office to Ambassador Chilton to 
communicate  with  Franco  through  the  Military  Governor  of  Irún,  Commander 
Troncoso,  regarding  the  Royal  Navy’s  involvement.273 Another  telegram  from  the 
Foreign Office to Chilton the same afternoon asked him to get in touch with the French 
Ambassador in Spain and with the Basque Government. By that time, the Home Office 
had agreed to the request from the NJCSR to accept Basque refugees, on the condition 
that there would be no cost to the Government.274
4 Alternative Offers to Evacuation: the “Safe Zone” Proposals 
from Franco and the International Committee of the Red 
Cross
The British Ambassador, Sir Henry Chilton, sent a communication to General Franco 
on 30 April 1937, announcing,
…as a matter of courtesy the instructions being issued to His Majesty’s ships to afford 
facilities for all possible protection to any ships leaving Bilbao with non-combatant 
270 Moradiellos (1996b).
271 On 30 April, the Basque Government called for evacuation to take place the very same day and that 
Franco should be informed that British ships would protect the evacuation. Euskadi also Euzkadi Roja, 31 
Apr 1937, p. 1. The Times, 30 Apr 1937, p. 8. 
272 PRO: FO 37121370.
273 PRO: FO 37121372, Doc. 6. 
274 The conditions of acceptance were that the Basque refugees would be independent of all political 
parties, and that there would be private funds for education and expenses, “only private funds for the 
operation to preserve the principle of non intervention and to prevent His Majesty’s Government being 
exposed to similar demands in other cases”. PRO: FO 37121372.
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refugees on board, when such ships reach the high seas.275
Franco’s answer was received in the afternoon of 1 May 1937 from Salamanca, sent by 
JoséAntonio  Sangroniz,  Head  of  Franco’s  Diplomatic  Cabinet,  in  charge  of  the 
Secretariat of Foreign Relations, and communicated by the Military Governor of Irún, 
Commander Julian Troncoso. 
In point 5 of Franco’s reply it stated,
“West of Bilbao, as far as Santander, there is a zone of ‘red territory’ far removed from 
the theatre of war, in which the civil population can escape from danger. Their 
evacuation to a foreign country is therefore unnecessary since non-combatants can take 
refuge in that area. A safety zone, moreover, could be established if the international 
Red Cross would guarantee that it would not be used for military purposes”.276 
Franco’s proposal for a Safe Zone277 was viewed favourably by Sir George Mounsey 
from the Foreign Office. On 2 May, Mounsey addressed the Foreing Secretary, Eden, 
giving his present position regarding the Anglo-French scheme to evacuate the civil 
population of Bilbao. He explained why he felt that General Franco’s offer of a Neutral 
Zone  guaranteed  by  the  Red  Cross  should  be  accepted  on  the  grounds  outlined. 
Mounsey  believed  that  Franco’s  proposal  was  reasonable  and  should  be  explored, 
because, he argued, there was no possibility of evacuating 300,000 people from Bilbao, 
as the Basque Government had requested after Guernica.278 
Mounsey also protested against  the use of British naval vessels to escort  evacuation 
ships, a feeling evidently shared by the Admiralty, as Chief of the Naval Staff, Sir Ernie 
A. Chatfield, pointed out, summarising his policy,
“I am using every effort I can and such influence as I possess to reduce our enemies and 
to avoid our rushing into dangerous situations which we are not prepared to follow to 
the end. It is essential that we should make friends and not enemies while our defence 
275 After much discussion about the way to “communicate” to the Salamanca Government the decision to 
use the Royal Navy to protect refugee ships sailing from Bilbao, it was decided “to inform” Salamanca 
concerning the instructions issued to the Navy. This was a result of the meeting of the Cabinet Committee 
on Foreign Policy PRO: FO 371.21370. W9159/37/41, Docs. 196-207.
276 PRO: FO 371.21369: W. 8710/37/41, Docs. 104, 105, 106. 
277 Also referred to as Neutral Zone.
278 PRO: FO37121369 W8866/37/41, Docs. 134, 135, 136, 137, 137, and one unmarked document 
attached.
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position is still weak. I shall be glad when the next two years are safely past”.279 
However, public opinion continued to be in favour of evacuation, and the Times letter of 
1 May had confirmed the pro-evacuation position of a broad sector of the political class. 
This  was  clearly  revealed  during  Parliamentary  Questions  on  6  May,  when  Major 
General Sir Alfred Knox asked,
“The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will give the substance of General 
Franco’s reply to the request for acquiescence in the project of evacuating the civil 
population of Bilbao and of the alternative proposals for safeguarding non-combatant 
lives put forward by General Franco. Does not this reply of the nationalist leader show 
that his attitude towards the civil population is just as humane as that of any sentimental 
supporter of the Spanish Government in this country?”280
Knox’s question, however, was answered  from the Labour benches by a Mr Mander, 
who replied, 
“Was not his attitude to the civil population very clearly indicated in Guernica?”
Clearly,  the  Guernica  bombing  cast  a  strong  shadow  over  the  issue,  and  Franco’s 
proposal was not seriously considered at first. Therefore on 5 May, Sir Henry Chilton 
addressed a note to Salamanca communicating the decision to continue preparations for 
the  evacuation.  On  6  May,  Franco’s  answer  was  sent  to  Chilton,  and,  apart  from 
references to the intervention and the sinking of the nationalist battleship  España281, it 
referred to the Safe Zone as follows:
“The humanitarian and affectionate feelings of his Excellency, the Generalísimo 
Franco, towards the population of Vizcaya moved him to seek a solution by which this 
attack against the sovereign rights of Spain might be avoided and by which the 
difficulties attendant upon the carrying out of the evacuation might be spared: a solution 
was offered with the possibility of establishing a zone of refuge under the auspices of 
the International Red Cross in order to save the civil population from useless suffering. 
This offer is maintained in full, provided that the International Red Cross guarantee, and 
the Basque authorities agree, that the said zone shall not be, like the safe zone in 
279 This was expressed in a letter to the Commander in Chief of the China Station, on 11 November 1937. 
PRO: FO37121370.
280 PRO: FO 371. 21369, Doc. 148.
281 The Nationalists thought that the Royal Navy had been somehow involved in the sinking of their 
battleship España. This was not the case. The ship struck a Nationalist mine off Santander and sank.
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Madrid282, a centre of military training, a storehouse of munitions for any kind of 
warlike activity. The representative of the International Red Cross should be called 
upon to intervene in this matter”.283 
A note from the Foreign Office following Franco’s repeated offer of a Safe Zone asked 
Chilton to find out if Salamanca stood by its offer and if so, to put it to the Basques. The 
text  also  revealed  that  Salamanca  no  longer  accused  the  Navy  of  having  anything 
directly  to  do  with  the  sinking  of  the  España,  as  was  first  thought.284 Despite  the 
resolution  of  the  España  issue,  however,  there  continued  to  be encounters  between 
British and Nationalist ships in the northern sea lanes.285 There was obvious disquiet 
regarding the situation in the northern seas, clearly revealed in a message sent from the 
Captain of  Destroyer 6  to the Admiralty on 3 May. The Captain requested the Bilbao 
Consulate to inform the Basque Government concerning Franco’s reply and the danger 
of attack from “bombing and rebel ships”.286 
In  Bilbao  itself  the  situation  was  desperate,  with  continuous  bombing  and constant 
pressure on its ground defences. The ICRC was extremely worried and believed that an 
evacuation of the population was practically impossible, given the lack of naval assets 
and Franco’s refusal to allow it. On 3 May, the ICRC made contact with the British 
Ambassador, Chilton, and the French Ambassador, Herbette, informing and requesting:
“Our delegate in Bilbao has transmitted to the Basque Government a message asking 
about the evacuation assets and food we can offer in favour of Bilbao’s women and 
children. Stop.
ICRC has not any material means of evacuation or feeding but is ready to cooperate 
with you if you believe it as useful, in accordance with our capability and especially by 
the services of our Bilbao Delegate George Graz. Stop. 
We shall be grateful to be informed about the steps foreseen by the British and 
French authorities”.287
282 On 7 November 1937, Franco unilaterally declared the Salamanca neighbourhood in Madrid a zone 
free of bombardments. While never accepted by the Republican Government, the declaration was 
basically kept to by Franco’s planes. That neighbourhood was mainly the residence of the upper 
bourgeoisie. Martínez Bande (1976), p. 235.
283 PRO: FO 37121370 W-9108/37/41, Docs. 169, 170, 171, 172.
284 PRO: FO 371. 21370: W 9108/37/41, Docs. 169, 170, 171, 172.
285 PRO: ADM 1163516 and PRO: FO 37121292 refer to incidents on 4 May 1937.
286 PRO: FO 37121369: W 8734/37/41, Docs. 112, 113.
287 Docs. 2242, 2243, 3 May 1937, in ‘Correspondance générale et rapports 1936–1950’ (16/4/1937-
10/5/1937), B CR 212 GEN-12, ICRCA; henceforth ICRC (1937b).
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A few days later, however, the Committee agreed with the proposal sent from London 
by  a  representative  from “the  Basques  abroad”,  Luis  Ortuzar,  for  a  Safe  Zone  for 
women, children and old people.288 Certainly the ICRC had never been in favour of 
massively evacuating children from Northern Spain, and therefore was responsive to 
Ortuzar’s idea of a Safe Zone. Nevertheless, the existing correspondence made it clear 
that the ICRC would have cooperated with the evacuation289, if that had been possible, 
and supported by the British and French. It is evident, however, that the ICRC had few 
resources at its disposal to offer for such an evacuation, and there were fears, voiced by 
Muntadas, Delegate of the ICRC at St Jean de Luz, France290, that both the French and 
British ambassadors were pro-Franco, and therefore he would only accept evacuation if 
it were ordered by London.291 Moreover, Raymond Courvoisier,  the ICRC Delegate in 
France  during  the  Spanish  conflict,  was  sure  of  the  imminent  fall  of  Bilbao  into 
Franco’s  hands  and the  risk  to  the  lives  of  pro-Franco prisoners  in  Bilbao  prisons, 
having had the precedent of the hundred or so pro-Francoists killed as retaliation for the 
first bombings of Bilbao.
Hence  the  Committee  decided  to  send a  telegram to  St  Jean de  Luz,  with  the  text 
addressed to Salamanca, proposing the agreement for a Safe Zone in Bilbao. On 5 May 
a telegram was sent by the ICRC asking General Franco, following a proposition from 
the “Basques abroad”, if it would be possible to find a “safe zone” near Bilbao, for old 
people, the sick, women and children.292 On 11 May, the President of the Nationalist 
Red Cross  (NRC),  the Count of Vallellano,  relayed to  Pourtales,  ICRC Delegate  in 
Salamanca  and  Burgos,  the  following  note  sent  by  the  Marquis  of  Rialp  of  the 
Nationalist Red Cross in answer to this request:
288 Doc. 2250, 5/5/1937, in ICRC (1937b). Telegram text : “Vous prie etablir Bilbao zone franche pour 
enfants, femmes et viellards qui pourron pas etre evacue ou voudrons pas quitez Bilbao – STOP – vous 
prie faire quelque chose pour les Basques STOP – Un Basque n’oublie jamais. Merci d’avance – 
Ortuzar.” (“Please establish a Save Zone in Bilbao for children, women and old people that could not be 
evacuated or did not want to leave Bilbao – STOP – please do something for the Basques – STOP – A 
Basque never forgets. Thank you – Ortuzar”.)
289 Doc. 2243, 3/5/1937, in ICRC (1937b). Telegram from the ICRC to Herbette, the French Ambassador: 
“Our Delegate at Bilbao has transmitted us the Basque Government message asking about evacuation and 
subsistence means the ICRC can offer to Bilbao women and children STOP – ICRC has not any means 
but is ready to cooperate with you…”
290 He was also Deputy-Delegate to Raymond Courvoisier, the ICRC Delegate in France.
291 Doc. 2254, Telephone conversation between de Muntadas and Dr Junod on 4 May 1937 
(transcription), in ICRC (1937b).
292 Doc. 2250, in ICRC (1937b); ‘Proces – Verbeaux de la Commission d’Espagne’, volume I (27/8/1936-
12/5/1937) No 147, B CR 212 PV-01, ICRCA.
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“The Diplomatic Cabinet Chief Executive has asked me to inform you that he has 
received the telegram and he awaits the acceptance of the idea by the International Red 
Cross in respect of a security zone guaranteed by the Red Cross from Bilbao to 
Santander, which could contain a refuge for non-combatants, because in paragraph 5 of 
the answer from the Government (Salamanca) to the British Ambassador (referring to 
the document of 01 May, discussed above), we said that there existed in the Red 
territory a zone far from war actions. There the population could avoid danger, and 
evacuation abroad was unnecessary, and to this the British Ambassador answered that 
he was notifying this indication to the Basque “dirigents”. The National Government 
awaits an answer that has not arrived as of today”. Marquis of Rialp.293 
By 12 May, the British Government had received two requests for a Safe Zone, one 
from Franco  and  one  from the  ICRC.  The  proposal  from the  ICRC,  was,  in  fact, 
identical  to Franco’s, and had,  indeed,  been promoted by Luis Ortuzar,  representing 
what the ICRC called “The Basques Abroad”. But, who was Luis Ortuzar? Luis Ortuzar 
was a former chief of the Basque police (Ertzaina) to whom Jesus María Leizaola294, a 
member of the Basque Government, had entrusted the task of establishing direct links 
with  the  British  Government,  essentially,  it  would  seem,  to  set  up  financial  and 
commercial links in London. These were seen as operational bases in the event of the 
situation becoming more extreme, which would happen when, first,  Basque territory 
and then the war itself were lost. Indeed, in 1938 Ortuzar formed a British company, the 
Continental  Transit  Company Ltd.,  with  him as director  and shareholder,  where the 
Basque Government channelled a substantial part of its financial reserves, in fact, the 
vast majority of its funds. At the end of the war this transfer would become the object of 
a political and judicial dispute in British courts, as Ortuzar refused to transfer control to 
293 M. de Pourtales and Sir Henry Chilton, the British Ambassador, met on 11 May 1937 at the request of 
the British diplomat and Pourtales transcribes something incredible: “Zone Neutre: Les Anglais n’avaint 
pas compris d’après les notes recues de Salamanque que ce gouvernement avait l’intention de faire creer 
une zone neutre pour la population de Bilbao, Chilton soumetrá cette question au gouvernement basque 
aussitôt quil aurà la confirmation de Londres. (“The British did not understand from the notes received 
from Salamanca that this Government had the intention to establish a Neutral Zone for the Bilbao 
population. Chilton will submit this matter to the Basque Government once he has had the conformity 
[sic] from London.”) This is not credible, because all the Foreign Office documents show a real 
understanding of the proposal.
294 Jesús Mª Leizaola Sánchez (San Sebastian, 1896-1989), Basque lawyer and politician, active member 
of the PNV (Basque Nationalist Party), during the Civil War was a member of the Defence Board of 
Bilbao and Justice and Culture Minister of the Basque Government under President Aguirre. After 
Aguirre’s death in 1960, he became “lehendakari” (President) of the Basque Government in Exile. In 
1979, after Franco’s death in 1975, he transferred the Presidency to Carlos Garaikoetxea, who had been 
democratically elected. He remained an MP until 1981, when he resigned. Leizaola, a man who combined 
politics with cultural and intellectual activities, always backed the possibility of a separate understanding 
with Franco to finish the Basque struggle during the war in the North, building a workable relationship 
with Commander Troncoso. See Pretus (2003).
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a new body,  the  Euzkadi  National  Council,  formed in  1940 by Manuel  de Irujo to 
succeed the Basque Government.  Ortuzar believed that the Basque Government  had 
been suspended, given the absence of most of its  members,  including the President, 
Aguirre, a view supported by Leizaola.295 
Ortuzar,  Leizaola’s  envoy  in  London,  had,  through  his  contacts  within  the  ICRC, 
succeeded in getting his proposal for a Safe Zone approved by the Committee. Both 
Ortuzar and Leizaola were, moreover, adamantly opposed to the Leftist direction of the 
Popular  Front  and  supported  the  need  to  arrive  at  an  understanding  with  Franco, 
maintaining  contact  with  Salamanca  through  Commander  Julian  Troncoso,  the 
Governor  of  Irún.  The  latter,  with  personal  links  to  both  the  French  and  British 
Ambassadors,  had been attempting  to  attract  the  “foralist”  wing of  the  PNV to the 
Nationalist cause, a sector which had been extremely unhappy with the position of the 
“independentist” wing under Aguirre, which had finally agreed to support the Republic 
after the granting of the autonomy statute in October, 1936.296 
It is evident that Troncoso played an important role as the main link between the pro-
Franco Basques and the British Government,  both of whom had much to gain from 
Franco’s proposal of a Safe Zone. The former, given their political allegiances, had no 
interest in a continuing war in their homeland, while the British Government,  which 
also supported Franco, did not want the Navy to become more involved in the conflict 
as it could seriously stretch its resources and expose the hypocrisy of its supposed non-
intervention policy. In Franco’s case, it is clear that he was adamantly opposed to Royal 
Navy intervention within Spanish waters, which would contravene Spanish sovereignty. 
But there were other important benefits of a Safe Zone to Franco and the Nationalists: 
Franco could perhaps “redeem himself” after the Guernica atrocity, and demonstrate his 
“humanitarian and affectionate feelings towards the population of Vizcaya”, and show 
that  “the  attitude  of  the  nationalist  leader  towards  the  civilian  population  is  just  as 
295 Correspondence and related documents to this conflict are deposited in the ARTEA Archive (Basque 
Nationalism) and EUSKOMEDIA Archive S. Sebastian. There is also a recent work on J.A. Aguirre, 
Mees (2006). In a letter from Jose Antonio Aguirre to Jesus Maria Leizaola on 24 November 1944, 
Aguirre defined this row as the “black hole of our exile” that “has hurt us much and on more than one 
occasion”. (AHNV: GE: 265, 4.) 
296 The “foralist” wing of the PNV desired the restoration of their old privileges, the “fueros”, and 
autonomy within Spain. The “independentist” wing wanted its own separate state and secession from 
Spain. It also seems to be the case that Troncoso was attempting to bring about a rapprochement between 
the “foralists” and the Navarrese Carlists. Pretus (2003), pp. 3, 10 and 11.
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humane  as  that  of  any  sentimental  supporter  of  the  Spanish  Government  in  this 
country”.297 
The “independentist” wing of the PNV, represented by Aguirre, President of the Basque 
Government, was adamantly opposed to the idea of the Safe Zone and argued instead, 
as we have seen, for a large-scale evacuation of women, children, old people and non-
combatants from the Basque country.  Aguirre also had his representative in London, 
José Ignacio de Lizaso298, who had been extremely influential within the NJCSR, the 
agency that  sent  one of its  leading  representatives,  Leah Manning,  to  Bilbao  on 24 
April.299 A meeting on 3 May at the Foreign Office, between Sir R. Vansittart300 and 
José Ignacio de Lizaso, in the presence of Sir H. Mounsey, reveals clearly their strategy. 
After expressing his thanks for escorting refugee ships from Bilbao301, Lizaso went on to 
state:
“The Basques are in a terrible situation because they are trapped between Franco (who 
does not control the atrocities of his troops) and Caballero [Largo Caballero, the 
Spanish Premier], who, if he obtained control of the Basque provinces would suppress 
their liberties and bring the Basques under a “state of the Reds”. The Basques only 
asked for peace and although their sympathies might in some circumstances lean further 
towards General Franco, they realise that he is not a free agent but is dominated by 
Fascism and that that is a regime entirely unsuited to the Basque nature”.302 
Lizaso argued against  the proposal  for a neutral  zone,  because Franco could not  be 
trusted and the International Red Cross was ineffective. Moreover, referring to Franco’s 
proposal  [that  he  already  knew  existed]  for  a  Safe  Zone  near  Santander,  Lizaso 
commented:
“There was no territory to which they could retire except in the direction of Santander, 
297 Franco’s proposal of a Safe Zone, put to Chilton quoted above. PRO: FO 37121370 W-9108/37/41, 
Docs. 169, 170, 171, 172. Major General Sir Alfred Knox, during Parliamentary Questions on 6 May, 
quoted above: PRO: FO 371. 21369, Doc. 148. 
298 A personal friend of Aguirre who was, through the Basque Delegation in London, the voice of the 
Basque Government in Britain. He was always on a “collision” course with the Spanish Ambassador, 
Azcarate, by acting as a “de facto” representative of an independent state.
299 Leah Manning’s trip is discussed in Section 3.
300 Sir Richard Vansittart was Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This meeting was 
requested by Sir Walter Citrine, TUC General Secretary, on behalf of Sr Lizaso.
301 The Royal Navy was helping to escort refugee ships to France, in joint operations with the French 
Navy.
302 PRO: FO 37121291 – W8936/1/41 – Situation of the Basques. Docs. 10–17.
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and that was a foreign and hostile country”.303
The real purpose of the meeting, Lizaso continued, was to ask Vansittart if a possible 
mediation in Spain by the powers (as presented by Churchill) was Churchill’s idea or 
that of H.M. Government, to which he did not receive a reply. Lizaso was then asked if 
he thought mediation by the British in the Spanish conflict was possible, to which he 
answered in the negative, stating that he believed more suffering was needed and the 
conviction by both parties that  neither  could win.  Lizaso then presented the Basque 
position:
“But when this time was reached I hope that the mediating powers would insist that 
under the terms of settlement there should be established such essential conditions for 
peace such as freedom of thought, order and self-determination of the people. There is 
no possibility in Spain of one region ruling another and the future regime, which must 
be secured against further outbreaks of civil strife, must be based on some kind of 
confederation of Spanish peoples, each enjoying essential privileges”.304 
It  was  clear  that  Lizaso  was  proposing  to  the  British  the  possibility  of  a  future 
independent state for the Basques, but before leaving the meeting Lizaso confirmed that 
at  that  moment  nothing  could  be  done  except  to  work  for  the  evacuation  of  non-
combatants  and  he  asked  that  the  visit  be  kept  entirely  confidential.  Not  even  the 
Spanish Ambassador should know of it.305 
In a memo dated 18 May, from Lizaso to a member of the Wright Organisation306, the 
Basque desire for a future independent state is again confirmed:
“The only end to the war which would benefit Spain would be the disintegration and 
weakening of the Spanish state. This state of affairs would also prove happiest for the 
Basque country. In the end there would be neither victors nor vanquished, but only a 
weak and divided Spain, sufficiently weak to allow foreign powers to intervene and 
decree what should be the construction of the new state”.307
What seems to emerge from these statements by Lizaso is that  foreign intervention, 
most probably British, could construct a new state, which might not even bear the name 
303 PRO: FO 37121291 – W8936/1/41 – Situation of the Basques. Docs. 10–17. (In the interpretation of 
the Basque Government, the Basque forces would not fight outside their homeland).
304 PRO: FO 37121291 – W8936/1/41 – Situation of the Basques. Docs. 10–17. 
305 PRO: FO 37121291 – W8936/1/41 – Situation of the Basques. Docs. 10–17.
306 See footnote 33(b). 
307 See footnote 33(b); Document A.
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“Spain”, but perhaps be called the “United States of Iberia”. This was to be stressed as 
much as possible in future propaganda as a necessary means of guaranteeing peace in 
Europe.  The  different  nationalities  in  this  new  state  would  be  Castille,  Andalusia, 
Valencia,  Catalonia,  Aragon,  Galicia  and  Euzkadi  (the  Basque  country).  It  was 
considered  desirable  that  British  public  opinion  should  be  convinced  that  the  only 
guarantee of peace in the Iberian Peninsula lay in the establishment of a peninsular state 
in  which  the  Basque  country  would  preserve  it  absolute  independence.  This  was 
because  she  was  a  nation  different  from the  rest,  and  because  of  her  strategic  and 
geographic position she would prove to be another Belgium for Europe.308 The rest of 
the document continues along the same lines.309 
It is clear that the Basque Government under Aguirre was unhappy with both “Spanish” 
options, and was pushing its claims for an independent Euzkadi, which they believed 
the British – who they saw as close to them politically and “temperamentally” – could 
possibly help them achieve. The evacuation to Britain – though undoubtedly conceived 
of in humanitarian terms – to remove non-combatants,  especially children,  from the 
dreadful effects of the bombings – could also fulfil a more political role. Certainly the 
increasing involvement of the Royal Navy in the evacuation would mean greater contact 
between the British and the Basques, and, hopefully, greater understanding between the 
two  “nations”.  Similarly,  contacts  established  in  Britain  between  the  refugees, 
particularly the children, and the British people, would create a wave of sympathy for 
the Basque cause and these “sentimental links” could possibly establish the basis for a 
future move toward independence.310
Political  motives  were  also  present  in  the  pro-evacuation  stance  of  the  NJCSR, 
dominated by the Labour Left  and the British Communist  Party.  The horrors of the 
bombings, experienced first-hand by Leah Manning on her trip to Bilbao, were no doubt 
felt deeply by all those involved in the NJCSR, and perhaps the first reaction to such 
suffering was to propose the removal of children, without considering the longer-term 
308 Probably trying to establish a parallel with the traditional British view that Belgian independence 
should be guaranteed to preserve the European balance of power.
309 See Document A (foot note 33 b)
310 The Basque Government was thus the pioneer of a strategy that has been employed during the last 
thirty years by two “nations” without a state, the Palestinian refugees in the Middle East and the people of 
Western Sahara. Children from Palestinian settlements and from Polisario Front camps in Algeria stay for 
a few months in Spain, hosted by Spanish families. The presence of these children over many years has 
strengthened pro-Palestinian and pro-Polisario feeling in Spain. 
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effects of such an action. However, there were undoubtedly political motives operating 
here as well, as further British involvement in the evacuation could possibly influence 
British policy towards Spain, as would the plight of child refugees from Republican 
Spain. It would certainly bring the war to the attention of the public.311 
Mr Cooper, from the Home Office, in a note dated 4 May, expressed the views of Lewis 
Golden,  secretary  of  the  Save  the  Children  Fund,  on  the  political  nature  of  the 
evacuation campaign:
“From his own knowledge of the workings of the Joint Committee (the NJCSR), he 
[Lewis Golden] had been forced reluctantly to the view that the desire to get the 
children sent to this country was activated largely by political motives and he had been 
quite unable to understand why the Committee should not consider the very reasonable 
plan to remove the children to another part of Spain where they would be looked after 
in an entirely suitable manner. Funds contributed by foreign sympathisers could be 
administered on their behalf by an impartial body such as the International Red Cross or 
the Save the Children International Union, which are able and ready to undertake the 
work at much less cost and without serious disturbance”.312 
Lewis Golden, referring to a meeting of the NJCSR, feared that:
“…the voice of the people who have only the interest of the children at heart will be 
drowned out by those who wish to make political capital out of the imminent 
catastrophe at Bilbao”.313
Golden expressed a further fear, the possibility that:
“…some of the most ardent members of the Committee may act precipitously and send 
a large number of children to this country in a ship chartered for the purpose, without 
waiting for Home Office approval to be given to the scheme”.314
311 The struggle to win the support of the democratic powers had guided Republican policy from the 
beginning of the Civil War, but by May 1937, as the situation became increasingly desperate, there was 
greater pressure to attract support. This, as it happened, was extremely naïve, as both the British and the 
U.S. were unstinting in their support for Franco, and this would of course continue to the end of the War, 
a fact unknown by the British and American public at the time, given the public policy of non-
intervention. 
312 Pro: FO: 37121370: Registry number W9147/37/41 From Mr Cooper (Home Office) to Mr Roberts 
(Foreign Office): Description: Proposal to evacuate children from Bilbao to United Kingdom. Docs. 184, 
186 - 192.
313 Pro: FO: 37121370: Registry number W9147/37/41 From Mr Cooper (Home Office) to Mr Roberts 
(Foreign Office): Description: Proposal to evacuate children from Bilbao to United Kingdom. Docs. 184, 
186 - 192.
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It is evident, therefore, that the humanitarian crisis affecting Bilbao became a politically 
charged issue,  and that  the two options  – evacuation  versus  Safe Zone315 –  became 
increasingly  identified  with  Republican  and  Francoist  politics  respectively.  This  is 
revealed in the press at the time, which divided along Left/Right  lines on the issue. 
Unidad, a right-wing organ from San Sebastian, gives us an idea of how the evacuation 
was viewed on the Right, in an article on 10 May:
“The red-separatist cruelty stops at nothing, now (after trying to break the unity of 
Spain), it is destroying the unity of the family. Here are Spanish children who are pulled 
from the arms of their mothers by English “humanitarianism” so that they can be put 
under the protection of the French Popular Front”.316 
Other right-wing newspapers, such as El Diario Vasco (San Sebastián), put forward the 
idea, on 7 May, that:
“The evacuation of women and children was not a voluntary act, but a suggestion of the 
Russian command operating in Bilbao”.317
Previously, on 5 May, El Diario Vasco had stated that:
“…los pobres salen engañados de Bilbao y se quedan, llenos de tristeza, en un medio 
hostil y desapacible, porque así los disponen los tiranos que disponen de sus vidas y de 
las de sus familias”.318 
The overwhelming impression given was that the Basque Government had forced the 
children to  leave  Bilbao  purely for propaganda purposes,  a  feeling  echoed by other 
right-wing organs between May and early June.319 The Catholic Church, through the 
voice  of  the  Spanish  Primate,  Cardinal  Gomá,  also  expressed  its  views:  “…
preocupación por los niños que los marxistas habían robado de España”.320 
314 Pro: FO: 37121370: Registry number W9147/37/41 From Mr Cooper (Home Office) to Mr Roberts 
(Foreign Office): Description: Proposal to evacuate children from Bilbao to United Kingdom. Docs. 184, 
186 - 192.
315 Even if the details of the Neutral zone offers were not of public knowledge
316 Alonso Carballés (1992).
317 El Diario Vasco (San Sebastián) 7 May 1937. 
318 “These poor children who are leaving Bilbao have been fooled, and they are left full of sadness in a 
hostile and unpleasant place, because that is what the tyrants, who control their lives and that of their 
families, have decided for them.” El Diario Vasco (San Sebastián), 5 May 1937. 
319 There were references to “stolen children”, “criminal exportation”, “children kidnapped”, “criminal 
despatches” and similar accusations during this period. El Diario Vasco, 15 & 22 May & 9 June; La Voz 
de España, 10 June; Amistad, 14 May; and Voz de España, 9 May.
320 “Concern for the children the Marxists had stolen from Spain.” This was expressed in Gomá’s letter to 
the “Primados”, First Bishops of France, Great Britain, Belgium, Mexico and other countries. Indeed, the 
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Left-wing opinion and the Bilbao press, on the other hand, were overwhelmingly in 
favour  of evacuation.  The press in  Bilbao  certainly played  an important  role  in  the 
evacuation process, and would occasionally publish information about decisions from 
the  different  Ministerial  departments,  in  particular  Asistencia  Social, with  lists  of 
children to be registered for evacuation and news of ships arriving and leaving Bilbao.321 
Indeed, the blockade of Bilbao and the intervention of Britain in the escorting of both 
incoming and departing vessels became an obsession and the main press issue in March, 
April  and May of 1937. It  seemed clear  that  the press was expressing the need for 
Britain to become involved in the conflict and often compared the British attitude with 
that of the French, who had played a prominent role in evacuations from the onset of the 
bombings in the Basque country.322
Given this polarisation between pro-Republican and pro-Franco positions vis-à-vis the 
humanitarian crisis in Bilbao, it would be the British, with contacts within both camps, 
who finally resolved the issue. On 11 May, Ambassador Chilton notified the Foreign 
Office that the International Red Cross representative,
“…who has just arrived from Salamanca, informs me that the authorities there await 
result of approach which they assume that His Majesty’s Government is making to 
Basque Government, and, while very doubtful whether proposed neutral zone would 
materialise it might be politic to take the matter up with the Basque Government and 
International Red Cross”.323
claim made by Gomá was that the majority of the children evacuated from Spain by the “Red” 
Government had belonged to right-wing families, whose parents had been assassinated, or had been 
orphans taken in by religious charities whose parents had been exterminated. As these children had now 
become state dependents, the state had readily dispatched them. El Diario Vasco, La Voz de España and 
Unidad (San Sebastián), 8 May 1937, and the Official Gazette of the Vitoria Diocese, 15 October 1937. 
See also Alonso Carballés (1992).
321 As mentioned in Section 1 above, the Official Gazette of the Basque Government, from its 
commencement of publishing in late 1936 until May 1937, makes no mention of the displacement of 
children from the Basque country to other countries, and research at the AHNV did not reveal any 
Minutes of the Basque Government. Given this, the final conclusion must be that the displacement 
operation was conceived and developed through verbal negotiations and agreements between the 
President (J.A. Aguirre) and the Ministers (consejeros) of Social Assistance, Interior and Finance, without 
any supporting legal publication. Therefore, the press was one of the few sources of written 
documentation of the evacuation. 
322 See Euzkadi (Bilbao) 8, 9, 12, 15, 18, 21, 25 April 1937; 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 13, 18, 21, 24 May 1937 and 2 
June 1937; El Liberal (Bilbao) 6, 8, 15, 22, 23 April 1937 and 2, 3, 7, 20, 21 May 1937; La Gaceta del  
Norte (Bilbao) 9 December 1936; Euzkadi Roja (Bilbao) 2 December 1936, 7 April 1937 and 15 June 
1937.
323 PRO: FO 37121269 – W 8710/37/41, Docs. 104, 105, 106.
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It would seem that even Ambassador Chilton, a pro-Francoist in favour of the Safe Zone 
and opposed to further Royal Navy involvement, was doubtful that the Safe Zone would 
actually materialise. Why was this the case? It is highly probable that the British already 
knew of the position of the Basque Government, which was adamantly opposed to the 
creation of a Safe Zone, although, officially, Franco’s proposal had not yet been put to 
it. However, it seems unlikely that this would entirely determine British Government 
thinking,  and  more  plausible  to  suggest  that  the  British  believed  that  the  imminent 
victory of Franco in the north would eliminate the need for a Safe Zone, and also free 
the Navy from its escort duties.324 
It could be the case, of course, that by this point in time the British Government was in 
a situation of paralysis, as the alternative of the Safe Zone was not desired by the most 
active  forces  in  the “Aid to Spain” movement,  who were crucial  in  influencing  the 
views of the press and public  opinion on the subject.  Tom Buchanan,  for example, 
believes that:
“The British evacuation was largely the result of a frenetic campaign by Leah Manning, 
an agent of the National Joint Committee in Bilbao, who successfully – surprisingly so 
given the diplomatic ramifications – petitioned the British Government to allow a small 
number of children to enter Britain. This decision, opposed by the Foreign Office, was 
probably influenced by the furore over the bombing of Guernica on 26 April, and by the 
example set by the recent French evacuations. 
Leah Manning’s success was a rare triumph for emotive political pressure over 
expert opinion. The British Government’s permission was granted in the face of 
opposition not only from the Foreign Office, but from all of the agencies with a 
recognised expertise in the subject.”325
Though there is little  doubt that  Leah Manning’s energetic  campaign was extremely 
influential, and successful, the above account does seem to give enormous weight to the 
power of the press and public opinion, which, in most situations, they simply did not 
have.326 Public opinion and the press, it would seem, can sometimes tip the balance if 
324 Documents investigated at PRO archives indicate the absolute conviction of the British Government 
concerning the quick termination of the War in the north with a Franco victory. 
325 Buchanan (1997), p. 110.
326 A case in point is the massive demonstration against the Iraq war in February 2003. Over a million 
people – the largest political demonstration in British history – marched to show their opposition to the 
war, but this did not change the Government’s thinking and Britain and the U.S. invaded Iraq in March of 
that year. 
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the  Government  is  undecided  and/or  discredited327,  but  it  is  rarely  decisive  in  a 
Government’s calculations, particularly on foreign policy.328 It seems more likely that 
Britain believed that Franco would triumph in the north in the very near future, which 
would  resolve  the  situation  without  too  much  inconvenience  for  the  British,  but, 
“politically”, Britain had to appear to be continuing to explore Franco’s proposal, which 
seems to be the thrust of Chilton’s memo. Moreover, a “humanitarian” gesture by the 
British towards the Spanish Republic, such as the evacuation of children, could have the 
added  attraction  of  restoring  the  Government’s  credibility  after  the  debacle  in  the 
northern seas [the arrival unmolested of the British Vessel “Sea Spray” to the Bilbao 
Port,  when  the  British  Governments  maintained  the  blockade  of  Basque  Ports  was 
effective]. In any case, the French had been extremely active in the evacuations from the 
Basque country since the end of 1936, and it would “not look good” for Britain if it was 
seen to be oblivious to the suffering of those under heavy bombardment. 
It could also be the case that there were differences of opinion within different sectors 
of  the  Government  concerning  the  feasibility  of  a  Safe  Zone.  It  would  appear  that 
Ambassador Chilton, closer to events unfolding in Spain and with direct contact with 
both Republican and Francoist representatives, was extremely “doubtful” that the Safe 
Zone would be implemented. The Foreign Office and the Admiralty,  however, being 
further removed from the situation on the ground, and deeply worried about the Navy’s 
involvement,  seemed  more  positive  about  the  possibility.  On  11  May,  in  reply  to 
Chilton’s communication regarding the information given by the ICRC representative 
returning  from  Salamanca,  Sir  G.  Mounsey,  from  the  Foreign  Office,  asked  the 
Ambassador to: 
“Please ascertain from Military Governor of Irún whether Red Cross representative’s 
impression is correct. If it is, you are authorised to get in touch at once with Basque 
Government and put General Franco’s offer to them”.329
On the same day, 11 May, records also include minutes of a conversation between Mr 
Seal, from the Admiralty, and Mr Pollock, from the Foreign Office, in which, as a result 
327 This can be seen in Ireland, after the Easter uprising of 1916. Though the uprising ended in total 
failure, the repression against its leaders by the British stirred Irish popular opinion, and led to the success 
of the Irish republican party, Sinn Fein, which won the elections of 1918. 
328 The Iraq war again springs to mind.
329 PRO: FO 37121370: W9291/37/41: Proposed neutral zone for civil population of Bilbao. Docs. 227 - 
229.
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of  Mr  Seal’s  worries  about  future  requirements  of  the  Navy  to  escort  ships  with 
refugees, Mr Pollock explains:
“I also pointed out to Mr Seal that we were doing our best to prevent the necessity for 
further large scale evacuations to France or this country by following up General 
Franco’s alternative proposals for a neutral zone and for reception of the Basque 
Children on nationalist territory”.330 
A further  note from Mounsey to Lord Cranborne (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of 
State)  on  11  May  gives  a  very  precise  summary  of  the  process  concerning  the 
involvement  of Britain,  the use of the Royal  Navy for the evacuations and the Safe 
Zone: 
“If it is desired to pursue General Franco’s practical suggestion and free our Navy from 
their increasingly embarrassing protecting duties, it might be possible, after consulting 
the French Government, to send a reply, saying that, noting the re-affirmation of 
General Franco’s previous offer, Sir Henry Chilton is now instructed to seek his 
definitive approval of it being immediately submitted to the Basque Government either 
in its present form or with any more detailed additions, such as the place to be selected, 
the arrangements to be made for removal and supervision, which the Governor of Irún 
will authorise him to put forward. It might be added that H.M.G. are prepared for their 
part to discontinue, and to invite the Basque and French Government to discontinue the 
evacuation of any more of their people by sea as soon as it is clear that the Land 
Scheme is acceptable to all parties”.331
Whatever the truth of the matter,  it  is clear that  the British Government did not act 
swiftly or energetically regarding the Safe Zone proposal put to them by Franco on 1 
May, which does lead one to think that the British were never really serious about its 
possibilities.  In  any  case,  a  meeting  took  place  in  Bilbao,  with  Stevenson,  British 
Consul  in  Bilbao,  President  Aguirre  and  Georges Graz,  representative  of  the 
International  Red  Cross,  during  which  the  Safe  Zone  was  rejected  definitively. 
Stevenson outlined the reasoning behind the rejection as follows: 
“Should the Basque Government be ready to establish a neutral zone between Bilbao 
330 PRO: FO 37121370; W93122/337/41; Evacuation of civil population from Bilbao. Docs. 238 - 240.
331 Pro: FO 37121370: W9493/37/41: Evacuation of refugees from Bilbao: question of activities of His 
Majesty’s Ships. Docs. 2903, 294, 295 (back page). The wording of this document is highly significant – 
why should the Navy be embarrassed to escort civilians to safety, if Britain were truly neutral in the 
conflict? Obviously, because it was helping Franco’s enemies, a highly embarrassing situation for the 
pro-Franco Navy.
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and Santander to spare the civil non-combatant population from the war? Such a 
proposition is unreal because there is no settlement big enough between the two cities to 
shelter the refugees, as it is impossible to improvise tents or barracks for 300,000 
persons and there is a lack of water and goods. And a massive evacuation would 
provoke a defeatist wake and produce panic”.
President Aguirre accepted all of Stevenson’s arguments, and added:
“In consideration of the spirit of our Basque soul, it shall never be a question of 
migrating to Santander, where the spirit is different from our Christian and Basque 
mentality. The war conditions are also favourable to us and Vizcaya shall become the 
grave where all Franco’s forces die”.332 
Aguirre then addressed Stevenson, declaring:
“You can tell your British Ambassador that we can in no case consider the creation of 
this neutral zone”.
Finally, addressing the ICRC representative Georges Graz, he added:
“You, Mr Graz, can tell the International Red Cross that the Basque Government cannot 
foresee the creation of this zone”.
Graz pointed out that he was not personally in charge of any official  “demarche”333, 
omitting to mention the telegram on 5 May from the ICRC to the British and French 
Ambassadors proposing a Neutral Zone. Why did the ICRC representative change his 
mind on the subject? Was Graz swayed by Stevenson’s opinion,  or had Graz never 
agreed  with  the  Neutral  Zone  proposed  by  the  organisation  he  represented,  the 
International Red Cross? 
It is impossible to know the answer to these questions, but it does seem probable that 
Graz realised that,  with both the British Consul representative and the leader of the 
Basque Government united against the Safe Zone proposal, it would be impossible to 
implement it. It may also be that he believed, as did Stevenson, that the Safe Zone was 
not practically possible, as these Foreign Office sources reveal:
332 This was very far from the truth, as only the perimeter around the “iron ring” was still resisting in 
Vizcaya by this time.
333 Pourtales, Horace de (1937), report on the establishment of the Neutral Zone between Bilbao and 
Santander sent to the Committee on Spain with the information supplied by Graz, 20 May 1937, Doc. 
2382, in ‘Correspondance générale et rapports1936–1950’ (10/5/1937-3/6/1937), B CR 212 GEN 13, 
ICRCA; henceforth Pourtales (1937).
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“During that meeting [i.e., on 11 May]334, the Red Cross representative (Mr Graz), 
stated that “he thought the suggestion impracticable, since there were no villages 
between Bilbao and Santander capable of housing large numbers of people, or any 
water or sanitary arrangements. Also, in the event of an advance on Santander, refugees 
would be in an uncomfortable position.”335 [emphasis in original]
These Foreign Office sources are totally at odds with those of the International Red 
Cross, which attribute these arguments to Consul Stevenson.336 Again, we do not know 
what the truth of the matter is as the documentation on this issue is contradictory.  It 
does seem plausible to believe, however, that both Stevenson and Graz believed that 
there were serious technical difficulties involved in establishing the Safe Zone, although 
neither  was,  technically,  capable  of  assessing  this  adequately.  With  the  technical 
capacity  of  the  time  and  the  agreement  of  both  fighting  sides,  helped  by  the 
International Red Cross and the British and French Governments, I believe it  would 
have been possible to create a decent temporary shelter for many thousands of people in 
a territory not directly implicated in the war at that time.337 After all, we are talking here 
about protecting children, women and old people from bombardments and the misery of 
war, not about building a permanent housing complex or a big city.  It must also be 
remembered that the distance from Bilbao to Santander is more than 100 kilometres and 
the area is about 5,000 square kilometres (the whole Basque country is about 7,000 
square kilometres). Also, there were some important villages and towns, such as Castro-
Urdiales338 and Laredo, which could have been converted into a nucleus for the Safe 
Zone very easily, with temporary constructions built nearby. 
Furthermore, if the evacuation had been sponsored by Britain, France and the ICRC, the 
panic  and  the  potential  feeling  of  defeat  would  have  been  much  less  than  what 
334 ICRCA sources placed the meeting on 14 May and the PRO documents on 11 May.
335 PRO: FO37121370. [emphasis in original]
336 Pourtales (1937).
337 In 1854, during the Crimean War, after Florence Nightingale revealed the dreadful conditions of the 
Military Hospital of Scutari, the British Government commissioned the engineer Brunel to design a 
prefabricated hospital that was shipped to the Crimea and erected. This was completed in five months, 
and prefabricated wood and canvas buildings were set up in the malaria-free zone of Renkioi in the 
Crimea. Florence Nightingale referred to them as “magnificent huts”. Silver (2007). Also, during the First 
World War, Major Niss of the 29th Company of Royal Engineers, designed a portable multi-use circular 
hut, and 10,000 were built during the war. This hut was further developed after the war, when it became 
cheaper and easier to build. It is reasonable to believe that in 1937, many years later, with all the advances 
in construction techniques, these performances had been dramatically inproved.
338 Consul Stevenson, when presenting his ideas to Aguirre, explained: “The first village that could lodge 
about 10 to 12,000 people is Castro Urdiales, and this village is in Santander territory and not in 
Vizcaya.” Pourtales (1937).
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eventually occurred – the desperate situation of the population of Bilbao leaving the city 
in the direction of Santander without order or control. A safety zone does not mean that 
war stops. Although the zone was planned to be under the control of the International 
Red Cross, if the Nationalist troops advanced in the direction of Santander, the zone 
would have fallen into Franco’s hands and would no longer be Basque or Republican 
Government territory. Whilst the zone was a better option for the population than being 
bombed, perhaps it was this eventuality – the future control of the zone by Nationalist 
forces – that caused uncertainty as to its future, and made it unpalatable to all those 
affected by the Guernica tragedy.339 
Some words  of  President  Aguirre  closing  the meeting  are  quite  enlightening  of  the 
Basque reasoning: “Mr Consul…. In consideration to the Basque soul, we shall never 
migrate  to  Santander,  where  the  spirit  is  so  different  to  our  Christian  and  Basque 
Nationalist mentality…340. Was Protestant Britain a better destination?
News of this  definitive rejection of the Safe Zone,  must  have reached Franco fairly 
quickly, given that his mediator in this issue, Troncoso, was close to both British and 
Basque sources.341 Ambassador Chilton, in a telegram of 20 May, stated:
“That 13 May 1937, Mr Malcolm [British Embassy in Hendaye] was told by Irún 
Military Governor that “suggestion [i.e. Safe Zone] was originally put up with a view of 
heading off His Majesty’s Government from evacuating women and children but, as 
they were now doing the latter, General Franco’s Government were no longer interested 
in creating a neutral zone”.342
The ostensible reason for Franco withdrawing the Safe Zone proposal – that the British 
Navy  was  escorting  refugee  ships  –  does  not  make  sense,  as  the  Navy  had  been 
escorting refugee ships since 1 May, after Franco’s offer, which did not seem to affect 
Franco’s  proposal,  which  he  had  reiterated  on  11  May,  before  the  meeting  with 
339 It was not just the memory of the terror used in Guernica, but that of other massacres by the 
Nationalists (often with the use of Moorish troops), such as that of Badajoz in August 1936, where some 
4,000 prisoners were taken to the bullring and shot. As Mike Richards has shown, the use of mass 
repression and terror by the Nationalists had an important social component – to terrorise the working 
class into submission and to purge Spain of all its “anti-Spain” elements, thus laying the basis of the new 
state totally devoid of dissent. Richards (1998). 
340 Pourtales (1937).
341 As we have seen, Troncoso had close connections with the pro-Franco wing of Basque nationalism, 
represented by Leizaola, promoter of the ICRC proposal of the Safe Zone, and with the British 
Ambassador, Chilton.
342 PRO: FO 37121370; W 9707/37/41.
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Stevenson, Graz and Aguirre.  It  seems fairly clear  that  Franco had already received 
news of the rejection of the Safe Zone proposal through Troncoso, while the feasibility 
of the Safe Zone was also being placed in doubt by the progress of the war itself. For 
the military attack on Santander was now being planned at Salamanca, and Nationalist 
thinking was that the conquest of Santander was not far away – in fact it took place on 
26 August 1937 -, a little more than two months after Bilbao fell to Franco’s troops on 
19 June 1937. Once they controlled the territory,  the Safe Zone would be more of a 
burden than an asset. 
Nevertheless, once the idea of the Safe Zone was buried, on 15 May the Foreign Office 
sent a telegram to Stevenson which officially approved the evacuation to England of 
2,000 children between the ages of six and twelve, 900 boys and 1,100 girls, together 
with 100 women and 15 priests.343 The Basque Children’s Committee was then set up, 
under  the  presidency  of  the  Duchess  of  Atholl,  but  with  representatives  from  the 
Salvation Army, the Catholic Church, with Cannon Graven representing the Catholic 
Archbishop  Hingles,  and  Conservative,  Liberal  and  Labour  Party  members,  and 
members of the TUC (Trades Union Congress).
Members of the Committee travelled throughout Britain to establish branches of the 
Basque  Children  Committee  (BCC),  and  raise  funds.344 Supported  by  all  political 
parties, people from all walks of life contributed to the sponsoring of Basque children, 
who would be housed in rural communities – referred to as “colonies” – organised by 
various secular and religious bodies.345 Through negotiation with both the Home Office 
and  the  Foreign  Office,  Leah  Manning  and  the  Duchess  of  Atholl  succeeded in 
obtaining authorisation for the acceptance of 4,000 children, aged from 5 to 15, with a 
preference  for  girls.346 Finally,  on  21  May  1937,  the  steamer  Habana left  Bilbao, 
343 This approval had been given as a result of a meeting between the Home Office and the NJCSR, 
including representatives of the Salvation Army. PRO: FO 37121370. On the same day, 15 May, 
Azcarate, Spanish Republican Ambassador in London, approached Roberts from the Foreign Office about 
the neutral zone. He complained of the British approach to the Basque Government without going 
through him, and indicated that his Government was against the idea of a Safe Zone, which had already 
been rejected in Madrid, following Franco’s proposal. PRO: FO 37121370. 
344 The Home Office calculated that it would cost 10 shillings per week to house and educate a child in 
Britain. As with the NJCSR, it would appear that it was the Left – Left Labour and Communist Party 
members – who were the most active force in the BCC, and took most of the decisions on the Committee.
345 Such as the BCC, the Catholic Church, The Society of Friends (Quakers), the Salvation Army and 
other religious bodies.
346 The Duchess of Atholl, from the BCC, had sent a telegram to Eden, stressing the Committee’s concern 
at the fate of “girls of about 15, should Bilbao fall and foreign troops (essentially the Moors) be allowed 
to run rampant through the city”. PRO: FO 37121370.
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escorted by HMS Fearless, with 4,111 Basque refugees aboard, the majority of whom, 
3,881, were children.
Given  these  developments  in  the  process  of  evacuation  from  15  May,  it  is  truly 
astounding that, on 18 May, Sir G. Mounsey should send a note proposing contacts with 
the Military Governor of Irún and the Basque and Spanish Republican Governments 
concerning  the  Safe  Zone.347 A  telegram  from  Ambassador  Chilton  on  19  May, 
informed the Foreign Office that Franco had not been interested in the Safe Zone since 
13 May. Mounsey, taking note of Chilton’s telegram, replied on 20 May:
“It seems useless to pursue the matter with such unhelpful and uncompromising 
combatants”.348
How are we to understand this? It does seem extraordinary that the Under-Secretary for 
Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Office, in charge of Spanish Affairs at the time, should be 
unaware that Franco had withdrawn his offer of the Safe Zone on 13 May, and that his 
own department had authorised the evacuation of refugees from Northern Spain on the 
15th. Was the authorisation of the evacuation not his responsibility,  as the person in 
charge of Spanish Affairs? This could be, of course, a question of total incompetence 
and due to a lack of communication between different sections of the Foreign Office, 
but perhaps it reveals, yet again, the lack of seriousness with which the British treated 
Franco’s and the ICRC’s proposals of a Safe Zone. 
5 Conclusions
The case of the evacuation of refugees from the Basque country, and the role of the aid 
organisations in this, is ample proof of the enormous difficulties involved in carrying 
out humanitarian actions – and assessing them on their merit – within the context of a 
Civil War. As we have seen, the idea of evacuating civilians to Britain to escape the 
constant bombings endured in Bilbao was viewed as an eminently “humanitarian” act, 
and  thus  supported  –  especially  after  Guernica  –  by  large  sections  of  the  British 
population,  including  a  wide  spectrum  of  the  British  political  class.  Evacuation, 
however,  was  also  seen  by  the  Autonomous  Basque  Government  as  a  means  of 
347 PRO: FO 37121370 W. 9634/37/41, Proposed creation of a Neutral Zone in Northern Spain. Docs. 
327, 328.
348 PRO: FO 37121370 W9634/37/41, Doc. 328.
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propagating  its  aim  of  independence,  and  thus  was  integrally  related  to  its  future 
political aims. Evacuation, and the increasing involvement of the British Navy that it 
implied, was also part of the political strategy of the Left within the NJCSR, who were 
attempting to move British policy away from “non-intervention”, and was therefore a 
policy in support of the internationally beleaguered Republic. 
Certainly not all those involved within the NJCSR were in favour of evacuation. The 
Save the Children Fund, which had much experience in this field, and the Society of 
Friends (Quakers) were adamantly opposed to evacuation, but they were overtaken by 
the much more “activist Left” within the Committee, the weight of public opinion after 
Guernica, and the lack of another alternative. An alternative, when it emerged in the 
form of the Safe Zone put forward by Franco on 1 May and by the ICRC days later, 
after  the  dramatic  appeal  by  President  Aguirre  for  mass  evacuation,  and  when  the 
process of evacuation was well underway, was discarded by President Aguirre without 
sound supporting arguments, backed by Consul Stevenson and with the mixed support 
and silence of ICRC delegate Graz. 
If the posture of George Graz can be interpreted as the position of a practical soldier 
(Graz was a Captain in the Swiss Army)  knowing that with the opposition of both, 
Stevenson and Aguirre, the Neutral Zone proposal had not any possibility to progress, 
Ralph Stevenson’s promotion of the evacuation, affirming difficulties which were not 
based  on  previous  professional  research  into  the  technical  feasibility  of  the  zone, 
represents a more serious matter.
Stevenson, through his process of involvement in the war in the North, become close to 
the  Basque  cause  touched  by  humanitarian  sentiments  towards  the  David  that  the 
Basque were, in front to the Goliath (the Franco forces, the “Spaniards”). For him, to 
see the children out of the conflict represented guarantee of safety without deepening 
into other considerations.
Furthermore,  maybe  after  Guernica  it  would  have  been  difficult  for  the  Basque 
Government to be seen negotiating with Franco regarding a Safe Zone, such was the 
level of popular anger in Bilbao at the time. Nevertheless under the umbrella of Britain, 
France and the Red Cross, the safety and care the Zone should represent, was in my 
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opinion an attractive alternative to the bombs and hunger, for the women, children and 
the old that day after day massed in Bilbao
Perhaps as importantly, the British – the only power that could feasibly have carried out 
such an undertaking, accompanied by the French – did not react quickly or energetically 
enough to Franco’s proposal,  undoubtedly because they believed a Francoist  victory 
was imminent. Although the British, who were strongly pro-Franco – particularly the 
Admiralty – were unhappy with the escort role assigned to the Navy in the evacuation, 
it was probably seen as a short-term inconvenience, which saved them the expense, and 
trouble, of erecting and maintaining a Safe Zone. Additionally,  when many refugees 
were being accepted in France, Mexico and the Soviet Union, it was imperative that the 
British were  seen to  be doing  something,  otherwise it  would  look as  if  they didn’t 
care.349 
On the Nationalist side, Franco also had his political reasons for proposing a Safe Zone. 
Undoubtedly it  was an attempt to somewhat “restore his image” after the horrors of 
Guernica,  and also to end the constant skirmishes between the British Navy and the 
Nationalist fleet in the northern seas. 
The Safe Zone proposed by Franco was also supported by the pro-Franco Basques, who 
succeeded in getting the International Red Cross to accept their proposal of a Neutral 
Zone, which was identical to Franco’s own. Increasingly, therefore, we begin to see a 
political pattern emerge: the Left (and the autonomous Basque Government) being in 
favour of evacuation, while the Right (including a sector of the Basques) supported the 
idea of a Safe Zone. This clear division undoubtedly produced a certain dynamic, with 
an increasing hardening of attitudes on both sides, which precluded a serious discussion 
about the plight of those it was supposed to serve: The Basque children.
Ultimately,  it was the progress of the war itself that decided the issue. Bilbao fell to 
Franco’s troops on 19 June, and with the Nationalist’s conquest of Santander on 26 
August the Safe Zone idea became obsolete, and the British Navy was relieved, at last, 
from its “embarrassing duties” of escort. The remainder of the north was rapidly taken 
throughout September and October, and Gijon and Avilés in Asturias were captured on 
21 October 1937.
349 See Marshall (1991).
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The war in the north was now over, and the repatriation of children got underway. After 
the fall of Santander on 26 August, the Apostolic Delegation of the Vatican in Spain 
worked on the preparation of lists of Basque parents reclaiming their children, which 
only included claims considered genuine, and not enforced by any Francoist authority. 
Father Henry Gabana was sent to England as the Apostolic Representative to deal with 
repatriation.  From  late  August  1937  to  early  September  1937,  all  requests  for 
repatriation faced the opposition of the Basque Children’s Committee, which refused to 
accept any request if not previously checked by an “ad hoc” delegation to be sent to 
Nationalist Spain to investigate. This idea of this delegation was never accepted by the 
Salamanca Government, as it was considered an insult. Thus, the repatriation process 
reached an impasse, with accusations of “political bias” being hurled at the NJCSR and 
the BCC by the Conservative MP Captain MacNamara and the Catholic Church. 
The slow pace of repatriation after August 1937 was, inevitably,  dogged by political 
differences  and  distrust.  The  difficulties  for  the  Leftist  members  of  the  NJCSR in 
negotiating with the Nationalist Government and the Catholic Church while the Civil 
War still raged are fairly evident, as was the idea that these children would be returned 
to a fascist state.350 Hence, those forces dealing with repatriation, as with the handling of 
the entire  humanitarian crisis  in Bilbao since April,  lost  sight of the needs of those 
affected  –  the  Basque  child  refugees  and  their  parents.  Sadly,  this  was  probably 
inevitable  in  the  political  context  of  the  Spanish  Civil  War,  a  war  engendered  by 
extraordinary polarisation and distrust. 
350 At the meeting held on 4 October 1937 by the Basque Children Committee, Wilfred Roberts told 
Father Gabana that, “The position from a business standpoint was that Franco wanted the children and we 
have them. He should therefore accept our terms.” MRO. TVC archive: BCC Minutes, 4 October. 1937. 
The letters of Sir Wilfred Roberts regarding the repatriation are deposited in the Modern Records Office 
at Warwick University (MSS-308/3/RO1-58- Repatriation and the Roman Catholic Church).
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Annexes to Appendix 2
Document A: Memorandum concerning British policy towards the Basque 
Country
Document B: Basque government appeal to the ICRC
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ii. Basque government appeal to the ICRC
[English translation below]
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Government of the Basque Country 
Presidential Department
[Stamp of International Committee of the Red Cross Geneva: Attested copy ICRC)
The most frightening and inhuman bombardments ever remembered in the history of the 
world are exterminating our cities and our race. Bilbao is threatened by an immediate 
blockade,  in  which  the  most  perfect  means  of  destruction  in  the  whole  world  will 
continue being tested.
More than three hundred thousand women and children have taken refuge with our 
hospitality, and they cannot be victims of such a monstrous tragedy if in the civilised 
world there is any feeling of pity or any institution capable of being moved by crimes of 
this nature.
The Basque Government which is facing this situation – which it has not provoked –
with the serenity of one who defends a just cause, and is acting with a respect for the 
most elemental human feelings, of which the International Red Cross already has proof, 
asks you, as President of that body in the Basque Country, to send a communication to 
Geneva so that they can tell us if the three hundred thousand women and children, who 
are victims of the crime referred to, can be prevented from suffering the horrors which 
threaten their lives, and what means of evacuation and subsistence can be offered to us, 
in addition to those provided by the Basque Government,  with the urgency that the 
circumstances demand.
Bilbao, the twenty-ninth of April. One thousand nine hundred and thirty-seven,
[signature]
To the President of the INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS
Bilbao
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